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B O O K I. 
PHILIP III . , king of Spain, son of Philip II . , and of Anne 
of Austria, daughter of Maximilian II. , emperor of Germany, 
was in the twenty-first year of his age at his accession to the 
tlirone. H e was a prince of a character extremely opposite 
to that of the late king, although no paíns had been spared to 
form him to a similarity of manners. From the instructions 
delivered to those who had the charge of his education, it 
appears* to ha ve been a principal object of his father's atten-
tion, to inspire him with the same bigoted attachment to the 
superstition of the church of Rome by which he himself had 
been actuated; and the means which he employed for this end 
were attended with the desired success. But he was not equally 
successful in his endeavours to overeóme that aversión which his 
son, frpm the natural indolence of his temper, early discovered 
to almost every species of manly exertion and act ivi tyf . 
W i t h this part of the young. prince's character, Phil ip was 
well acquainted; and foresaw, with much anxiety, the unhappy 
consequences which it was hkely to produce in his future reign. 
In order to introduce and habitúate him to the management of 
public afíairs, he formed a council of his ablest and most expe-
rienced ministers, who, in the presence of the prince, debated 
* Historia de la vida y hechos del Ínclito monarcha D . Felippe tercero. Por Gi l 
Goiisalez Davila, Cronista de los ^ennores Reyes D . Felippe III. y IVto. lib. i. cap. 6. 
f" Addiciunes a la Historia del Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi, in Yancz Memorias, p. 136. 
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three times a week conceming various important matters relat-
ing to the administration of the kingdom; and the prince was 
required to preside in this council, and to report the opinión of 
the majority to the king*. But neither this, nor any other 
expedient which Louisa, the prince^ faithful preceptor, could 
devise, preved effectual for the purpose for which it was 
intended. Inactivity or indolence still remained the most con-
spicuous feature in his character; and it early excited in the 
king a strong and well-grounded apprehension that his son, 
unable or unwilling himself to hold the reins of government, 
would surrender them into the hands of the marquis of Denia, 
or of some other favourite. Against this conduct, which is so 
commonly attended with the mosb pernicious consequenees, 
Phil ip had often put the young prince upon his guard ; and it 
was his last adviee to him, which he delivered with great ear-
nestness, a few hours before his death, that he should govern 
" his kingdom by himself. H e had likewise requested of him to 
employ, as his principal counsellors, Don Christopher de Moura, 
marquis of Castel Rodrigo, and Don John Idiaquez; from whose 
experience, fidelity, and great abilities, he might derive the high-
est advantages, especially in the beginning of his reign t . 
The soft and gentle temper of the prince had hitherto ren-
dered him extremely obsequious to his fiather^ will X ; hut, 
conscious of his incapacity, and prompted by his indolence, he 
no sooner mounted the throne, than, disregarding the counsela 
which had been given him, he resolved to avoid the perplexity 
* Davila, lib. i . cap. 10. 
f Gon. Davila, lib. i. cap. 12. Porreno Dichos y Hechos, passim. It was a eaying of 
Philip's concerning his son, Que era mas para ser mandado, que mandar. Addiciones 
di Malvezzi. 
J The autbor of Addiciones a la Historia de Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi gives the 
follovting singular instance of the truth of.this assertion :—Philip II. intending that his 
«on should marry one of the daughters of Charles, archdukc of Austria, and having sent 
for the pictures of these príncesses, he one day, in presence of his daughtcr Isabella, and 
severa! of his xninisters, derired the young prince to examine the pictures, and make his 
cholee of the princesa whoin he •would prefer for his wife. Philip, with his usual deference 
and humility, submitted his choice to the king. The king reinonstrated witli him on tive 
impropriety of requesting any other person to judge for him in this matter, in which his 
own taste alone ought to beconsulted, and desired him to carry the pictures to his owu apart-
ment, where he might carefully examine them and fix his choice. " I ha ve no choice," 
replied the prince, " but your majestv's pleasure, and I am certain that that princess will 
appear to me the best and the most bcautiful whom your majesty shall prefer."—P. 137. 
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which might attend his having recourse, on any occasion, to dif-
ferent counsellors, and therefore committed the whole adminis-
tration of affairs to his favourite the marquis of Denia. 
The marquis del Castel Rodrigo, in whom Phil ip I I . had 
long reposed the most perfect confidence, was honourably 
dismissed from court, and appointed viceroy of Portugal*. 
Idiaquez had the presidency of the military orders conferred 
upon h i m : and being of a less ambitious and more complying 
temper than Castel Rodrigo, and willing to act ín an inferior 
or subordínate capacity, he was suffered to remain, and occa-
sionally consulted, on aceount of his long experience and the 
high character which he held for prudenee and sagacity f. But 
all power was lodged in the hands of the favourite, who, having 
been chief equerry to the king, before his accession to the throne, 
and having in that station had frequent access to his person, 
had gained his affections, and acquired an entire aseendant over 
him. 
H e was instantly ereated duke of Lerma, and admitted into 
the council of state: after which, the king transmitted edicts 
to all the councils in the kingdom, requiring obedience to what-
ever orders should be communicated to them in his ñame by the 
duke f i 
This determined partiality, which Phil ip was at no pains to 
conceal, occasioned a general diseontent. The grandees of the 
first rank were filled with indignation, when they beheld one 
whom they had been accustomed to regard as their inferior, 
invested with such unlimited authority; and all ranks of men, 
judging from former instances of the same nature, dreaded an 
unprosperous and unquiet reign. Their complaints were the 
louder and the more generally diífused, as the duke of Lerma 
was utterly unpractised in the affairs of government, and had 
not yet given any proof of merit or abilities. It was a demon-
stration, they thought, of extreme weakness in the character 
of the king, so avowedly, and in contradiction to the advice and 
example of his father, whose memory they revered, to declare 
his cholee of a favourite; and they apprehended that, on trial, 
the character of this favourite would be found, in this respect, 
too nearly similar to his own§. Their apprehensions were not 
* Davila, p. 36. f D&YÍIII, p. 27. J Davila, p. 41. 
§ Vide Audiciones to Malvezzi, p. 144. 
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without foundation. B y his courteousness and affability, the 
duke imposed on the penetration of many of those who approached 
h i m ; and, by discovering on all occasions the most devoted 
attachment to the church, he conciliated the favour of the 
ecclesiastics, but it soon appeared that his views and abilities 
were extremely l imited; and that he neither possessed the 
economy, the firmness, or the capacity, requisito for the difficult 
and important charge with which he was intrusted*. 
It was peculiarly unfortunate for the Spanish monarchy to 
have the helm of governraent committed to such weak hands at 
the present period. The late king indeed had foreseen, and, in 
some measure, provided for thig event, by the peace which he 
had concluded with France, and the resignation of his sove-
reignty in the Netherlands ; vvhich he hoped would put an end 
to the war in tliat country, and prove the means of recovering 
the revolted provinces. H e liad likewise left all his other 
dominions, not only in Spain, but in Italy, and in the new 
world, in the enjoyment of peace ; and Portugal, now accustomed 
to the yoke, yielded a ready obedience to his authority. 
But although Philip II . , through the vigilance and^ vigour of 
his adminLstration, had left his dominions everywhere, except 
the Netherlands, in the enjoyment of intemal tranquillity, he 
had not left them in a flourishing condition. On the contrary, 
Spain, his place of residence, and his seat of empire, was greatly 
exhausted, and some of the principal sources of her opulence and 
prosperity were dried up. 
B y the war in which he had madc so many great excrtione, 
both by sea and land, and still more perhaps by the migrations 
of the people of the new world, the inhabitants of Spain were 
greatly reduced in number. A l l emoluments and honours which 
the sovereign could bestow, had, for ages past, been divided 
betvveen the military and the ecclesiastical profeesions. B y this 
mcans, the mechanic arts and agriculture, having come to be 
regarded as comparatively mean and despicable, were alike aban-
doned by the indolent or inactivo, and by those who were endued 
with a spirit of ambition and enterprise. This coijtempt, and 
the consequent neglect of the moro useful arts, the profits 
arising from which, though sure, are always modérate, was 
* Miiycrne Tunjnet, p. 1295. 
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heightened by the frequent instances of enormous fortunes, 
suddenly acquired by the adventurers in America. That pro-
portion of the riches arising from the American mines, which the 
sovereign received, was spent either in those countries in which 
his wars were carried on, or in purchasing naval and military 
stores from other nations. The greater part of what was 
imported by merchants and other individuáis was laid out in 
England, Italy, and the Netherlands, for manufactures, which 
the colonies required, but which Spain was become unable to 
supply ; and the remainder was drained off by taxes which the 
king had, from time to time, been necessitated to impose. 
From this scarcity of money ; from the want of manufactures ; 
from the neglect of agriculture, joined to the numberless losses 
sustained at sea, where Phil ip had been almost always foiled by 
his enemies, trade of every kind was reduced to the lowest ebb; 
and so great was the consequent disorder in the finances, that, 
besides a debt of 140 millions of ducats which he lefb upon the 
crown, he had been obliged to have recourse to the disgraceful 
expedient of employing ecclesiastics to go from house to house, 
to receive from his subjects in Spain such assistance as they 
were willing to aíford : a measure which was not attended with 
the advantages which he had expected to derive from it, while it 
contributed to sink his reputation in Spain, as his refusal to pay 
the interest of his foreign debt, before related, had already done 
in the rest of Europe*. 
The danger to which the Spanish monarchy was exposed, 
from that debility to which it was reduced at the present 
period, was the more to be dreaded, because many parts of 
this widely extended empire were removed to so great a distance 
from the seat of government; and nothing, there was ground 
to believe, could avert the impending ruin, but a vigorous exer-
tion of the highest abilities, joined to the most rigid and judicious 
economy. It was likewise obviously necessary that peace should 
instantly have been established with the maritime powers ; who, 
having for several years past held the sovereignty of the seas, 
seemed to possess sufficient naval forcé entirely to destroy the 
Spanish trade, and to cut off all communícation between the 
mother country and her colonies. 
* Gou. Duvil», p. 25. 
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But the duke of Lerma was equally incapable of discerning 
this danger, and of providing against it. A s he had seen the 
difficulties in which the late king was involved, through the 
disorder of his finances, and could not be ignorant of the 
exhausted condition of the kingdom, it might have been expected, 
that one of the first objects of his attention would have been to 
retrench Lhe unnecessary expenses of the court, by attempting, 
if practicable, to reduce the number of superfluous offices, to 
which, in times of greater prosperity, the vanity of former kings 
had given birth. But, instead of this, he greatly multiplied 
such sort of offices* ; and, in the very infancy of his adminis-
tration, gave other signal proofs of a degree of profusión which 
would have been unjustifiable, had the kingdora been in the 
most flourishing condition. 
One of the first events of this reign was the marriage of the 
king with Margaret of Austr ia "f-, whom the archduke Albert 
had conducted into Spain. H e had gone, for this purpose, 
from the Netherlands to Gennany, about the time of the late 
king's death; and had soon afterwards set out with her from 
Gratz, by the way of Italy : but so great were the preparations 
made for her reception in Spain, and, agreeably to the character 
of the nation, so slowly were they carried on, that the fleet sent 
to bring her thither did not arrive at Genoa t i l l several months 
after. In the marriage solemnity, in the city of Valentía, 
above a million of ducats were expended, besides a great number 
of rich presents, which were made to foreign princes and to the 
churchj. B y the ecclesiastics, who on this, as on many other 
occasions, shared amply of the duke of Lerma's munificence, 
his conduct was extolled as highly liberal and magnificent, but 
filled the minds of the more impartial and discerning part of 
men, who were concerned for the true glory and interest of 
the nation and of the crown, with indignation, mingled with 
contempt§. 
About the same time with the royal nuptials, those of the 
^pni 169» . archduke with the infanta were solemnized||; but not 
End of May. iong after, they set out together for the Netherlands, 
having received full assurance from the king and his miníster, 
* Gon. Davila,. p, 45. f Daughter of Charles, arclidukc of Gratz. 
t Gon. Davila, lib. ii. § Addiciones a la Historia de Malvezzi, p. 15'2. 
II Albert had beforehand rtsigncd his dignity of cardinal into the hands of the pope. 
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that no assistance in raoney or in troops, which Spain could 
afford, should be wanting to support them in their new sovereignty, 
and to enable them to accomplish the reduction of the revolted 
provinces. 
In forming this resolution, there was no room for hesitation. 
From the conditions upon which the late king had transferred 
the sovereignty of the Netherlands to his daughter, joined to 
the age of that princesa, there was little ground to doubt that 
it would ere long revert to the Spanish monarchy. It could not 
be considered, even during the life of the infanta, in any other 
light than as a fief of Spain. for she and her successors were 
expressly required to take an oath of fidelity to the kings of 
Spain, and, in order to ensure the faithful observance of this 
oath, the liberty was reseryed of putting garrisons of Spanish 
troops into Antwerp, Ghent, Cambray, and other places; besides 
which, both parties had solemnly engaged to regard the same 
powers as enemies, or as friends, and promísed mutually to assist 
and defend each other against all the world besides*. 
It would probably have saved the Spanish monarchy from the 
extreme debility into which it fell in the present and in the 
following reign, and would have highly contributed to lessen 
those difficulties which, in his future administration, the duke 
of Lerma was about to encounter, had the sovereignty yielded 
been enjoyed free and independent by the infanta, and Spain 
been delivered from the burthen of the war with the United 
Provinces. But Isabella could not, in this case, have accepted 
of the sovereignty conferred on her. Without the assistance of 
Spain, she must have sunk under her unequal contest with the 
Dutch, supported by the queen of England ; or she must instantly 
have made peace with these powers, on whatever terms they 
should be pleased to prescribe. The sovereignty of the United 
Provinces would thus have been established, and both their 
religious and civil liberty have been recognised. 
To embrace a measure which would be attended with so dis-
agreeable a consequence, Phil ip was hardly less averse than his 
father had ever been. W i t h a temper gentle and obsequious 
to excess, he was devoted with the most bigoted attachment to 
the Popish faith ; and being entirely governed by his minister, 
Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 2. 
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who, on all occasions, assiduously courted the favour of the 
Spanish ecclesiastics and the sovereign pontiff, he would have 
believed hiraself highly criminal in the sight of God, had he not 
resolved to employ his utmost power to reduce the revolted 
provinces under obedience to the holy see. H e had, besides, 
before his father's death, formally given his consent to the deed 
of transference, with all the conditions that were annexed to 
i t ; and as he could not consistently with honour, so, from his 
affection to the infanta, he was not inclined to retract. 
Prompted by these motives, which were not likely ever to 
lose their forcé, he resolved to consider his sisters and her 
husband's interest as his own, and to take the same concern 
in all the affairs of the Netherlands as if the sovereignty of that 
country had never been transferred. Conformably to thís reso-
lution, both the money and the troops of Spain continued to be 
employed in the Low Countries, as in the preceding reign. A l l the 
affairs of these provinces were directed as formerly by Spanish 
councils. The interest of the Spanish monarch was aífected as 
much as ever by what happened there; and for these reasons, 
almost all the important transactions which passed in the pro-
vinces, for several years after the present period, make an 
essential part of the Spanish history. 
The archduke having, during his absence, committed the 
government of the Netherlands to his cousin. Cardinal Andrew 
of Austria, bishop of Constance, and the command of the forces 
to Mendoza, marquess of Guadalette, and admiral of Arragon, 
had instructed the latter to secure some convenient passage over 
the Rhine, which might open an entrance into the northern 
provinces, and enable him either to support the army at the 
expense of the enemy, or, if that should be found impracticable, 
to quarter them in the country of Cleves, and the other neutral 
adjoining states. Albert gave Mendoza instructions, at the 
same time, to avoid exposing the army to any unnecessary risk 
before his retum ; and therefore there is little room for doubt 
that his principal intention, in ordering him to cross the Rhine, 
was to furnish the troops with freo quarters, in compeneation for 
their pay. To form this extraordinary resolution, it is said he 
was determined by necessity; the southern provincos of the 
Netherlands having been greatly exhausted by the depredations 
of the Spanish troops, which had so often mutinicd, and his 
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exchequer drained, partly by the suma lately advanced in pay-
ment of their arreare, and partly by the preparations for his 
journey to Spain, which, in honour of the young queen, had 
been performed with unusual magnificence *. 
But whatever were Alberto motives for having recourse to so 
unjustifiable an expedient, it should seem that he could not have 
made choice of a person better qualified by the native temper 
of his mind for carrying his plan into execution. Im-
September. me(jja^ejy ¿¡fafa ^he archduke's departure, Mendoza, 
having collected together all the troops which could be spared 
from the necessary defence of the country, passed over the Maese 
near Ruremond, and directed his march, at the head of twenty 
thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse t, towards 
Orsoy, a town on the west side of the Rhine, belonging to the 
duchy of Cleves. The garrison of this place being utterly unpre-
pared for a defence, were easily induced, by promises mingled 
with threats. to open their gates and receive him. He then 
applied himself to strengthen the fortifications of the town and 
citadel, and at the same time employed a great part of his forces 
for several weeks in fortifying Wassum, a small town on the 
east side of the river, directly opposite to Orsoy. 
Although his communication with the country beyond the 
Rhine was thus secured, he judged it to be of great importance 
to get possession of some other town upon the Rhine, at a 
smaller distance from the enemy, and therefore he marched 
down the river with all his forces, and laid siege to Rhinberg. 
This place belonging to the bishopric of CoJogne, was, as above 
related, in the hands of the United Provinces. It was deemed 
a place of considerable strength, and was defended by a sufficient 
garrison. The Spaniards, after battering the walls, attempted 
to take the town by storm, and were repulsed with great 
slaughter. 
But the siege was much sooner brought to a conclusión than 
the besiegers had reason to expect, through one of those fatal 
accidents which have often happened since the invention of gun-
powder, when the utmost precaution is not employed in pre-
• Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. p. 473. 
f This army consisted of seven thousand S]>anianls, thrce thousand Italiana, two thou-
sand. Burgundians, a thousand Irish, aud seven thousand Gcnnans and Walloons, besides 
the cavalry. 
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serving it. Having caught fire from a spark occasioned by the 
stroke of a cannon-ball against the tower where the magazine 
was kept, and which the ball had entered by a window, not only 
the tower, but a great part of the wall of the town was tbrown 
down. Several vessels in the river were, by the violent agitation 
of the water, overwhelmed and sunk, and the govemor, his wife 
and family, with a considerable number of the inhabitants, were 
buried in the ruins. The garrison stood aghast at this unfore-
seen disaster ; and, dreading that the town must now be taken 
by assault, they resolved, without further resistance, to capitúlate 
on terms, to which Mendoza, in order to save time, immediately 
agreed *. 
B y the success which attended the Spanish arms in 
the reduction of Orsoy and Rhinberg, all the other 
towns in that quarter were filled with anxiety and terror. Burick, 
a town on the west side of the Rhine, in the duchy of Cleves, 
having, without hesitation, admitted a Spanish garrison, Mendoza 
began to make preparations for employing forcé against Wesel, 
one of the most flourishing places in the circle of Westphalia, 
and which had lately received a considerable augmentation of 
Protestant inhabitants frora the neighbouring provinces. Having 
abolished the exercise of the Catholic religión and established 
the Reformed, as taught by Calvin, in its stead, they knew how 
guilty they must appear in the oyes of a Spaniard, and were at 
the same time conscious of being unable to defend themselves 
against so great a forcé. They attempted, by sending the 
general an embassy with presents for himself, to divert him from 
his purpose. But Mendoza, laying hold of this opportunity to 
colour his present expedition with the pretext of zeal for the 
Popish faith, peremptorily required they should immediately 
restore the exercise of the Catholic religión. W i t h this condition 
the inhabitants, in order to avoid a siege, were obliged, though 
extremely reluctant, to comply f. After which, though he had 
before rejected their presents, he demanded a large supply of 
provisions, and of money for his troops; and having obtained his 
demands, he continued his march down the river, and jtook pos-
session of the towns of Rees and Emerick. 
* Tliuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 9. Grotius, lib. vii. Bcntivoglio, p. 474. 
f Tiic Spanish army had no sooner Icft Gcrnwny, than the priekU wer« again czpclled, 
and Calvinism re-cstablished. 
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The inhabitants of the latter of these places, having been 
long distinguished by their attachment to Popery, had, from 
some interested motive, invited the Spanish army to come into 
that quarter, and had received a promise in writing from 
Mendoza, that neither their town ñor territory should suffer any 
inconvenience from the neighbourhood of his troops. He insisted 
however upon their admitting a Spanish garrison; and when 
they reminded him of his promise, by one of their principal 
ecclesiastics, he replied, that the service of the king and the 
interest of religión made it necessary for him to chango his 
views and measures. The priest asked him if, after such a 
declaration, it was surprising that the revolted provinces should 
refuse to put trust in the faith of the king of Spain, or of his 
generala ; and wamed him of the vengeance threatened by 
Heaven against deceit and falsehood. But Mendoza, unmoved 
by this remonstrance, gave orders for the immediate admission 
of his troops *. 
In order, howover, to appease the people of Emerick, ho 
readily promised that only four hundred should be sent, and 
he even required the Germán officer who commanded them to 
swear that he would not admit a greater number. Notwith-
standing which, so little regard did he pay either to his character 
or his faith, that he afterwards attempted to introduce another 
cohort, under Barlotta, an Ital ian; to whom the Germán refused 
admittance, saying openly, that though the general had set the 
example, he would not viólate his faith. 
After getting possession of Emerick, the Spanish army was 
at the distance only of a few miles from the fort of Schenck 
and other places belonging to the United Provinces; ñor had 
the states been inattentive to the danger which so nearly 
threatened them. Having, from the commencement of Men-
doza's expedition, suspected that his design must be to make an 
attack upon their eastern frontier, Prince Maurice had hastily 
assembled together at Arnheim a body of troops, amounting to six 
thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse, and had ventured to oross 
the Issel, and advanced towards the enemy as far as Zevenaer, 
which lies at little more than a day's march from Emerick. 
W i t h such unequal forces he could not pretend to cope with 
1 Grotius, lib. v ü . p. 351. 
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the enemy in the open field; but on no occssion liad he ever 
exhibited greater military skill and conduct. B y making choice 
of the most proper stations which the nature of the country 
could aíford, and the prudence and vigilance which he displayed 
in strengthening all the approaches to his camp, he rendered 
it impossible for the Spanish general to attack him with any 
probability of success; while, at the same time, he prevented 
him from advancing any farther, or undertaking the siege of 
any of the frontier towns upon the Issel. The two armies, 
between which there was so great a disparity of numbers, lay 
for a considerable time almost in sight of each other; and, 
from the anxiety which Mendoza discovered on that occasion, it 
should seem he was deeply impressed with a sense of his infe-
riority to Prince Maurice, in respect of military knowledge and 
capacity. Fo r ten days and nights, without intermission, his 
whole army, horse and foot, stood under their arms ; and were 
permitted to take no other rest, though it was in the middle of 
winter, but in their ranks in the open air. It was necessary, 
meanwhile, to send out his cavalry, and the retainers of his 
camp, in search of forage and provisions; and between them 
and detachments of the pnnce's army various rencounters hap-
pened, in which they were always worsted, and considerable 
numbers taken prisoners. 
Both the Spanish infantry and cavalry had begun to suffer so 
much from the cold, joined to a scarcity of provisions, and were 
at the same time so much disheartened by that anxiety and 
dread of which their generaFs conduct was so expressive, that 
there was ground to believe, that íf Maurice had thought him-
self at liberty to attack them, he would have aequired a cheap 
and easy victory. 
Finding it at length impossible, on aceount of the want of 
provisions, to remain any longer in their present situation, they 
directed their march towards Doesburg, which commands an 
important passage over the Issel, into the territory of Velue. 
But Maurice, who lay nearer to that place, easily reached it in 
November ^ m e *0 Prepared for their approach. They 
stopped short therefore at Dotechem, a town on their 
road to Doesburg; and there deliberated what course they 
should noxt pursue. 
To a general of such mean capacity as Mendoza, and so little 
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endued with the spirit of laudable ambition or enterprise, there 
appeared to be no rocín for hesitation. B y the severity of the 
season, by the sword of the enemy, and by desertion, his army 
had suffered considerable diminution; and, having been long 
permitted to plunder the country through which they passed, 
and to live in the most licentious manner, they were become 
reluctant to submit to the control of military discipline. H e 
dreaded, besides, the great abilities of Maurice, and thought it 
doubtful whether, in case he should succeed in effecting his 
passage over the Issel, he would find it practicable to support his 
army during the winter season in the territories of the states, 
where almost all the towns were fortified, and prepared for their 
defence. Determined by these considerations, he resolved to 
turn back, and to take up his winter quarters in the duchy of 
Cleves, and other neutral states in the territory of Westphalia. 
H e accordingly retired with precipitation, leaving behind him 
many of his sick and wounded, exposed to the merey of the 
inhabitants of the country, who were highly exasperated by the 
Bad con *njury an^ outrage they had received. Maurice pur-
duct of sued him for several miles, and cut off or took prisoners 
Mendoza. ^ g , , ^ a number of his troops, that, including those 
who had deserted, and those who had fallen or were taken pri-
soners in former rencounters, it was computed that he had lost 
above seven thousand men. 
H e fixed his head-quarters at Rees, having left a strong 
garrison in Emerick, which lay nearer to the enemy, under the 
command of the count de Boucquoij one of his ablest officers. 
But the count, having soon after been taken prisoner in a 
skirmish with Count Lewis of Nassau, Maurice conceived the 
design of making himself master of the town. Fo r this purpose 
he ordered Count Hohenloe to invest i t ; and, in order to pre-
vent Mendoza from returning to its relief, he cut the dyke of 
the Rhine, and laid all the country between Rees and Emerick 
under water. B y this device the garrison, having no prospect of 
assistance from their friends, were intimidated, and, after a feeble 
resistance, laid down their arms. Maurice was equally successful 
against the garrison of Zevenaer: but being well pleased with 
an opportunity of showing his condemnation of the conduct of the 
Spanish general, who, with so great a contempt of the established 
laws of nations, had seizcd on the towns of neutral powers, he 
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Magnani retained possessidn of neither of these places, but 
mous policy delivered Emerick to the citizens, and Zevenaer to the 
of x nance. 0f (3ieves *# After which he put his troops into 
winter quarters, and went himself to the Hague, where he was 
employed during the. remaining part of the winter in making 
preparations for the next carapaign. 
In the mean time Mendoza, equally inattentive to his character 
The licen- and to the laws of humanity, permitted his troops to 
thTspa-8 0f exercise t^ 16 most cruel oppression over the people of 
niards. Westphalia, from whom he could not pretend that 
either the king of Spain or the archduke had received the 
smallest injury. After plundering the inhabitants of the open 
country, and leaving them neither corn ñor cattle for their 
support, he allowed his soldiers to employ forcé against such of 
the towns as refused them adraittance; and the towns being 
generally unprepared for defence, they got possession of many 
of them, where they not only lived at free quarters on the 
citizens, but robbed them of their most valuable effects, which 
they sold at Cologne, and, by the merchante there, transmitted 
the price, amounting to very great sums, to Antwerp or other 
places in the Netherlands. Ñor were they satisfied with pillago 
or plunder, but indulged themselves in every species of licen-
tiousness; and treated the inhabitants, on innumerable occasions, 
with a degree of barbarous cruelty and outrage, of which the 
troops under Frederick de Toledo had, in their treatment of 
the people of Zutphen and Naarden, furnished the only instance 
which occurs in the annals of Europe for many yearsf. 
In order to compel such of the people as they suspected of 
Their being rich, to reveal their treasures, they wounded some, 
barbarity, they mutilated others, and, under the pretext of their 
being heretics, they committed others to the flamea. Count 
Falcostein, lord of Bruck, a Protestant, having refused them 
admittance into his castle, which for some time he defended 
against them with great resolution, at length surrendered, on 
condition that he and his domestics should be allowed to depart 
in safety ; but he was no sooner in their power, than they first 
butchered his domestics before his eyes, and afterwards himself. 
Mendoza had the effrontery to avow and vindícate some instances 
of this kind, by alleging that those who had suffered were here-
• Grotui», p. 353, &c. t Grotius, lib. vii. 
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t ics; but it was not the Protestants only, but great numbers 
likewise of the Catholics, who experienced the barbarity of his 
troops; and even many of those who had distinguished them-
selves by theír attachment to the Spanish interest in the 
Netherlands : among whom were the subjects of the bishops of 
Munster, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne, as well as the duchies 
of Cleves and Juliers, who were all treated with the same 
violence and inhumanity*. 
B y these enormities the Germán princes were affected in the 
manner which it was natural to expect. They were fired with 
indignation against their barbareas oppressors, and had early 
deliberated concerning the measures proper to be pursued. No 
European nation had been more distinguished than the Germans 
State of by their warlike disposition, and their military prowess, 
Germany. ^ no nation had exerted greater intrepidity and vigour 
in the defence of their property and liberty when attacked. But 
having enjoyed profound tranquillity for near half a century, and 
all of them, but a few who had entered into the service of foreign 
states, having been disused to war, their tameness and timidity 
invited the injuries of the Spanish soldiers; who found not only 
the inhabitants of the open country, but those likewise of most 
of the towns, utterly defenceless and unarmed. It was pro-
bably Albert's knowledge of this, joined to the consideration of 
the character of Rodolph, the present emperor, a prince of a 
tame and índolent disposition, that had induced him to resolve 
to support his army at the expense of the Germans ; and what 
they suífered affords a striking proof how necessary it is that 
every people, exposed by their situation to be invaded, should, 
instead of trusting to their neutrality, or to the faith of treaties, 
stand on all occasions in a posture of defence. 
The people who suífered most from the depredations of the 
Spaniards were the subjects of the duke of Cleves, and of Ernest 
of Bavaria, who held, at the present period, the four bishoprics 
of Munster, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne. Ernest, who had 
formerly been much indebted to the court of Spain, and was 
extremely desirous of avoiding a rupture with the archduke, in 
order to obtain redress, resolved to content himself with making 
remonstrances and complaints. 
• Grotius, lib. vii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi. Piasecii Clironica, anno 1598. Gestornm 
in Europa singularium. 
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Confede ^u^e 0^ Cleves was a vveak prince, and, being 
racy of at times disordered in his judgment, was incapable of 
^mreT holding the reina of govemment. But his place was 
against well supplied, on the present occasion, by his sister, 
Sybilla, a princess of a masculine spirit, who exerted 
great activity in rousing the indignation of the neighbouring 
states and princes, and laboured to convince thein of the neces-
sity of uniting together in order to drive the Spaniards out 
of Germany. The elector Palatine, the landgrave of Hesse, 
several imperial cities on the banks of the Rhine, and a great 
number of counts, and other sovereign princes in Westphalia, 
readily entered into Sibylla's views, and endeavoured to interest 
the rest of the empire, or at least the neighbouring circles, in 
their cause. 
They began with remonstrating to the archduke against 
the iniquity of his conduct; and they were seconded by an 
ambassador, sent for that purpose by the emperor, who likewise 
published a rescript, commanding Mendoza immediately to 
evacúate the towns and territories of which he had taken posses-
sion. But, finding that no regard was paid by Mendoza to the 
eraperors rescript; and that, instead of complying with their 
requests, Albert only lamented that the necessity of his situa-
tion had obliged him to adopt a measure which he said was 
equally disagreeable to himself as to them, they assembled toge-
ther at Munster, and resolved all of them, but the bishop, or 
elector of Cologne, to have recourse to arms. It was agreed 
that a numerous army should be raised with the utmost expe-
dition. The proportion of money and troops which each prince 
or state should furnish was ascertained ; and the count de la 
Lippe, lieutenant-general of the circle of Westphalia, was 
appointed to be commander-in-chief. F rom the unanimity, 
alacrity, and ardour which appeared in this assembly, there was 
ground to hope for the utmost despatch and vigour in carrying 
the plan adopted into execution ; yet from the slowness inci-
dent to the motions of a league, in which no one member pos-
sesses authority sufficient to control the rest, the season, as will 
be seen in the sequel, was far advanced before the count de la 
Lippe was in a condition to take the field*. 
* Bentivoglio, part ¡i¡. lib. v. ab initio. Grotius, lib. vü . & viii. Thuanus, lib. 
cxx í . &c. 
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The Spanish army, in the mean time, kept possession of all the 
towns into which they had entered ; and, without restraint from 
their general, continued to exercise over the people the same 
oppression as before; t i l l the season arrived when the cardinal 
governor of the Netherlands judged it proper to begin the opera-
tions of a new campaign. They were then withdrawn from all 
the towns in which they were quartered, except Orsoy, Rhinberg, 
Rees, and Emerick; the last of which places they had again 
obliged the inhabitants to surrender, after prince Maurice had 
retired. 
The cardinal having come to Rees, where he held a council of 
Siege of war, to delibérate concerning an expedition against 
Bommei. some 0f the frontier towns of the United Provinces, it 
was determined to undertake the siege of Bommel, the conquest 
of which would open an entrance into Hol land: but, in order to 
conceal this intention from the states, and to facilítate the 
landing of the troops on the isle1 of Bommel, it was agreed to 
send a detachment of the army to make a feigned attack on the 
fort of Schenck, which, as formerly described, is situated on the 
upper extremity of the Betuwe. This detachment was sent 
down along the right or north side of the Rhine, while Mendoza, 
with the main army, marched down on the other; and both 
divisions began about the same time to play off their batteries 
against the fort; the former from the banks of the Rhine, and 
the latter from those of the W a a l . 
Prince Maurice's head-quarters were at Amheim, only a few 
leagues distant from Schenck. H e had never before experienced 
so great anxiety or fatigue. Almost all the officers on whom 
he chiefly depended for the execution of his orders, were absent: 
count Hohenloe was in Germany, employed in exciting the 
princes of the league of Munster to take the field against the 
Spaniards ; colonel Veré was not returned from England, 
whither he had gone to basten a body of fresh troops, which had 
been promised by Elizabeth ; and the younger L a Noue had not 
finished some levies which, with the connivance of the king, he 
had been making among the Protestants in Franco. A l l the 
troops therefore which Maurice had been able to 
Apnl* muster, after leaving sufficient garrisons in the fortified 
towns, amounted only at this time to four thousand men. 
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W i t h this little army he crossed over to the Betuwe; and 
Beginning having reinforced the garrison of Schenck, and strength-
ofMay. ened the banks opposite to Mendoza, where only he 
had occasion to suspect that an attack might be designed, he 
lay prepared to oppose him in case he should attempt to land 
on the island. 
The Spaniards, having the river between them and the fort, 
were at too great a distance to do execution with their artillery; 
and, as this attack was only a feint to amuse prince Maurice, 
and that for this reason they had not taken time to employ the 
usual precautions for their shelter from the enemy^s fire, they 
lost upwards of four hundred men. This expense of blood, 
which the prince could easily observe from the ramparts, contri-
buted to confirm bis belief that their design against the fort was 
serious, and his attention was therefore wholly engrossed with 
providing for his defence. In the mean time the count of Berg, 
with a body of troops, under the command of the colonels 
Stanley, Zapean, and Barlotta, was ordered to march down along 
the left or south side of the Waal ; and, in order to cover his 
intention, a great number of boats had been transported to this 
river over-land from the Maese, on board of which he embarked 
his troops, and seeraed to intend paesing over to the Betuwe. 
Prince Maurice could hardly doubt that this was his design; 
and, to prevent him from accomplishing it, he carefully watched 
his motions with a part of his forces, which being put on board 
of boats collected together at Nimeguen, kept directly opposite 
to the Spaniards in their progresa down the river. In this 
manner both partios continued to advance, sometimos approach-
ing within reach of each others fire, and the Spaniards seem-
ingly intending on some occasions to effect a landing on the 
Betuwe, t i l l they both arrived in the neighbourhood of the V o o r n ; 
when the count de Berg, having disembarked his troops, drew 
all his boats on shore, and having put them into carriages which 
had been prepared for that purpose, he marched with great 
expedition across the country, from the W a a l to the Maese, 
where having again launched his boats, he sailed down the river 
t i l l he arrived at Empel, and thus secured a passage into the 
isle of Bommel. 
The fortifications of the town of that ñame, which stands on 
the other side of the island, though, on account of its situation, 
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deemed a place of great importance, had, amidst the multi-
plicity of objects which required the attention of Maurice and 
the states, been extremely neglected ; the oíd fortifications were 
ruinous, and new ones, which had begun, were yet unfinished. 
H a d the troops, therefore, under the count de Berg been 
sufficiently numerous, or had Mendoza advanced in time to his 
support, he might without much difficulty have accomplished the 
object of his expedition. But the army having been detained 
longer than it ought to have been in the fictitious attack on the 
fort of Schenck, the count was obliged to rest satisfied with 
securing his station at Empel, or with making short excursions 
into the country. Prince Maurice was, in the mean time, every 
dayreceiving fresh supplies of troops from Franco, England, and 
other places; and his army amounted now to so great a number, 
that he could aíford to leave a part of it for the defence of the 
Betuwe, and lead the rest to Bommel. 
H e accordingly no sooner reeeived information of the count 
of Berg's invasión of that island than he set out with the greater 
part of his army, and arrived there in time to prevent the inha-
bitants from abandoning the town, which they were preparing 
to do, from their despair of being able to defend it. Mendoza 
left his camp opposite to the Schenck about the same time, and, 
having in his march reduced the fort of Crevecoeur, which would 
have interrupted his communication with Bois le Duc, he trans-
ported his forces into the isle of Bommel, and began to lead 
them towards the town. H e first attempted to make himself 
master of the dyke of the Waa l , on which he intended to have 
erected batteries, in order to straiten the navigation of the 
river, but was prevented by an incessant fire from a great 
number of armed vessels, which Maurice had prepared for that 
purpose. F rom the delay occasioned by this unnecessary enter-
prize, and the reduction of Crevecoeur, a general of so great 
activity as Maurice had leisure to put the town of Bommel into 
a proper posture of defence. 
His army, at this time, was not inferior to that of the enemy, 
and amounted to eighteen thousand foot and three thousand 
horse. Having pitched his camp on the right sido of the Waa l , 
opposite to Bommel, and constructed two bridges*, formed of 
* Each four hundrcd and fifty paces in length. 
c 2 
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barks covered with planks, one above and the other below the 
town, he committed the defence of the place to a select body of 
four thousand foot and two thousand horse. 
Bommel was too small a place to admlt of so numerous a gar-
r ison; but, in order that he might avail himself of the great 
number of his troops, his first care had been to give the town 
an artificial magnitude, by drawing round it, at a little distance 
from the walls, an intrenchraent, strengthened with a ditch, 
Maurice an(l w ^ redoubts at proper dietances; to which he 
invenís a added a covered way, a new species of fortification, of 
of ^onif ic íu which he himself was the inventor, and which he first 
tI0D- put in practico on the present occasion. 
Mendoza was greatly disconcerted by the celerity and dispatch 
with which these works were executed : and as not only the 
cannon planted upon them, but a strong battery which Maurice 
had raised on the dyke of the river, was ready to be played off 
upon the Spaniards, as soon as they approached, they suffered a 
considerable loss of men, before they could cover themselves 
with their tronches. Mendoza might now have seen his error 
in not advancing sooner to the siego : and, i f he reflected on the 
strength of the place, and the number of the garrison, or on the 
neighbourhood of the prince's army, and the facility with which, 
as he was master of the river, he could, at all times, introduce 
supplies, or reinforcements into the town, it must appear sur-
prising that he did not perceive the impossibility of succeeding 
in his attempt. 
Prince Maurice, on the other hand, was blamed by many of 
his countrymen for resting satisfied with defending a town 
against an enemy, whom it was alleged, as he was superior to 
them in numbers, he might have successfully encountered in the 
Sufipidon» open field. It began to be surmised that Maurice did 
coucermng ^ wj ^ ^ bring the war to a conclusión ; and the 
Maurice states sont deputies, to represent to him, that, as they 
could never expect to assemble a more flourishing army than 
was at present under his command, and the expense which their 
late preparations had cost them was enormous *, they could not 
help expreseing their desire that he would shortcn the campaign 
as much as possiblo, and must therefore recommend to him, if 
• Twelvc thoiiíand guildcn. Sec Rcidan, quoted by Clerc, p. 197. 
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he could do it with safety, to try the fortune of a general 
engagement. 
Maurice was the more surprised at this remonstrance of the 
states, as they had hitherto been extremely averse to all adven-
turous measures; and, on many occasions, had discovered a 
degree of caution bordering on timidity. H e could not account 
for it, but on the supposition that they had listened to the 
insinuations of his enemies, who accused him of protracting the 
war, with the view of perpetuating his own authority ; and, in 
order to wipe oíf this groundless aspersión, he would not have 
declined the risk of a battle, in case a favourable opportunity 
had offered. " But, in the present situation of the Spanish 
army, in a country so narrow and confined, where his cavalry, in 
which only he was superior, could be of little use, no such 
opportunity could reasonably be expected. Should he attempt 
to transport his army over the Maese into Brabant, Bommel 
raust thereby fall into the hands of the Spaniards ; and, although, 
after the reduction of that place, they should be induced to 
follow him, and to offer battle, yet, without the greatest pro-
bability of success, he should doubt whether it would be expedient 
to accept; as the fate of battles often depended on accidents, 
which no human prudence could foresee ; and the king of Spain, 
with such inexhaustible resources, could much more easily sus-
tain the loss of an army than the states. It was for these 
reasons, not only his opinión, but that of his most experienced 
officers, that the enemy should be permitted to spend their 
strength in the siege of Bommel, which, should they persist 
in it, he was confident would prove their ruin."" The states, 
convinced by these considerations, entered without much diffi-
culty into the prince's views, and left him at liberty to pursue 
the plan of operations which he had laid before them. The 
cardinal Andrew, in the meantime, having with great activity, 
formed at Bois le Duc, the most ampie magazines of every-
thing necessary for the siege, Mendoza was enabled to make 
his approaches to the town, with greater expedition than there 
was reason to expect. H i s troops were now, in a good measure, 
covered from the enemy's fire ; and he began to play off his 
batteries. But it soon appeared how little reason he had to 
flatter himself with the hopes of success in his enterprize. The 
garrison, supported by fresh troops, sent to their assistance by 
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the prince, could not only prevent them from making farther 
progresa in the siege, but sallied out against them, sometimes 
by day, and sometimes by night, demolishing their works, and 
putting a considerable number to the sword. The Spanish 
troops displayed, on every occasion, the most determined intre-
pidi ty; and thereby fully justified the caution of prince Maurice, 
in declining to reduce them to the necessity of a general engage-
ment. They gave the most striking proofs likewise of the 
excellence of their military discipline, by recovering themselves 
with a facility which astonished the enemy, from the confusión 
into which they were sometimes thrown ; and they were every-
where successful in repressing the sallies of the garrison, although 
these sallies were performed by numerous bodies, amounting to 
five or six thousand men, of the best of the French and English 
forces, conducted by L a Noue, colonel Veré , and other officers 
of the most unquestionable bravery. They suffered, however, 
considerable loss. In the space of three weeks, upwards of two 
thousand perished; and the cardinal governor, being at last 
convinced of the absurdity of persisting in his enterprise, sent 
orders to Mendoza to raise the siege. 
H e was determined, however, by the advice of Colonna, the 
invcntion historian, who was, at this time, an officer in the 
torian*5 Spanish army, to attempt accomplishing, in another 
lonna. vf&y, the object of the present expedition, by erecting a 
fort in another part of the island, from which the same advan-
tage might be derived as from the possession of Bommel : and, 
for this purpose, agreeably to the counsel that was given him, 
he made cholee of a narrow neck of land which imites the upper 
with the lower part of the island, intending to oceupy, with a 
fortification of the strongest kind, the whole space between the 
Maese and the W a a l ; and thus, not only to facilítate an inva-
sión of the United Provinces, but to check the enemy's naviga-
tion in both rivers. 
Beginning The construction of this fort was committed to 
of June. Velasco, general of the artillery. A thousand soldiers, 
and two thousand pioneers, were employed in the work; and 
the army was posted about the neighbouring villages of Herwyn 
and Rossem, to prevent the approach of the enemy. 
Maurice, having penetrated this design, led up his troops 
along the north side of the Waal , and took his station directly 
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opposite to the Spaniards; where, having planted batteríes of 
his largest cannon, he greatly annoyed the workmen, and, though 
not without some loss, did considerable execution. Velasco, 
however, persevered, and was at length able to cover his men 
from the enemy^s fire. 
The prince finding then that all his efforts in this quarter must 
be ineffectual, transported his army into the adjoining isle of 
V o o r n ; and, from thence, sent over a detachment of three 
thousand men, to the upper part of the isle of Bommel; giving 
them instructions to entrench themselves at the village of Her-
vorden, which lies at a little distance from the place where the 
Spaniards were employed in making the new fort. H i s orders 
were executed with the greatest expedition, and the entrench-
ments almost completed before the Spaniards got notice that 
the troops had landed on the island. 
Mendoza, sensible of the danger and inconveniences to which 
he was exposed, from having the enemy so near him, immedi-
ately despatched the count de Berg, to attack their lines, with 
a numerous body of chosen troops. The count was repulsed with 
the loss of more than five hundred men, among whom were 
many officers of distinguished merit : but having stationed the 
greater part of his army on that side of the fort which lay next 
to the enemy, he kept the prince at bay, and enabled Velasco, 
without interruption, to carry on his operations in the construc-
tion of the fort. 
The Spanish cavalry, in the mean time, which could neither 
have proper accommodation, ñor be supplied with forage in the 
isle of Bommel, were quartered in Brabant, in the neighbour-
hood of Megen. Their communication with the main army was 
kept open by a bridge over the Maese ; but as they lay at the 
distance of several miles, a fort called Durango, from the ñame 
of the engineer employed in constructing it , and several redoubts, 
had been erected on that part of the dyke of the river by which 
the enemy might approach. Notwithstanding these prudent 
precautions, Prince Maurice still resolved to attack the Spanish 
cavalry, and with this view, having thrown a bridge over the 
Maese from the isle of Voorn, he kept his own cavalry in rea-
dinees to march as soon as orders should be given them. But 
judging it necessary beforehand to dislodge the Spaniards from 
their fortifications on the dyke of the river, he sent the Sieur 
24 H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F [BOOK I. 
de la Noue, and Colonel Vere, with a select body of troops, 
chiefly English and French, to make an attack on fort Durango. 
Nothing could surpass the spirit and intrepidity which these 
troops, animated by the example of their leaders, displayed in 
the attack. Having thrown down their pikes and muskets, they 
scaled the ramparts in several places, and attacked the garrison, 
with extraordinary fury, sword in hand. But this garrison, 
consisting of Spaniards and Walloons, though amounting only 
to five hundred men, coramanded by Ladeiano, an officer o í 
distinguished bravery, in their defence discovered a degree of 
intrepidity not inferior to that of the assailants. The smaUness 
jul^ of their number was compensated by the advantages of 
their situation ; and the combat was thus prolonged for 
several hours, with mutual slaughter, t i l l L a Noue and Vere, 
being informed that Mendoza was approaching towards them 
with superior forces, judged it prudent to retire. 
No other memorable transactions happened between the con-
tending parties during this campaign. Maurice could not ven-
ture now to attack the Spanish cavalry with safety ; and, from 
the precautions which had been taken to cover the workmen 
employed in erecting the fort in Bommel, joined to the advan-
tageous situatíon of the Spanish army, he found it impossible to 
prevent them from earrying that design into execution. 
The fort was accordingly fínished in the most regular man-
ner; the ramparts, flanked with bastions, and instantly 
orectcd ¡n planted with camión, in a great measure commanded 
thoisie of the navigation of the Maese on the south, and of the 
Bommel. 0 " ' ' 
W a a l on the north. On the east and west, they were 
secured with ditches of extraordinary breadth and depth, which, 
being at all times filled with water from the rivers, served as 
harbours for twelve armed vessels, stationed in them, to cruiso 
against the enemy. A n d , in imitation of the example which 
Maurice had exhibited in the fortifications of Bommel, the whole 
was strengthened with a oovered way, which was strongly for-
tified with redoubts. 
The cardinal came himself to visit this fort as soon as it was 
finished ; and, having marked out a place for a church, of which 
he laid the first stone with his own hand, he gave both to the 
church, and to the fort, the ñame of Saint Andrew. H e had 
bcen extremely desirous to distinguish his administration by some 
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remarkable achievement; and he was overjoyed to have been 
able to finish so great a work, which he hoped would be found 
of great importance towards the reduction of the revolted pro-
vinces. 
Prinee Maurice, on the other hand, notwithstanding his suc-
cessful defence of Bommel, could not fail to be severely mor-
tified; although, as will appear in the sequel, this fort, the 
erecting of which he had exerted his utmost skill and vigour to 
prevent, served only to furnish him with one opportunity more 
than would otherwise have occurred to display his wonted acti-
vity and enterprize. In the mean time, he built another fort 
directly opposite to Saint Andrew, on the right side of the 
Waal , which rendered the country of Betuwe secure against the 
íncursions of the enemy*. 
During the course of these transactions in the Netherlands, 
Trans- Germans, in the circle of Westphalia, had begun 
actions in their operations against the Spanish garrisons in Rhin-
Germanj. a n ¿ other towns upon the Rhine. But as 
neither the emperor, ñor the electors of Cologne, Mentz, and 
Troves, besides several other Popish princes, were willing to 
come to an open rupture with the court of Spain, their prepa-
rations for war had not been carried on with that alacrity which 
might have been expected from the strong and just resentment 
with which they were inflamed; and the season of action was 
ia r spent before they were ready to open the campaign. The 
Elector Palatino had withdrawn his contingent of troops, under 
the pretext that the league had been violated by the other 
electors; and the bishop of Cologne, though his subjects had 
suffered greatly from the depredations of the Spaniards, had 
carried his complaisance to them to so great a length, as to per-
mit them to make levies in his dominions, and to furnish them 
with provisions and military stores. It was therefore with the 
utmost difficulty that the count de la Lippe could muster twelve 
thousand foot and two thousand horse f, and the greatest part 
of these were raw trc ps, entirely unaccustomed to military 
discipline. 
W i t h such an army it is probable that no general could have 
fulfilled the expectations of those by whom it had been assem-
* Grotius, lib. viii. Beutivoglio, part iii. lib. v. Thnaaus, lib. cxxii. 
f Grotius. 
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bled, and the count de la Lippe possessed neither experience 
nor capacity sufficient to entitle him to tlie supreme command. 
The counts Hohenloe and Solmes had been sent to his assist-
ance by the United States; and these men were neither defi-
cient in courage nor in activity and enterprise; but they 
discovered a jealousy of each other, which proved pernicious to 
the cause in which they were engaged, and when they differed 
in their opinions, the general was incapable of determining 
aright to which of their counsels the preference was due. 
The first enterprise in which he was engaged was the siege of 
Augus" Rhinherg: having no part of the apparatus neces-
sary for carrying it on, except what he received from 
Holland, and the inhabitants of the adjacent country, whose 
resentment the governor of the Netherlands had found means 
to appease, being unwilling .to supply his troops with provisions, 
he soon abandoned his attempt, and directed his raarch towards 
Rees, where he expected the Dutch could more easily convey to 
him such assistance as his exigencies should require. 
The garrison of Rees was i l l prepared for their defence, and 
September. i f L a Lippe had listened to the counsel of count 
Siege of Hohenloe, who advised him to station a part of his 
army on the other side of the river, to prevent them 
from receiving any reinforcement or supplies, they would soon 
have found it necessary to lay down their arms : but he neglected 
this necessary precaution. The garrison were several times 
reinforced by detachments from the army in Bommel; and 
at length, finding themselves possessed of sufficient strength, 
and observing that the siege was carried on in the most remisa 
and negligent manner, they made a vigorous attack upon his 
trenches, put a great number of his men to the sword, nailed 
up several of his cannon, and even carried off some of them in 
triumph to the town. 
This disaster increased the división which from the beginning 
had subsisted among the leaders. The troops were disheartened, 
and became more disobedient and refractory than ever ; and in 
two days after the count gave orders to raise the siege. 
The retreat of this army was still more disgraceful than their 
conduct during the siege. Dreading that the garrison would 
renew their attack upon the trenches, they fled in the most 
precipitate manner, leaving behind them a great part of their 
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baggage and provisions. The Spaniards hung in their rear for 
several miles, put many to the sword, and threw the whole army 
into confusión. Not long after, a party of them mutinied against 
their officers, left their standards, and, m their way home, 
indulged themselves in the same rapiñe and depredation against 
their countrymen, as had formerly been exercised by the Spanish 
troops. 
The Dutch had, in the beginning, entertained the hopes of 
finding useful allies in the Germans. W i t h this view they had 
exerted all their influence in rousing them to arms, and had 
several times supplied them with stores and provisions. On the 
present occasion they sent W i l l i a m de Nassau, a near relation 
of prince Maurice, an experienced officer, and a person of 
distinguished prudence, to attempt to re-establish discipline 
among the troops, and a good understanding among the leaders, 
h . but al l his endeavours having preved ineffectual for 
November. 0 r 
Germán ^eso euds, and the winter season approaching, it was 
army dis- judged nccessary to disband the army, and put an end 
banded. ^ inglorious campaign. 
Such is frequently the fate of confederacies formed by the 
unión of independent princes, even when there is one common 
interest to unite them, unless the supreme command be devolved 
on some person of extraordinary abilities, whose want of power 
may be supplied by the confidence inspired by his superior merit. 
Notwithstanding the feeble efforts of this confederacy, the 
archduke, having only intended, by seizing the Germán towns, 
to accommodate his troops for a season, ordered most of them 
to be evacuated. H e likevvise promised to indemnify the several 
states for the injuries and damages which they had sustained; 
and two commissioners were appointed by the emperor to 
estimate their losses; but it does not appear that anything 
effectual was ever done in consequence of this appointment*. 
In Spain the duke of Lerma, desirous to give some proof of 
A fleet sent vigour in the beginning of his administration, fitted out 
ugalnstAe a ^ee^ 0^ ^ 7 ships of war, which he put under the 
English. command of Don Mar t in de Padilla, and sent tb cruise 
against the Engl i sh ; but this enterprise preved equally unfor-
" Grotius, lib. v iü . Bentivoglio, pait. iii. lib. v. Piasecii Chronica Gestorum in 
Europa Singularium, an. 1599. Gonsalez Davila, & lib. ii. cap. 4. Thuan. llist. lib. 
cxxii. cap. 6, 8, &c. 
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túnate as most of the former ones which the Spaniards had 
undertaken against their northern enemies. Padilla had not 
been many days at sea when a violent storm arose, which 
obliged him, without having seen the English fleet, to return to 
Spain. 
The duke of Lerma was more suocessful in the measure whieh 
Leuity and at this time he suggested to the king, for conciliating 
^thrduke affections of his subjects in Arragon, who had been 
of Lerma. disgusted by the treatment which they had received 
in the former reign. Phi l ip and his young queen, accompanied 
by the duke and many other courtiers, having set out to visit 
the city of Saragossa, notice was sent to the inhabitants, by 
order of the king, that he could not enter their town with 
pleasure t i l l the heads of those citizens who had suffered in the 
unfortunate affair of Antonio Pérez, were taken down from the 
gates, and that inscription erased which recorded their pretended 
crime. This order, so agreeable to the people, and which was 
instantly obeyed, was accompanied with the royal pardon to all 
those who had been concerned in the insurrection, and a 
declaration that the king could not be happy while any of his 
faithful subjects had cause of grief. H e then made a magni-
ficent entry into the town, amidst the strongest demonstration 
of affection and joy on the part of the inhabitants; and soon 
after he solemnly confirmed all their rights and privileges *. 
Among the entertainments which the people of Saragossa pre-
sented to their king on this occasion, there was one, which, at 
the present period, will appear somewhat extraordinary; a dis-
pute held at the university, at the conferring the degree of 
doctor, the subject of which was, whether the emperor be the 
lord or sovereign of the whole wor ldf . 
September. During the course of the transactions that have been 
The Arch- Te^e^ Albert and Isabella arrived in the Nether-
duke's ar- l ands l . They entered Brussels with a splendid court 
Nether- an(i retinue, and were received with extraordinary 
lands. magnificence. There was considerable difficulty in 
adjusting the form of the oath of allegiance which they adminis-
tered to their new subjects ; and the states of Brabant demanded 
* Gon, Davila, lib. ii. cap, 8. f Davila. 
% He bad tarríed much longer than his new subjects had reason to expett, but no 
coutemporarjr historian has informed us of the reason of bis dclaj. 
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that, beforehand, certain forts and citadels should be demolished, 
and the ancient rights and privileges of the province ratified; 
but, finding that the Archdukes (this was the title which 
Albert and Isabella no\y assumed) were utterly averse to comply 
with their requests, they were persuaded to desist from their 
purpose, and agreed, though with much reluctance, to take the 
oath required. It was likewise a matter of great offence to the 
Flemings that Albert, besides assuming the Spanish dress, and 
requiring to be served upon the knee, had formed his court 
according to the model of that of Spain, and in everything 
adopted the Spanish manners and customs, in preference to 
those of the Netherlands. This conduct was probably intended to 
gratify the Spaniards, on whom Alber t saw he must principally 
depend during the continuance of the war; but it contributed 
to aliénate the aífections of his Flemish subjects, and to prevent 
them from exerting themselves with active zeal in his behalf *. 
He stood, however, much in need, at the present juncture, of 
all the assistance which they were able to afford. Although he 
had received a considerable supply from the duke of Lerma, 
before his departure from Spain, yet having, in conformity to 
the practico of the age, expended largo sums in idle pomp and 
show in his marriage solemnity, and his magnificent entrance 
into Brussels, and other towns which he and Isabella visited on 
their accession, he found himself utterly unable to discharge 
the arrears due to his troops, who no sooner entered their 
A mutiny winter quarters than they began to mutiny against 
s-^nlíhhe ^ e i r officers. The Spanish forces, to the number of 
troops. two thousand foot, and eight hundred horse, having 
abandoned their commanders, took possession of the town of 
Hamont, in the bishopric of Liege, where, having first strength-
ened the fortifications, they lived at free quarters on the inha-
bitants, and laid all the adjacent country under contribution, 
Their example was quickly followed by sixteen hundred Italians, 
and soon afterwards the garrisons of Crevecoeur and St. Andrew, 
consisting of Germans and Walloons, expelled their officers and 
elected others from their own number in their room-f*. 
Prince Maurice having received information of these 
disorders, did not suífer so favourable an opportunity 
* Grotius, lib. viii. p. 379 ; and Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. 
f See Metern, fol. 451. 
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of action to escape. After reducing the town of Wachtendonc, 
and the fort of Crevecoeur, and making a sueeessful attack on 
the Spanish cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Bois le Duc, 
January. where he put near five hundred of them to the 
SiegeofSt. swor<i, he laid siege to Saint Andrew. This fort, 
Andrew. the only fruit of the operations of a whole campaign, 
the archduke justly considered as a place of the first import-
ance, both on account of the strength of the fortifications, and 
the great advantage which it afforded him for invading the 
revolted provinces. H e was therefore extremely solicitous to 
preserve it, and for this purpose assembled together at Bois 
le Duc such a body of troops as were deemed sufficient to 
raise the siege. Of these troops he gave the command to 
Velasco, by whom the fort had been erected: and on the part 
of this officer no time was unnecessarily lost. But all his 
atterapts were rendered ineffectual by the vigilance and foresight 
of Maurice, who, besides fortifying his camp and all the ap-
proaches to it, had cut the dyke of the Maese, and laid all 
the low grounds betwixt it and Bois le Duc under water. The 
garrison consisted of twelve hundred men, who, although they 
had mutinied against their officers, yet regarding the fort as 
their only pledge for the payment of their arrears, strenuously 
exerted themselves in its defence. 
But perceiving that, notwithstanding their most vigorous 
efforts, Maurice was making daily progress in the siege, and 
having no prospect of deliverance, they listened to a proposal 
which was made to them by the prince, in order to save time, 
and agreed to surrender the fort for a sum of money equal to 
their arrears *. Immediately after which, conscious that 
they had committed an unpardonable crime against the 
Spaniards, they enlisted in the army of the United States ; and 
as they knew that they could not expect quarter in case they 
should fall into the hands of their former masters, they were on 
many occagions of singular use, by the desperate intrepidity 
which they displayed f. 
B y these disasters the archdukes were afflicted in the most 
sensible manner. They received information at the same time 
that prince Maurice, having on no former occasion exerted 
* A hundred and twentj-five thounnd guilders. 
f Tríumpha of Nassau, pmted 1613. Orotius Hist. lib. i z . , and Bentiroglio. 
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greater diligence in his military preparations, was resolved to 
prosecute the approaching campaign with extraordinary vigour, 
in the hopes of making some important conquesta before the 
mutineers were persuaded to return to their duty. A U their 
endeavours for this end had hitherto preved ineffectual. They 
had some ground to suspect that the rest of the troops were 
infected with the same mutinous spirit, and dreaded that many 
of them might be induced to imítate the treacherous example 
of the garrison of Saint Andrew. 
Conven- The states of the provinces subject to their authority, 
statesof"5 ^ ^ " g been lately convened at Brussels, Albert repre-
Bruasels. sented to that assembly that, as the source of all the 
disorders which prevailed was his inability to discharge the 
arrears due to his troops, i t was necessary they should grant 
him an extraordinary supply. H e had reason to expect that 
ere long he should receive remittances from Spain; but the, 
demands of the mutineers must be immediately satisfied, other-
wise there was ground to dread that the most pernicious conse-
quences would ensue. 
The states replied, by expressing their apprehension of these 
consequences, and by giving him the strongest assurances oí 
their attachment and fidelity; but insinuated that, considering 
the exhausted state of the provinces, and the difficulty which 
Advisean the court of Spain had ever found in supporting so 
accommo- orreat & uumber of forces, no other effectual remedy 
dation with _ i - «• « » 
the revoited could be applied to the present disorders but an accom-
states. modation with the revoited states. 
They had conceived hopes at this time that an accommodation 
might be brought about by the mediation of ambassadors, whom 
the emperor had sent inte the Netherlands, in order to procure 
a restitution of some towns on the Germán frontier, of which 
the contending partios still retained the possession. The ambas-
sadors found no difficulty in accomplishing the object of their 
commission; and having passed over into Holland, they pre-
vailed on the United States to send deputies to Bergen op 
Zoom, to negocíate a treaty with deputies sent thither by the 
archdukes. Bu t the Dutch being unalterably determined to 
maintain their independence, and discovering the same dístrust 
of the archdukes, with which they had long been actuated 
towards the Spaniards, the conferences were no sooner begun 
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than they were broken off; and both parties retired, extremely 
dissatisfied with each other. 
Whi le a reconciliation was thus, in vain, attempted between 
A negocia. ^16 archdukes and the United Provinces, a negociation 
tion for was begun for restoring peace between the queen of 
tvreen Spain England and the king of Spain. Some advances had 
rndEng ^een ma^e ^or purpose to the English ministers 
by the cardinal Andrew, while he was governor of the 
Netherlands, and neither of the courts at variance seemed at 
this time to have been •inclined to prolong the war. It was 
agreed that a congress should be held at Boulogne ; and ministers 
were sent thither by the contending powers. But this negocia-
tion likewise preved abortivo, as the plenipotentiaries 
abortive, . . , . 
found it impossible to adjust the ceremonial among 
them to the satisfaction of their respective courts, The prece-
, denco had, from time immemorial, been yielded to the crown of 
England, by the kings of Castile and Arragon ; and Elizabeth 
maintained that it still belonged to her, notwithstanding the 
unión of these crowns, and the conquest of Granada, since Spain 
considered as one kingdom, was greatly inferior to England in 
respect of antiquity, which was the only ground on which a 
point of this nature could properly be decided. But the Spanish 
ministers could not perceive the forcé of this reasoning. They 
"claimed the precedence on account of the superior extent and 
power of the Spanish monarchy; and, even when Elizabeth, in 
order to prove the sincerity of her pacific disposition, offered to 
agree to an equality, they rejected this offer, and insisted that 
the superior dignity of the catholic king should be recognised. 
To this the queen as peremptorily refused her consent; and, 
soon afterwards, the plenipotentiaries left Boulogne. 
This unexpected issue of the congress was matter of great joy 
to the United States. They had suffered much anxiety from 
the apprehension of losing so powerful an ally as queen Elizabeth; 
and now, when they were delivered from this apprehension, they 
United resolved to improve to the utmost the advantages which 
Stotes^re- derived from her alliance, by employing the English 
invade forces, and as raany of their own as could be spared 
Fianders. from ^ defence 0f the frontier towns, in an invasión 
of Flanders. To form this resolution, they were encouraged by 
the mutiny of the Spanish troops ; and they were, at the same 
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time, earnestly solicited to carry it into execution by the mer-
chants of Zealand, who were extreraely desirous of dispossessing 
the archdukes of the sea-ports in Flanders, which afforded shelter 
to some Spanish ships of war, by which their trade had lately 
received considerable interruption. In compliance with their 
request, it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Nieuport; 
and, about the middle of June, the army, amounting to fifteen 
thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse, set sail 
from Ramekins in Walcheren, the place of rendezvous, and 
landed in Flanders near Ghent. After reducing some small 
forts, Prince Maurice led them towards Bruges, and passed 
almost within reach of the cannon of that place, not without 
hopes, which preved fallacious, that by the sight of so flourishing 
an army, and the late disasters which had befallen the arch-
dukes, the inhabitants might have been induced to throw off the 
Spanish yoke, and return to their former connexions with the 
United Provinces. 
From Bruges he marched towards Nieuport, and, by the way 
thither, made himself master, with little difficulty, of certain 
forts called St. Albert, Snaerseerck, Bredene, and Oudenbourg, 
in which he left garrisons, with the view of retarding the pro-
gress of the enemy, in case they should venturo to approach *. 
Sicgeof H e then invested Nieuport by land, while his fleet 
Nieuport. ijiockecl up the harbour; and, as the town was neither 
very strong ñor well prepared for a vigorous defence, he hoped 
in a few weeks to be able to compel the garrison to surrender. 
The archduke, in the mean time, exerted himself with great 
activity in his preparations for an attempt to make him raise 
the siege ; and, having had the good fortune to persuade a con-
siderable number of the Spanish mutineers to return to their 
duty, his army soon amounted to twelve thousand foot, and 
twelve hundred horse. Both he and Isabella, upon the first 
news of the enemy's arrival in Flanders, had repaired to Ghent, 
in order to próvido for the security of that important place, and 
the other towns of the province. The troops were ordered to 
assemble together at Bruges; and as in their march thither they 
passed near Ghent, Isabella, mounted on horseback, went out 
to meet them, and rodé along the linos ahimating and exhorting 
* Maurice was attendcd by a number of the deputies of the statcs. 
D 
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them, giving them repeated assurances that, in future, they 
ehould not have the same ground as hitherto to complain of the 
irregularity of their pay ; and declaring that, rather than their 
demanda should not be satisfied, she would expose to sale her 
píate and jewels, and deliver up to them the funds appropriated 
to the support of her court and servants. This speech, joined to 
her majestic air and raanner, produced a powerful effect upon 
the minds of the soldiers, who received it with shouts of high 
applause, and called out to her that they were ready to expose 
their lives to every danger in her defence. Albert , on this occa-
sion, omitted nothing in his power to confirra them in their pre-
sent disposition, and acquainted them that he was determined to 
fight at their head, and to share their fortune. 
Agreeably to tbis resolution, haying joined bis army at 
Bruges, he set out with it from thence about the end of June. 
His first object was the reduction of the forts above-mentioned, 
in wbich bis success corresponded with bis most sanguino hopes. 
The garrisons wbicb Maurice had left in these forts, were intimi-
dated by the sight of so great a forcé, and after a feeble resist-
ance surrendcred them, on condition, that they sbould be suffered 
to depart with their arms and baggage. The archduke himself 
subscribed the capitulation ; but, though bis intention was sin-
cere, he could not protect tbe garrison of Snaerseerck, consisting 
of two companies of soldiers, from tbe fury of tbe Spanisb muti-
noers, wbo fell upon them, notwitbstanding their officers1 prohi-
bition, and put them all to the sword. 
Prince Maurice, being at tbe same time informed of the 
surrender of the forts, wbicb he bad expected would have beld 
out much longer, and of the near approach of the eneray, was 
thrown into great perplexity. F rom bis confidenco of bringing 
the siege to a speedy conclusión, he had neglected to fortify his 
camp ; the number of bis troops was not sufficient to enable hira 
both to continué tbe siege, and to oppose the enomy in the open 
field; and be had even reason to dread, from the rapidity of 
their march, that he should not have leisure, beforo their arrival, 
to put himself into a proper posture of defence. 
In order to retard their progress, and to gain as much time 
as possible, be immediately dispatched his kinsman, Count Ernest 
of Nassau, with two regiments of foot, consisting of Zealanders 
and Scots, and four troops of horso, to seize on the bridge of 
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Lessingen, by which the enemy must pass in their way to 
Nieuport. But before Count Ernest could reach this place, 
they had advanced and taken possession of it. Ernest, however, 
knowing how necessary it was to afford time to Maurice to 
prepare for their reception, resolved, how fatal soever the con-
sequences should prove to himself and his detachment, that he 
would not retire without fighting; and this generous resolution 
was happily attended with the desired effect. Albert, believing 
that Maurice's whole army must surely be at hand, spent a con-
siderable time in making the proper dispositions for a general 
engagement. A t length being informed that Emest's troops 
had received no augmentation since their first appearance, and 
that no other part of the enemy's army was in sight, he gave 
j ^ 2 orders for an attack. The troops under Ernest kept 
their ground for some time, but the horse having 
quickly given way, they were overpowered by numbers and 
obliged to retire. In this action upwards of five hundred 
of the Scots were slain, with many officers of distinguished 
reputation *. 
The archduke's hopes were greatly heightened by this success, 
and he wrote to Isabella, that having with so great facility 
discomfited the vanguard of the enemy1» army, he expected soon 
to inform her of the defeat of the whole. H e judged, however, 
that there was ground to hesitate with regard to the conduct 
which it was proper to pursue; and in order to assist him in 
forming his resolution, he called a council of his most experienced 
officers. Gaspard Zapena, a Spaniard of great experience, was 
of opinión that it was altogether unnecessary, and would there-
fore in the present circumstances be extremely imprudent to 
risk a battle. The enemy's general, through his confidence of 
being able to reduce Nieuport before an army could be assembled 
to oppose him, had brought himself into the most dangerous 
situation in which he had been ever placed. H e durst not 
now, in the face of so powerful an army, continué his operations 
against the town. H i s communication with Ostend was inter-
cepted, since the archduke was fortunately situated between him 
and that place; and should he attempt to make his escape by 
sea, when his highness was ready to fall upon him, in the hurry 
1 
• Piasccius, p. 182. 
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of embarkation, the greatest part of his troops must be cut to 
pieces. H e therefore thought that the archduke ought not 
immediately to advance with a design to attack the enemy, but 
ought rather to take the proper measures for reducing them, 
without exposing himself to the chance of a battle ; and if he 
did, he believed that ere long he would be able to obligo the 
enemy to lay down their arms. But whether his opinión on this 
head should be rejected or embraced, it was at least necessary 
that before he advanced any farther, he should procure informa-
tion of the situation of the enemy, of which he was entirely 
ignorant; and before adventuring to attack them, should wait 
for the arrival of Velasco, who in a few days would join him 
with a reinforcement of three thous ud troops. 
This prudent counsel was warmly opposed by the sieur la 
Barlotte, an oíd Flemish commander, of no less experience than 
Zapena, but whose courage, notwithstanding his advanced age, 
still bordered on temerity. H e maintained that the present 
favourable opportunity of att king the enemy ought not to be 
suffered to escape ; that the archduke would find them entirely 
unprepared for their defence, intimidated by the rapidity of his 
approach, and disheartened by the defeat which their troops, 
under Ernest of Nassau, had so recently sustained ; that, as the 
advantages he must derive from these circumstances were more 
than sufficient to compénsate for the want of the troops under 
Velasco, so his inferiority in number to the enemy was more 
than counterbalanced by the superior discipline and bravery of 
his troops; that his troops were at present animated with the 
highest degree of ardour; and that the delaying to lead them 
forward, when they were so eager to engage, would only serve to 
damp their alacrity, while it would afford leisure to the enemy 
either to fortify their entrenchments or to secure their retreat. 
This reasoning was received with high applause by a great 
majority of the council; and the soldiers, especially the Spanish 
mutineers, impatient to advance, could hardly be restrained. 
Albert , however, being strongly impressed with a sense of the 
solidity of Zapena's reasons for delay, still hesitated as to which 
of the counsels given him he should embrace, when chance, which 
often directs the most important events, contributed to fix his 
resolution. The army having a view from their present situation 
of the sea-coast, a great number of ships were seen in their 
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course ftom Nieuport to Ostend. The Spaniards, prepossessed 
with the idea that the enemy durst not wait for their approach, 
conclüded that they had already begun their flight, and that at 
least a part of them were on board the ships which they 
observed. Albert himself too readily yielded to this delusion, 
and instantly gave orders to his troops to begin their march. 
He was at this time only at the distance of a few miles from 
Nieuport, and, as he advaneed with great rapidity, his cavalry 
arrived within sight of the enemy about mid-day, and his whole 
army about four or five hours before sunset. 
He soon discovered how greatly he and his officers had erred 
in their conjectures with regard to the conduct and situation of 
the enemy. Fa r from meditating flight, Prince Maurice had 
ordered his fleet to quit the coast, and retire to Ostend; by 
which prudent measure, he at once gave his army proof of the 
confidence which he reposed in them, and reduced them to the 
alternativo of death or victory. H e had withdrawn all troops 
from the siege, except a number which he judged sufficient to 
restrain the sallies of the garrison. H e had advaneed to a little 
distance from the town, partly to encourage his troops, by 
showing that it was not with reluctance that he had resolved to 
accept of battle ; and partly because the situation of the ground 
was more convenient for drawing them up in the order which he 
most approved. 
Besides his Dutch forces, he had several regiments of Brit ish, 
French, and Swiss, commanded by officers of distinguished 
merit, who had acquired the most consummate knowledge of the 
military art in the civil wars of Franco, and in the Netherlands; 
and these men, he well knew, from long experience, would execute 
his orders with equal skill and valour. 
He thought it necessary, however, to encourage and anímate 
the troops, and for this purpose he rodé from rank to rank, 
reminding them that they were about to engage with an enemy 
who were not only inferior in numbers, and fatigued with their 
march, but who, in the manner of their approach, had given 
proof of extreme temerity : that it entirely depended on them-
selves whether they should return to their country and their 
friends crowned with glory and victory, or be cut to pieces by 
an enemy over whom they had often triumphed, and have their 
ñames fpr ever covered with infamy. From his confidence in 
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their bravery, he had ordered the transports to leave the coast; 
and he now led them on to battle, under a conviction that they 
would follow the example which he would set before theiü, and 
resolve either to die or conquer. These exhortations were 
everywhere received with the most joyful acclamations, and the 
whole army seemed to be animated with that intrepid spirit 
which he wished to inspire. 
H e gave the command of his vanguard to Sir. Francis Vere, 
that of his main body to the Count of Solms, and of the rear-
guard to Oliver Vander Temple, lord of Corbeck. H e distri-
buted his cavalry, commanded by Count Lewis of Nassau, partly 
in the front, and partly on the flanks; and having taken no 
particular station to hiraself, he was at liberty to go from place 
to place, wheresoever he found his presence necessary. H e was 
accompanied by his brother, the celebrated Prince Frederick 
Henry, who was only sixteen years of age * ; and by the Duke 
of Holstein, the Prince of Anhalt, the Count of Coligni, Lord 
Gray, and Sir Robert Drury, grandson of the famous admiral of 
that ñame, and by several other noblemen of the first rank, in 
the different protestant states in Europe, who had lately come 
into the Netherlands to improve themselves by his lessons and 
examples in the art of war. 
Having drawn up his army upon the downs, by the sea-shore, 
and planted his artillery on some of the highest of the little hills 
of sand of which the downs are formed, he resolved, in that 
posture, to wait for the enemy's approach. Albert was greatly 
disappointed when he found him so well prepared for his defence, 
and he was somewhat discouraged, when he observed that from 
the position he had made choice of, the Spanish army would 
have both the sun and the wind in their face ; the latter of which 
circumstances he dreaded would prove particularly inconvenient, 
from the light sandy soil on which they were about to engage. 
It was now however too late to entertain the thoughts of a retreat, 
and his troops were as confident and as eager and impatient for 
the combat as before. They had long cherished a contempt of 
the enemy, and they were now heard in all the ranks uttering 
threats that they would give no quarter to any of the heretics, 
* Manrice urged his brotlier to go by oca to Ostend, but Henry insistcd that he should 
b'" pcrmittcd to icmain ¡md to shiiie his biothti's fatc. 
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except Prince Maurice and his brother, whom they would 
reserve to adorn the triumph of their general. 
The battle was begun by the Spanish cavalry under Mendoza, 
Battie of admiral of Arragon, who endeavoured to gain the flank 
Nieuport. 0f the Dutch army, by advancing along the sands 
between the sea and the downs; but Maurice, having foreseen 
that this might be attempted, had made provisión against it by 
planting cannon on the sands, and ordering some of his ships of 
war to approach the shore as near as possible, Mendoza was 
therefore unable to effectuate his purpose, and was obliged to 
retire, after having sustained considerable slaughter. 
In the mean time, the two armies, after a discharge of their 
artillery, having advanced within musket-shot of each other, the 
English forces in the van, under Sir Francis Veré, were attacked 
by the Spanish mutineers, who, in order to retrieve their honour, 
displayed on this occasion the most desperate intrepidity. The 
British troops received their assault undaunted, and for some 
time withstood their fury ; their general had his horse shot 
under him, and was twice wounded. St i l l , however, he main-
tained his ground, refusing to give any attention to his wounds, 
ti l l his brother, Sir Horatio Veré , arrived with fresh troops to 
his relief. These troops, while engaged in combat with the 
mutineers, having been vigorously attacked in flank by the 
Spanish cavalry, were thrown into disorder, and many of them 
began to fly towards the shore. 
But the battle was instantly restored. Prince Maurice 
having divided his army into battalions, ordered two of those 
which composed his main body to advance; and by them the 
Spaniards were in their turn compelled to retreat, and time 
aíforded to the Brit ish troops to rally. In support of the 
Spaniards, the archduke brought forward his Walloons and 
Irish, and with their assistance the mutineers would once more 
have regained their superiority, had not Maurice, without delay, 
led on another fresh battalion, consisting of Swiss and of those 
Walloons who had surrendered to him the fort of Saint Andrew. 
The Brit ish forces likewise returned to the charge; and soon 
after, the whole of both armies, horse and foot, were engaged 
from one wing to the other. 
The Dutch cavalry, commanded by Count Lewis of Nassau, 
who in this battle highly distinguished himself by his activity 
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and valour, proved in every rencounter an overmatch for that of 
the enemy, and having broken their ranks, drove them with 
great slaughter from the field of battle. 
The combat was better supported by the Spanish infantry, 
where Albert himself was present, exposing himself to every 
danger, and sometimes mingling with the foremost combatants. 
His troops in every quarter gave proof of the most determined 
bravery. The battle had lasted for more than three hours, 
during which time, notwithstanding the fatigue of their rapid 
march from Lessingen, they had fought without intermission, 
and often repulsed the fresh battalions of the enemy. F rom 
the beginning they had been extremely incommoded with the 
sun and wind in their face, and still more with the dust or sand. 
The Dutch artillery too had kept up a constant fire upon them 
during the whole engagement, and having been not only planted 
on higher and firmer ground, with planks under i t to prevent it 
from sinking in the sand, but better served and more skilfully 
directed, it had made great havoc among the Spanish troops-
Sti l l , however, they preserved their ranks, and seemed determined 
sooner to lay down their lives than yield to an enemy whom 
they had been so much aceustomed to despise. Albert had 
made several attempts to get to the windward of the enemy, 
but had been as often prevented by the prudent precautions and 
vigilance of Prince Maurice. A t length, having thrown off his 
helmet that he might be the more easily distinguished by his 
men, he received a wound in the ear with a pike, and was obliged 
to retire. Through some accident, his horse, which was con-
spicuous, fell into the hands of the enemy. His troops observed 
this, and believing that he himself had been taken prisoner or 
killed, were greatly disheartened. They still kept their ranks, 
but in the languor of their exertions they gave manifest symptoms 
that both their strength and courage had begun to fail. 
This abatement of their vigour did not escape the vigilant eye 
of Maurice, who instantly resolved to improve the advantage 
which it afforded h i m ; and for this purpose, having collected 
his whole forcé, he renewed the assault upon the enemy in front 
with his infantry, and with his cavalry in flank. It happened 
at the same time, that the Spanish magazine of gunpowder, 
designed for the use of the artillery, took fire. The Dutch 
cavalry availed themselves of the confusión which this accident 
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occasioned, and pushed forward with irresistible forcé, crying 
out, Victory, victory ! This cry being instantly communicated 
to the rest of the army, animated them with redoubled ardour. 
The Spaniards, unable any longer to resist their fury, gave way 
on every side, and falling soon after into confusión betook them-
selves to flight. The victors pursued for some time, and put 
great numbers to the sword; but the night coming on, the 
prince gave orders for sounding a retreat. H i s troops he knew 
must be exceedingly exhausted and fatigued, as they had taken 
no food since the morning, and almost the whole day had either 
stood under arms, or been engaged in battle; besides that, he 
was well acquainted with the intrepid spirit of the enemy, who 
might rally and return when he was unprepared for resistance, 
and most of his troops employed in the pursuit. Fo r this reason 
he selected such of them as had suffered least from the fatigue 
which they had undergone, and stationed them as a guard to the 
rest of the army, who remained all night on the field of battle. 
The contemporary historians differ widely in their accounts of 
the number of the slain. On the part of the Spaniards, Reidan, 
an historian who is generally well informed, says that it amounted 
to five thousand, but Grotius makes i t only three thousand ; 
while the loss on the side of the victors did not exceed one thou-
sand ; and the greatest part of these, he says, were of the 
English troops, who distinguished themselves by their intre-
pidity in this engagement, and had eight of their captains killed, 
and all the rest wounded, except two. 
The Bri t ish officers were almost the only persona of distinc-
tion wTho fell in the army of the states ; but in that of the army 
of the archduke, besides so great a number of his best troops, 
Zapena, and colonels Bastock, de Lasso, D'Avalos, and many 
other officers of great merit, were either killed in the field of 
battle, or died afterwards of their wounds. The admiral of 
Arragon and De Vigliar were taken prisoners; and the count 
de Boucquoi, Barlotta, and many others, wounded, and rendered 
long unfit for service. A l l the Spanish artillery, baggage, 
and provisions, with more than a hundred standard s, fell into 
the hands of the victorious army*. Such was the battle of 
* Among the Italians who fell in this battle the Cardinal Bentivoglio mcntions his brolhcr 
aml bis ncphew, two young noblemcn, about twenty years of age, who had latcly entered 
iuto the service of Si^iin, and were much regrcttcd on account of their youth and bravery. 
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Nieuport, or, as it is sometimes called, the battle of the Downs, 
the event of which proved so extremely different from what the 
confidence of the Spaniards and their generáis had prompted 
them to expect. Their defeat was, no doubt, partly owing to 
the disadvantages under which they fought; although it was 
acknowledged by all parties that nothing could surpass the pru-
dence, vigour, and intrepidity, which Prinee Maurice displayed 
from the beginning to the end of the engagement. His skill in 
the siege of fortified towns had long been highly celebrated; 
but it now appeared that he was equally possessed of all the 
other talents whieh form a consummate general, and all Europe 
at this time resounded^vvith his praise *. 
Albert, having left the field of battle immediately after seeing 
his troops give way, arrived on the same night at Bruges, 
whence he soon after set out for Ghent, and was there received 
by Isabella, with the same firm and masculine spirit which she 
had discovered upon the various reports that had reached her, 
first of his being killed, and afterwards of his being wounded 
and taken prisoner. H e returned next day to Bruges, and there 
employed himself in collecting his seattered troops. 
Prince Maurice, in the mean time, had retired on the next 
day after the battle to Ostend, to recruit his army in a place of 
safety, and to consult with the deputies whom the states-general 
had sent thither to assist him with their advice. His enterprise 
against Nieuport was a measure which the states themselves had 
first suggested, and which Maurice had undertaken at their 
desire. It does not appear that he himself had approved of this 
measure, and it was strongly condemned by his kinsman, Count 
Wi l l i am of Nassau, whom the Dutch historians celébrate as a 
person of the most consummate prudonce. 
To lead the army so far into the enemy's country as Nieuport, 
trusting to an event so extremely uncertain as the continuance 
of the mutinous spirit of the Spanish troops, Wi l l i am had repre-
sented as a rash and dangerous enterprise, by which the exist-
ence of the commonwealth would be exposed to imminent 
danger for the sake of acquiring a single town. That, even 
although they should conquer Nieuport, yet the great expense of 
• Grotius, lib. ix. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. TÍ. Tlic Heroic Acts of Prince Maurice, 
piintcd in tlic year 1613. Piasecii Chronica Geit. in Europa «ingularium, an. 1600. 
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defending a place at so great a distance from them would more 
than counterbalance all the advantages they could derive from 
the possession of i t ; and that, i f the archduke should be able 
to appease the mutineers, the army of the states might suffer a 
defeat, or they might be reduced by famine, as the supplying them 
with provisions would entirely depend on the winds and waves. 
These apprehensions had hitherto been happily disappointed; 
but from the events which had fallen out, it manifestly appeared 
how much reason there had been for entertaining them. The 
mutineers had easily been persuaded to return to their duty. 
The archu j.ke had in due time collected a sufficient forcé ; and 
if he had listened to the counsel that was given him by Zapena, 
and waited for the arrival of Velasco, without precipitating an 
engagement, the army of the states would probably have either 
been obliged to lay down their arms without fighting, or in the 
hurry of attempting to get on board their' ships, the greater 
part of them would have been destroyed. 
The deputies, after the defeat of their troops at Lessingen, 
had come to be, in some measure, sensible of the error into which 
the states had been betrayed; and, from that time t i l l the vic-
tory was fully decided, they had been disquieted with the most 
dreadful apprehensions. F rom these apprehensions they were 
happily delivered ; but being still impressed with a sense of the 
danger which they had so narrowly escaped, they thought that, 
notwithstanding the great advantage they had obtained, there 
was ground for hesitating whether it was expedient to persevere 
in the plan of operations that had been begun. 
They gave proof on this occasion, by the slowness of their 
deliberations, how much wiser it had been on the part of the 
states to have left Prince Maurice at perfect liberty with regard 
to the conduct of the war, than to require him, as they had 
done, to follow the opinión of men, who, from their ignorance 
of military affairs, were so extremely i l l qualified to advise. 
They differed widely in their opinions from each other; and 
while some thought that the army ought immediately to re-
turn to Nieuport, others were of opinión that it ought 
rather to penétrate into the interior parts of Flanders. The 
former of these opinions at length prevailed; and, on the 
fourth or fifth day after the battle, the siege of Nieuport was 
resumed. 
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This measure ought either not to have been adopted, or carried 
Siege of sooner into execution. The archduke, having exerted 
Nieuport great activity in repairing the faults which he had 
committed, had sent Velasco * with a reinforcement to 
the garrison of Nieuport of two thousand five hundred men, who 
having marched with great expedition, had entered the town 
before Prince Maurice had invested it. The operations however 
of the siege were renewed ; but the garrison, after making some 
vigorous sallies on the besiegers, soon convinced Prince Maurice 
that he could not justly expect to reduce them before the arch-
duke would arrive with another army, which he was collecting 
togetber for their relief. 
Moved by this consideration, and dreading that he might soon 
be again involved in the same danger from which he had so 
recently escaped, he raised the siege, and having led back his 
troops to Ostend, he put thera on board the transporte which 
the states had provided for that purpose, and retumed to 
Hol l and ; judging it impracticable, on account of the difficulty 
of his situation, in the heart of the enemy's country, to derive 
any advantage whatever from the decisivo victory he had 
obtained -f. 
The greatest part of the season fit for action still remained; 
but both partios were greatly exhausted with the exertions 
which they had already made, and no other memorable transac-
tions passed during the course of the present year 
In Spain, the operation of the several causes of decline above 
mentioned, was at this time sensibly felt in every department of 
* Bentivoglio, Grotiug. Thuanus Bay8 it was Barlotta, and not Velasco. 
t Bentivoglio. Thuanus, lib. cxxiv., &c. 
Before he embarked, Maurice made au attempt to reduce a Spanish fort in the neigh-
bourhood of Ostend, called St. Cathcrine ; but in this too he was disappoiuted by the 
vigour and activity of Barlotta, who by foreed marches arrived with a considerable body 
of forces before the prince had time to make any progresa in the siege. Barlotta himself 
however lost liis life on this occasion. He was a nativa of Luxcmburg, and had praclised 
surgery in Paris, where having beea employed in his profession by Count Charles of 
Mansfeldt, when he commanded the Spanish troops in Francc, the count took an attach> 
ment to him, and gave him a commission among his troops. He soon distinguished 
himself by his activity and enterprise, obtained the highest military honours, and was 
ronsidered as one of the ablest officers in the service of Spain. His low birth, joined to 
his native arrogance and presumption, procured him many enemics among his inferiors and 
reináis; but the archduke was sincercly sorry for his dcatb. 
X Davila, &c., p. 77, ch. ix. 
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the etate. Complaints were heard all over the kingdom of the 
neglect of agriculture and the decay of manufactures ; 
.igricuiture and great numbers of the people, being without em-
and manu- ployment, were reduced to a state of indigence, which 
rendered it impossible for them to contribute their 
proportion of the taxes and supplies. 
Several councils were held to consider of the proper remedies 
for those evils; but the duke of Lerma, and the other Spanish 
ministers, appear to have been extremely ignorant of the causes 
from which they proceeded. They supposed them to have 
arisen principally from the scarcity of money : and this they 
ascribed partly to the great quantities of píate that were 
employed in the churches and in the houses of the rich, and 
partly to the exportation of gold and silver for the purchase of 
foreign manufactures. 
But as no expedient occurred at present to prevent the latter 
of these practices, while the manufactures of Spain were 
for^emedy- at so low an ebb, they resolved immediately, i f possible, 
ing those ^o put a stop to the progress of the former; and with 
this view a royal edict was published, requiring all 
churches, corporations, and individuáis of whatever rank within 
the kingdom, to deliver upon oath, to certain magistrates who 
were named, an exact inventory of all the píate, whether gold or 
silver, in their possession. In the body of the edict this reason 
for the publication was assigned, that from the information 
which his Majesty had received, there was ground to believe the 
quantity of the precious metáis in píate and in church utensils to 
be so enormous, that if it were converted into coin, and cir-
culated throughout the kingdom, it would be found sufficient to 
restore the nation to that happy state of wealth and prosperity 
which i t had formerly enjoyed; and that for this reason, the 
king had, with the advice of his present counsellors, resolved not 
only to prevent the farther increase of píate, but afterwards, 
under the severest penalties, to prohibit the exportation of it to 
foreign states. 
But it was soon found impracticable to carry this edict, which 
would not probably have been in any degree productive of the 
advantages proposed by it, into execution. The clergy were 
highly incensed because the sacred utensils were comprehcnded 
in i t ; and both in writings and harangues from the pulpit, they 
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represented the edict as an attack upon the privileges of the 
church. Neither Phil ip nor his minister, the duke of Lerma, 
had resolution to contend against an order of men whom they 
dreaded, and whose favour they had been above all things 
solicitous to conciliate. Their design was therefore suddenly 
relinquished, and no other attempt made, on tKe present occa-
sion, to remedy the disorders which prevailed. 
It was not probable that any effectual remedy could be applied 
to them, t i l l peace should be established with England and the 
United Provinces. Notwithstanding which, it was judged 
necessary, for the reasons formerly mentioned, to continué the 
prosecution of the war against both these powers, without regard 
to the prejudice which from thence the monarchy was likely to 
sustain *. Orders were given for the equipment of a fleet to 
support the catholics of Ireland in their rebellion against El iza-
beth; and both money and a reinforcement of Italian and 
Spanish troops were sent into the Netherlands. 
The archduke had at the same time prevailed upon the states 
assembled at Brussels to grant him much greater supplies than 
formerly; and these he employed in making numerous levies in 
Germany, and the Walloon or southern provinces. The enemy, 
hovvever, was sooner prepared to take the field. Prince Maurice, 
having drawn his army out of winter quarters early in the spring, 
and ordered them to rendezvous in the neighbourhood of the 
fort of Schenck, seemed for some time to intend an attack on 
Bois le Duc ; but it soon appeared that his real design was to 
attempt the reduction of Rhinberg, the possession of this im-
portant place being necessary in order to facilítate the expulsión 
of the Spaniards from Guelderland, a part of which was still 
subject to their authority. 
The archduke no sooner received intelligence of his design, 
than he ordered Count He rmán of Berg to set out with a body 
of troops to reinforce the garrison; but before the count had 
time to execute his commission, Maurice had drawn lines of 
circumvallation round the place, and fortified the approaches to 
his camp in such a manner, as rendered all access impracticable. 
Albert had therefore no other expedient for saving Rhinberg 
left, but to make a diversión, by attacking some important place 
• Gonsalcz Davila, lib. ii. cap. 9, 
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belonging to the United States, in the hopes that Maurice migbt 
be thus induced to abandon his present enterprise. 
A t the earnest request of the people of Flanders he resolved 
to lay siege to Ostend; the garrison of which place, though 
somewhat checked by adjacent forts, had been able to make 
incursions into the heart of the province, and often laid the 
inhabitants of the open country under the most burdensome 
contributions. 
The states of this province, notwithstanding the peculiar 
hardships under which they laboured, had discovered great 
alacrity in raising their proportion of the supplies lately granted 
to the archduke; and they now promised strenuously to exert 
themselves in furnishing him with everything necessary for 
carrying on the siege with vigour. 
Such were the motives by which Albert was influenced in 
formlng his resolution to undertake the siege of Ostend; the 
most hazardous enterprise in which he had ever been engaged, 
and which was attended with more important consequences than 
any other which occurs in the history of the Netherlands. 
Ostend stands on the sea coast, in a marshy soil, and almost 
Dcscription surrounded with canals; two of which being much 
of Ostend. iarger than the rest, and communicating with the sea, 
receive smaller vessels at all times, and at high water admit of 
ships of a considerable magnitude. It was an open fishing town 
ti l l the year-1572, when it was first fortified with a palisade by 
the duke of A l v a . A t the pacification of Ghent, the inhabitants 
having thrown off the Spanish yoke, the fortifications were so 
much strengthened and augmented by the United States, that 
the duke of Parma, who invested it in the year 1583, despairing 
of success, abandoned his enterprise, and could never afterwards 
be persuaded to resume the siege. 
Ostend is divided into two parts, called the Oíd and the New 
Town. The former of these is washed by the sea, against the 
ravages of which it is secured by a strong fortification, formed 
of huge and well-compacted beams or palisades ; and the latter 
was defended by a wall flanked with bastions, and the canals 
already mentioned, to which there had lately been added a 
covered way, fortified with numerous redoubts. A s , from the 
situation of Ostend, on the coast of Flanders, i t afforded a con-
venient shelter to the ships of the United Provinces, the states 
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had ever been extremcly solicitous for its preeervation. They 
had spared no expense in rendering the fortifications as complete 
as possible, and besides a numerous garrison under the command 
of an experienced officer, they had always kept it richly furnished 
with provisions and military stores. Nor were these the only 
circumstances which had deterred the duke of Parma from 
renewing his attempt against it. H e considered, what was of 
much greater importance than even the strength of the place, 
that while the Dutch preserved their superiority at sea, the 
garrison might continué to receive whatever supplies and rein-
forcements they should stand in need of, t i l l his strength and 
resources being exhausted, he should be compelled to raise the 
siege. To this consideration the archduke seems not to have 
paid that attention which it merited. H e did not possess the 
same military skill as the duke of Parma, and could not there-
fore so clearly perceive the difficulties he must encounter in his 
intended enterprise. H e vvas not by nature bold or rash, yet, 
from the facility of his temper, he was apt too readily to adopt 
the rash imprudent measures that were recommended by his 
counsellors*. 
Having set out with his numerous army about the end of 
June, he began his operations against Ostend on the 4th or 5th 
of July . Prince Maurice, in the mean time, who secretly 
rejoiced to observe his enemy engage in so dangerous an under-
taking, persisted in the siege of Rhinberg, and in a few weeks, 
Rhinberg notwithstanding the most vigorous defence on the part 
capitúlales. 0f the garrison, he compelled them to capitúlate. 
But the attention of both parties was now alraost totally 
Siege of engrossed by the siege of Ostend, where Charles 
Ostend. Vandcr Noot, the govemor, before the besiegers had 
time to complete their intrenchments, had sallied out upon 
them, and killed upwards of five hundrcd men. This unfortu-
nate beginning, however, did not deter the archduke from tho 
prosecution of his enterpriso. 
Having taken the necessary precautions to prevent the futuro 
sallies of the garrison, and stationed one part of his troops in 
the downs to the westward of the town, and the rest of them on 
the south and east, he soon oponed his batteries, and began a 
* Vidc Bentivoglio, Le Clerc, and Grolius. Thuanus, lib, vi. p. 7G, &c. 
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furious cannonade in every quarter. But his distance from the 
body of the place, occasioned by the canals, ditches, and other 
outworks, which the industry of the besiegers had greatly mul-
tiplied, rendered his fire of email efFect; and showed him that it 
must long remain impossible to compel the garrison to surrender, 
unless he could prevent them from receiving reinforcements and 
supplies by sea. 
In this opinión he might have been confirmed by the proof 
which the United States had lately given, how much they vvere 
determined to exert themselves with vigour in the defence of 
the place. Though Vander Noot was an officer whom they 
highly esteemed, yet they had taken from him the chief coramand, 
and given it to Sir Francis Veré, who, next to Prince Maurice, 
was the most renowned of all their generáis for his military 
prudence and capacity; and to engage Veré to accept of this 
command, they had consented to his selecting the flower of the 
English forces, for a reinforcement to the garrison. They had 
at the same time sent to Ostend a copious supply of military 
stores and provisions, and were unanimous in resolving that 
whatever i t should cost them they would defend the town to the 
last extremity. 
This resolution and vigour which the states had begun to 
display, drew the attention of all Europe to the operations of 
this important siege, and with the permission of the states, the 
town was visited by many illustrious foreigners, from Germany, 
Denmark, Franco, and England *, who were led there by curiosity 
to view so interesting a scene of action, and the desire of being 
thereby enabled more clearly to comprehend the relations of 
those military achievements which they expected to be perfonned 
by the contending parties. 
The archduke had ground for much solicitude with regard to 
the final issue of his enterprise; but he could not now desist, 
without exposing himself to reproach and ridiculo; and therefore 
he applied himself with redoubled ardour to the prosecution of 
the siege. 
It might be brought to a period, he imagined, either by carry-
ing it on in the ordinary form, by mines, batteries, and assaults, 
or by rendering himself master of the entrance of the cánals, 
• As the Duke of Holsacc, the king of Denmark's brothcr, the Earl of Northumber-
l.ind, and otlicrs. 
E 
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and thereby intercepting the communication of the garrison by 
sea with tlie United Provinces. H e ought maturely to have 
considered which of these two methods of procedure was the 
most likely to prove effectual, and to have confined his attention 
to one of them, without suffering it to be diverted by the other. 
But instead of this, he employed his forces, sometimes in carrying 
on attacks upon the enemy",s entrenehments, and sometimes in 
attempting to bloek up the canals ; and, by this división of his 
strength, as the siege was protracted to an enormous length, so 
it was attended with an immense expense of blood and treasure. 
For several weeks his principal object was to approach still 
nearer than where his batteries were first opened to the fortifica-
tions of the town. The garrison, on the other hand, omitted 
nothing in their power that could t)bstruct his approach. They 
adventured, on some occasions, to sally out, and to attack the 
besiegers svvord in hand ; and in the mean time, they laboured 
indefatigably in casting trenches, and raising new redoubts, 
wherever they apprehended there was danger of the enemy^ 
attempting an assault. A n incessant fire was all the while kept 
up from the Spanish batteries, on the one hand, and the fortifica-
tions on the other; and great numbers were killed on either side. 
A t length, the archduke, perceiving that his operations were 
not attended with the success which he expected, had recourso 
to the other expedient above mentioned, and employed great 
part of his forces in attempting to obstruct the entrance of the 
cariáis. One of them was the entrance to the harbour, and here 
he began his operations. But, as all the ground to a consider-
able distance from the shore was sand, no mound which he 
formed pf it could sustain a battery, or resist the violence of 
the waves. He was therefore obliged to collect together from 
the neighbouring towns, a great quantity of huge beams, of 
which and bricks he resolved to form a dyke at the mouth of 
the canal. The beams were driven deep into the ground, then 
bound together, and the intermediate spaces filled with bricks. 
Of this sort of building, one was piled upon another, t i l l the 
whole was raised to a sufficient height; after which, being 
planted with a numerous battery of cannon, the enemy's ships 
found all access to the harbour utterly impracticable. 
But the hopes which Albert had from thence conceived of 
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being able to reduce the town by famine, were quickly frustrated 
by the ingenuity and great exertion of the governor and garri-
son. They instantly applied themselves to enlarge the mouth 
of the other canal, which passed through the heart of the town, 
and soon rendered it capable of receiving the largest ships. 
The archduke however did not despair of being able to deprive 
them of this resource; and he immediately began the same sort 
of operations at the entrance of this canal, as those by which he 
had made himself master of the other. A t first, his troops and 
pioneers proceeded with great alacrity, as they were sheltered 
from the fire of the besiegers, by a dyke which had been raised 
to defend the town against the encroachments of the sea. But 
the garrison resolved to forego the advantage which they derived 
from this defence ; and having strengthened their fortifications, 
as well as they could, by stakes, huge stones, and other materials 
fitted to repel the fury of the waves, they demolished the dyke, 
and, as by this expedient, the Spanish works were exposed to 
the artillery of the town, and a great part of the adjacent 
country laid under water, the archduke was obliged to draw off 
his troops to a greater distance, and to have recourse to other 
measures which required greater experience and time to carry 
into execution. 
In the mean time, the states general of the United Provinces 
held frequent conferences to consider how they might best im-
prove the leisure which they enjoyed, while the Spanish army 
was detained before Ostend. They wished to have made an 
attack on the island of Cadsant, and afterwards to have under-
taken the reduction of Sluys. But, at the present juncture. 
they had neither the money ñor the troops which prince Maurice 
thought necessary for so difficult an enterprise. The flower of 
their army had, after the taking of Rhinberg, been sent to 
Ostend; and the great expense which attended the defence of 
that place, had almost exhausted their finalices. Much time 
was spent in deliberating, and various expeditions were pro-
posed. A t length, towards the end of October, when the 
season of action was nearly elapsed, they formed the resolution 
of undertaking the siege of Bois-le-Duc, the garrison of which 
important place, they understood, amounted only to three hun-
dred men. 
In obedicnce to their commands, though extremely diffident 
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Siege of 0 f success, prince Maurice immediately began his march, 
Bois-ie-Duc. an(j having arrived before the place on the first of No-
vember, he judged, that, considering the great extent of the for-
tifications, the garrison must soon find it necessary to capitúlate, 
provided he could prevent the entrance of more troops. W i t h 
this view, he instantly began to draw lines of circumvallation 
round the town, and at first, this work was carried on with great 
rapidity. But soon afterwards, it was retarded by a violent 
frost, wliich happened, this year, much sooner than usual: and 
the archduke had time to send a large detachment of his army, 
above a thousand of which forced their way into the town, before 
the entrenchments were complete ; while the rest lay at a little 
distance from the prince's camp, with the design of embracing 
any opportunity that might oifer, of annoying him. Sti l l , hovv-
ever, he persisted in his design; but as the frost continued daily 
increasing in violence, and put an entire stop to his operations, 
End of No- he complied with the desire of the deputies of the states, 
vember. who as usual, attendcd him in the camp, and raised the 
siege *. 
Maurice had no sooner retired from Bois-le-Duc, than Albert, 
having recalled his troops, resumed his operations, vvhich had 
been suspended during their absence, against Ostend; and, in 
a few days after, he had ground to entertain the hope of being 
able to terminate the siege. The fortifications of the town ncxt 
the sea, had lately suffered considerable prejudice from the fury 
of the waves; and the garrison, through sickness and desertion, 
and the great numbers killed by fatigue and the incessant fire 
of the besiegers, ^as reduced from eight thousand to between 
two and three thousand men. Sir Francis Veré had given 
repeated notice of his distressful situation to the United States: 
but, t i l l the raising of the siege of Bois le Duc, they had no 
troops which they could spare; and after troops were procured, 
and put on board the transports, they were prevented from 
sailing by contrary winds. About the same time, the archduke 
had ordered a select body of forces to pass over the harbour at 
low water, in the middle of the night, who set fire to a tem-
porary defence, composed of huge piles of faggots and other 
combustible materials, which had been placed at the foot of the 
* Melcicn, lib, xxii. G'rotiiis lib. x. Bentivoglio, fcc. 
1(;02.] P H I L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 53 
rampart, on tlie north side of the town, to prevent the further 
encroachments of tlie sea. The fire burnt furiously for three 
days and nights, baffling all the attempts of the garrison to 
extinguish it. The rampart was thus much weakened, and a 
greater number of men were necessary for its defence. In the 
midst of this distress, the governor received notice that the 
archduke had been assiduously employed in preparing for a 
general assault, and would certainly carry his design into execu-
tion on the next day, or, at farthest, on the day immediately 
following. Veré, though possessed of the most unquestionable 
courage, was too sensible of the present weakness of his garrison 
and fortification, and too well acquainted with the perseverance 
and intrepid spirit of the Spanish troops, not to be alarmed with 
the danger which threatened him ; and, in order to avert it, he 
made use of an expedient to which a brave man will hardly, even 
when necessity requires it, have recourse. Without any serious 
intention of capitulating, he secretly sent over to the arehduke 
an officer, to signify that he was ready to treat with him for the 
surrender of the tov/n. Albert, suspecting no dissimulation, 
gladly listened to this proposal, and hostages were instantly 
exchangod. H e came soon, however, to entertain some doubt of 
the governor's sincerity, and urged him without delay, to propose 
his terms. This, the governor, by employing different pretexts, 
found means to defer from day to day, t i l l a reinforcement of 
troops which he had expected arrived from Zealand. This re-
inforcement consisted of only five companies, amounting to four 
hundred men, But finding that the archduke could not be any 
longer deceived, and having already gained sufficient time to 
repair the breaches in the rampart, he sent him word, that since 
his masters the states had augmented his garrison, he could not 
now, consistently with his honour, consent to give up the 
town. 
A s Veré had begun this transaction without communicating 
it to his officers, some suspicions were at first entertained of his 
fidelity by all such persons as were averse to a surrender; and 
the states-general were not entirely satisfied, either with the 
duplicity he had employed, or the example which he had given 
of entering into a treaty with the enemy, without the knowledge 
of his council of war. But no person had so much reason to be 
offended as the archduke, who though he did not hesitate to 
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eend back the hostages, was both incensed and mortified when 
he considered how he had been deceived by an enemy, whom he 
might probably have compelled to lay down his arras*. 
The fortifications of the place were now more secure than 
formerly, and the garrison had been reinforced. Stil l however, 
being moved by passion more than the probability of success, he 
resolved to execute the design which the hopes of a capitulation 
had induced him to lay aside, and gave orders for a general 
assault. He intended to make his principal attack on the west, 
near the harbour, which had been for some time in his possession; 
but, in order to divert the enemies1 attention and divide their 
torces, he resolved at the same time to make attacks in other 
quarters, and gave the command of a body of troops, destined to 
act on the east side, to the celebrated count de Bucquoi; having 
committed the execution of his principal design to Augustin 
Mescia, an experienced officer, and governor of the citadel of 
Antwerp. 
Early in the morning he began to play off 4iis batteries, and 
Jamiarv7 kept up a furious cannonading in every quarter t i l l 
1602. raid-day, when, the tide having gone back, Mescia 
led forward the Spanish troops. They were drawn up in a 
compact body, forty raen in front, and the foremost ranks clothed 
in complete armour, followed by the musketeers and others, who 
were provided with scaling ladders, and whatever else was judged 
necessary, either for acquiring or securing possession of the 
rampart. They advanced across the oíd harbour, in which 
there was between three and four feet water, with great ardour 
and the most determined intrepidity; but the garrison were 
well prepared for their defence. The governor had beforehand 
ordered the cannon to be removed from that part of the fortifi-
cations where he expected their principal attack, and in their 
place had planted seven large mortars, which were loaded with 
stones, flints, bullets, and other instruments of mischief. H e 
had likewise instructed those to whom he had comraitted the 
charge of these mortars to keep up their fire t i l l the enemy 
should approach. This order was well obeyed, and the Spaniards 
had almost reached the foot of the rampart, when the mortars 
were discharged, and made dreadful havoc among the foremost 
ranks: a great nuinber was killed and woundcd, and the ranks 
* If he had miproved the opportnnity which he had lost. 
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were thrown into confusión, St i l l however they contlnued to 
advance, those who were behind pushing forward those who 
were before, t i l l the greater part of thein were so near that 
every stroke and shot of the besiegers did certain execution. 
The night carne on, yet the Spaniards seemed still determined to 
persist. To prevent a surprise, the governor ordered a great 
number of fires to be lighted up within the rampart, and the 
battle continued to be as bloody and desperate as before. 
The Spanish troops at the same time crowded together in the 
harbour, ready to advance to fill up the places of those who fel l ; 
when the governor had recourse to an expedient which he liad 
raeditated from the beginning. There were two sluices within 
the fortification, one of which served in the time of ebb to keep 
the water in that part of the canal which lay within the town, 
and the other to restrain it in that part which ran up into the 
country. Having ordered both these sluices to be opened, so 
great a quantity of water was poured into the harbour, that 
many of the Spaniards were carried down by the violence of the 
stream and drowned; while many others, attempting to save 
themselves by laying hold of the palisades on the rampart, were 
slaughtered by the enemy. The archduke had commanded his 
cavalry to keep cióse in the rear of the infantry, to prevent them 
from having recourse to flight. It was thus rendered impossible 
for the latter to make their retreat so soon as necessity required; 
and by this means they were obliged to stand exposed to the 
fire of the besiegers, long after it was manifest that their most 
vigorous efforts could be of no avail. A part of the cavalry 
having entered the water, with a design to obstruct the violence 
of the current, several horses with their riders were likewise 
drowned, and Mescia at length found it necessary to give the 
signal of retreat. The assailants having been equally unsuc-
cessful in every other quarter, were obliged to abandon the 
assault. In this rash and desperate enterprise about fourteen 
hundred of the Spaniards and Italiana were either killed or 
drowned, among whom were several persons of the first rank, 
while the loss of the besieged amounted only to forty killed, 
and a small number wounded*. 
The archduke would have renewed the assault on the second 
day after his repulse, but was prevented by a mutiny of his 
* Mclcrcn, lib. xxiii. Círotius, lib. xi. ab initio. Bcntivog. pari. iii. lib. vi. 
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Italian and Spanish troops, who were highly exasperated at 
the barbarous, and what they deemed disgraceful manner in 
which they had been used. They bitterly complained that they 
liad been treated like slaves or brutes, and not like soldiers of 
unquestionable bravery, when they were compelled by the cavalry 
to stand exposed to the enemy's fire after,the sluicesbeing opened, 
it was rendered irapossible for them to advance. They complained 
that this measure, which had been adopted without consent of the 
council of general offieers, was contrary to every rule of war, and 
they declared,that since theyhad not been treated as soldiers, they 
would no longer aet as such. Albert, soured with his i l l success, 
was equally alarmed .and provoked at this behaviour: and in 
order to prevent the infection of their example from spreading 
through the rest of his army, he instantly caused between forty 
and fifty of the most seditious to be executed, and sent a 
hundred and fifty to the galleys. B y this prompt severity he 
quelled the mutiny; but, finding it necessary to relinquish his 
design of renewing the assault, he now bent his whole attention 
to the blocking up of the canal. 
During the course of these transactions the court of Spain, 
Spanish le- notwithstanding their inability to furnish the archduke 
excite j e a - e ^ ^ e r ^1^1 the troops or money necessary to insuro 
lousics. success in his contest vvith the United States, was 
cngaged in other expensive enterprises. B y their order the 
count de Fuentes, governor of Milán, had some time before 
made such numerous levies of troops, as excited in the minds of 
the Italian states and princes an apprehension, which at the 
present period seems to have been without foundation, that 
some ambitious design had been coneeived of reducing Italy 
under the Spanish yoke, Of these troops a part was sent to 
the archduke Ferdinand, to assist him in his operations at 
Canissa against the Turks; another part of them to the Nether-
lands; and the rest were intended for an expedition against 
Algiers, which was still the principal seat of those numerous 
pirates, by whom the coast and the ships of Spain continued to 
be no less molested than in the former reign. About ten thou-
sand troops were employed in seventy galleys, partly Genoese 
and partly Spanish, commanded by the celebrated Doria, and 
they had a prosperous voyage t i l l they were within a few days, 
sailing of the destined port. Had they immediately landed, it 
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is probable they would have succeeded in their enterprise, as 
the greater part of the pirates, agreeably to information which 
Doria had received, were absent, and such of them as had been 
left behind, were unprepared for their defence; but, unfbrtu-
nately, one of the capital ships had been separated from the rest 
of the fleet, on which account the debarkation was delayed t i l l 
next day; and in the intervening night a dreadful storm aróse, 
which not only rendered all attempts to land impracticable, but 
obliged the fleet to leave the coast and return to Sicily *. 
The court of Spain was not discouraged by the failure of their 
Invasión of attempt against Algiers, from engaging in another 
Ireknd. enterprise, which was still mor% difficult to be carried 
into execution. The war with England had not for several 
years been vigorously prosecuted by either of the two contend-
ing powers; and no event happened which deserves to be 
recorded: but Phil ip, or more properly the duke of Lerma, had, 
about this time, conceived the hopes of being able to give a 
mortal wound to the power of Elizabeth, by an invasión of Ire-
land, where a great number of the natives were in open rebellion 
against her, under the earl of Tyrone. 
Philip the Second, by various intrigues carried on by ecclesi-
astics, had fomented the discontents of the Irish, and on different 
occasions had sent them supplies of arms and military stores, 
Many of them had been engaged, by the kind treatment which 
he ordered to be given them, to enter into his service in the 
Netherlands: and of these, many having returned to their 
nativo country, had, through the knowledge which they had 
acquired, in some measure contributed to teach their country 
the rules of military discipline, thereby rendering them a much 
more formidable enemy than they had hitherto been to the 
English troops. 
Tyrone, whose aífections Elizabeth had in vain endeavoured 
to conciliate, though noted for his treachery and cruelty, vicos 
which generally attend on barbarous manners, yet, being brave 
and active, had persuaded many of his countrymen to enlist 
themselves under his banners, by flatteringly inspiring them 
with the hopes of deliverance from the English yoke. He had 
applied for assistance to the court of Spain, and being seconded 
in his application by several seminarios of English priests and 
* Thuanns, lib. cxxvi. Piasecii Chronica, an. 16(11. 
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Jesuits, solicitors the most likely to succeed with Phil ip and his 
minister, he liad obtained a promise both of arms and troops. 
A bull of excommunication having been published by three 
succeeding popes* against Elizabeth, absolving her subjects 
from their allegiance, and inviting all catholic princes to take 
possession of her dominions, the superstitious mind of Phil ip 
was easily impressed with a persuasión that, by supporting the 
rebels, and abolishing Elizabeth's authority in Ireland, he would 
act the meritorious part of a faithful son of the church, and 
serve the cause of God and of the catholic religión. And , 
although he had too much indolence to be capable of being 
principally actuated by arabition, yet he could not but desire to 
add Ireland to his dominions, as, besides the great extent and 
fertility of that island, its commodious harbours would occasion-
ally afford a retreat and shelter to his ships, and better enable 
him to dispute the empire of the sea with England and the 
United Provinces. 
Determined by these considerations, he gave orders for the 
equipment of a fleet of transports and ships of war, sufficient 
for carrying six thousand troops; and so confident was he and 
his minister of the success of their intended enterprise, that, 
besides the troops, a great number of families, including women 
and children, were put on board, with the design of establishing 
a Spanish colony in the kingdom which they expected to subdue. 
They had lent too easy faith to the exaggerated accounts which 
Tyrone had given them of his strength; and they were not 
sufficiently acquainted with the character and abilities of lord 
Mountjoy, whom Elizabeth had appointed viceroy and com-
mander-in-ehief of the English forces. 
The command of the Spanish troops, and the conduct of the 
expedition, were committed to Don John D'Aguilar, who had 
learnt the rudiments of war under the duke of A l v a , and had 
afterwards acquired some military reputation from a successful 
enterprise, in which he had the chief command, against the 
town of Blavet in Bretagne. 
He set sail from Spain in the end of August, accompanied by 
some ships of war, under Don John Guevara, and arrived at 
Kinsale, in the south of Ireland, on 8th of October : but a part 
of his transports having been separated from the rest of the 
* Pfoi V . , Oicpory XIII. , Cknicnt V I H . tlic prcscnt pope. 
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fleet, he founcl, on his arrival at Kinsale, that he could rauster 
only four thousand men. W i t h this little army, he applied 
himself to strengthen the fortifications of the place, resolving to 
remain there, t i l l he should be joined by Tyrone, or t i l l the rest 
of his forces should arrive. The ships of war under Guevara 
returned immediately after the troops were landed; and, soon 
after, the harbour of Kinsale was blocked up by a squadron of 
English men-of-war, commanded by sir Richard Levison. Agree-
ably to his instructions frora the court of Spain, D'Aguilar dis-
persed a manifestó o ver the adjacent country, in which he 
assumed the title of general in the holy war, undertaken for the 
preservation of the catholic faith in Ireland; and whilst he 
invited people to come in to his assistance, he declared that he 
was sent by his master the king of Spain, with no other inten-
tion but to deliver them from the dominión of the devil, and the 
heretical queen of England. 
The Irish had formerly, on different occasions, received 
the justest grounds of complaint against the English govern-
ment; and at this time they were highly incensed on account 
of the introduction of what the English, with good reason, 
regard as one of their most valuable privileges, the institution 
of triáis by ju ry ; they were therefore generally animated with 
a spirit of discontent against their ancient masters. The 
greater part of them were likewiso strongly atlached to the 
popish faith ; and their priests, who were wholly in the interest 
of Spain, possessed an entire ascendant over them, having per-
suaded them that their ancestors had originally spnmg from 
Spain, and thereby created in their minds a strong predilection 
in favour of the Spaniards. 
They were discouraged, however, from complying with 
D'Aguilar s invitation to have recourse to arms, by consider-
ing the small number of troops which he had brought to their 
assistance ; and they resolved to remain quiet t i l l the arrival of 
the rest, which he had assured them would quickly follow. 
The viceroy was, at this time, engaged in the prosecution of 
the war against Tyrone, in the northern parts of the island. 
His arms had been attended with great success ; he had 
defeated several partios of the rebels, and had made prisoners 
of many of their leaders, somc of whom he had sent to England. 
Tyrone himself, with his adherents, had fled before him, and 
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taken shelter in those fastnesses in the northern Provinces, 
where the marshy ground rendered it difficult for the English 
general to advance. Here, however, the rebel chief was in a 
manner besieged, and as the country was but little cultivated, 
he must ere long have been obliged, through the want of sub-
sistence, to subrait to the conqueror. In this critical situation 
were the affairs of the insurgents whcn the Spanish troops 
arrived. IJpon receiving information of their arrival, the viceroy, 
justly dreading that the insurrection would soon become more 
general, resolved, without delay, to exert his utmost vigour 
against the invaders. W i t h this intention, having left a part of 
his cavalry to watch the motions of Tyrone, he set out for 
Kinsale, and having marched with great rapidity, he soon 
arrived before the place, and began the siege with betvveen eight 
and nine thousand men. But before he had time to make any 
considerable progress, he received notice that the Spanish tran-
sports above raentioned, which had been separated from the rest 
of the fleet, had arrived at Baltimore, with two thousand soldiers t 
on board, under the command of an officer named Ocampo ; and 
soon after he was informed, that the frost having set in with 
great violence in the marshy country where he had left Tyrone, 
that leader and his followers had made their escape over the 
ice, had joined Ocampo with upwards of four thousand men, 
who, together with the Spaniards, were on their march to raise 
the siege of Kinsale. This alarming intelligence he procured by 
intercepted letters from Ocampo and Tyrone to Agu i l a r ; and 
from these letters too he understood their plan of operations, 
the time of their approach, and the route which they intended 
to pursue. H e therefore prepared himself for his defence ; and, 
having drawn oíf the greater part of his army to an advantageous 
situation, at some distance from the town, he left no more forces 
than were sufficient to restrain the eruption of the Spaniards 
under Aguilar. 
When Tyrone saw the English army so advantageously posted, 
and prepared for his attack, his courage failed ; and notwith-
standing the remonstrances of Ocampo, who reproached. him 
with cowardice, he gave orders to his men to change the direc-
tion of their march, hoping to reach a marsh which lay near, 
and thus to avoid the necessity of fighting. But the vice-
roy, perceiving his intention, hastened forward with all his 
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forcea, and attacked him in the rear. Finding then that an 
engagement was unavoidable, he resumed his courage, and faced 
about to the enemy. But the rebels were no match in the open 
field for the English forces. They were quickly thrown into 
confusión, and put to flight. The Spaniards, who fought despe-
rately for some time, being forsaken by their dastardly associates, 
were overpowered by numbers, and Ocampo himself with several 
officers, made prisoners. In this battle, above twelve hundred 
men were killed upon the spot, a great proportion of whom weró 
Spaniards. The rest of that nation fled to Baltimore and other 
places on the coast, in which they had left garrisons. Such of 
the Irish as were taken, were hanged as rebels; the greater 
part of them, among whom was Tyrone, escaped through their 
knowledge of the country ; but were totally dispersed. 
It was easy for D'Aguilar , when he received intelligence of 
this defeat, and the cowardly behaviour of the Irish, to perceive 
how much the court of Spain had been mistaken in their judg-
ment of the facility of establishing their authority in Ireland. 
There could be no secure dependence, he saw, on assistance from 
the nativos; and no army, which in the present state of the 
finances could be sent from Spain., could be able to contend 
alone with the English forces. He resolved, therefore, to 
employ all his influence to dissuade the king from persisting in 
so desperate an attempt: and being at the same time conscious, 
that with so small a number of troops as were under his com-
mand in Kinsale, he could not justly cxpect to be able, above a 
few weeks, to defend the town against a general of so much skill 
and vigour as the viceroy, he resolved to save the lives of his 
soldiers, and to deliver the place into the hands of the English, 
provided he could obtain from them such terms as his honour 
would permit him to accept. 
In a few days after the battle, he gave the viceroy notice of 
his intention, and explained to him the motives of his conduct, 
and the sentiments which he had come to entertain of the Irish 
rebels, and of the folly of the enterprise, into which the court of 
Spain, through misinformation, had been betrayed. 
But he accompanied his offer with a declaration expressed in 
the strongest terms, that, in case the viceroy should refuse to 
grant him the conditions which he required, the honours of war 
to his troops, with a promise of transporting them and their 
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cannon and ammunition to Spain, in English ships ; and an act 
of indemnity to the inhabitants of Kinsale, by whom he had 
been so kindly received and entertained, he and his soldiers 
were unalterably deterrained to defend the town to the last 
extremity. 
Lord Mountjoy could not but respect the spirit by which this 
declaration was dictated. He was prompted by the native gene-
rosity of his disposition to comply with the terms proposed, and 
he thought himself justifiable in point of prudence for complying 
with thera, when he eonsidered how much his army was likely to 
suffer in the operations of a siege, carried on in the middle of 
winter, against so brave and so determined an enemy. 
Without hesitation, therefore, he agreed to D'Aguilar's 
demands. K i n ^ I e , Baltimore, and some other forts, in the 
possession of the Spaniards, were delivered into the hands of 
the viceroy; and D'Aguilar with his troops, cannon, and am-
munition, were soon after transported to Spain in an English 
fleet. 
Philip, after hearing of the issue of the battle, having despair-
ed of their preservation, greatly rejoiced at their arrival. He 
highly approved of the capitulation, and, with the advice of his 
counsellors, resolved, in consequence of the information which 
Tie received from D'Aguilar , to abandon the Irish rebels to their 
fate; and henceforth to apply himself with more undivided 
attention to his affairs in the Netherlands *. 
* Van Meteren, lib. xxiii. Carte's Hist. of England, book xix. Thuanus, &c. 
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THE archduke, after the repulse of his army, as above related, 
by the garrison of Ostend, was advised by some of his principal 
officers to raise the siege. H e was himself extremely reluctant 
to comply with this advice, but thought it necessary, before 
rejecting it, to know the sentiments of the court of Spain. 
Philip's ministers could judge of the propriety of his persisting 
in his enterprise, only by the information which he transmitted 
to them ; and there is ground to believe that, having conceived 
an opinión that it would be inconsistent with his honour to relin-
quish it, .his representaron was calculated to make them think 
too lightly of the obstacles which it was necessary to surraount, 
and too highly of the importance of the place. They believed it 
to be impossible for the garrison to defend it much longer against 
so great a forcé, and they imagined that by the reduction of it 
they might ruin the trade of the United Provinces, and thus 
insure success in the futuro operations of the war. It was there-
fore determined that the archduke should continué the siege, and 
that no assistance should be withheld which could enable him to 
bring it to the desired conclusión. 
Their assistance on the present occasion was the more neces-
Siege of sary'a8 his own fiuances were almost entirely exhausted, 
Ostend and he had little prospect of receiving any considerable 
contmued. gUppor^ from assembly of the states. He convened 
this assembly, however, and urged them, on account of the 
necessity of his affairs, to grant him an immediate supply. The 
deputies were liberal in their professions of loyalty; but, in 
return to his application, they represented that, in their present 
circumstances, it was impossible for them to comply with his 
request, as the province of Brabant had, almost every season, been 
obliged to pay the most cxorbitant contributions to the enemy, 
and not only that province but several others had long been 
cruelly robbed and plundered by the mutineers. 
Consgious of the truth of this representation, he could not 
persist in his demand, but was obliged to rest satisfied with 
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what he received from the states of Flanders, who, being more 
deeply interested than the rest in the conquest of Ostend, con-
tributed to the utmost of their power to assist him in carrying 
on the siege. 
Having, since the failure of his late attempt, despaired of being 
able to reduce the garrison by storm, his principal object now 
was to intercept the communication with the United Provinces, 
by blocking up the entrance of the canal. For this purpose 
he brought engineers from Italy and other places, and, by their 
direction, various works were undertaken at an immense expense. 
But at the raouth of the canal their labour was rendered fruitless 
by the fury of the waves ; and when they attempted to raise a 
dyke and batteries on the banks of the canal, somewhat nearer 
to the town, they were not only exposed to the enemy,s artillery, 
but were often interrupted by the garrison, who on different 
occasions sallied out upon them, destroyed their works, and put 
great numbers to the sword. In order to avoid the farther 
repetition of these disasters, they began at a distance from 
the canal, and out of the reach of the besieged, to construct 
huge machines, formed of beams strongly bound together, which, 
when finished, they intended to push forward to the banks of 
the canal, and on these, after covering them with turf, straw, 
and other materials, to erect their batteries. But the finishing 
of this, and other works which they attempted, required a con-
siderable length of time ; a great part of the present year was 
spent in preparing them, and all the other operations of the 
siege were thus relaxed. In the mean time abundant supplies 
of stores and provisions were introduced into the town. The 
garrison, many of whom were sickly and wounded, was entirely 
changed. B y the new garrison, consisting of select troops, 
partly Brit ish and partly French and Dutch, all the damage 
which the fortifications had sustained were repaired ; and so 
little dread was entertained of the success of the besiegers, that 
general Veré, with the consent of the states, went over to England, 
devolving the command, during his absence, upon the sieur 
Frederick de Dorp. 
The defence of Ostend had cost the United Provinces about 
a hundred thousand florins each month, besides the pay of 
between six and eight thousand troops ; yet, from the great 
increase of their commeree, joined to the frugality of their 
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manners, they were not only able to bear the burden of this 
expense, but to maintain a considerable fleet, and at the same 
time to make so great an augmentation of their land forces, that 
prince Maurice began bis operations this campaign with twenty-
four thousand foot and six thousand horse, a more powerful army 
than any former one which he had commanded since the com-
mencement of the war. 
In raising this army they were secretly favoured by Henry 
The United who permitted the sieur de Bethune, of the house 
States as- of Melun, to levy troops for them in Franco; and in 
HenryTv. Germany, where they were befriended by some princes 
anJthe06' of the Protestant religión, they raised a body of two 
queen of thousand four hundred horse. But their most useful 
Engiand. ajjy wag queen of England, who furnished them 
with three thousand men to fill up the vacancies in the English 
regiments already in their service, and soon after sent them 
three thousand more. The obtaining of this reinforcement had 
been Sir F . Vere's principal object in going over to England, 
and he now returned from thence, and was appointed to the 
command of all the English forces. 
The Spanish army, on the other hand, had not for many years 
been so much reduced in number as at the present period. 
Many had been killed, or had died of a pestilential disease, and 
of the hardships they liad undergone before Ostend; and the 
Italian and Spanish mutineers amounted to a considerable 
number; notwithstanding which, the court of Spain and the 
archduke wrere as obstinately as ever resolved to prosecute the 
siege. The United States rejoiced at their obstinacy, and hoped 
it might ere long prove fatal to their power in the Netherlands. 
They considered the present juncture as the most favourable 
for action which could occur, and therefore had resolved strenu-
ously to exert themselves in attempting to make some important 
conquest in the southern provinces, which, in case the garrison 
of Ostend should be obliged to capitúlate, might fully compénsate 
for the loss. 
They had conceived an expectation at this time that the people 
in the southern provinces, who had lately suífered great oppres-
sion from the rapacity of the mutineers, might be induced to 
shake off the Spanish yoke; and in this expectation they published 
a memorial addressed to the states of these provinces, enume-
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rating the grievances which they must be conscious of having so 
long euffered; representing how much they had been abused in 
the late king's transference of the sovereignty over them to the 
archdukes, notwithstanding which they were still as much as 
ever subject to the tyranny of Spain; and calling upon them, in 
remembrance of their first engagements, to return into their 
former connexion and alliance with their kinsraen in the United 
Provinces. In order to procure attention to this memorial, they 
resolved that their army should march into the heart of Brabant, 
to be ready to afford support to such of the inhabitants as should 
be willing to vindicate their liberty : and this measure, it is said, 
received the approbation both of the French monarch and the 
queen of England. 
But Prince Maurice could not be satisfied that it was either 
expedient or practicable. The people, he thought, were too 
much inured to the Spanish government, and too much over-
awed by citadels and garrisons, to listen to the invitation of the 
states; and he dreaded the difficulty of being able to support so 
numerous an army in an enemy's country for so long a time as 
would be necessary for the end in view. The Spanish army, 
indeed, could not at present contend with him in the open field; 
but they could harass him in his march, and intercept his 
convoys of provisions; besides that the archduke was in daily 
expectation of receiving a reinforcement of troops from Spain 
and Italy*. 
Moved by these considerations, the states consented that, t i l l 
i t should appear whether their memorial was likely to produce 
the desired eífect, he should lead his army along the east side of 
Brabant; that, by keeping it near the Maese, he might more 
easily receive supplies from the neutral powers in that neigh-
bourhood. Having assembled his army at Nimeguen, he passed 
the Maese near Marck, and towards the end of June he had 
advanced as far as Masryc, when he was obliged to stop for 
several days, through an unjustifiable action of his English 
troops, who having on their march sold a great part of the 
bread with which he had furnished them, could not procure any 
in the country where they now were, and were obliged to bring 
* Sin saya that Maurice intended marching through Brabant to lay siego to Nieuport or 
sorne other sea-coast town. Vide vol. i. p. 126. Mem. recondite. 
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it from a considerable distance. This delay was, in the issue, 
attended with important consequences. 
The archduke, having heard with much anxiety that Maurice 
had begun his march, had dispatched Mendoza, admiral of 
Arragon, who had lately been set at liberty, with six thousand 
foot and four thousand horse, to watch his motions, and, i f 
possible, to obstruct his progress. Mendoza was come as far as 
Tienen, a fortified town in the centre of Brabant, and was there 
employed in casting up entrenchments to secure his troops. 
Could Prince Maurice have immediately advanced, he might 
have attacked hira with the highest probability of success. But 
through the delay occasioned by the improvident conduct of the 
English troops, Mendoza had not only full leisure to complete 
his intrenchments, but received a reinforcement of eight thousand 
men, under the marquis of Spinola, who at this time arrived 
from Italy, and, i f the prince could have hastened forward, might 
easily have been intercepted before he reached the Spanish camp. 
Maurice still however continued to advance, t i l l he arrived within 
a little distance of the enemy, and once and again offered battle; 
but, finding that Mendoza was unalterably resolved to decline it, 
and was now too strong to be compelled, and considering how 
dangerous it must be, in the face of so great a forcé, to remain 
much longer in a country where it was so difficult to procure 
provisions, he returned hastily towards the Maese; and, about 
the middle of July, began to put in execution the only part of 
the general plan of his operations which he himself had judged 
practicable, by laying siege to the town of Grave. 
This place, one of the strongest in the Netherlands, and 
Siege of deemed of great importance, on account of its situation 
Grave. on the banks of the Maese, and its neighbourhood 
to the dominions of the states, had remained in the hands of 
the Spaniards since the year 1586, when, as above related, 
the young barón de Harmont, involved himself in ruin and 
infamy, by surrendering it, without necessity, to the duke of 
Parma. It was defended, at this time, by Antonio Gonsalez, a 
Spanish officer of distinguished meri t ; and, as the archduke had 
beforehand dreaded the danger which impended over this 
important place, he had sent a body of select troops to reinforce 
the garrison, which, after their arrival, amounted to fifteen 
hundred men. F rom such a govemor and garrison Prince Maurice 
F 2 
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expected to meet with the most vigorous resistance; and he could 
not doubt that Mendoza would quickly follow him, and attempt 
to compel him to raise the siege. But he did not despair of 
bringing his enterprize to a happy issue before the approach of 
winter, provided he could prevent the entrance into the town of 
any farther reinforcement and supply. W i t h this view, he drew 
lines of circumvallation round his camp, extending from that part 
of the river which is above the town, to that other part of it which 
is below. These lines were more than half a Germán league in 
length, of an extraordinary height and depth, and strengthened 
by a great number of redoubts planted with cannon. Whi le this 
laborious work was going on, he reduced a fort belonging to the 
garrison, on the other side of the river, directly opposite to the 
town, and having stationed a part of his troops there, he next 
threw two temporary bridges over the Maese, one above, and the 
other below the town. When these works were finished, the 
town was completely invested on every side, and the garrison 
must, ere long, have found it necessary to capitúlate : but, as he 
knew not what quantity of stores they possessed, and consequently 
was ignorant how long they might be able to sustain the blockade, 
he resolved, in order to save time, to carry on the siege in the 
usual fonn, and immediately began by opening trenches in 
different quarters, to make regular approaches to the town. 
A cotemporary historian*, who upon the spot examined the 
various works which Prince Maurice executed on this occasion, 
speaks of them as the most masterly which had ever been exhibited 
in any siege. In order the more effectually to save his men from 
the enemy's fire, the trenches were made of a greater depth than 
usual; both the workmen and soldiers were, at every approach, 
secured against the sallies of the garrison, by mounds and 
batteries; and when the trenches were advanced within a certain 
distance of the fortifications, spacious covered ways, of sufficient 
breadth to admit of carriages, were formed, which led from the 
trenches to the ditch. The garrison made frequent sallies, in 
which they displayed the most unquestionable bravery; but, 
through the precautions mentioned, they were as often repulsed 
with loss, while few of the besiegers were killed, either in these 
sallies, or by the artillery of the place. 
• Van Meteren. 
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Mendoza had, in the meantime, advanced from Tienen as far 
as Venlo, which stands on the banks of the Maese, about twelve 
Germán miles higher than Grave, and there deliberated with his 
council of war, whether it was practicable to compel Prince 
Maurice to raise the siege. But he quickly perceived how vain 
and ruinous it must prove to attack a numerous enemy in such 
strong entrenchments, for whom he was not an equal match in 
the open field; and therefore he resolved to rest satisfied with 
introducing a reinforcement of select troops into the place. Had 
this measure been attended with success, it must have rather 
served to basten than to retard the surrender, as the stock of 
provisions in the town must thereby have been sooner consumed. 
It was adopted, however, by Mendoza, who was probably more 
influenced by the dread of the reproach which he would incur i f 
he made no attempt, than by the prospect of any advantage that 
could accrue from it. 
The execution of this enterprise was committed to an Italian 
general of the ñame of Spina ; who was ordered, with a thousand 
chosen troops, to attack the enemy's entrenchments in the night, 
at a place where they appeared to be the weakest, and to attempt 
to forcé his way across their camp into the town. 
Another party, equal in number, was appointed to support 
him, and, in case of a repulse, to secure his retreat; while a 
third detachment was sent to make a feigned attack in another 
quarter, in the hopes of dividing the attention of the besiegers, 
and thereby rendering it easier for Spina to execute his design. 
But Prince Maurice was everywhere upon his guard. The 
Spaniards were repulsed ; and leaving behind them their 
carriages with their scaling ladders, and other apparatus, they 
fled precipitately to their camp. 
Mendoza, now despairing of success, retired with his whole 
^ t 2o army towards Maestricht; and, a few days after, the 
garrison capitulated upon honourable terms *. 
During the course of these transactions the contending par-
Kaval af- ties cxerted themselves at sea, with somewhat greater 
faire. vigour than for several years preceding. The court of 
Spain had, before the present period, sent a squadron of galleys 
to cruise on the coast of Flanders, under the command of 
• Van Meteien, lib. xxiv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Grotius, lib. ix. Ileroic Acls 
of Prince Maurice, &c. 
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Frederick Spinola, a Genoese nobleman, who had served under 
the duke of Parma, and given some distinguished proofs of 
vigour and abilities. From this squadron the Dutch trade had 
sustained considerable prejudice : and Spinola, encouraged by 
this success, having gone himself to Madrid to solicit an 
augmentation of his fleet, had obtained six galleys more, which 
he had conducted in safety into the harbour of Sluys. This 
harbour afforded him the most commodious shelter and retreat-
His galleys lying at anchor in the canal which leads to it, issued 
forth against the enemy when they were least prepared to oppose 
them, and either took or sunk a great number of their trading 
vessels. W i t h a more numerous squadron, and a greater num-
ber of soldiers on board, he would have ventured to a greater 
distance from the coast, and thus have in some measure inter-
cepted the communication of Ostend with Holland and Zealand. 
H e could likewise have sometimes ventured to make a descent 
upon their coasts; or have entered their harbours and canals, 
and seized or burnt their shipping. 
Impressed with a conviction that from such spirited naval 
enterprises the enemy must suífer more essentially than from the 
siege of their towns, or the operations of the Spanish army in 
the field, he this year made a second journey into Spain, after 
having communicated his intention to his eider brother Ambrose, 
the eelebrated marquis of Spinola. This nobleman, so justly 
renowned on account of the military talents which he afterwards 
displayed, had not yet entered into public life, though he was 
at this time about thirty years of age. But his ambition was 
now roused by his brother's success, and being conscious of great 
abilities, he resolved henceforth to avail himself of his fortune, 
which was one of the greatest in Genoa, in order to render 
himself illustrious. 
Having, from the Information communicated to him by his 
brother, conceived an opinión that the war in the Netherlands 
might be successfully carried on at sea, he empowered his bro-
ther to propose to the court of Spain that, in case they would 
grant an augmentation of the number of their galleys at Sluys, 
he would raise at his own expense a body of eight thousand 
troops, to be coramanded by himself, and to serve occasionally 
on board his brother's fleet. 
The Spanish minister readily consented to this proposal, and 
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gave the marquis a commission for levying the troops, while 
orders were at the same time issued for the equipment of the 
galleys. The marquis, with the assistance of his numerous 
friends, and of the count de Fuentes, governor of Milán, punctu-
ally fulfilled his part of the agreement, and, as above related, 
arrived with his troops in the Netherlands at a fortúnate june-
ture, when, without his aid, the admiral of Arragon must have 
abandoned the province of Brabant to the army of the United 
Provinces. 
Hi s brother was not so fortúnate in conducting from Spain 
the galleys with which the king had furnished him. They were 
eight in number, with above a thousand soldiers on board, and 
fifteen hundred slaves, who served as rowers. But two of these 
galleys were, before their departure, burnt by some English ships 
of war on the coast of Portugal ; and other three, having been 
intercepted by an English and Dutch squadron, which lay in 
wait for them in the narrow seas, and either taken or destroyed, 
Frederick arrived in Flanders with only the remaining three. 
He was deeply affected by this disaster. H i s forcé, which he 
had been at so great pains in soliciting, was still too small for 
carrying the designs which he had formed into execution, and for 
several months he could not engage in any memorable enterprise, 
But having become impatient under this inactivity which neces-
sity imposed on him, he ventured with eight galleys, having a 
great number of soldiers on board, and some frigates, to attack 
a squadron of Dutch ships of war, which had for some time been 
stationed on the coast. The contest was bloody and obstínate 
on both sides; but as the Dutch were favoured by the wind, 
and could navigate their ships with greater dexterity, they were 
enabled to avoid grappling with the Spaniards, and had thus a 
May 1603 muc^1 smaUer number ki l led. A t length Frederick 
himself received a mortal wound, of which he died 
soon after, and his fleet, disheartened by this calamity, and 
perceiving that their utmost efforts to come to cióse fighting were 
ineffectual, retired into the canal of Sluys*. 
The marquis of Spinola was at this time employed in raising 
troops in Italy, and still entertained the hopes of being able to 
carry his first design into execution; but his brother's death, 
* Mcteren, Bcntivoglio, &c. 
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joined to the weakness of the Spanish fleet at Sluys, obliginghim 
to abandon it, he now resolved to turn his attention from the sea 
to the land service, and with this intention he returned to the 
Netherlands, where the archduke was disposed to give him every 
mark of esteem and confidence. 
This prince had never before stood so much in need of the 
counsel and assistance of his friends, The promises of money 
made him by the court of Spain had been only in part fulfilled, 
and the mutinous spirit of his troops, occasioned by his inability 
to pay their arrears, had risen to the greatest height. 
They had no sooner retreated after their repulse in attempting 
to raise the siege of Grave, ^ than almost all the Italians, except 
Mutiny and those who were commanded by the marquis of Spinola, 
desertion. refuse(j to obey the order which the admiral of Arragon 
had issued for their marching towards Maestricht, and withdrew 
themselves in a body from the camp. They were accompanied 
by several officers of experience and abilities, and by these men 
were conducted towards Hochstrate, a fortified town in Brabant, 
of which, as they carne upon the garrison by surprise, they easily 
acquired possession. Their number having been augmented by 
other mutineers, who flocked to them frora every quarter, soon 
amounted to three thousand foot and two thousand horse, and 
almost the whole of them were veteran soldiers, distinguished for 
their knowledge of military discipline. Having chosen an elect, 
or leader, and filled up from among themselves the places of all 
such officers as had not joined in the mutiny, they established, 
with general consent, a system of regulations which they judged 
necessary for their safety and preservation, after which they 
applied themselves to strengthen the fortification of the town, 
and then sent out parties to lay the inhabitants of the adjacent 
country under contributions. Emboldened by their numbers, 
they made incursions into the interior and more distant parts of 
the province, and when the péople refused to comply with their 
exorbitant demands, they laid waste the country, and indulged 
themselves in every species of injury and outrage. This populous 
and fertile province had long been exposed to the inroads of the 
troops of the United States; but they had never been treated 
with so great cruelty by the enemy as, on this occasion, by the 
troops which had been hired for their defence. 
The archduke having convened the states to delibérate 
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concerning a proper remedy for these disorders, he was urged by 
that assembly to employ whatever money could be raised to give 
the soldiers immediate satisfaction with regard to their arrears, 
because without this they represented that the country must be 
involved in utter ruin. 
But Albert, conscious that he had not funds sufficient at once 
to satisfy the mutineers, and to pay the arrears due to his other 
troops ; and judging, from past experienee, that unless he could 
satisfy them all, the example of those who had mutinied would 
be quickly followed by their companions. for this reason he 
entertained some doubt of the prudence of the advice which the 
states had given him, and declined complying with it, t i l l he 
should know the sentiments of the court of Spain. 
That court ought to have been sensible of the folly of expecting 
Misconduct 1^3^ 1 discipline could be maintained among troops, 
of the Spa- especially foreign troops, uninterested in the issue of 
msh court. war? when their pay was withheld from them. 
They ought, long before this time, to have perceived the absurdity 
of keeping an army on foot, which they were unable to support. 
They ought, on the present occasion, to have resolved to reduce 
the number of their troops, and to rest satisfied with a defensivo 
war, or, by greater economy at home, to enable themselves to 
make more liberal remittances to the archduke, or to have put 
an end to the war, by empowering him to grant to the United 
States such terms of peace as they were willing to accept. But, 
instead of adopting any of these measures, which prudence and 
necessity required, they resolved that, for an example to the rest 
of the army, the mutineers ought to be reduced to obedience by 
forcé, and for this end they gave orders for levying several new 
régiments with the utmost possible expedition. It does not 
appear that the archduke was dissatisfied with this resolution of 
the Spanish council, and he instantly applied himself to carry it 
into execution. More than half a year was .spent in raising the 
troops, and making the other necessary preparations; and during 
all that time, the people of Brabant were exposed to the violence 
and depredations of the mutineers. In order to intimídate them, 
Albert published an edict of proscription, in which he declared, i f 
they did not return to their duty in three days after receiving the 
copy of the edict which he sent them, they should be considered 
as rebels to his government, and be all put to the sword without 
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mercy. To this edict the mutineers published an answer, 
expressed iri the most contemptuous terms. They were more 
than ever exasperated, and they resolved that, rather than submit 
to a prince, by whom they thought their services were so 
ungratefully requited, they would enter into the service of the 
United States, and make him feel the weight of their resentment. 
Agreeably to this resolution they sent a deputation of their 
January 2 , number to Prince Maurice, to inquire whether, in case 
1604. were attacked by the archduke's forces, he would 
afford them his protection. Maurice, conformably to his conduct 
on a former occasion, gave them the most gracious reception, and 
Spanish agreed that, in case they should be obliged to abandon 
notaetaT Hochstrate, they might retire with safety under the 
by Maurice. walls of Breda, Bergen op Zoom, or Swenberg. H e 
likewise permitted them to parchase provisions in these towns, 
and left them ground to hope that, i f Albert should not be 
induced to treat them with greater lenity, he would exert himself 
to the utmost in their behalf. 
The United States considered this mutiny as the most 
fortúnate event that could have happened, because it would 
greatly retard the archduke's operations in the siege of Ostend, 
and prevent him from engaging in any new enterprize during the 
present campaign. They highly approved therefore of the 
prince's conduct with regard to the mutineers, and empowered 
him to enter into a formal treaty with them, of which the 
following were the principal conditions; that, in retum for his 
assistance against the Spaniards, they would serve in his army 
for the rest of the campaign; and farther, that in the case 
of an accommodation with the archduke, they would not carry 
arms for four months against the United Provinces. The states 
believed that this treaty could not expose them to the imputation 
of acting ungenerously towards an enemy, whose whole conduct 
in the war they regarded as tyrannical and unjust; and they 
thought themselves justified for fomenting the mutiny, by the 
practico of most nations, and particularly of the Spaniards 
themselves, who on all occasions encouraged desertion from the 
armies of their enemy. 
The archduke was greatly alarmed whenhereceivedintelligence 
of this transaction, and, being at the same time more than ever 
incensed against the mutineers, he collected his troops with th« 
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greatest expedition which the state of his affairs would pennit, 
and sent them, under the command of Frederick, count of Berg, 
to lay siege to Hochstrate. These troops amounted to seven 
thousand foot, and three thousand horse; and, as Hochstrate 
was but indifferently fortified, he must have soon compelled the 
mutineers to lay down their arms ; but prince Maurice, already 
prepared to fulfil his agreement with the mutineers, advanced 
towards him with a superior army, which he had assembled at 
Gertrudenberg, and before the count had time to make any 
July 10. progress in the siege, obliged him to retire into the 
interior parts of the province. 
Maurice followed him for some time, but finding it impossible 
to overtake him, without entering too far into the enemy^s 
country, he suddenly returned and laid siege to Bois le Duc. H e 
had lately given the mutineers a proof of the trust which he 
reposed in them, by entering their camp with only seven or 
eight of his attendants; and, on the present occasion, he gave 
them a farther proof of confidence, by employing them equally 
with his own troops in the operations of the siege. 
The archduke, extremely anxious for the preservation of Bois 
Bois le Duc le Duc, which he considered as one of the most 
besieged by important frontier towns, sent a reinforcement of troops 
Maurice. to the count of Berg, and ordered him to march without 
delay to its relief. The counfs army was now nearly equal 
to that of the enemy, and he arrived in time to seize an 
important station adjacent to the town, which Prince Maurice 
had not found leisure to secure. F rom this station he could 
easily introduce whatever reinforcements or supplies were 
necessary. Bu t the inhabitants, having hitherto successfully 
defended the place without the assistance of the Spaniards, were 
utterly averse to the admission of regular forces. The count 
laboured to persuade them that their preservation entirely 
depended on admitting them, but they refused to listen to his 
request; and Prince Maurice still entertained the hopes of being 
able to bring the siege to the desired conclusión. 
A t length the archduke, having come himself to Bois le Duc, 
endeavoured, but in vain,to overeóme the obstinacyof the citizens, 
ti l l having obtained their permission to suffer a body of Walloons 
to pass through the town, under the pretext of their being 
necessary to oppose the enemy on the other side, he called them 
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together, while the Walloons were within the walls, and once 
more represented to them the necessity of yielding to his desire, 
i f they meant to preserve their religión and their liberty. They 
remained still as averse as eyer to his proposal; but believing that, 
while so great a number of his troops were within the town, it 
would be in vain to refuse their consent, they agreed with much 
reluctance to admit a garrison of three thousand regular forces ; 
and at the same time a large supply of stores and provisions was 
introduced. 
The two armies continued for some time longer in sight of each 
other, and several skirmishes passed between them with various 
suceess. A t length Prince Maurice despairing, on account of the 
approach of winter, to bring the siege to the desired issue, 
abandoned his entrenchments, and retired in good order to some 
distance from the town. There he remained a whole day, in 
expectation that the enemy might nowbe induced to risk a battle; 
but being informed, that so far from intending this, they had, as 
soon as he left his entrenchments, directed their march towards 
the interior parta of the province, he broke up his camp, and put 
his troops into winter-quarters. 
To the mutineers, who represented to him that Hochstrate 
was too small for their accommodation, he assigned the town of 
Grave, of which he himself was lord paramount, retaining the 
citadel in his own hands, and rcquiring that Hochstrate should 
be put into his possession. H e likewise entered on this occasion 
into a new agreement with them; the conditions of which they 
continued religiously to fulfil t i l l the following year, when the 
archduke, standing much in need of their assistance, and dread-
ing that many of his other troops were about to join them, 
found it necessary to grant them an act of indcmnity for all past 
offences, together with full and immediate payment of their 
arreara *. 
In the conree of the transactions related in this book an 
Dcath and ímportant event happened, ¡n which both the contend-
•taJÜL** ing powere were equally interested; the death of Eliza-
qneen of beth, queen of England. This great princesa, whoso 
Engiand, j-úgn was go long and prosperous, had through her 
whole life enjoyed uninterrupted health, which she had been 
• Van Metercn, lib. M T . XXTÍ. BentiToglio, part iii. lib. r i i . PUaecii Chronica, 
an. 1603. 
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careful to preserve by regular exercise, and the strictest tempe-
ranee. But towards the end of the preceding year, having been 
seized with a cold, which confined her for Beveral days, she 
found her strength considerably impaired; and, in the hopea of 
deriving benefit from a chango of air, she removed from West-
minster to Richmond; but there she grew daily worse, could 
neither sleep ñor eat as usual, and though her pulse was regular, 
she complained of a burning heat in her stomach, and a per-
petual thirst. Both her looks and spirits had from the begin-
ning been greatly affected : business of every kind had become 
an intolerable burden to her ; and at length she sunk into a 
deep melancholy, expressing the anguish of her mind by tears 
and groans, and obstinately refusing nourishment, as well as all 
Hume's the medicines which the physicians prescribed for her 
History. rccovery. This melancholy might have entirely pro-
ceeded from her bodily indisposition, although, from some late 
discoveries, there is ground to believe that it was greatly 
heightened, i f not principally occasioned, by remorse and grief 
conceived on account of her having ordered the execution of 
her favourite, the earl of Essex. But to whatever cause her 
dejection of mind was owing, it preyed upon her exhausted 
frame, and in a few weeks put a period to her life, in the seven-
tieth year of her age, and the forty-fifth of her reign. 
It is not surprising that we meet with such contradictory 
descriptions of the character of this princess in the cotemporary 
historians, whose passions were too much inflamed to suffer 
them to judge impartially of her character : but it would seem 
impossible for any person, who is not blinded by prejudice, to 
refuse her a place among the most illustrious princes of whom 
we read either in ancient or in modera times. 
She was not indeed exempt from the imperfections that are 
incident to humanity, and she was subject to several of those 
weaknesses which characterise her sex. She cannot be vindi-
cated from the imputation of female vanity, and the love of 
admiration on account of her exterior accomplishments. W o 
should have loved her more i f she had been more gentle and 
indulgent, less imperious and violent, and more candid and 
sincere. F rom natural temper, her passions of every kind were 
strong and vehement, and, among her courtiers, they sometimos 
betrayed her into improprieties ; but they were almost never 
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permitted to influence her public conduct, which was uniformly 
regulated by the principies of prudence, and a regard for the 
public good; even her ambition was controlled and governed 
by these principies, of which she gave a rare and signal proof, 
when she refused to accept of the sovereignty of the United 
Provinces. Her penetration and sagacity, her prudence and 
foresight, her intrepidity in the midst of danger, her activity 
and vigour, her steadiness and perseverance, and her wise 
economy, which prompted her to save every unnecessary 
expense, however small, while i t permitted and enabled her to 
undergo the greatest, when necessity required; these qualities 
in her character, which are acknowledged by her enemies, as 
well as her admirers, no prince, of whom we read in history, 
appears to have possessed in a more eminent degree. 
Few princes have been placed in so difficult circumstances, or 
have had so many, and such formidable enemies to oppose ; yet 
almost no prince ever enjoyed a reign so long and prosperous. 
Whi le the neighbouring nations were almost continually involved 
in the calamities of war, she was able, notwithstanding the un-
remitted attempts of her foreign enemies, and her popish 
subjects, to preserve her dominions in almost uninterrupted 
peace. Ñor did her own subjects only reap the fruits of her 
great abilities, but her friends were everywhere supported and 
protected by her power; while her enemies, though possessed of 
much greater resources, were either checked and restrained, or 
humbled and overeóme. Without her judicious interposition, 
the reformation in Scotland must have been extinguished; a 
race of popish princes must have inherited the crovvn of that 
kingdom; and the diíference of religión there, and in England, 
joined to the hereditary right of the Scottish princes to the 
English throne, whilst it must have preved a copious source of 
discord, would long have prevented the unión of two nations, 
which must have often been unhappy while they remained 
divided, and were, by nature, destined to be one. Ñor were 
the benefits which mankind derived from her wise and active 
reign confined to B r i t a i n ; but it is likewise probable, that 
without her aid and her exertions, the protestants in France 
must have been extirpated ; the best and greatest of the French 
monarchs must have been excluded from the throne; France 
itself must have sunk under the Spanish yoke; the republic of 
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the United Provinces must have been crushed in its infancy; 
and an overgrown and enormous power established, which must 
have overwhelmed the liberties of Europe, and prolonged the 
reign of ignorance, bigotry, and superstition. 
Her death gave equal sorrow to the Dutch as it afíbrded joy 
to the archdukes and the court of Spain. The former were 
thereby deprived of a powerful friend, who had often supported 
them in the time of their distress; whereas the latter were 
delivered from a determined enemy, by whom they had been 
long controlled in all their enterprises. 
The afíliction of the former was the more sincere, because 
they had ground to suspect that Elizabeth's successor had not 
the same favourable sentiments of their cause, ñor the same 
James I ^60*^011 ^or their republic, as the cpieen had enter-
king of tained. James, though of a gentle and indulgent 
Engiand, ^einperj ayerse to the cxcrcise of despotic power, had 
conceived the most extravagant notions of the ineasure of obe-
dience due from subjects to their prince; and, being naturally 
open and unreserved, had, on some occasions, condemned the 
conduct of the United States, and given them the ñame of 
rebels to their rightful sovereign. The court of Spain, desirous 
to conciliate his favour, had, before the death of Elizabeth, 
made him an offer of their assistance to vindicate his right to 
the English crown, in case he should meet with opposition. 
Intelligence of the queen's death had no sooner reached the 
Netherlands than the archduke, considering the war with Eng-
land as at an end, had issued a proclamation, forbidding all 
hostilities against the subjects of the king of England, and 
ordering all the Scotch and English prisoners to be set at 
liberty *. The like orders were issued by the court of Spain. 
And , in return to these advances, James, by proclamation, 
recalled the letters of marque which had been granted against 
the Spaniards, by Elizabeth. 
From these concurring circumstances, the states perceived 
how little ground they had to hope for the friendship of the 
English monarch. They resolved, however, that nothing should 
be wanting on their part, which might induce him to chango 
his sentiments, and, for this end, they sent a solemn embassy, 
* See Gonsalez Davila. 
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at the head of which were the celebrated Barnevelt, lord of 
Tempel, and prince Henry Frederick, brother to prince Maurice, 
to congratúlate him on his accession, and to solicit his renewing 
the alliance which had subsisted between thera and Elizabeth, 
These ambassadors, on their arrival in London, found that 
Ambassa- ^ e suspicions which the states had entertained of the 
H ^ / d"1 ^jnS,s prejudice against them, were but too well founded. 
France, ánd James still continued to employ the same disrespectful 
t h l d ^ language, when he spoke of their republic, as formerly; 
ofGieat nor could they at first obtain an audience. After 
Bntain, 8omG delay, they were at length admitted into his 
presence, through the persuasión of his English counsellors. 
But though Barnevelt exerted all his eloquence, which he pos-
sessed in so eminent a degree, to make him sensible of the 
danger to. which Britain would be exposed, if, by withholding 
his assistance, he should suífer the United Provinces to fall back 
again under the dominión of Spain, he could only draw from 
him a general and vague reply : " That he had not, at present, 
leisure to consider fully of the subject which had been proposed 
to his consideration, and would not, therefore, now declare what 
resolution he should form ; but he was himself desirous to live 
at peace with them, and all his neighbours ; and, in case they 
would imítate his example, he would cheerfully employ his good 
offices to procure them peace with Spain, upon reasonable 
terms." 
It sufficiently appeared from this reply, that the plan of 
conduct which the king had formed, was extremely different 
from that which had been pursued by his predecessor; and the 
ambassadors would have immediately returned home, in despair 
of being able to interest him in their behalf, had not they been 
in daily expectation of the arrival of the French ambassador; 
through whose intercession they hoped that James might be 
induced to lend a more favourable ear to their request. 
Henry had appointed for his ambassador to England, on this 
occasion, the marquis of Rosni *, whom, on account of his supe-
rior talents and fidelity, he esteemed the most of all his min-
ísters. No subject had ever performed more important services 
to his prince; and Henry could not, without great inconveni-
• Afterward» duke of Sul l j . 
1603.] P H I L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 81 
ence, spare a minister so necessary to him in the administration 
of his kingdom. But from various reports, which were propa-
gated at this time, he had conceived a suspicion that James 
might be persuaded to enter into an alliance with the court of 
Spain, and no person he believed was more likely to engage 
him to alter his intention than Rosni, whom he highly respected 
on account of his inviolable attachment to the protestant reli-
gión, and used to celébrate as the greatest statesman in Europe. 
James was highly pleased with Henry^ choice of his ambas-
sador, and received him with more than ordinary marks of 
distinction and regard. It had been reported to him by some 
of the partisans of Spain, that Henry, and even Rosni himself, 
had spoken disrespectfully of his character * ; and James so 
far descended from his dignity as to mention what he had 
heard to the raarquis: but the impression which it had made 
upon him was easily effaced ; and Rosni, from his first audience, 
conceived the hopes of being able to accomplish the object of 
his embassy. 
A party among the English ministers were, not without rea-
son, suspected to be attached to the interests of Spain; and 
others, dreading the difficulties which they must encounter in 
providing funds for carrying on the war, were averse to all 
engagements either to France or the states-general. F rom 
these men, the proposals of the French monarch met with 
considerable opposition. But the ambassador, having been 
admitted by the king to a prívate audience, and having ex-
plained to him at full length his master's views, which he 
showed were all calculated to promote the general interest of 
Europe, and the security of the protestant religión, whereas 
the court of Spain were daily giving fresh proofs of the raost 
inordinate and turbulent ambition ; he had the address to con-
vince him, that a regard to the safety of his dominions, as well 
as the interest of his religión, EÉiquired that he should join 
himself with France, and resolve to support the United Pro-
vmces. A treaty of alliance to this purpose was accordingly 
drawn up, and soon after signed and ratified ; of which the fol-
lowing were the principal articles. 
That the two kings should mutually contribute their assist-
* If was reported to him, that Henry had called hiin captain of arts. and clerlí of armi. 
O 
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ance to prevent the Dutch froni being overpowered by the 
Spaniards ; that, for this purpose, a sufficient number of troops 
should be levied within the dominions of the king of England, 
and sent from thence to the Netherlands as soon as possible; 
that the whole expense of these troops should be defrayed by 
the king of Franco, but that the half* of what he advanced 
should be deducted from the debt which he owed to Elizabeth. 
It was resolved, that in order to avoid an open rupture with 
the court of Spain, the utmost secrecy should be observed in 
levying the troops, and in transporting them to the continent; 
but it was agreed, that in case these transactions could not be 
concealed, and the Spaniards, in revenge for the assistance 
aíforded to the Dutch, should attack either, or both of the 
contracting princes, they should mutually assist each other, and 
fumish such a number of troops, to be employed by sea or land, 
as should be judged sufficient for their mutual defence, and the 
preservation of the United Provinces f. 
James immediately fulfilled his parts of this agreement, by 
giving secret orders to the lord Buccleugh to raise a body of 
two thousand men in Scotland; who, some months after, were 
sent over to join the army of the states 
The archdukes and the court of Spain were greatly alarmed, 
1604. when they heard of the kind reception which the king 
had given to the French ambassador, and they suspected that 
some treaty had been concluded between them. It does not, 
however, appear that they received particular intelligence of the 
purport of i t ; and they still entertained the hopes of being able 
to fix James in their interest. 
The archdukes had early sent over the count D^remberg , as 
their ambassador, to congratúlate him on his accession ; and 
soon after Don John de Taxis, count of V i l l a Mediana, arrived 
in the same capacity from Spain. It was commonly believed 
that the former of these noblemen, who was esteemed as a 
soldier, but was extremely i l l qualified for his present employ-
ment, had, soon after his arrival in England, given his counte-
nance to a conspiracy, formed by the lords Grey, Cobham, sir 
• Grotius says two thirds. 
f Sully's Mcmoirs, book xvi. Carte's History of England. 
X Carte and Meteren ; Vittorio Siri, tom. i. p. 148. For the precise mm due to Eliza-
b«th, vide Sully, book xxi. near the beginuing. 
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Walter Raleigh, and others, for subverting the present govern-
ment, and raising Arabella Stuart to the throne. It would 
seem that he had, at least, lent an ear to the conspirators, 
without thinking it incumbent on him to communicate their 
intention to the king's ministers ; and by this imprudent conduct 
he rendered himself so obnoxious to James, that, in his hands, 
no treaty of agreement with his" master could have succeeded. 
But James was still as much as ever bent on peace with Spain, 
ñor had he meant to preclude himself from concluding it by his 
treaty of alliance with the French monarch. 
Taxis left no art untried to confirm him in this pacific dis-
position; and, at the same time, laboured to remo ve those pre-
judices against the Spaniards which he had long entertained, 
and had been lately awakened by count D'Aremberg's concern 
in the conspiracy. H e was warmly seconded by the queen, who, 
being attached to the Spanish interest, had conceived the desire 
of having the young prince, her son, married to the infanta; and, 
by bribes and promises, it was believed, he had gained over a 
considerable party of the English counsellors. 
The French king and the states-general thought they had 
much reason to dread the influence of such powerful agents, and 
they employed all their interest to counteract them, and to 
divert the king from his intention. James gave them repeated 
assurances, that Henry should have no ground to complain of 
him for any breach of the alliance into which he had so lately 
entered, ñor the states for being inattentive to their interest; 
but the present situation of his affairs, he told them, rendered 
it necessary for him to put an end to the Spanish war. 
He accordingly gave orders to his ministers for holding con-
ferences for this purpose, with the Spanish and Flemish ambas-
sadors, and in the mean time caused an entire stop to be put to 
all hostilities. 
Those appointed by the archdukes were D'Aremberg, and 
Richard of Verreicken ; and Rouida, a senator of Milán, had 
come over to the assistance of Taxis. 
The letter which Taxis brought to James from the king of 
Spain was addressed to him not in the usual style, To our 
Brother, but to our Cousin; and, in enumerating James's titles, 
though Franco was mentioned, Ireland was omitted. James 
laughed at the latter of these absurdities, into which he sup-
Q 2 
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posed the Spanish court had been led, by their complaisanoe to 
the pope, who had published a bull, declaring Ireland to be a 
fief of the holy see ; but he sharply expressed his resentment at 
the term Cousin. 
It soon appeared that the claims of the two nations on each 
other, were but few in number. No conquests had been made 
by either of the two parties, which the other could insist to have 
restored; and neither of them claimed an indemnification for 
the expenses of the war; but there were tvvo points which were 
difficult to be adjusted, and occasioned the holding of many con-
ferences. The Spaniards, on the one hand, insisted that James 
should engage to prevent his subjeets from entering for the 
future into the service of the United States; and he, on the 
other, required that they should enjoy the liberty of trade to the 
Indios. 
The Spanish ambassador represented, that his raaster expected 
to find in his Britannic majesty, a good and faithful ally ; and 
hoped to have formed an offensive and defensivo alliance with 
h im; but i f he was still determined, in imitation of his prede-
cessor, to give assistanee to the rebels in the Netherlands, it was 
impossible but the catholic king must consider him rather as an 
enemy than a friend. The English comraissioners replied, that 
their master could not now regard the Dutch in the light of 
rebels; their sovereignty had been acknowledged by some of the 
greatest princes in Europe, and the king had, on his accession, 
found so cióse a connexion subsisting between them and his 
English subjeets as could not be dissolved without considerable 
prejudice to his kingdom: he was therefore resolved to permit 
them to make levies within his dominions as formerly ; but as 
he intended to observe a strict neutrality, he was ready to grant 
the same permission to the archdukes and the king of 
Peace be- i i. i 
tween Spain Spain, and farther to engage that he should not send 
andE"gland any of his own troops to the assistanee of the states, 
ñor furnish them either with money or with military stores. 
The Spanish commissioners finding, after several conferences, that 
all their remonstrances on this. head preved ineffectual, were 
obliged to acquiesce in the king's proposal. 
The other article above mentioned, which related to the India 
trade, was the subject of several conferences, and of great alter-
cation between the commissioners. The Spaniards maintained 
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that, as they were the first discoverers of the Indies, and theii 
right to these countries liad been confirmed by the sovereign 
pontiff, no other nation was entitled to trade there without their 
permission; that for weighty reasons they had refused to grant 
this permission, not only to the king of Franco in the treaty of 
Vervins, but likewise to the emperor, and to the archdukes; 
that these reasons still subsisted, and therefore they must not 
only decline granting it to the English, but insist that the king 
of England shall, by proclamation, prohibit all his subjects from 
continuing to trade in India, as they had done for some years 
past. 
This chimerical pretensión was treated by the English com-
missioners with the contempt which it merited: the Spaniards 
themselves had traded to many parts of India, besides those 
where they had established their dominión; and no reason could 
be given why the English should not enjoy the same liberty. 
James peremptorily refused to publish the prohibition which 
was requested of him. His subjects had for many years been 
in possession of the India trade, and he resolved that they 
should not be deprived of it by any article in the present 
treaty. 
The disputes on this subject rose to so great a height, as to 
give ground to apprehend that the conferences would havo 
preved abortivo; but, as both parties were eagerly bent on 
peace, it was at length proposed that no mention whatever 
should be made of the Indies in the treaty, and to this proposal 
they both yielded their consent. 
A l l the other articles were easily adjusted ; but as Taxis had 
not plenipotentiary powers, the signing of it was delayed for 
some time longer. This however had been reserved for Don 
John de Velasco, duke of Frías , and constable of Castile, who 
several months before had come to Brussels, in his way to 
England, but had remained t i l l now in Flanders, either on 
account of his health, which was the excuse he offered for his 
delay, or, as was suspected by the English, because he judged it 
to be incompatible with his dignity to come over to England 
til l he knew that peace would certainly be concluded. H e had 
requested the English monarch to send his commissioners to 
treat with him in the Netherlands; but James declined com-
plying with this request, because the catholic king, he said, had 
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first offered to send his ambassador to England, and he chose to 
have the treaty carried on under his own eye *. 
Velasco arrived at Dover on the oth of August, and was from 
thence conducted by some English noblemen, sent to receive him, 
with great pomp, to London. The treaty was signed on the 
19th of August, and next day was ratified by the k ingf . The 
publication of it gave general satisfaction both to the Spanish 
and English nations; but was unaceeptable to the English 
sailors, because they alone, by the numerous captures they had 
made, had derived any advantage from the war 
During the course of these negociations, the war in the 
Netherlands was carried on with more than ordinary vigour. 
The siege of Ostend had lasted for more than two years and a 
half, and the besiegers, during all that time, had exerted their 
utmost strength and s k i l l ; yet so vigorous was the opposition 
which they received from the garrison, that they had not been 
able to make any considerable impression on the place. Those 
huge machines, above-mentioned, which were intended for block-
ing up the canal, were no sooner brought within reach of the 
artillery of the town, than, by the well-directed shot of the 
bosieged, they were either demolished or set on fire. The 
besieged too made innumerable sallies, in which they displayed 
the most determined intrepidity, and completed the destruction 
of such parts of the Spanish works as could not be reached by 
the artillery. 
The principal engineer employed in constructing these works 
was Pompeo Targoné, an Italian, who possessed an inventive 
genius, but had never t i l l now enjoyed an opportunity of reduc-
ing his theoriesto practico. Of this mans ingenuity the archduke 
unfortunately entertained too favourable an opinión, and was 
thus too easily induced to approve of projects which, on trial, 
were found impracticable, but were attended in the execu-
tion with immense expense. H i s machines were all con-
structed at some distance from the town, but when they were 
brought forward to the places where they were to be used, they 
were exposed, either to the violence of the tide, or to the fire of 
* Carte, Stilly, Bcaiimont, Mcteren, and Siri Mcm. recondite, tom. i . p. 200, &c. 
f It was r.ot till the following year tbat the earl of Nottingham, lord bigh admiral, wa» 
gent to Madrid to witness the notification of this treaty, by the kingof Spain. 
* For farthcr particulars rclating to thU treaty, «ce Appcndix A . 
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the besieged ; and it often happened that works were in a few 
hours destroyed, or rendered us^ess, on which the labour of 
many weeks had been employed. 
The archduke carne at length to be undeceived in the expec-
tations which he had formed of the success of thes£ works. H i s 
patience was now greatly exhausted; and he began to suspect 
that the repeated disappointments which he had met with must 
be in a great measure owing to the want of skill or of vigour, 
on the part of those to whom he had committed the conduct of 
the siego. 
The marquis of Spinola had been only a few months in the 
Netherlands, and, t i l l his arrival there, had never witnessed any 
military operations ; yet Albert, with the consent of the court 
of Spain, resolved to devolve on him the command of the army, 
The com- and the prosecution of this siege, in which the strenuous 
thTspanish ^ 0 1 ' ^ of his most exporienced coramanders had been of 
army given so little avail. In forming this resolution, it was 
quis of Spi- generally believed that, in the issue, he would find that 
uola. he had been betrayed into still greater iraprudence 
than when he reposed such undeserved confidence in the 
abilities of Targoné, and many of his officers were greatly 
incensed at a cholee so expressive of his distrust in their 
abilities; but having conceived a high admiration of Spinola, 
partly on account of his spirited conduct in some enterprises of 
small importance in which he had been engaged, and partly 
from the prudence and sagacity, of which he had given proof as 
often as he had consulted him on the conduct of the war, Albert 
persisted in his resolution, and was justified by the event. 
Spinola was highly pleased with so flattering a distinction, 
but could not avoid feeling much anxiety when the archduke 
communicated to him his intention. H e hesitated for some 
time whether to accept, at so critical a juncture, of so important 
a command; in which, instead of acquiring fame, he might, at 
his very entrance upon the military life, expose himself to so 
great a risk of incurring censure and reproach : and therefore, 
before he agreed to the archduke's proposal, he convened toge-
ther such of the officers as he confided in, and desired them 
deliberately to consider whether it was practicable to bring the 
siege of Ostend to the desired conclusión. 
These men differed widely from each other in their sentiincntf" 
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on the subject, and only contributed to increase his perplexity. 
But, being conscious of resoj^ces within himself, of which those 
vvho attempted to dissuade mm could form no conception, his 
hopes and his arabition at length prevailed over bis doubts and 
fears, and determined him to accept of the command. 
The failure of many enterprises, he believed, had been greatly 
owing to the mutinous spírit of the troops, occasioned by the 
irregularity of their pay; and to remedy this evil was the first 
object to which he applied his attention. Upon inquiry, he 
found that large sums of money had been misapplied, or embez-
zled by those who liad the care of the military chest. These 
persons he dismissed frora their employments, and substituted 
others, upon a plan of greater economy, in their room. But he 
still perceived that the military funds were too small to enable 
him to keep the troops in good huraour, and at the same time 
to carry on successfully all the expensive operations of the siege, 
Of the truth of this, he spared no pains to convinee the archduke 
and the Spanish ministers; and, in the meantime, t i l l they 
should devise expedients for furnishing him with more ampie 
supplies, he pledged his prívate fortune for such considerable 
sums as put it in his power to give instant satisfaction to the 
troops. 
In conducting the operations of the siege, his deference for 
the judgment of the archduke determined him to persist for 
sorae time longer in the attempt, which had cost so much 
expense of blood and labour, to intercept the navigation of the 
canal; and, in order to fonn the intended dyke, and batteries 
on the banks of it, great quantities of stones and earth and 
other materials were brought from a distance, on floats or rafts 
constructed by Targoné. But this work, being exposed both to 
the fire and the sallies of the besieged, advanced slowly. It 
could not be finished, he perceived, for many months; and even 
when it should be finished, though it would render the naviga-
tion of the canal more difficult to the Dutch ships, yet many of 
them, he foresaw, by taking advantage of the night, and winds 
and tides, might elude his batteries, and the garrison still con-
tinué to receive supplies. In order to prevent this, Targoné 
had, with the archduke's approbation, begun to erect, on large 
boats strongly bound together, a huge floating castle, which he 
proposed to station in the mouth of the canal, and to plant it 
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vvith cannon. But Spinola considered this project as chimerical. 
A pile so huge and unwieldy could not, he suspected, be brought 
from the place, where the engineer was employed in building it, 
to the mouth of the canal; although it should be found prac-
ticable to do this, yet the machine would not long resist the 
violence of the tide; and unless a dyke of an extraordinary 
height and strength could be raised to shelter-it, it would soon 
be demolished by the artillery of the town. 
Determined by these motives, Spinola abandoned the design 
of blocking up the canal, and resolved henceforth to employ his 
whole strength in carrying on the siege by mines, batteries, and 
assaults. The archduke, notwithstanding the repulse which he 
had met with in the assault above related, would, on the second 
day after, have resumed his attempt, if the troops, discontented 
with his treatment of them on that occasion, had not refused to 
obey. But the whole army was now under the most perfect dis-
cipline, and having no longer any ground to complain of their 
want of pay, they were ready to give every proof of their attach-
ment to their general, from whom they had received so much 
greater attention than had formerly been shown them. Encou-
raged by this disposition of his army, Spinola issued his orders 
for a general assault, in the same quarter where the former one 
had failed, at the small canal which encompassed the fortifica-
tions on the west. In order to inspire his troops with emulation, 
he divided them into four battalions ; one of which was entirely 
composed of Germans, the second of Spaniards, the third of 
Italians, and the fourth of Walloons, and other soldiers raised 
in the county of Burgundy. Great quantities of materials had 
been provided for forming dykes across the canal, at those parts 
where he intended the troops should pass; and the forémost 
ranks were ordered to carry before them a sort of rampart 
formed of twigs and faggots, to screen them from the fire of the 
enemy's small arms in their approach. 
The garrison, having received intelligence of his design, were 
well prepared for their defence; and the assailants had no 
sooner entered the canal, than they began a dreadful fire upon 
them, both with their small arms and their artillery. Great 
numbers fell, notwithstanding the precautions which had been 
taken: still, however, they continued to ad vanee. The W a l -
loons having been ptationed farthest from the sea, where the 
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canal was of the smallest depth, were the first who arrived on 
the other side, and the rest of the army quickly followed. The 
garrison*still maintained their ground, and kept up an incessant 
fire, by which the bravest of the assailants fell in heaps above 
one another. Spinola was in the midst of his troops, giving 
orders, and exhorting them to persevere. They were animated 
by his example as well as his exhortations; and it being now 
become more dangerous to retreat than to advance, they 
hastened forward with the most desperate intrepidity, and 
attacked the ravelins and half-moons which defended the coun-
terscarp. The garrison withstood their fury for some time; but 
at length, after great numbers had fallen on both sides, they 
were compelled to abandon their outworks, and retire within the 
ditch. 
Spinola could not at this time attempt, with safety, to pro-
eeed any farther in the attack; but having covered his men 
from the enemy's fire, he immediately began, by working 
trenches, to make still nearer approaches to the place *. 
The states-general were in the meantime deliberating whether 
to attempt to raise the siege, by marching the army to Ostend; 
or to undertake some new conquest on the coast of Flanders, by 
which the loss of Ostend, which they had now more reason to 
dread than ever, might be compensated. After mature delibe-
ration, the latter of these measures was adopted, as the easiest 
to be carried into execution; and it was agreed to undertake 
the reduction of Sluys, which, as it lay nearer to the United 
Provinces, would prove in every respect a more valuable posses-
sion than Ostend. 
The troops were ordered to rendezvous at Williamstadt, 
where prince Manrice, attended by the deputies of the states, 
arrived on the 24th of A p r i l ; and next day he set sail with 
upwards of twelve thousand men for the isle of Cadsant, which 
is separated from Sluys by the great canal. Having disem-
barked without opposition, he soon reduced all the forts upon 
the island. From Cadsant, he passed over into that part of 
Flanders which lies to the eastward of Sluys, and laid siege to a 
strong fort called St. Catherine. The garrison of this fort 
having made a more vigorous resistan ce than he expected, he 
resolved, rather than be detained before it any longer, to leave 
* Buntivoglio, part iii. lib. vii. 
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it behind him in the enemy's possession, and gave orders for 
having his artillery drawn off in the middle of the night; but 
one of his cannon having sunk in a marsh, a great number of 
sailors were employed in raising it, who made so great a bustle 
and noise, that the garrison, believing the whole Dutch army to 
be at hand, and that they were removing their artillery to 
a more advantageous situation, in order to renew the attack, 
were seized with a panic, and fled precipitately towards Isen-
dyck. Of this unexpected event, the prince received intelligence 
next morning, when he took possession of the fort: and from 
thence he proceeded to Isendyck, Ardenbourg, and other places, 
all of which he easily compelled to surrender. 
In the meantime, Spinola, having been informed by Serrano, 
the governor of Sluys, of the danger which threatened him, sent 
him a reinforcement of three hundred men. W i t h this rein-
forcement, joined to as great a number of the garrison as could 
be spared, Serrano, who was an officer distinguished for his 
activity and enterprise, resolved to embrace the opportunity 
which the present distance of prince Maurice^ army afforded 
him, to make an attack on the isle of Cadsant. 
Had his design succeeded, he must have got possession of all 
the Dutch transports, together with their military stores, and 
thus have rendered it impracticable for Maurice to proceed in 
his intended enterprise against Sluys. Some companies of 
Scotch troops, which had been stationed in Cadsant, having no 
apprehension of danger, were oíf their guard, and Serrano had 
time to land six hundred of his men without opposition; but the 
Scots, having soon received intelligence of their landing, set out 
instantly to oppose them, and having come upon them before 
they were completely formed, attacked them with uncommon 
fury, and drove them back in great confusión to their boats. 
The prince had now subdued all the fortified places which lay 
to the east of Sluys, and was advancing westward, when he was 
met by Velasco, general of the archduke's cavalry, who had been 
sent to obstruct his progress. Velasco had posted his troops in 
a strong situation, near Dam, which stands on the canal of 
Bruges. H e had the good fortune, in the beginning, to repulse 
a party of the Dutch horse, who were sent before the rest of the 
army to attack his intrenchments; but the infantry coming up, 
he was overpowered by numbers. About eight hundred of his 
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men were killed and taken prisoners, and he hiraself, with the 
rest, was obliged to retire preeipitately towards Dara. 
After this success, Maurice, judging it unnecessary to lose 
time in laying siege to this fort, proceeded in his march, and, 
with little difficulty, made himself master of all the forts on the 
great canal, by which Sluys communicates with the sea; imrae-
diately after which he assigned their several stations to his troops 
in the neighbourhood of the town ; and began to form a line of 
cir&imvallation round the place, by working deep intrenchments, 
where the soil permitted, ca&ting bridges over the numberless 
little canals and rivulets, by which the ground is almost every 
where intersected, and fortifying the whole at certain distances 
with redoubts*. 
In these laborious operations several weeks were employed, 
and before the works were finished, the archduke found means, 
at different times, to reinforce the garrison with fifteen hundred 
men. Prince Maurice was not sorry for the introduction of 
Siege of these troops into the town. H e had received certain 
Sluys. intelligence that the stock of provisions in the place was 
not sufficient long to support so great a number; he had no 
intention to carry on the siege by batteries or assaults, and he 
hoped soon to be able to render the blockade so complete, as to 
prevent the entrance of supplies. 
The archduke, on the other hand, expected ere long to be able 
to raise the siege, and dreaded no danger but frora the weakness 
of the garrison. He was deeply sensible of the great importanco 
of Sluys, which, besides affording the most commodious retreat 
to the Spanish galleys, was conveniently situated for an invasión 
of the United Provinces, and enabled him to give great annoy-
ance to their trade. He could not, however, persuade himself to 
forego the fruits of his long continued labours before Ostend, by 
raising the siege of that place ; but he resolved, for some time, 
to suspend his operations there, and signified to Spinola, his 
desire that he should imraediately march to the relief of Sluys, 
leaving no more troops behind him than were sufficient to restrain 
the sallies of the garrison. 
Spinola, who was well acquainted with the character of prince 
• In order more deeply to impress tlie minds of his soldiers with a sense of the import-
anco of their prcsent enterprisc, Miinricc appointcd the 2l8t of May to be observed as a day 
of fasting and of prayer to the Almighty, for h¡« blessiiig upon their arms. 
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Mauríce, had a just sense of the difficulty of carrying the arch-
duke^ design into execution, and remonstrated against it as 
impracticable; but finding that Albert could not be prevailed on 
to alter his resolution, he agreed to accept of the command, upon 
condition that the officers of the greatest experience should 
accompany hira in the expedition. H e could hardly flatter hira-
self with the hopes of success, and he wished that others should 
partake in the censure which he was likely to incur. The arch-
duke readily consented to this proposal; and, being joined on 
this occasion by a great number of the mutineers, who had been 
persuaded to return to their duty, he began his march with six 
thousand foot, and two thousand horse, besides a train of artil-
lery, and a large convoy of provisions. 
The garrison of Sluys had already begun to sufler greatly from 
the want of wholesome food; and Serrano had repeatedly sent 
notice, that without a supply, he could not possibly hold out for 
raany days longer. Spinola therefore advanced towards Sluys 
with the utmost expedition; and, having received intelligence 
that the weakest part of the enemy^ lines was at a village called 
Tervarde, he made an attack upon them in that quarter, in the 
middle of the night. But the Dutch troops were prepared for 
his reception; and though he had taken every precaution to 
ensure success, he was obliged, after repeated attempts, to retire 
with considerable loss. 
H e then fetched a compass round by Ardenbourgh, and 
directed his march towards the isle of Cadsant, in the hopes of 
making himself master of that island, frora whence he might by 
water introduce provisions into Sluys. H e expected to have 
come upon the enemy in surprise, by fording the canal which 
separates Cadsant from Flanders on the east. But prince 
Maurice. having suspected his design, had planted a half-moon 
battery there, and stationed some select troops to dispute his 
passage, under count Wi l l i am of Nassau. Over these troops, 
Spinola at first gained some advantage, and drew them from the 
battery: but Maurice himself, coming up with fresh troops to 
their assistance, Spinola was, at length, obliged to 
Aug"st* abandon his attompt, after an obstinate contest, in 
which he suffered the loss of five hundred killed, and as many 
woundcd. 
Had not Spinola entered with reluctance on his present enter-
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prise, his prudence might justly have been impeq,ched; but as 
his disapprobation of it, and his diffidence of success were known 
to the enemy by intercepted letters, as it had been known from 
the beginning to his friends, and nothing had been wanting on 
his part to carry it into successful execution, it served, nofcwith-
standing his repulse, to heighten his character for military skill, 
and confirmed the archduke in the high opinión which he enter-
tained of his abilities. 
H e returned without delay to Ostend; and, on the second day 
August 19 a ^ e r ^a retreat, Serrano, the governor of Sluys, capi-
tulated upon honourable terms. His garrison amounted 
to four thousand men, besides a great number of slaves, who had 
formerly been employed on board the galleys; but his stock of 
Capituiation provisions had, several days before, been entirely con-
ofSiuys. gumed, and the strength of the soldiers was so much 
impaired, that more than sixty of them died on the road to Dam, 
which is only two hours march, from Sluys. 
B y one article of the capitulation, all the artillery and military 
stores, and by another, all the ships and ten Spanish galleys, 
which had so long infested the Dutch trade, were delivered into 
the hands of the conqueror. 
Fourteen hundred slaves, the greater part of whom were Turks, 
were set at l iberty; and as many of them chose to return to 
their native country, the United States, in order to concíllate 
the friendship of the Corsairs, treated them with great humanity 
while they remained in Holland, and afterwards sent them in 
Dutch ships to Barbary*. 
The glory which prince Maurice acquired from so important a 
conquest was greatly heightened by the comparison which men 
generally instituted between the rapidity of his progress, and the 
slowness of that of the Spaniards before Ostend. Judicious 
observers thought there was hardly room for this comparison, 
the two cases being extremely diíferent in the most important 
respects from each other; but i t was universally acknowledged 
that Maurice had, on no former occasion, discovered greater 
vigour and vigilance, or greater military skil l . 
The archduke, on the other hand, was severely mortified ; ñor 
was he entirely free from apprehensions of being ere long 
subjected to a still greater mortification, as a considerable part 
* Grotiu?, lib. xiii. Metercn, ati«l the Triumplit of Nassau. Bentivoglio, p. 3. cap. TÜ. 
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of the season fit for action still remained, and he expected that 
Maurice, whose army liad suffered almost no diminution, would 
next attempt to compel him to raise the siege of Ostend. In 
order to prevent this, which he would have considered as the 
greatest calamity that could befall him, he gave immediate orders 
for strengthening the fortifications of Dam, Blackenberg, and 
other places, by which the prince's army could approach. 
But Maurice had no intention of entering so far into an 
enemy's country, whose forcea were superior in number to his 
own; and the states-general, highly satisfied with the success 
which had already attended their arms, resolved to employ the 
remainder of the season in securing their new conquests. No 
expense was spared to render Sluys impregnable, and Cadsant, 
Isyndyck, and severa! other places in the neighbourhood of Sluys, 
were strongly fortified. 
The marquis of Spinola had, in the mean time, resumed his 
operations before Ostend, and was daily making nearer ap-
proaches to the town. H e had already crossed the ditch, and 
compelled the garrison to retire from all that part of the place 
called the Oíd Town, but one redoubt*, from which, as it was 
considerably elevated above the other fortifications, the besieged 
made dreadful havoc among his troops. He resolved, whatever 
it should cost him, to make himself master of this redoubt. H i s 
Spanish and Italian troops, having been again and again repulsed 
with great slaughter, could not be persuaded to renew the attack; 
and this arduous undertaking was therefore committed to two 
regiments of Germans, who, allured by promises, and pushed on 
by emulation to execute what the Italians and Spaniards had 
abandoned in despair, advanced tovvards the fort with the most 
tletermined intrepidity. The garrison sprung a mine upon the 
foremost of these regiments, and blew up a great number of them 
in the air. The rest, however, supported by the second regiment, 
still continued to advance, and having attacked the garrison 
sword in hand, they drove them with irresistible fury from the 
place. 
The garrison, by the advice of a Scotch engineer of the ñame 
of Dixter, had provided against this disaster, by drawing a 
strong intrenchment, flanked with bastions and fortified with 
• Callci the Sand-Hill. 
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artillery, betwixt the oíd and the new part of the town; and 
behind this, they had likewise drawn another intrenchment of 
the same kind, across the middle of the new town; being deter-
mined to dispute every incli of ground, and to maintain their 
defence t i l l the last extremity. 
F rom the progress however which Spinola had already made, 
and the skill and vigour with which his operations were con-
ducted, it could not be doubted, that he must ere long get pos-
session of the place. The garrison still continued to make the 
most vigorous sallies upon his miners and his troops; but since 
they had lost the fort of Sand-Hill , these sallies were made at a 
much greater expense of blood, on their part, than formerly: 
their new works had not yet acquired the same solidity and 
strength as those from which they had been expelled ; and, 
being now confined within such narrow limits as could not admit 
of any considerable reinforcement of fresh troops, they were 
exposed to much greater danger than before, of being over-
powered in every assault, by the superior numbers of the 
enemy. 
The states-general, influenced by these considerations, and 
thinking it extremely doubtful whether the preservation of 
Ostend, since the conquest of Sluys, was an object worthy of the 
expense and attention it must cost, resolved to persist no longer 
in the defence, and sent instructions to the sieur de Marquette 
the governor, to prepare himself for capitulating upon honour-
able terms. 
On receiving these instructions, Marquette immediately con-
veyed to Flushing, by the ships which were then lying in the 
harbour, all deserters, and other persons, who had any particular 
reasons for dreading the enemy's resentment, together with ar 
part of the artillery and stores; after which he sent two of his 
principal officers to treat with Spinola of the surrender of the 
place.. 
This general, whether from admiration of that intrepid bravery 
which the garrison had displayed, or because he was still diffident 
of success, and desirous to avoid the farther effusion of blood, 
^ ^ ^ readily agreed that the garrison should march out with 
eapitulates. ^ the honours of war, and be safely conducted by land 
to Sluys ; that waggons should be furnished to the sick 
and wounded ; that the inhabitants should be at liberty to quit 
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the town without molestation; and that all prisoners on both 
sides should be released. This agreement was made on the 20th 
of September, in the beginning of the fburth year since the com-
mencement of the siege ; and on the second day after, Spinola 
was put in possession of the town. He religiously fulfilled all 
the articles of the capitulation, and while the garrison were pre-
paring to set out, he gave proof of a generosity of spirit, of which 
no other instance has occurred in the history of the present war, 
by inviting the governor, and all colonels and captains in the 
place, to a magnificent entertainment, where he treated them 
with every mark of distinction and respect. 
From Ostend, the governor marched at the head of his 
garrison, amounting to near four thowsand raen, with a small 
train of artillery, along the sea coast, t i l l they arrived in the 
neighbourhood of Sluys, where they were raet by Prince Maurice, 
who received them in the most gracious raanner, and gave them 
every testimony of applause and gratitude. They were soon after 
foliowed by almost the whole body of inhabitants, who chose 
rather to reside at Sluys than Ostend; and the chief magistrate 
of Ostend was appointed chief magistrate of Sluys. 
Such was the termination ol ¿his celebrated siege, which, 
besides an enormous expense of labour and military stores, had 
cost the contending partios the lives of near a hundred thousand 
raen. Ostend could not, on any account, be deemed worthy of 
this expense; yet the Dutch seeraed to have acted wisely in 
defending it with so great obstinacy. They could, nowhere elsc, 
have encountered the eneray on more advantageous terms: and, 
while the siege continueji, they not only enjoyed profound tran-
quillity at home, but were at liberty to secure and extend their 
frontier, by the acquisition of Rhinberg, Grave, Cadsant, Isyn-
dyck and Sluys. 
The conduct of the archduke does not admit of any such 
apology. Hardly any of the places which he had lost was of less 
importance than Ostend; and Sluys, from its excellent harbour, 
and its neighbourhood to Zealand, was of much greater import-
ance. His arras, at a juncture when his finances were low, and 
his troops mutinous, ought rather to have been eraployed in 
defending his own dorainions than in attacking those of the 
enemy; and if he had found leisure for acting offensively, he 
98 H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F [BOOK II. 
ought to have made hís attack on some place of easier conquest, 
in the preservation of which the United Provinces were more 
deeply interested. 
But i f he ever carne to be sensible of his error, it was not t i l l 
he thought that it could not be retrieved with honour; and he 
was encouraged to persist in it by the Spanish ministers, who 
were at too great a distance from the scene of action to judge of 
the conduct which it was proper to pursue. 
But there was reason now to expect that neither the archduke, 
ñor the court of Spain, would for the futuro be guilty of the 
same sort of imprudent conduct, as that into which, on different 
occasions, they had been hitherto betrayed ; as both he and they 
were impressed with a just esteem of the prudence and great 
abilities of the marquis of Spinola, and had resolved to devolve 
on hira the entire direction of the war. He had already given 
striking proofs of superior capacity; and no person doubted that 
he would still be found deserving of that extraordinary confidence 
that was reposed in him. 
A chief source, Spinola knew, of those disappointments and 
losses which Albert had sustained, was bis irregularity in the pay 
of his troops; and in order to remedy this evil, the marquis 
resolved either to reduce their number, or to be well assured of 
procuring more ampie funds for their support. But no sufficient 
funds could be procured, unless they were furnished by the court 
of Spain, and therefore, as soon as he put his army into winter-
quarters, he set out for Madrid, in the hopes of being able to 
convince the Spanish ministers of the necessity of either making 
greater exertions, and furnishing more liberal supplies, or of 
resolving as soon as possible to put a period to the war. 
The Spanish finances were in no better order at this time than 
Scarcity of at any former period. From that decay of industry, of 
meuiTi'nU9 w^0*1 the causes have been already mentioned, Spain 
Spain. was no longer able to furnish either her colonies or 
herself with manufactures of her own production. The gold and 
silver which she imported from America no sooner arrived 
than it was transmitted, for the purchase of manufactures, to 
other nations that were more industrious; and the scarcity of 
the precious metáis in Spain had risen to so great a height, that 
the duke of Lerma had, last year, raised the nominal valué of 
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the copper coin, which by a royal edict was made nearly equal to 
that of silver. But this absurd expedient served only to increase 
the evil which it was intended to prevent or remedy *. 
Counterfeit copper money, of equal intrinsic valué to the 
current coin in Spain, was poured into that kingdom by the 
neighbouring nations; these nations, at the same time, received 
gold and silver in return ; they still continued likewise to receive 
the price of their manufactures in gold and silver. A n d thus 
was Spain more than ever drained of these precious metáis. The 
distress arising from thence was sensibly felt from one end of the 
kingdom to the other, and the ministers often found it difficult 
to procure money sufficient for the necessary purposes of govern-
ment. But, being now delivered from the burden of the war 
The court ^ h Englaud, and hoping that henceforth the returns 
of Madrid 0f trcasure from America would be greater and more 
resol ves to 
carry on certain than they had hitherto been, they resolved, in 
the war. conformity to the king's inclination, to spare no expense 
to enable the archduke to carry on the war in the Netherlands 
with vigour. 
Agreeably to this resolution, the marquis of Spinola, to whom 
Philip, on this occasion, gave every proof of esteem and confi-
dence, was immediately furnished with a considerable sum of 
money. The strongest assurances were likewise given him by 
the ministers, óf greater punctuality in their future remittances; 
and there was at the same time conferred upon him, full power 
to employ all the money which he received, or was afterwards 
to receive, in the manner which he should judge to be most 
expedient. The conduct of the archduke, it seems, and that of 
those to whom he had committed the administration of his 
finances, had rendered this precaution necessary; he had never 
observed that strict econoray which the exigencies of his affairs 
required ; and it would appear, that being sensible of this defect 
in his character, and conscious of his inability to correct it, he 
was well pleased to have the disposal of the money, sent from 
Spain, devolved upon Spinola. 
The marquis, having thus accomplished the design of his 
joumey to Madrid, and obtained from Phil ip and his ministers 
their approbation of his plan of operations for the next campaign, 
* Gonsalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. xiv. 
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returned without delay to Brussels. The first object of his 
attention was to remove every ground of discontent among his 
troops, by applying a part of the money which he had brought 
along with him to the discharge of their arrears; immediately 
after which, he gave orders for making numerous levies in Ger-
many and in the Southern Provinces of the Netherlands. The 
Spanish ministers had promised to send him a veteran regiment 
from Spain by sea; and they had given instructions to the 
governors of Naples and Milán, to provide for him a strong 
reinforcement of Italians*. 
The United Provinces, on the other hand, being already well 
acquainted with the activity and enterprise of Spinola, had 
strenuously exerted themselves in their military preparations, 
and were sooner ready to take the field. They had formed the 
design of laying siege to Antwerp, where they had learnt that the 
number of the garrison was neither adequate to the extent of 
the fortifications, or the great importance of the place. Prince 
Mauricc did not approve of this expedition, but engaged in it 
at the request of the states. Having put a part of his army on 
board transports, under Count Ernest of Nassau, he himself 
marched over-land with the rest from Bergen-op-Zoom, and 
joined Ernest, at the fort of L i l lo , which stands on the north 
side of the Scheld, about two leagues distant from Antwerp, and 
was still in possession of the Dutch. 
His intention was to lay all the low grounds between Lil lo and 
Antwerp under water, by cutting the dyke of the Scheld, 
together with the counter-dyke at Courvestain, and then to cross 
over the inundation, and to pitch his camp on the higher grounds 
which lie near the town. He would thus have had a much 
smaller space to inclose with his entrenchments, while his army 
would have been entirely secure on one side against the approach 
of the enemy. His design had been carefully concealed, and i f 
his transports had not been detained by contrary winds, his 
enterprise would probably have been attended with success. 
But Spinola, conjecturing, from the embarkation of a part of his 
forces, and his cholee of Bergen for the rendezvous of the rest, 
that he could not have any other object in view but the siege of 
* Some officers were sent overto recruit in Britain, but James discouraged his subjeets 
from entering into the Spanish service. Vide Carte. Yet soldicrs were raised among the 
catholics, as appears from the seqnel. 
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Antwerp, had time to take every precaution to prevent him from 
carrying his plan into execution. H e had greatly augmented 
the garrisons of the town and of the forts upen the counter-
dyke; and at the same time had lined the banks of the Scheld 
on both sides with a sufficient number of troops to oppose his 
landing*. 
Maurice attempted, however, to make a descent on the 
Flanders side near Caloo, but finding his utmost eíforts ineffec-
tual, and that Spinola was everywhere upon his guard, he 
abandoned his first attempt; and, after reducing the castle of 
Woude, a strong fort in the neighbourhood of Bergen, he 
embarked his army, and made a descent in Flanders, near 
Isyndyck, with an intention of laying siege either to the Sas of 
Ghent or Hulst. 
Maurice himself had disapproved of this expedition, as well as 
of his attempt on Antwerp, and had advised to employ the army 
on the banks of the Rhine, where he thought there was reason 
to dread an irruption of the enemy ; but he liad yielded to the 
judgment of the states, who, being anxious for the preservation 
of Sluys, were desirous of getting possession of as many fortified 
towns as possible, in the neighbourhood of that important place. 
They had formerly had repeated proofs, how i l l qualified they 
were to judge of the proper conduct of the war; and from the 
sequel, it wil l appear how much wiser it had been, if, on the 
present occasion, they had listened to the opinión of their 
general. 
Maurice had not time to begin his operations, either against 
the Sas of Ghent or Hulst, when Spinola, who on this occasion 
derived great advantage from his bridge over the Scheld, arrived 
in sight with all his forces : but, as neither of the two generáis 
were inclined to try the fortune of a battle, they immediately 
applied themselves to fortify their respective camps ; resolving, 
each of them, to await t i l l some favourable opportunity should 
offer of annoying his enemy, without exposing himself to danger. 
Several skirmishes were fought by foraging parties, with various 
success, but neither party was able to gain any considerable 
advantage over the other. 
• He had likcwise come himself to Antwerp, with all the forces which he could collect 
togethet and having thrown a hridge over the Scheld, a little above the town, he stood 
prepared to march whenever the enemy ehould adventure to begin their attack. 
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A t length, Spinola having effectually provided for the safety of 
the two places which Maurice had intended to attack, left a 
part of the army under the count of Berg, to watch his raotions, 
and ordered the rest to direct their march towards Maestricht. 
About this time he expected the arrival of the troops which 
had been raised for the archduke's service in Germany and Italy, 
and he had appointed Maestricht for the place of rendezvous. 
Agreeably to the promise given hira by the court of Spain, a 
regiment, consisting of twelve hundred men, had been embarked 
at Lisbon, in eight ships, which, in order to elude the vigilance 
of the enemy, had been hired frora Hamburgh of the English 
and Danish merchants. But, notwithstanding their precaution, 
they were intercepted by the Dutch adrairal Hautain, whom the 
states had ordered to lie in wait for them in the English channá 
Four of them were either taken or destroyed, and the remaining 
four obliged to take shelter in Dover, where they were shut up 
by the Dutch t i l l the following winter, when the long nights 
aíforded them an opportunity to escape to Flanders *. 
The marquis of Spinola lamented the loss of the Spanish 
troops the more, as they were all veteran soldiers, commanded by 
officers of great experience. But all the Germán and Italian 
forces which he expected, having arrived in safety, he resolved, 
without farther delay, to enter upon the execution of the plan of 
operations, which, in concert with the archduke, he had formed 
Spinok's for the remainder of this campaign. It had been his 
clnducting intention, ever since the surrender of Ostend, to esta-
tlie war, blish the theatre of the war beyond the Rhine, in that 
part of the dominions of the states where the superiority of their 
naval forcé could be of no avail. H i s army would thus, he 
thought, be in some measure supported at the enemy's expense; i t 
would be easier forhimto suppress themutinous spirit of his troops, 
• The states disgraced themselves, and sullied the victory which they obtained on this 
occasion, by ordering all the prisoners to be tied, two and two together, and tbrown into 
the sea. Yet neither Grotius ñor Van Meteren, the two most respectable of the Dutch 
historians, ha ve spoken of their conduct as'reprehensible. Their pretext for this barbarity 
was to damp the courage of the Spaniards, but itrather served to inspire them, in all ren-
counters, with desperate rage and fury ; and as no better reason could be given for treating 
M Í t h so great inhumanity the prisoners whom they took at sea, than those whowcre taken 
in the sicge of towns, or io the field of battle, it was an example calculated to revive that 
savage method of carrying on the war, which had excited such general horror when it waa 
praclised by the duke of Alva and his son. 
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in case it should again appear; and as the states had no dread 
of an attack in that quarter, he expected to find some of their 
principal towns unprepared for a defence. His design had been 
carefully concealed, even from the general officers; councils of 
war had been held, in which the archduke, in order more effectu-
ally to prevent a discovery, had sometimes proposed to under-
take thesiege of Sluys, and sometimes that of Bergen-op-Zoom, or 
of Grave, or of Breda; and the different opinions of the officers 
had, from time to time, by secret agents, been communicated to 
the states. 
Prince Maurice, as already mentioned, was almost the only 
person upon whom these artifices did not produce the desired 
eífect. H e could not be persuaded that Spinola, who had given 
conspicuous proof of superior sagacity, would undertake the 
reduction of any of these towns, where the army of the states 
was at.hand to interrupt his operations. He suspected that his 
attack must rather be intended against some more distant place, 
which could not be so easily relieved; and had therefore pro-
posed to station the troops on the banks of the Rhine, in order 
to prevent the enemy from entering the Dutch dominions on the 
eastern frontier *. But the states having, in consequence of the 
information they had received of the deliberations in the arch-
duke's council of war, rejected this advice, Spinola was now at 
liberty to carry his design into execution. 
Before he left Flanders, he had given orders to the count de 
Bucquoi, his general of artillery, to secure a convenient passage 
for his army over the Rhine ; and this active officer, after 
planting batteries on the banks, and thereby clearing the river 
of some armed vessels which were stationed there, had begun to 
erect two strong forts, one on each side of the Rhine at Keiser-
wert, a small town in the electorate of Cologne. A s soon 
Jul)' as these forts were finished, Spinola set out from Maes-
tricht, with all the troops which he had assembled there ; and 
having joined those which were under Bucquoi, and crossed the 
Rhine at the passage which had been secured for him, he called 
a council of war, and, for the first time, communicated to them 
his design. 
The enemy, he told them, had been led to expect an attack in 
• Grotius. Mctcren. 
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Flanders; and they now believed that he had formed a design 
on Rhinberg. But his intention, from the beginning, had been 
to lay siege to Lingen ; and by the reduction of that important 
place, to open an entrance into Friesland. He was sensible 
how much it was contrary to the common maxims of war, to 
leave behind hira so strong a place as Rhinberg; but he did not 
from thence apprehend any danger or inconvenience, since, with 
the forts which had been erected, he could always comraand a 
safe passage over the r iver ; besides that, the success of his 
enterprise agaínst Lingen must greatly depend on the celerity 
with which i t should be executed ; as prince Maurice would no 
sooner hear of the danger to which that place was exposed, than 
he would basten to its relief. That although Lingen lay at 
a great distance, and the march must be performed in a neutral 
country *, in which the troops would not be supported by plun-
der, yet there was no ground to dread a scarcity of provisions ; 
he had brought a considerable quantity along with h im; he had 
money sufficient to purchase whatever more should be necessary ; 
and, as he was determined to enforce the strictest military disci-
pline, he had received assurances from the towns of Westphalia, 
that, on that condition, they would cheerfully furnish him with 
supplies. But attention to discipline was indispensably neces-
sary ; and for this reason, he was resolved that every violation 
of the rules of it should be punished with the utmost severity 
and rigour. 
What he declared on this occasion to his officers, he after-
wards carried into execution. Some of the soldiers having 
ventured, notwithstanding the peremptory orders which he had 
issued, to leave their standards, they were instantly seized, and 
put to death. The rest were intimidated by this example; 
and although a great part of them had long been accustomed to 
rapiñe and disobedience under former generáis, yet so great is 
the power of discipline over troops which regularly receive their 
pay, that almost no army ever marched through a neutral 
country, against which the inhabitants had so little reason to 
complain. H i s camp, in consequence of this prudent conduct, 
was at all times abundantly supplied, and no time was lost 
in sending out detachments to procure provisions. The inha-
" Westphalia and tho dnchy of Cleve í . 
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bitants still retained a bitter remembrance of their sufferings 
from the Spanish army, under the admiral of Arragon; and 
were in some measure animated with gratitude to Spinola for 
the justice and humanity which he displayed, 
After traversing a part of the duehy of Cleves and West-
phalia, he first directed his march to Oldenzeel, a fortified town 
in the province of Overyssel, and soon compelled the garrison 
to capi tú la te ; immediately after which he advanced towards 
Lingen, which lies at the distance of only one day"1» march from 
Oldenzeel; and, without meeting with any opposition, assigned 
„ . , , to his troops their several quarters round the town. 
opinóla lays ^ r f 
siege to Prince Maurice, on whom the states-general had, as 
formerly mentioned, bestowed the property of Lingen 
and its territory, as a reward for his important services, had, 
at his own expense, made great additions to the fortifications 
of it. But as the enemy's attention had, for several years, 
been turned to another quarter, it was defended at this time only 
by the ordinary garrison, amounting to five or six hundred men-
Even with so small a garrison, however, prince Maurice had 
expected it raight sustain a siege of several weeks; and the 
governor, an officer of the ñame of Cobbe, seemed at first deter-
mined to defend it t i l l the last extremity. Spinola was there-
fore obliged to begin the siege in form, and to make his 
approaches to the place as usual, by working trenches. The 
garrison had not sufficient numbers to interrupt his operations, 
and he soon reached the ditch, which was of an extraordinary 
breadth and depth, and filled with water; ñor could the water 
be drawn oíf, because the ditch lay considerably lower than the 
adjacent ground. But at length his troops got over it, though 
not without considerable slaughter, by filling it up with earth 
and fascines, and then began to work a mine under one of the 
principal bastions of the town; when the garrison, importuned 
August 18 ^ ^ e i ^ ^ i t a n t s , and despairing of being able to 
defend themselves much longer, capitulated on honour-
able terms. 
Prince Maurice, in the meantirae, had advanced as far as 
Deventer, the capital of Overyssel, and was employed in pre-
paring for an attempt to raise the siege. 
On the first intelligence which he received of the march of the 
cnemy from Maestricht, he had despatched his brother, Henry 
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Frederick, with four thousand foot, and one thousand horse, 
to watch their motions; and a few days after, he had set out 
himself at the head of another división of his forces. But 
having judged it necessary to leave a considerable proportion of 
them in Flanders, to oppose any attempts whieh the enemy 
might make in that province, he was obliged to stop for some 
days at Deventer, t i l l he had collected a sufficient number of 
troops from the neighbouring towns, to enable him to undertake 
the relief of Lingen; and before his preparations were complete, 
a messenger arrived with the news of its surrender. He was 
highly incensed against the governor and officers, for the feeble 
defence they had made of a place of so great iraportance; and 
threw them all into prison, where they remained for near a 
twelvemonth; and though they were afterwards set at liberty, 
they were all of them degraded frbm their rank. 
He had just cause for the resentment which he felt on this 
occasion, as Spinola, who had thought it unnecessary to secure 
his army by intrenchments, must have raised the siege as soon 
as the army of the states had approached. H e had ground 
likewise for great anxiety, when he considered the defenceless 
«tate of most of the towns in the neighbourhood of Lingen ; and 
particularly that of Bourtang and Coevorden, by the conquest 
of which the enemy would have a free course into the provinces 
of Groningen and Friesland. It was believed, that i f Spinola 
had immediately attacked these places, he might, without great 
difficulty, have made himself master of them. But having spent 
some time in strengthening the fortifications of Lingen, he 
thereby afforded leisure to prince Maurice to próvido for their 
security. H e judged it to be of greater importance to preserve 
what he had already acquired, than to multiply his conquests ; 
and as Maurice had collected an army in the neighbourhood, 
nearly equal to his own, he thought that he could not venturo 
any farther into the enemy^ country, so late in the season, 
without exposing himself to the greatest risk. Having, there-
fore, taken every necessary precaution for the safety of Lingen 
and Odenzeel, he returned afterwards to Keyserwert, and 
repassed the Rhine. 
The forte which had been erected there, having given offence 
to the elector of Cologne, on whose territory they had been 
raised, the archduke, in order to appease his resentment, had 
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8ent orders for demolishing them; which Spinola did accord-
ingly, and then began to build other two, a little farther down 
the river, at Rorerort, in the county of Meurs, which was at 
that time subject to the Dutch. 
Whi le a part of his army was employed in building these 
forts, so necessary for preserving his communication with his 
late conquests, he sent the rest, under the count de Bucquoi, to 
lay siege to Waehtendonc, a town in Guelderland, which stood 
in a marshy soil, and was deemed one of the strongest towns in 
that province, but was at this time rendered more accessible 
than usual by a long-continued drought. A s the fortifications, 
however, were complete, and the garrison numerous *, he had 
reason to apprehend that the siege must last for several weeks; 
and that prince Maurice, who had left Overyssel, and was 
encamped in the neighbourhood of Wesel, would certainly 
attempt to raise it . H e therefore ordered the count de Buc-
quoi to fortify his camp with strong intrenchments; and having 
lately received a strong reinforcement of Italians, besides a con-
siderable number of English, Scotch, and Irish Catholics, whom 
James, agreeably to his treaty of peace with Spain, had per-
mitted the archduke to enlist in his dominions, he took his 
station near Rorerort, with a resolution to attack prince Mau-
rice's army in the rear, in case he should venturo to approach to 
Waehtendonc. 
In distributing their quarters to his troops on the north side 
of the Rhine, next to the enemy, he committed an error which 
was likely to have been attended with fatal consequences, by 
stationing his cavalry at the village of Mulleim on the banks of 
the Roer, where they were at too great a distance from the 
infantry to receive immediate support; no entrenchments had 
been thrown up to secure them against an attack, ñor was there 
any place of shelter near but a fort on the other side of the Roer, 
opposite to Mulleim, called the castle of Broeck, which was neither 
strongly fortified ñor furnished with a sufficient garrison. Prince 
Maurice, having got intelligence of their position, resolved to 
avail himself of the advantage which it afforded him, and instantly 
set out from his camp at Wesel, with all his cavalry, and a select 
body of infantry, amounting to two thousand four hundred men. 
That no time might be unnecessarily lost on the march, the foot 
• Twelve hundred men. 
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soldiers were put into carriages : the cavalry was ordered to 
hasten forward before the foot, one half of them commanded by 
Marcellus Baex, an officer of distinguished spirit and intrepidity, 
and the other half by Prince Heury Frederick, who was at that 
time only tvventy years of age, but who had already given 
conspicuous proof of superior prudence and capacity. Prince 
Maurice himself followed as quickly as possible with the infantry. 
Colonel Baex was ordered to cross the Roer, and to endeavour 
to get possession of the castle of Broeck, in order to intercept 
the enemy^s communication with their camp, while Henry, 
supported by Prince Maurice, was to attack thera at Mulleim. 
Baex was successful beyond what could justly have been 
expected in his first assault upon the fort, having expelled the 
garrison from every part of it but one, which was defended by a 
small number of men ; but he was interrupted in his progress by 
the accidental arrival of a party of foragers, who attacked him 
with great vigour, and obliged him to abandon his attempt upon 
the fort. 
In the mean time Prince Henry had passed a narrow defile, 
_, which the enemy had left un^uarded, and was about to 
Engage- > J . -
ment near begin the attack at Mulleim. It was unfortunately 
ofeMVui-age judged proper to defer it for a little time t i l l the 
leim, infantry should arrive somewhat nearer. A t length 
he gave orders for his troops to advance, and they obeyed at first 
with great alacrity ; but finding that, through the delay in making 
the attack, the enemy had taken the alarm, and were in a better 
posture of defence than they had expected, they were seized, 
though greatly superior in number, with a sudden panic, and, 
after an irresoluto and feeble effort, they turned their backs and 
fled, t i l l they were met by Prince Maurice at the head of the 
infantry. 
Ashamed of their dastardly behaviour, and being severely 
reproached by the prince, they were persuaded to retum. The 
Spanish cavalry from whom they had so precipitately fled, far 
from venturing to pursue, were in great confusión retreating 
across the Roer, before a small number of the Dutch cavalry that 
had remained with their commander. Henry was now rejoined 
by the rest, and being likewise supported by the English and 
Scotch infantry, under Colonel Veré and Lord Buccleugh, he 
pursued the enemy to the other side of the river ; but there the 
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Spaniards, commanded by Trivulcio, in the absence of Velasco, 
general of the cavalry, having recovered their ranks, returned 
with great resolution to the charge; and the Dutch being again 
unaccountably struck with terror, gave way before an inferior 
enemy, and left Prince Henry almost alone in the field of battle. 
H e must have been cut to pieces or taken prisoner, but for the 
seasonable interposition of the Brit ish troops, who, being armed 
with pikes, attacked. the Spanish cavalry, and kept them-long at 
hay. 
Henry, perceiving himself abandoned by almost all his men, 
went over with the few that remained with him, and joined the 
troops under Colonel Baex, who had been long engaged in combat 
with the enemy in another part of the field. Soon after this, the 
Spaniards, having received a reinforcement under Velasco, this 
part of the Dutch cavalry too was intimidated, and the two 
commanders, with a small number of adherents, were left, 
surrounded by the enemy: but in the mean time Prince Maurice 
arrived with his vanguard, and having planted some field-pieces 
on a rising ground, he played them oíF so successfully upon the 
Spaniards, that he soon threw them into confusión, and put them 
to flight with considerable slaughter. He was preparing to 
pursue them into a wood, where they had taken shelter, when he 
received intelligence that Spinola himself was approaching with 
all his forces. 
This general had got early information of the attack, and had 
instantly set out at the head of six hundred men, leaving orders 
for two thousand more to follow as quickly as possible. In order 
to intimídate the enemy, by making them believe that his whole 
army was at hand, he sent forward a great number of drummers 
on horseback, and as the ground was favourable to this 
stratagem, it produced the desired effect. Prince Maurice gave 
immediate orders for sounding a retreat. Spinola pursued, and 
made considerable slaughter; but his troops were stopped short in 
their career by Colonel Yere, who being supported by the count 
de Chatillon, with a select body of French infantry, placed his 
men in an advantageous situation, behind a hedge, and kept up 
so hot a fire upon the Spaniards, as obliged them to desist from 
the pursuit. 
The loss of men in this action, which lasted upwards of eight 
hours, was considerable ; and probably not less than five hundred 
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men on either side. H a d the Dutch cavalry arrived at Mulleim 
a little earlier, or acquitted themselves after their arrival as they 
had done on all former occasions, the Spaniards must have been 
compelled to lay down their arms *. Prince Maurice therefore, 
who had never before conceived more sanguino hopos of victory, 
was highly incensed against thera for their pusillanimous 
behaviour, and reproached them in the severest terms. H e 
could no longer confide in their courage for the execution of any 
important enterprise, and found it necessary to act with the 
utmost circumspection through the rest of the campaign-f*. 
In order, however, if possible, to extinguish the meraory of this 
repulse, he soon after made an attack in the middle of the night 
on the town of Guelders, and he so far succeeded as to demolish 
one of the outer gatos of that place, by fixing a petard in i t ; 
but the garrison having taken the alarm, by the bursting of 
another petard which happened to fall into the ditch, he was 
repulsed with loss, and obliged to abandon his attempt. His i l l 
success in this, and in his enterprise at Mulleim, made a strong 
impression on the minds of the garrison at Wachtendonc. They 
had from the beginning expected that he would come to their 
relief, and, in the hopes of his being able to raiso the siege, they 
had given him the strongest assurances of their resolution to 
defend the town to the last extremity; but- when they found 
that, notwithstanding his most vigorous exertions, the enemy 
still maintained their superiority, their courage failed, their 
defence became moro feeble and irresolute, and, on the twentieth 
day after the commencement of the siege, they offered to 
capitúlate, thóugh their number still amounted to more than a 
thousand men. 
From Wachtendonc, Spinola ordered the count de Bucquoi to 
lead his troops against the castle of Cracao, of which the count 
made himself master in a few days, and obliged the garrison to 
surrender at discretion. 
Had not the season been so far advanced, it is probable, from 
the great disparity between the contending parties during this 
* Grotius, in speakiug of this action, makes the fullowitig observation, " tum id si 
evenisset, reliqua exercitus invadcre statuit, laudabili consilio, et magnam illo die victorium 
elaturus, ni Deo visum, longa Batavorum prospera et belli gloriam adversis retundere : 
namque haud alii rectius causse tam fatalem pavorem adscripserim." 
•f Grotius, lib. x\v. p. 469, &c. Van Met. lib. xxvii. Bcntivoglio, part. iii. lib. vü . 
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campaign, the states must have suffered still greater losses; but 
it was now the end of November, the rains had begun to fall, and 
the troops were greatly exhausted with the fatigues which they 
had undergone. Spinola therefore, after carefully providing for 
the security of his new conquests, sent his army into winter-
quarters, and his example was soon after followed by Prince 
Mauriee. This general had at no former period suffered the 
enemy to gain so great advantages with impunity; yet, on his 
part, neither prudence and vigilance, ñor vigour and activity, 
were wanting in opposing their designs. H a d the states 
permitted hira to foliow his own judgment in the conduct of the 
war, a different plan of operations would have been adopted; 
Spinola would probably have been prevented from passing the 
Rhine, and the places lost have been preserved. Hi s army was 
from the beginning much inferior in number to the enemy, yet, 
if his well-concerted attack at Mulleim had not preved abortivo, 
through that unaccountable panic with which his troops were 
seized, the Spanish cavalry would have been cut oíf, and Spinola 
obliged to act on the defensivo through the rest of the 
campaign. 
But while, for these reasons, it would seem that no blame can 
justly be imputed to prince Mauriee, Spinola was surely well 
entitled to the applause which he received from his contempo-
raries, by whom he was henceforth regarded as one of the 
greatest generáis of the age. 
The Spanish ministers had no reason to repent of the confi-
Sanguine deuco they had reposed in him, when they reflected on 
hopes of the the vigour and great abilities he had exerted during 
Spamards. campajgn , an(j ^heir hopes of being able to com-
pel the revolted provinces to lay down their arms were at this 
time raised to the greatest height. The archduke likewise had 
conceived the most sanguino expectations of success, and was 
assiduously employed throughout the winter in preparing for a 
vigorous prosecution of the war. 
Having removed the seat of it into the enemy's country, his 
subjeets in Brabant and Flanders could, with greater ease than 
formerly, afford their annual supplies ; but these were not alone 
sufficient to enable him to carry the plan concerted with the 
general for the next campaign into execution ; and, in order to 
procure from Spain the assistance which was requisito, he judged 
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it necessary that Spinola himself should undertake ánothér jour-
ney to Madrid. The Spanish rainisters liad acquainted him that 
they were at present involved in the greatest difficulties, occa-
sioned by the loss of some of their ships loaded with treasure, 
which had foundered in a storm, in their passage from America ; 
but he hoped that, through Spinola's personal influence with the 
king, which was so great as even to excite the jealousy of his 
ministers, they might be induced to have recourse to some extra-
ordinary expedient for his relief. 
The marquis, who left Brussels about the middle of winter, 
found, on his arrival at Madrid, that the account transmitted to 
the archduke, of the exhausted state of Phi l ip^ finances, had 
not been exaggerated. There was hardly money in the exche-
quer sufficient to defray the necessary expenses of government; 
and the ministers had no prospect of being able to procure the 
suma requisito for carrying on the war with vigour, before the 
season fit for action would be elapsed. Phil ip could not resolve, 
in the midst of victory, to abandon a cause in which he was so 
deeply interested : and Spinola was determined to decline accept-
ing the command of the forces, unless an adequate fund should 
be provided for their pay. Many weeks were spent in fruitless 
endeavours to raise the money which he demanded *. A t length 
1606 the ministers oífered to mortgage the treasure which 
Expedient was expectod to arrive towards the end of the year 
nisímfniT- ^rom America. A n d the merchante of Cádiz and 
try for mis- other places, upon receiving an obligation for their 
>ng supphes. r e j m | 3 u r g e m e n ^ f r o m that fund, agreed to advance the 
money that was wanted: upon a condition, which marks their 
diffidence either in the good faith or good economy of the 
ministers, that the marquis of Spinola should give an additional 
security for their payment on his estates in Italy. 
The marquis did not hesitate in complying with this request; 
and, immediately after receiving bilis of exchange for the money, 
he set out for the Netherlands, by the way of Italy. In that 
Sickness of country he was seized with a fever which detained him 
Spinola. for geveral weeks, and prevented him from reaching 
Brussels t i l l the beginning of June. 
The states general, on the other hand, having got early intel-
• It amounted to three linndrcd thousand crowns a month. 
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ligence of the difficulty whích he nmst encountér iri raising 
money, had long flattered themselves with the hopes that he 
would not be able to procure it. They were affcerwards amused 
for a considerable time by a report which had been propagated 
of his death; an event which they were persuaded would contri-
bute more than any other that could happen to relax the arch-
duke's exertions in the prosecution of the war. Influenced by 
these hopes, and this report, joined to their desire of avoiding 
any unnecessary expense, they had been uncommonly remiss in 
Strange re. their military preparations. They had not availed 
niissness m themselves of Spinola's detention in I ta ly; and when 
the conduct í > ^ 
of the Unit- they heard, not only that he had arrived in the Nether-
ed Sutes. ian¿Sí was daily receiviug reinforcements of fresh 
troops from Germany and Italy, they were filled with the most 
disquieting apprehensions; but it was now too late to remedy 
their error. They had not sufficient time to augment their 
army, by making new levies, as they used to do in Britain ; and 
almost all the Protestant soldiers, whom they might have 
enlisted in France and Germany, were, during the greatest part 
of this summer, detained at home ; those in France, by a quarrel 
between the king and duke of Bouillon ; and those in Germany, 
by an insurrection of the inhabitants of Brunswick against their 
sovereign, 
When the campaign, therefore, was about to be opened, 
PiinceMau- their forces being greatly inferior in numbers to 
dcTen^vf9 ^1086 of the enemy, Prince Maurice was obliged to 
operations. adopt a plan of operations which was merely de-
fensivo. 
Having carefully provided for the security of such of the 
frontier towns as were most exposed to danger, he next applied 
himsclf to fortify the banks of the W a a l and the Issel, whereso-
ever he suspected that the enemy might attempt to transport 
their forces. 
A long the banks of all that part of the W a a l which extends 
from the fort of Schench to the isle of Bommel, redoubts, at 
small distances from each other, were raised on the north dyke 
of the river. The troops, to which the defence of these redoubts 
was committed, were ordered to keep themselves in constant 
readiness to march to each other's assistance on the first notice 
of an attack. A n d a great number of armed barks and boats 
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were ordered to cruise in the river, to watch the motions of the 
enemy, and to be ready to attack them, in case of their adven-
turing to erabark. 
The same care and pains were taken in fortifying the Issel; 
on the banks of which another line of redoubts was raised, 
extending from Arnheim to Hattem, which stands at the 
distance of only a few hours1 march from the Zuider Sea. 
These works, in which the Dutch were more expert than any 
other nation, and which had been carried on with surprising 
expedition, were far advanced before Spinola had fully prepared 
Spinoia de- take the field. H i s plan had, from the beginning, 
tcrminedto teen what the states and Prinee Maurice had sus-
intoiitrecht pected, to penétrate into the province of Utrecht and 
andHoliand. Holland, through the Betuwe on one side, and the 
Veluwe on the other. H e justly considered, that while the 
Dutch maintained their superiority at sea, it was only on their 
eastern frontier he could expect to make any sensible impres-
sion; and that, in case he should so far succeed as to get pos-
session of Utrecht, which was a large town, but weakly fortified, 
not only the numerous fortified places which lie to the north and 
east would be easily compelled to submit, because their commu-
nication with Holland would be interrupted ; but Holland itself, 
the chief seat of the wealth and strength of the revolted pro-
vinces, would be laid open in that quarter, where it would be 
most successfully attacked. 
H e was sensible, that since the states had employed such wise 
precautions for their defence, it must now be extremely difficult 
for him to carry this plan into execution. But he still resolved 
to persist in it, and hoped, on one side or other, either to find 
the enemy oíf their guard, or to overpower them by his superior 
numbers. 
Having divided his forces, he gave the command of one army, 
consisting of ten thousand foot and twelve thousand horse, to 
the count de Bucquoi, with instructions to attempt to transport 
i t over the W a a l into the country of Betuwe ; and he himself 
conducted another, still more numerous, into the province of 
Overyssel, which had been the scene of his operations in the 
preceding year. 
Bucquoi, having passed the Maese at Mooch, pitched his 
camp in the neighbourhood of that village, resolving to attempt 
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the passage of the W a a l , between the fort of Schench and 
Nimeguen, and, in case of his being able to effect it, to lay 
siege to the latter of these places. W i t h this view, he trans-
ported a great nuraber of boats in carriages from the Maese; 
and having launched them into the Waa l , he put a select body 
of troops on board, under the command of Justiniano, an Ita-
lian general of distinguished abilities. But before Justiniano 
could approach the opposite bank, Dubois, a French general in 
the service of the states, had drawn up some companies of 
French and English soldiers, brought hastily from Nimeguen, 
and was prepared to dispute his landing. Justiniano still con-
tinued to advance, having first obliged all the Dutch armed 
vessels to retire, by planting a battery at the place of his 
embarkment. A n obstínate engagement soon followed, in which 
he lost about one hundred and twenty men. 
The rowers were intimidated, and being furnished with a pre-
text, from the rapidity of the current, they suffered the boats to 
fall down the stream. Dubois followed along the dyke of the 
river. Other attempts were made afterwards to approach the 
shore, but the enemy were everywhere prepared to make resist-
ance. A t length the boats, which at first had proceeded in good 
order, being attacked by the Dutch armed vessels, which were 
six abreast, were thrown into confusión ; and Justiniano, despair-
ing of success, abandoned his attempt. 
Spinola in the mean time had passed the Rhine at Rorerort, 
and was advancing through the province of Overyssel. But he 
was greatly retarded in his progress by an extraordinary quan-
tity of rain which had begun to fall before he left Rorerort, and 
continued falling after he had set out upon his march. A l l the 
rivers were swelled to an unusual height; and at those places 
where in ordinary seasons they were fordable, much time was 
lost in collecting boats, or in building temporary bridges. A 
great part of the country through which he marched being natu-
rally wet and marshy, the roads were everywhere so much 
broken, that the one half of his army was commonly a whole 
day behind the other. The artillery carts, and his waggons 
with provisions, of which he had near three thousand, were 
dragged along with the utmost difficulty, and, as they often 
sank in the mud, they preved almost every hour the occasion of 
confusión and delay. Many of his men fell sick from the 
lie H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F [BOOK II. 
unhealthiness of the season, and many were overpowered by the 
extraordinary fatigue which they underwent. 
I t was past the middle of July before he arrived in the neigh-
bourhood of the Issel; and he still entertained the hopea of 
finding it practicable to bring his enterprise to the desired issue: 
but, as the rains had not yet begun to abate, he found the river 
everywhere unfordable. It was, at the same time, crowded with 
armed vessels, which must have rendered all attempts to cast a 
temporary bridge over it impracticable: and Prince Maurice, 
having had leisure to fortify the opposite banks, had collected an 
army of ten thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse, 
with which he stood prepared to oppose his passage. 
After deliberating for some days what course he should pursue, 
he would have undertaken the siege of Deventer or Zutphen. 
But , besides that every precaution had been taken for their 
defence, Prince Maurice had pitched his camp on the opposite 
side, at an equal distance from each of these places, and was 
ready, with forces nearly equal to his own, to march to their 
relief. 
H e had, in the mean time, sent the count de Solre with a 
detachment of his army down the river, to attempt a passage in 
the neighbourhood of Swoll, where he hoped the enemy might 
not be so much upon their guard. But de Solre was vigorously 
repulsed by the garrison of Swoll, supported by some armed 
vessels, and obliged to retum, without being able to execute his 
enterprise. 
Spinola therefore found it necessary to relinquish his plan of 
penetrating through the country of Veluwe, and to rest satisfied 
with employing his arms against some of the towns of the 
province of Zutphen, where Maurice could not attempt to inter-
rupt his operations, without exposing himself to the risk of a 
general engagement. H e first attacked the town of Lockem, 
and in a few days compelled the garrison to surrender. Imme-
Siege of diately after which he laid siege to Groll , a town much 
Groil, better fortified than Lockem, and defended by a garrison 
of one thousand three hundred men. H e was the more desirous 
to get possession of the place, as it would greatly contribute to 
the security of his former conquests, Lingen and Oldenzeel. 
A n d for the same reason Prince Maurice was equally solicitous 
to prevent it from falling into his hands. 
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August 14. 
The prince, therefore, having augmented his army, by drawing 
the garrisons from Zutphen, Deventer, and other places, resolved 
to attempt, without delay, to raise the siege. Birt Spinola being 
acquainted with his design, pushed forward his operations with 
the most unremitted ardour, and, though not without considera-
ble slaughter of his troops, he, in a few days, drove the garrison 
from all the out-works of the place. 
They might still, however, have resisted t i l l Prince Maurice 
had arrived; but the governor, a young man of little experience, 
being either prevailed upon by the importunity of the inhabitants, 
or intimidated by the threats of Spinola, who sent him notice 
that i f he did not immediately surrender he would put all his 
garrison to the sword, capitulated on the ninth day 
after the commencement of the siege. 
Spinola had no sooner got possession of the town, and repaired 
some breaches in the fortification, than he resolved to remove his 
army from Overyssell, where their health was greatly affected by 
the humidity of the soil, and to employ them in some other 
quarter, in which they would not be exposed to the same incon-
veniences. Having called a council of war to assist him in his 
deliberations on this occasion, it was agreed, conformably to his 
own proposal, that no enterprise could be undertaken at that 
time, with any probability of success, of equal importance with 
the siege of Rhinberg. 
This town, which commands one of the most convenient 
Rhinberg passages over the Rhine, had several times been taken 
besieged. anj retaken since the commencement of the war; and 
the Dutch, in whose possession it had remained since the year 
1601, when it was subdued by Prince Maurice, had, at an 
immense expense, made great additions to the fortifications. 
Round the oíd fortifications, they had drawn a new rampart, 
strengthened with half-moons, redoubts, and ravelins, and had 
surrounded the whole with a second ditch, of extraordinary 
breadth and depth; to which they had added a covered way. 
They had erected on the island, which is separated by a narrow 
channel from the town, a strong fort with regular bastions, of 
nearly the same extent as the island itself; and they had 
fumished another fortification of still greater extent and strength, 
defended by a deep intrenchment, on the opposite bank of t h e 
river. 
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Spinola was aware of the difficulty he must encounter in 
reducing a town so strongly fortified, and which he knew likewise 
to be abundantly supplied with provisions and military stores: 
but, having been greatly disappointed by the failure of his enter-
prise against the interior provinees, and being desirous of perform-
ing sorae achievement that might justify the opinión which the 
archduke and the court of Spain had conceived of his abilities, 
even the difficulty of accomplishing his design preved a motive 
for adopting i t ; while, at the same time, it determined him to 
exert his utinost vigour in the execution. 
Having sent orders to the count de Bucquoi to come to his 
assistance, the count immediately directed his march towards 
Rhinberg along the south side of the river, while he himself 
advanced towards it on the north. No delay was unnecessarily 
admitted by either general; but before they could throw up 
their intrenchments, Prince Maurice, having received intelligence 
of their design, had time to send his brother Henry Frederick 
with a reinforcement to the garrison of two thousand men. 
Henry was accompanied on this occasion by a large body of 
cavalry, and having executed his commission without any loss, he 
immediately retumed with the cavalry to the camp, where his 
brother was preparing to march to the relief of the besieged with 
all his forces. 
In the mean time Spinola began the siege by attacking the fort 
above mentioned, which had been raised on the side of the river 
opposite to the town. Of this fort, which communicated by 
temporary bridges with the island and with the town, and was 
deemed a post of the first importance, the defence was given to 
Colonel Edmund, a Scotch officer of distinguished merit, who had 
been advanced in the service of the states from the rank of a 
common soldier to that of colonel. Besides a numerous garrison, 
upwards of seventy French gentlemen, who had come into the 
Netherlands to learn the military art, served under him as 
volunteers; and, that they might merit promotion on their 
return to their nativo country, were ready to expose themselves 
to every danger. W i t h this determined band, supported by his 
garrison, both horse and foot, he sallied out against Spinola, as 
soon as he approached, threw a great part of his army into con-
fusión, and made considerable slaughter. Spinola himself nar-
rowly escaped being taken prisoner: but fresh troops coming 
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forward to his assistance, Edmund was at length repulsed, and 
obliged to retire into the fort. 
From the intrepid spirit which the garrison displayed in this 
sally, joined to the character of their commander, Spinola had 
reason to expect the most vigorous resistance. But a few davs 
affcer, Edmund was killed by a shot from the enemy's camp while 
he was viewing his intrenchments; and the garrison, immode-
rately disheartened by his death, evacuated the fort in the 
following night, and passed over into the island. 
This precipitate measure, the effect of sudden dejection on 
account of the loss of their commander, was quickly attended 
with the most important consequences. The fortifications of the 
island were in a great measure commanded by the artillery of 
the fort which they had so hastily abandoned, and Spinola, by 
keeping up an incessant fire on them, from which their ramparts 
did not long afford protection, compelled them to take shelter in 
the town. 
He then applied himself to strengthen the fortifications which 
he had gained on the banks of the river, in order to prevent 
Prince Maurice from approaching on that side to the relief of 
the besieged; and having brought his bridge of boats above 
mentioned from Rorerort, he transported the greatest part of his 
forces over the Rhine, to co-operate with the count de Bucquoi, 
who had begun his operations against the town. 
Being already secured against an attack on the side towards 
the river, he now laboured to render himself equally secure on 
the other side, by casting a strong intrenchment round his camp. 
And as he was perpetually present himself, and no hands per-
mitted to be idle, the work was carried on with extraordinary 
expedition, while a great proportion of his troops were employed 
in making their approaches to the town. 
There was nothing omitted on the part of the garrison, which 
prudence and bravery could perform, to retard their progress. 
Animated by the example of the French volunteers, they spurned 
at danger, and made several vigorous sallies on the enemy, in 
some of which they succeeded in their attempts to demolish their 
works, and in all of them put considerable numbers to the 
sword. 
But the exertions of the besiegers were in proportion to the 
obstacles which they found it necessary to surmount. Spinola 
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had on no forraer occasion given more conspicuous proofs of 
vigour, skill, and bravery ; he exposed himself to every danger to 
which his troops were exposed, and at the same time discovered 
the most perfeet composure and tranquillity. The conduct of 
Bucquoi and Velasco fully justified the opinión that was enter-
tained of their abilities. The duke D'Ossuna, one of the first 
grandees in Spain, the princes of Casería and Palestrina, and the 
marquises of Est and of Bentivoglio*, were commonly mingled 
with the foremost combatants, and exhibited a bright example of 
the most heroic valour. The behaviour of the troops corre-
sponded to this example of their general and officers. The 
Italians and Spaniards on the one hand, and the Walloons and 
Germans on the other, animated by their leaders, and stimulated 
by ambition to surpass their companions, displayed in every 
rencounter the most determined intrepidity. 
The garrison therefore, notwithstanding the most obstinate 
resistance, were compelled to abandon one part of their fortifi-
cations after another; and it soon appeared, that in order to 
save themselves from utter destruction, they must ere long 
deliver up the town, unless Prince Maurice should come speedily 
to their relief. 
This general had already crossed the Rhine near Wesel, with 
an army amounting to fourteen or fifteen thousand men; and 
had advanced as far as Alpen, which lies at the distance of only a 
few hours1 march from Rhinberg. From his approaching so 
near, and from the various movements of his troops, Spinola 
could not doubt that he intended to attack his intrenchments. 
H e therefore immediately applied liimself to fortify some hills 
adjoining to his camp ; and, having ordered such of his forces as 
had been left for guarding the fort on the opposite side of the 
river, to come to his assistance, he stood prepared to accept of 
battle, in case it should be offered by the enemy. 
But Prince Maurice was too prudent, and too well acquainted 
with the character of Spinola, as well as with the strength of his 
present situation, to expose his army to so great a risk. F rom 
the time when the garrison had abandoned the fort on the 
opposite side of the river, he had despaired of being able to raise 
the siege, as all communication with the town on that side was 
thereby íntercepted, and the enemy enabled to effectuate a 
* l íephew to the celebratcd historian of that ñame. 
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junction of their forces. They were now greatly superior to his 
in number. No precaution had been omitted by their general to 
prevent a surprise. It was impossible to attack them without 
resolving to try the fortune of a battle. A n d he considered that 
while the preservation of Rhinberg would be the only fruit 
which he could reap from a victory, a defeat must be attended 
with the loss of other towns of still greater importance, and, at 
the same time, render it practicable for Spinola to execute his 
first plan of an invasión of the country beyond the W a a l ; he 
thought it rather fortúnate that this general, with so numerous 
an army, had engaged in an enterprise which could not greatly 
aífect the prosperity of the United Provinces; and hoped that, 
by his persisting in it, he would exhaust his strength, and lose 
what remained of the season fit for action. 
Many of Prince Maurice's countrymen, however, were 
dissatisfied with his inactivity on this occasion, and the states 
general sent deputies to his camp to acquaint him that they 
had expected he would have made an attempt to raise the siege. 
But having brought over the deputies to his opinión, he despised 
the general censure to which his conduct was exposed, and still 
adhered to his resolution. 
B y the various movements which he made he prevented the 
garrison from despairing of his approach; kept the enemy under 
perpetual alarms; and thus contributed in some measure to 
retard their progress. But Utenhove, the governor, coming at 
length to perceive that the prince had no serious intention to 
relieve him, and dreading, i f he persisted much longer in the 
defence, that the town might be taken by assault, resolved to 
capitúlate, and offered to deliver up the town upon certain 
^ t b ' honourable conditions, which Spinola readily granted, 
as the winter season was fast approaching, and his army 
had already suffered such considerable diminution that in severa! 
regiments hardly one half of the original number remained at the 
termination of the siege *. 
Spinola had hitherto preserved the most perfect discipline in 
his army, and had fully experienced the benefit arising from it, 
in the facility with which he procured supplies from the neutral 
countries adjoining to his camp. But, some time before the 
present period, a convoy with a part of his money, having been 
• Grotius, lib. xv. Van Metcren, lib. xxviii, Bent. part. iii. lib. vii. 
122 H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F [BOOK II. 
intercepted by the enemy, and the affairs of some merchants, 
who had accepted his bilis, having fallen into disorder, in conse-
quence of losses sustained at sea, he was no longer able to 
pay his troops with the same regularity as forraerly, and 
considerable arrears had become due. They had begun to 
complain before the termination of the siege, and soon after the 
same mutinous spirit appeared among them, which had so often 
preved pernicious to the Spanish interest in the Netherlands. 
Spinola, in his treatment of the mutineers, mingled gentleness 
with severity, and omitted nothing in his power to prevent the 
infection from becoming general; but his endeavours were in a 
great measure ineffectual. A considerable number deserted, and 
Mutiny and went over to the enemy's camp ; while a body of two 
Spadsh11 0 thousand horse and foot, with several officers, directed 
troops. their march towards Breda, and put themselves under 
the protection of Prince Maurice; who, agreeably to his usual 
maxims, resolved to encourage them in their revolt; and sent 
orders to the governor of Breda to grant them permission to 
fortify their quarters under the cannon of the town, and to 
purchase provisions from the citizens. 
A s soon as intelligence had reached him of the surrender of 
Rhinberg, Maurice had retired with his army into the province 
of Overyssel; and he now resolved to embrace the opportunity, 
which the mutiny of Spinola's troops afforded him, to recover 
some of the towns in that province which had been lost. H e 
first attacked Lockem, which he reduced in a few days, and 
Siege of immediately after laid siege to Grol l . Spinola, anxious 
Groii. for .^jje preservation of a place which he deemed of 
great importance, immediately conceived the design of attempting 
to relieve it, and called a council of war to delibérate on the 
subject. A great majority of his officers endeavoured to persuade 
him to relinquish his design, by arguments drawn from the 
lateness of the season, the humidity of the country through which 
he must pass, joined to the weakness of his army, and the 
pernicious consequences which must accompany a defeat. H e 
was deeply sensible of the forcé of these objections. But he 
considered that the loss of Grol l would probably soon draw after 
it that of all his other conquests beyond the Rhine ; that his late 
conquests of Rhinberg would thereby become in a great measure 
insignificant, as it derived its importance chiefly from the secure 
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communication which it afforded with his other conquests ; that 
the glory he had acquired would thus be quickly buried in 
oblivion ; and the fruit of all those labours lost, which had been 
attended with so great an expense of blood and treasure. 
Stimulated by these motives, he persisted in his design, though 
if could not perhaps be justified on the principies of prudence ; 
and instantly selected from his own army eight thousand foot, 
and twelve hundred horse, on whose obedience and bravery he 
could depend for the execution of any enterprise, however 
dangerous. These troops were highly pleased with the flattering 
distinction which they received, and began their march with 
every symptom of ardour and alacrity. 
The success of his enterprise Spinola knew must entirely depend 
on his preventing the enemy from having time to complete their 
intrenchments, and with this view he advanced towards them 
with the utmost rapidity, and in a few days arrived within sight 
of the town. Prince Maurice, on the other hand, having from 
the'beginning believed that Spinola would not attempt to inter-
rupt his operations, had neglected to employ such precautions 
as might have obstructed his approach. Being desirous to spare 
his men, he had not as usual drawn any lines of circumvallation 
round the place, and his camp itself had no other defence on one 
side but some marshy ground, which he had thought sufficient to 
prevent any sudden incursión of the enemy. 
It was in this quarter that Spinola resolved to begin his attack; 
and having drawn up his army in four battalions, each of which 
had a small train of artillery attending them, and a part of the 
cavalry secured by a double row of carriages on their flanks, he 
first rodé through the several ranks, encouraging and exhorting 
them, and at the same time declaring that he was determined 
either to die or conquer; immediately after which he gave 
the signal to advanee. 
But Prince Maurice had, from the first appearance of the 
enemy, resolved to decline the combat, and had already begun 
to raise the siege. H e first withdrew his troops in good order 
to an advantageous situation, near his camp, where he was free 
from danger, and soon after retired to a greater distance from 
the town. Hi s army was greatly superior in number to that of 
the enemy; but many of his men were sickly, and worn out with 
the fatigues of a long campaign ; and the event of battles he 
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considered depended less on the numbers than on the intre-
pidity and vigour of the combatants. To the ignorant, his con-
duct was a matter of censure and surprise : but, as both his skill 
and courage were unquestionable, the constraint which he im-
posed upon himself on this occasion was, by the more prudent 
and judicious, deemed deserving of admiration and applause. 
Such was the conclusión of this campaign, through accidenta 
against which no human prudence could provide. Spinola had 
been disappointed in his hopea of reducing the interior parts of 
the United Provinces; but, from his conduct in the siege of 
Rhinberg, and the relief of Groll , all the world were satisfied 
that, on his part, neither abilities nor vigour would have been 
wanting to carry the plan which he had concerted into success-
ful execution*. 
* Piasecü Chronica. Grotius, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Mcteren, lib. 
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SOON after the transactions above related. a negotiation for 
Negotiation peace was begun, in the course of which it appeared 
for a peace. ¡fafc neither of the two contending parties were intent 
on the farther prosecution of the war. But , in order fully to 
comprehend their views and motives, a more particular account 
of some of their operations at sea, in the East Indies, and in 
America, is necessary, than could have been conveniently given 
in the preceding books. 
It may justly appear surprising, that a state possessed of so 
gmall a territory as the republic of the United Provinces, should 
have been able to support the expense of a war at home against 
so potent an enemy. Ye t , during the continuance of this war, 
their exertions were not confined to the Netherlands. They 
maintained at the same time a numerous fleet of ships of war, 
with which they generally preved victorious in all their naval 
rencounters with the enemy, while they successfully attacked his 
dominions in the most distant quarters of the globe. They had 
been much indebted for their success in the Low Countries to 
the assistance in money and troops which they received from 
Henry I V . and Queen Elizabeth ; but as the aid which these 
princes could afford them was never liberal, they must have sunk 
under the power of their enemies, but for those copious resources 
which they opened by the extensión of their trade. 
The inhabitants of the Low Countries had for several centu-
Progress of ries been distinguished by their industry, and their skill 
LowCoun- in manufactures. Even in the time of the Román 
tries. republic they had given proofs of their superior inge-
nuity *. W h e n by the irruptions of those northern barbarians 
who overturned the Román empire, all the useful arts of life, as 
well as letters and science, had been well nigh extinguished, they 
were first revived and successfully cultivated by the Flemings, 
and other inhabitants of the Netherlands. About the middle of 
* Est summffi gemís solertise, atque ad omnia inutaoda quae a qunquo traduntur aptissi-
mum. Vide Cseaar, lib. vii. 
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the tenth century, free marts, or fairs, were established by 
Baldwin, earl of Flanders, to which great numbers of merchants 
from Germany, France, and other places resorted, to purchase 
the manufactures in which the Flemings so much excelled. The 
example of Baldwin was imitated by his successors for almost 
three centuries, during which period the industry and commerce 
of the Flemings were carried to the greatest height, and 
remained unrivalled by the other European nations. But the 
succeeding sovereigns, finding it necessary for defraying the 
expense of the wars in which they were often engaged with the 
neighbouring princes, to impose various taxes on commodities, 
great numbers of the manufacturers and merchants, unaccus-
tomed to such impositions, withdrew into Holland, where they 
were at once free from taxes, and much less exposed to those 
calamities of war, which they had often experienced in the more 
open provinces of Flanders and Brabant. 
The art of salting herrings having, in the fourteenth century, 
been discovered by Wi l l i am Bucrem, a nativo of Pierulem, in 
Flanders, the herring trade, which hath preved so copious a 
source of wealth and industry to the Netherlands, was first culti-
vated by the citizens of Sluys and Bruges ; but it was soon 
afterwards communicated to the Dutch, who improved to the 
utmost the advantages which their situation afforded them for 
carrying it on with success. They were, at the same time, in 
possession of the cod and whale fishery; and, while they 
exported great quantities of fish, and of manufactures, they were 
every year extending their trade in the southern parts of Europe, 
in the countries which lie round the Baltic, and in those parts of 
Germany with which they communicated by the Rhine and other 
rivers which pass through their territory, before they fall into 
the sea. 
Before the middle of the sixteenth century the provinces of 
Holland and Zealand underwent an important chango by the 
great increase of the number of inhabitants, occasioned by the 
persecutions on account of religión in France and Germany. 
Charles the Fifth had resolved to ext írpate the Protestants from 
his dominions in the Netherlands, as well as from those in 
Germany ; but he had been in a great measure deterred from the 
prosecution of his design, partly by the partial affection which he 
bore towards his Dutch and Flemish subjects, and partly by his 
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dread of the fatal consequences, with which the rigorous execu-
tion of his edicts might be attended, with regard to their 
manufactures and their trade. 
Both the French and Germán Protestants therefore found an 
asylum in the Netherlands, and imported thither their families, 
their wealth, and their industry. Of the advantages resulting 
from thence, Brabant and Flanders participated in common with 
the more northern maritime provinces, but the intolerant and 
oppressive spirit of the Spanish government prevented them 
from long enjoying these advantages. It was chiefly by the 
manufacturers and merchants that the opinions of the reformers 
were embraced ; they were persecuted with the most unrelenting 
fury, and they likewise most severely felt the burthen of those 
oppressive taxes that were imposed. B y the cruel treatment 
which they received, several thousands of them were compelled 
to withdraw into other countries. Many went over to England, 
where Elizabeth was ready to afford them her protection. But 
when the maritime provinces had asserted their liberty, and 
Ghent, Bruges, and Antwerp, after an unsuccessful struggle, 
had again submitted to the Spanish yoke, by much the greater 
part of the Flemish emigrants retired into Holland or Zealand, 
and took up their residence in Middleburg, Haerlem, Leyden, 
and Amsterdam. In their new abode they enjoyed the free 
exercise of their religión, a privilege which they deemed a 
compensation for every hardship they might find it necessary to 
undergo. The country which they had made cholee of being of 
small extent, could not afford sustenance for one third part of 
its inhabitants. But, being situated in the heart of Europe, at 
the mouth of several navigable rivers, and most of the towns 
communicating with each other by these rivers, or by canals, no 
country could be more commodious either for inland or foreign 
And com- trade. VVhile their situation therefore prompted them 
merce. ^0 apply themselves to commerce, by the conveniences 
which it afforded for carrying it on, they at the same time found 
it necessary to engage in it, as the only means of their subsistence 
and support. 
No branch of it, to which they could find access, or from which 
any profit could be derived, was neglected ; ñor did they confine 
themselves, like other nations, to the exporting of such of their 
own commodities as they could spare, or the importing of such 
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commodities from other countries as their necessities required, 
but they likewise traded for other nations, and had many of their 
ships continually employed in carrying the merchandise of one 
nation to another. This species of commerce had been formerly 
possessed by the Anseatic or maritime towns on the Baltic ; but 
the situation of the Dutch, between the northern and southern 
European nations, was more commodious for carrying it on. 
The necessity which their circumstances imposed upon them, of 
contmual action and employment, had prompted them to engage 
in i t ; and their extreme frugality and rigid economy, by rendering 
it practicable for them to trade for smaller profits, had enabled 
them to wrest it from their competitors, and to engross it almost 
wholly to themselves, 
Among the various branches of commerce in which the Dutch 
displayed so much activity and enterprise, one of the most consi-
derable consisted in carrying from the countries lying round the 
Baltic to the different ports in Spain and Portugal, great quan-
tities of cora and naval stores ; in return for which, besides fruits, 
wine, and other productions of those southern kingdoms, they 
received the gold and silver of America, and the spices and other 
commodities which the Portuguese imported from India or Lisbon. 
The period when this branch of trade commenced cannot be 
exactly ascertained. Being of small extent at first, it has escaped 
the notice of historians, But it had become considerable soon 
after the beginning of the sixteenth century, and before the middle 
of that century, it was deemed a species of commerce of the first 
importance. I t was equally necessary to Spain and Portugal as 
to the United Provinces, and was for this reason connived at by 
the court of Spain for many years after the revolt in the Nether-
lands; being still carried on by the Dutch themselves, who found 
no other precaution necessary but to sail under the flag of some 
neutral power at peace with Spain. But Ph i l ip^ resentment 
against his revolted subjects being on some occasions too violent to 
be rostrained by considerations of policy or prudence, the Dutch 
ships were sometimes confiscated, the commanders thrown into 
prison, and the sailors either sent to the galleys, or compelled to 
serve on board the Spanish fleet. This monarch having come at 
length to suspect that the commerce which he had hitherto in 
some measure permitted, was of infinitely greater advantage to 
the enemy than to himself, and being desirous to deprive them 
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of what he believed to be a principal source of their increasing 
wealth and strength, he resolved to enforce an ediet which he 
had formerly published, prohibiting his subjects in Spain and 
Portugal from holding intercourse with the revolted provinces ; 
the Dutch traders were, in consequence of this resolution, every 
year more harassed than the preceding, t i l l the restraints and 
vexations which they suffered had become intolerable. 
Finding themselves therefore under the necessity of abandoning 
this gainful traffic, they began to. consider whether they might 
not, in another way, secure to themselves the advantages which 
they had hitherto derived from it. 
Having so long acted as carriers for the Portuguese, in 
distributing the rich productions of the East over the Northern 
nations, they well knew where to find the speediest sale for 
these productions, and they likewise knew that the demand for 
them was every year increasing : ñor, when they considered the 
great advantages of their situation, joined to their superior naval 
power, could they doubt of being able to deprive the Portuguese 
of this profitable trade, provided they could procure the commo-
dities requisito for carrying it on. 
But, for this purpose, it was necessary they should perform a 
voyage of severa! thousand leagues, through seas with which 
they were unacquainted ; that they should visit countries of 
which they were almost entirely ignorant; and after their arrival 
there, should enter into a competition with a bold and enterprising 
nation, who, besides being in possession of the trade of these 
countries, had established a formidable military forcé for its 
protection. The Dutch, though sufficiently aware of these 
difficulties, were not thereby deterred from persisting in their 
design. In order to shorten their voyage, the great extent of 
which, through unknown seas, was the principal cause of their 
dread, they made three different attempts, to discover a passage 
to India, by the Northern Ocean ; but these attempts, like all 
others of the same kind, proving fruitless, they resolved to 
undertake the voyage to India by the customary route, provided 
they could procure some person already acquainted with it to 
conduct them. 
It happened opportunely, when they were deliberating on 
the subject, that some merchants of Amsterdam received an 
application from Cornelius Houtman, a native of Flanders, who 
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was in prison for debt in Lisbon; representing, that having 
made several voyages with the Portuguese to India, he was not 
only well acquainted with the course of navigation thither, but 
likewise with the nature of the India trade ; and that, in case 
they would furnish him with a sum of money to purchase his 
liberty, he would gladly communicate to them all necessary 
information. and undertake in person the conduct of their ships. 
Hi s proposal was instantly accepted, the money which he 
requested for his reléase was transmitted to him, and soon 
afterwards he arrived at Amsterdam. The merehants, highly 
satisfied with the information which they received from him, and 
perceiving him to be a man of uncommon penetration ánd 
abilities, immediately formed an association, to which they gave 
the ñame of the Company of Distant Countries, and equipped a 
squadron, consisting of four ships, which they put under his 
command. This little squadron had two hundred and fifty men 
on board, and a hundred pieces of cannon, which were furnished 
by the states; besides naval and military stores, and a variety of 
merchandise fitted to the taste of the Indian nations *. 
A s the principal object of the voyage was to procure more 
particular information than they yet possessed conceming the 
country, and the different branches of trade which it afforded, 
Houtman was instructed, as much as possible to avoid the 
settlements of the Portuguese, and carefully to abstain from 
all hostilities, when they were not necessary for his defence : ñor 
was he inattentive to these instructions ; he might, in his way to 
India, have seized a rich carrack in which the archbishop of Goa 
was retuming home ; but though he went on board that vessel 
in order to procure intelligence, he suífered it to proceed on its 
voyage without molestation. 
After visiting the coasts of Africa and Brazil , he doubled the 
Operations 0^ Good Hope, and proccedcd to the isle of 
in the Madagascar, in which island and- that of St. Mary he 
was detained for some time, in consequence of a 
dissension which happened between him and the other 
June 1396, commanders, with regard to the route which it was 
proper to pursue. From St. Mary he at length proceeded to 
* The two largcst of these «hips were of two hundred and thirty tons; the third, of 
onc hundred and thirty; and the fourth, of fifty. The valué of the whole equipmcnt was 
eMimated at four hundred thousand florins. 
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Sumatra, and from thence to Bantam. in the island of Java, 
where he began to purchase pepper and other spiceries. A t 
first he was well received, and no aversión was discovered by the 
natives to enter into a commercial treaty with h im; but the 
jealousy of the Portuguese merchants, a considerable number of 
whom resided at Bantam, being instantly alarmed, they resolved 
to exert their influence to effectuate his ruin. Fo r this end, 
carrying rich presents in their hands, the only means of procuring 
access to the princes of India, they represented the Dutch to 
the king or general of Bantam as pirates, and the common 
enemies of human-kind, of whose rapiñe and violence his subjects 
would soon have fatal experience, if they did not embrace the 
present opportunity, when they were few in number, to cut them 
bff, and to prevent their return. The governor, ignorant, and 
therefore credulous, was easily persuaded of the truth of this 
representation, and consented to follow the counsel that was given 
him. But distrusting his ability to destroy them by open forcé, 
he resolved to employ fraud and treachery. He pretended an 
inclination to have a commercial treaty, which had been proposed 
by the Dutch, concluded, and desired that Houtman, and the 
other officers, would come to his palace to adjust the terms. 
Suspecting no deceit, Houtman, and one or two more, complied 
with his request, and were immediately taken into custody. The 
governor had absurdly believed that all the officers would have • 
accepted his invitation, and that the ships, having no persons on 
board that were fit to command them, would then have become 
an easy prey. Being disappointed in this expectation, he 
dreaded the consequences of putting his prisoners to death, 
while their companions remained at liberty to take vengeance on 
him for his perfidy. St i l l , however, he detained them in prison, 
and refused to listen to the repeated solicitations of their friends 
in their behalf; t i l l the Dutch ships having begun to cannonade 
the town, and laid part of it in ruins, he at length restored them 
to their liberty. 
Soon after this, Houtman finding, on a review of his men, that 
by death, occasioned chiefly by the climate, they had suñered a 
diminution of more than one third of their number, ordered one 
of his ships to be burnt, and set sail for Europe with the rest; 
carrying with him some of the natives of Madagascar and 
Sumatra, a Japanese, a Chínese, and a pilot of the ñame of 
K 2 
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Abdul , distinguished for his knowledge of the Indian seas. After 
a prosperous voyage of between five and six months, he arrived 
safe in the Texel in the beginning of August, 1597, having 
spent almost two years and a half in his expedition. H e 
hardly bronght home with him wealth sufficient to defray the 
expense of his equipment; but both he and his companions were 
now able to give the most satisfactory inforraation to their 
employers. The Indians too, whom he had induced to accom-
pany hitn, were likely to be afterwards of the greatest use ; and 
the hopes which his countrymen conceived of greater success in 
their future voyages, were raised to the greatest height*. 
The Portuguese, they knew, would give all the opposition in 
their power to every attempt which they could make, either to 
establish their trade, or to procure a settlement in India; but, 
from the aecounts which they had received of the declining power 
of the Portuguese, and of the manner in which the eastern 
nations were affected towards them, they hoped to be able, 
either to elude, or to counteract their malignity. 
A bolder and more enterprising spirit had never been displayed 
Portuguese ^han the Portuguese had manifested in their numerous 
settiemcnts conquests and discoveries ; and no conquests, so exten-
in ia* sive and important, had been ever made with so small 
a forcé, or by a nation possessed of such scanty resources. 
Animated at once by almost all the passions which most power-
fully impel the human mind, by avarice, by bigotry, and by 
ambition, they had performed exploits, which seemed to be 
beyond the power of man, and were regarded by all those bar-
barous nations, over whom they triumphed with so great facility, 
as more than men. They had made themselves masters of all 
the more important parts of the coast of Guinea. They had 
expelled the Arabians from that of Zanguebar, where they had 
formed settlements, which gave them the command of all the 
gold and silver mines in their country, from Sofala to Melinda. 
They had acquired a decided superiority over the Egyptians, 
though aided by the Venetians, in the Red Sea ; and had thus 
put an entire stop to that gainful trade which the Venetians had 
so long carried on with India, by the way of Suez and Alexandria. 
Their arms had been attended with equal success in the Persian 
• Meteren, lib. xvii. and xviii. Antonii Thygii Historia Navalis, Lugd. Batav. 4to. 
1G57, p. 117, &c. 
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Gulf, and on the coasts of Persia, Malabar, and Malacca. They 
had acquired possession of Ceylon, and the Molucca and Sunda 
islands ; and, by their establishraent at Macao, they had secured 
to themselves the trade of China and Japan. 
H a d the Portuguese, at the present period, possessed the 
same vigour and intrepidity of which they had given sueh con-
spicuous proof on their first arrival in India, it is probable that 
any attempt to dispossess them would have preved abortivo: but 
they were no longer the same people as before. The first con-
querors of India were all extinct; and their successors, a few 
only excepted, were men defiled with the most odious vices, 
which rendered them a scourge to the people committed to their 
care. Removed to so great a distance from the seat of govern-
ment, as gave them hopes of impunity for the most flagitious 
crimes; corrupted by prosperity, and enervated by the climate, 
while their religión, of the most illiberal kind, only served to 
render them more ferocious, their conduct towards the nativos 
was equally oppressive and perfidious. Attempts were made, by 
some virtuous viceroys, to reform the numberless abuses which 
had been committed; but these great men, whose ñames are 
handed down to posterity with just applause, were too few in 
number, and their government of too short continuance, to 
produce any permanent effect. Corruption of every kind had 
struck its roots too deep to be so easily extirpated; and the 
natives, who had been long disgusted, began to feel contempt, 
mixed with abhorrence of their oppressors, in the room of that 
respect and dread, which they had formerly been accustomed to 
entertain. 
After the subjection of Portugal to the crown of Spain, the 
affairs of the Portuguese in India were more than ever neglected 
by the government at home, and disorders of every kind were 
increased and multiplied. It was believed by some persons, that 
Philip II . , agreeably to the maxims of his malignant policy, was 
well pleased that the power of his new subjects should suffer a 
diminution, as he would thereby find it easier to maintain his 
usurped authority. But it is more reasonable to suppose that 
his attention being wholly engrossed by objects which he judged 
to be of greater importance, he had not leisure to attend to the 
aífairs in India; and found it, therefore, in some measure neces-
sary to leave the several governors at liberty to act without 
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control. However tliis be, it j s certain that they acted more 
like independen! monarchs than the subjects of one common 
prince, to whom they were aecountable for their conduct, and 
seemed to have forgotten the relation which they had borne, and 
the duties which they ovved, both to their country and to one 
another ; while each individual was solely attentive to his prívate 
interest, and seldom scrupled to promote it at the expense either 
of faith or of humanity. The nativos had, on different occasions, 
taken arms, and attempted to vindicate their rights against 
their lawless oppressors. Their efforts hitherto had not been 
vigorous, ñor attended in the issue with success; but they 
were become more than ever impatient under the injuries which 
they suffered, and longed for an opportunity to assert their 
liberty. 
Such was the state of the Portuguese, and such the disposition 
of the nativos with regard to them, when the Dutch made their 
first voyage to the Indies. They were thereby encouraged to 
persist in their attempt to establish trade in those parts ; and a 
spirit of enterprise and adventure was excited, which soon 
diffused itself over all the marítimo provinces. The Spanish 
ministers imprudently contributed to quicken this adventurous 
spirit, and to confirm the Dutch in the resolution they had 
formed, by republishing, soon after the accession of the present 
king, an edict, prohibiting the Spaniards and Portuguese from 
all commercial intercourse with them in the strictest manner, 
and under the severest pertalties. They might have perceived 
the folly of this measure from the effects which their former 
restrictions on the Dutch trade had already produced; but they 
attended only to the immediate inconvenience which was occa-
sioned thereby to the enemy, without considering either the 
advantages which the Dutch might ultimately derive from their 
prohibition, or the prejudice which the Spaniards and Portuguese 
were likely to sustain. 
B y the advice of the Count de Fuentes, a nobleman of great 
abilities, but naturally haughty and severe, and extremely igno-
rant of the commercial interest of his country, the prohibitory 
edict was carried into the most rigorous execution. A strict 
inquiry was made, at all the sea-ports of Spain and Portugal, 
whether any of the Dutch had come thither under the colours of 
any neutral power; and as a considerable number were disco-
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vered to have been guilty of this teraerity, their ships and goods 
were confiscated, and they themselves either cast into prison, or 
sent to the galleys, and condemned to work as slaves. 
The states-general, in order to expresa their contempt of this 
conduct of the Spanish court, published an edict, in which, 
besides prohibiting all intercourse between their subjects and 
those of the K i n g of Spain, they declared, that they would treat 
as enemies the subjects of all neutral powers, who should carry 
commodities, of whatever kind, to the ports of Spain, Portugal, 
or Flanders. 
To this manifestó, copies of which were sent to the courts of 
the several maritime powers, no answer was returned, ñor any 
objection made, by the states or princes who received i t ; and the 
French monarch gave, on this occasion, a striking proof of his 
favour for the Dutch, by publishing a declaration, that if any of 
his subjects should, for the space of six months, adventure to 
trade with Spain, they raust do it at their prívate risk, without 
the hopes of his protection. 
While the Dutch in this manner shewed their contempt of the 
Spanish trade, and the prohibitory edict, being more than ever 
intent on prosecuting the trade which they had begun in India, 
several different associations were formed by the merchants in 
Holland and Zealand, almost immediately after the return of 
their fleet under the command of Houtman ; and before the end 
of the following year, more than eighty ships, completely equip-
ped, and furnished with various articles of commerce, were sent 
Dutch trade ou^ ' ^16 greater part of them to the East Indies, and 
in both in- some to the West, and to the coasts of Africa, while 
the coast of others were ordered to attempt the passage by the 
Africa. Straits of Magellan into the Pacific Ocean. 
They were divided into small fleets, consisting chiefly of four, 
six, or eight armed vessels, from about one hundred and fifty to 
three or four hundred tons, some of which had regular troops on 
board, that were furnished by Prince Maurice and the states. 
Their instructions were nearly the same as those which had been 
given to the commanders employed in the first expedition: to 
avoid the settlements of the Portuguese, and, as much as possible, 
to abstain from hostilities. But i t was impossible for them 
strictly to comply with these instructions. Their enemies were 
spread almost everywhero over the coasts which they visited ; 
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and being equally animated by jealousy and by resentment, were 
resolved to give thera all the opposition, and to do them all the 
mischief in their power. They had laboured to inspire the 
natives with the same malignity; and on the minds of some of 
them their misrepresentations had produced the desired effect. 
It was not only the dangers, therefore, of voyages, so long and 
difficult, through climates the most adverse to the human con-
stitution, which the Dutch encountered in the prosecution of 
their design ; but, after their arrival on those coasts, where the 
trade, which they desired to establish, must be carried on, they 
found it necessary to fight and to negotiate by turns. They had 
the prejudices of the natives to overeóme ; and they were obliged 
to stand perpetually on their guard against the machinations of 
the Portuguese, who practised every method which they could 
devise to accomplish their destruction, whether of secret fraud, or 
open forcé and violence. 
The Portuguese had no suoh formidable opposition to encoun-
ter, when they first arrived in India. The ships of their enemies 
were few in number, and much inferior to theirs, both in respect 
of strength and size ; and the towns which they attacked were 
weakly fortified, and unskilfully defended by a dastardly, effemi-
nate, and feeble race of men. Whereas the Dutch encountered 
fleets of ships of the same construction as their own, and were 
obliged to contend with an enemy, who, besides being accustomed 
to the climate, and familiarly acquainted with the Indian seas, 
were not less distinguished than themselves for their naval and 
military skil l . 
But their conduct was wisely adapted to their circumstances, 
being equally prudent whether it respected the natives or the 
Portuguese. They soon convinced the former of the falsehood 
of those injurious aspersions which the latter had cast upon their 
charaoter; and by the moderation, justice, and humanity, which 
they displayed in all their dealings, preved that, in purity of 
manners, they were much superior to their accusers. They were 
soon allowed to trade in many places, from whence the Portu-
guese had laboured to exelude them ; and, as with indefatigable 
industry they improved to the utmost every advantage which they 
enjoyed, they came, ere long, to procure admission to several of 
the most important branches of commerce. 
A s the extensión of their trade, and not conquest, was the 
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great object which they pursued, they avoided all unnecessary 
rencounters with the Portuguesa ; but they were generally well 
prepared to defend themselves when attacked, gave many proofs 
of the most determined bravery, and sometimes triumphed over 
the superior forcé and numbers of the enemy. St i l l , however, 
they kept the great end of their voyages perpetually in view. 
The same time which they found it necessary to spend in repair-
ing the damages sustained in battle, was likewise employed in 
trading with the natives; as soon as their cargoes were complete, 
and their damages repaired, they returned to Holland : thus 
enriching their employers, and enabling them not only to defray 
the expense of their equipment, but to exert themselves with 
redoubled vigour in the prosecution of their designs. 
Although some of the numberless voyages which they had 
undertaken, had, through misconduct or cross accidents, preved 
unfortunate, they had been in general sufficiently successful to 
render it their interest to persevere. The societies, however, of 
merchants, by whom the Indian trade had been carried on, 
were not satisfied with the profits which it afforded. They com-
plained that too great a number of adventurers had engaged in 
i t ; and that in consequence thereof, as they must pay much 
higher prices for Indian goods than had been formerly given 
by the Portuguese, so they found it necessary to sell them 
much cheaper; and would either be ruined by their efforts to 
establish this new branch of commerce, or obhged to abandon it 
altogether. 
This evil, which could hardly have been apprehended in the 
beginning of a trade attended with so great expense and danger, 
would probably have soon been remedied by a diminution of the 
number of competitors, the natural consequence of small profits 
in any branch of commerce; and, i f the evil complained of had 
been the only reason for the interposition of the states, it may be 
questioned whether they ought to have interposed. But, besides 
this, there was another reason of greater weight. The Portuguese 
in India, being under the direction of their governors or viceroys, 
could more easily act in concert, than the great number of inde-
pendent Dutch societies; and the small fleets or single ships, 
belonging to these societies, were exposed to the danger of being 
separately attacked and destroyed one after another, by an 
enemy with whom i f they too could act in concert, they might be 
138 H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F [BOOK III. 
able to contend. Deterrained by these considerations, the states 
1602. general, in the year 1602, united the several societies 
í n d l a ' c o m - 0^ ^ d e r s into one body, under the ñame of the East 
pany. India Company ; on which, besides the exclusive privi-
lege of trading beyond the Cape of Good Hope on the one hand, 
and the Straits of Magellan on the other; they conferred the 
power of administering justice, of building forts, of appointing 
governors and garrisons, of raising troops, and of making peace 
and war with the Indian princes. A fund, amounting to more 
than six millions of florins, was immediately subscribed for by the 
merchants in the principal maritime towns, and managers were 
appointed, under whose direction all the trade to India was hence-
forth to be carried on. This company being the first regular com-
mercial society of which we read in history, has served in some 
measure as a model to all the trading companies that have been 
created in modem times. It eonsisted chieflyof those who had been 
engaged as prívate adventurers in the Indian trade; and by these 
men, who had profited from their former errors, and were well 
acquainted with the trade in all its branches, the affairs of the com-
pany were, from the beginning, conducted with consummate s k i l l ; 
ñor was their good-fortune inferior to the prudence which they dis-
played. Having, by their justice and moderation, extinguished 
those groundless prejudices against their national character, which 
the Portuguese had laboured to instil into the minds of the Indian 
princes, they were almost everywhere received with favour, and 
in several places obtained permission to establish factories, and 
to build forts for the protection of their trade. They were 
requested by some of these princes to lend their assistance in 
expelling the Portuguese, and in their rencounters with that na-
tion they generally came oíf victorious. They made innumerable 
captures of their richest ships. Their trade was every year more 
widely extended, and the profits arising from it were greater 
than they had been accustomed to derive from any former branch 
of commerce. The principal causes of their weakness have been 
already explained, and to these must be added this consideration, 
that, on the other hand, the trade and power of the Portuguese 
were quickly hastening to decay. Whi le their rivals were every 
season receiving reinforcements both of ships and troops, they 
were left unsupported by their friends in Europe, to struggle 
with the difficulties which surrounded them. The strength of 
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Portugal liad long been exhausted by the too numerous emigra-
tion of its inhabitants, and the Spanish ministers, besides that 
their attention was entirely occupied by other objects, found 
more than sufficient employment at home for all the forcé and 
treasure which they possessed. 
It was this reason, and not, as has been supposed, the desire of 
having Portugal reduced to a state of weakness, and thereby ren-
dered more tame and obsequious, that prevented the court of Spain 
from affording that assistance to the Portuguese in India, which 
their oxigéneles so much required at the present period. They 
were almost equally inattentive, or equally unable to afford sup-
port to the Spanish traders and colonists as to the Portuguese. 
Many captures were made of their ships loaded with the trea-
sures of America and the Indios. Their fleets were sometimos 
blocked up in their harbours, t i l l the season fit for entering on 
their voyages had elapsed ; and their settlements on the coasts 
were often plundered, sometimos by the Dutch, and sometimos by 
the English, with impunity. 
Ñor was it only in the Indios and on the coasts of America, 
that the subjeets of the Spanish monarchy were exposed to the 
depredations of their enemies. Whi le the war with England 
subsisted, the coasts of Spain itself had been insulted both by the 
Dutch and English, and many ships in the harbours either taken 
or destroyed. After the establishment of peace with Franco 
and England, the Spanish ministers had conceived the hopos of 
finding it easy, not only to resist the most vigorous eíforts of the 
Dutch, but, ere long, to reduce them to obedience. But, although 
they had now only a single enemy to contend with, whom they 
had long been aecustomed to despise, that enemy, through the 
great increase of their trade and navigation, were become more 
powerful, while they themselves, from the decay of their trade 
and other causes, were much weaker than before. Fo r some 
time past, therefore, the Spaniards had found it equally difficult 
to defend themselves against the Dutch alone, as they had done 
formerly against the Dutch, and English, and French united. 
Philip's ministers were not ignorant of the sources from whence 
the Dutch had received so great an accession of wealth and 
power ; and of ono of these we have seen, they had in vain en-
deavoured to deprive them, by the prohibition of their trade with 
Spain and Portugal. Another, not less copious, they knew, was 
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their cod and herring fishery, on the coast of England and tlie 
Netherlands; and to deprive them of this, and, at the same time, to 
intereept their navigation in the narrow seas between the southern 
Th1 ' an^ nor^iern skráes 0^ Europe, had for some years been 
Jrdsa^tempt a principal object of their attention. It was with this view 
th/D^tch a^ *^ose §a^eys ^a(^ been equipped, which as for-
commerce. merly related, had been intrusted to the command of 
Frederick de Spinola; and with the same view there had been 
fitted out at Nieuport andDunkirk a great number of armed 
vessels, from which the Dutch suffered considerable molestation 
in their coasting trade and fishery. But all Spinola's galleys had 
either been destroyed, or had fallen into the hands of the Dutch, 
when they got possession of Sluys ; and the states having provided 
some ships of war on purpose, had, on some occasions, taken 
eignal vengeance on the privateers of Nieuport and Dunkirk, the 
crews of which they always treated as pirates, and either hanged 
or drowned. Their fleets now rodé triumphant from the Baltic to 
the Straits of Gibraltar; and their European, as well as their 
African and Indian trade, was at this time in a much more 
flourishing condition than ever *. 
The courts of Spain and Brussels had long beheld this supe-
riority of the naval power of the Dutch, with much anxiety. 
They dreaded from it the utter extinction of their commerce ; 
and perceived, that in order to prevent this effect, i t would, ere 
long, be necessary to put a period to the war. Ñor did peace 
Causes appear to be less necessary, when they considered what 
duced thé a^<^  hitherto been the issue of their military operations 
Spauish mi- at land, than when they reflected on the numberless 
whhfor0 losses which they had sustained at sea. Their most 
for peace. strenuous endeavours to reduce the revolted provinces to 
obedience had served only to render the people more expert, and 
more obstínate in their defence ; to strengthen the bond of their 
intemal unión; and to confirm the neighbouring powers in their 
resolution of affording them assistance and support. The maritime 
provinces, almost surrounded by the sea, and everywhere inter-
* Recueil des Voyages, &c. Van Metercn, passim. Grotius. De Wit's Maxims— 
Thysii Hist. Navalis, passim. Huet on the Dutch Commerce. Janizon, Etat présent dea 
Prov. U n . Recueil des Voyages qui ont servi a l'Etablissement et aux Progrés de la 
Compagnes des Indes Orientales formée dans les Provinces Unic» des Pays-Baa. Rouen, 
1725. 
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sected by the rivers and canals, had hitherto been found impreg-
nable; and the southern írontier had lately been strengthened 
by the acquisition of some of the strongest places in Flanders 
and Brabant, Sluys and Breda. 
The marquis of Spinola had wisely directed his attack against 
the confederates in that quarter where they were the worst pre-
pared for resistance. The army which he commanded had been 
the most numerous which could possibly be collected. 
Through the united exertions which had been made by the 
archdukes, the court of Spain, and by the marquis himself, who 
had mortgaged his ampie fortune in order to procure money, his 
troops having regularly received their pay, had been kept under 
the strictest discipline. A l l his operations had been conducted 
with consummate s k i l l ; and nothing had been omitted on his 
part which might have insured success : yet he had been utterly 
unable to surmount the difficulties which he encountered. In-
stead of penetrating into the interior provinces, he had been 
obliged to rest satisfied with conquests from whence no solid 
advantage could be derived. F rom the fatigues which they had 
undergone, and the moisture of the climate, the army had lately 
suffered considerable diminution. Those funds, from whence 
the marquis had defrayed the expenses of the last campaign, 
had for several months been almost entirely exhausted; and consi-
derable arrears being now due to the soldiers, the same mutinous 
spirit by which they had formerly been actuated, had again begun 
to appear, A part of them, as above mentioned, had already 
abandoned their officers; and having chosen others from among 
theraselves, had begun to indulge themselves in every species of 
licentiousness. To these disorders no adequate remedy could 
possibly be applied during the continuance of the war. A l l the 
money which could be raised in the Netherlands, or furnished 
by the court of Spain, would be hardly sufficient to defray the 
expense of the new levies which must be made before the next 
campaign. A n d in the meantime the licentious spirit of the 
mutineers must diífuse itself throughout the army; and both 
the army itself, and the provinces, be thereby exposed an easy 
prey to a watchful enemy ; who, being possessed of more certain 
resources for carrying on the war, had been always ready to 
avail themselves of every advantage that was afforded them *. 
* Grotius, lib. xv. Benliv. part xiii. lib. viii. 
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Besides these considerations, there vvere some others, which, 
with Phil ip and his ministers, were supposed to have had still 
greater weight. A report at that time prevailed, that the 
Dutch, having entered into a correspondence with the Moors 
on the coast of Barbary, had agreed to furnish them with ships 
to transport an army into Spain. A n d another report was 
likewise propagated, that the French monarch having formed 
the design of annexing the Netherlands to France, was now 
prepared and resolved to carry ifc into execution. It does not 
appear that there was any just foundation for either of these 
reporta. But they seem to have made a strong impression on 
the minds of the Spanish ministers; who, dreading that either 
an interruption of that domestic tranquillity which Spain had so 
long enjoyed, or the entire loss of the Netherlands, must be the 
consequence of the continuance of the war, were now more 
desirous than ever to have it brought to a conclusión*. 
The archduke was still more solicitous for peace than the 
The Arch- Spanish ministers. From the commencement of his 
duke Albert sovereignty he had lived in perpetual disquietude. 
solicitous O ^ A l i 
for peace, He had fully experienced the vanity of his hopes of 
and why. gUccess from the support of Spain, which he knew to 
be too much exhausted, and removed at too great a distance 
from the scene of action, to afford him the assistance that was 
necessary. He had no heirs of his own body to whom he could 
transmit his dominions. A n d both he and the infanta, besides 
being sensibly affected by the calamities in which their subjects 
were involved, were desirous to pass the remainder of their days 
in peace. 
They were confirmed in their resolution by the marquis of 
Peace re- Spinola, who did not hcsitate in advising peace, notwith-
b y ^ b o l a . stauding the renown which he had acquired from his 
conduct of the war. But his ambition being tempered with 
prudence and moderation, he wisely judged it better to rest satis-
fied with the glory which he had already gained, than to run the 
risk of exposing himself to reproach, by attempting what he knew 
to be impossible. He was better acquainted than any other per-
son with the difficulties to be encountered in the prosecution of 
the war, and therefore exerted all his influence to persuade the 
archduke, and the Spanish ministers, of the folly of persisting in 
• Memorie recondite, vol. i . p. 418. 
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their attempt. The time míght come, he represented, when the 
confederates, divided among themselves, and no longer supported 
by so powerful an ally as the king of Franco, might be induced 
or compelled to return to their allegiance; but while, through 
their dread of Spain, their internal unión was preserved inviolate, 
and a prince so near them, possessed of such inexhaustible re-
sources, ever ready to'lend them his assistance; as it was absurd 
to expect to bring the war to the desired issue, so the conse-
quences of persisting in it must prove equally ruinous to the 
dominions of the archdukes, and to the Spanish monarchy*. 
Albert, who had entertained the most profound respect for 
Albertoffers ^pinola^ judgment, being now more firmly than ever 
peace to the persuaded that peace was necessary, resolved, whatever 
confedeiacy. cong^ruction might be put upon his conduct, to make 
the confederates an oífer of it without delay. Having previously 
sounded their inclinations, by two persons of the ñames of W i t -
tenhorst and Gevart, he some time after sent these men back to 
Holland, with instructions signed by himself and the infantat. 
These instructions they first communicated privately to several 
individuáis, and afterwards requested to be permitted to lay them 
before the assembly of the states. The members were of differ-
ent opinions with regard to the expediency of granting them this 
Priuce Mau- permission; and Prince Maurice endeavoured to dis-
an^verture SUSi^ e the states from granting it, by expressing his 
for peace. apprehensions that some insidious design was covered 
under the prtsent proposal, and that as no treaty with Spain or 
with the archdukes, while they were so entirely governed in al l 
their conduct by the court of Spain, could be productivo of any 
good effect, so the granting of a public audience to the commis-
sioners would only serve to inspire the people with fallacious 
hopes of peace, and so damp their zeal in the prosecution of the 
war. 
But Maurice yieldedj, on this occasion, to the persuasions of 
the celebrated John Olden Barnevelt, pensioner of Holland ; one 
of the greatest statesmen of the age, and equally eminent for his 
public spirit as his political abilities and integrity. B y this 
* Bentivoglio, Giotius, Baudius, &c. 
t Dated January 3, 1607. 
+ It docs not appcar to have becn candour or conviction. Vidc Jeannin, tom, iii. 
106, 107. 
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venerable patriot it was urged, that while the king of Great 
„, Bri tain stood an idle spectator of the war, and the 
Peace stre- r 
nuousiy re- French monarch seemed to have some great object in 
byB^rne-6*1 view, which he deemed of more importance than the 
^el<i» support of the Dutch republic, both these princes were 
well pleased to observe the Spaniards exhaust their strength by 
an obstínate perseverance in the war with the Netherlands; and. 
would probably be more liberal in their offers of assistance to the 
states than they had hitherto been, i f there were a negotiation 
begun for the establishment of peace. A great majority of the 
assembly, with Maurice himself, carne readily into this opinión, 
and the commissioners were readily admitted to an audience. 
They represented that the archdukes, being desirous to put an 
end to the calamities of war, were ready to enter into treaty with 
them, either for establishing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, and 
would consent to such reasonable terms as they could not suppose 
would be rejected by the United Provinces. That the states 
could not be ignorant of the equity of the pretensions of the 
archdukes ; that in all their conduct they had shown how averse 
they were to every severo and arbitrary measure in the govem-
ment of their subjects; that they would claim nothing to which 
they had not the most unquestionable title ; and that the states 
might assuredly depend on receiving from them every sort of 
satisfaction and security they could require for the full enjoyment 
of their rights and privileges. 
To this proposal the states, after an interval ót a few days, 
replied, that no regard could be paid to what the commissioners 
had delivered in the assembly ; since the archdukes, it appeared, 
still persisted in supposing themselves possessed of a right to the 
sovereignty of the United Provinces. That in the solemn deed, 
entitled the Union of Utrecht, the states, having, on the justest 
grounds, renounced the authority of the king of Spain, had 
asserted their liberty and independence; that this deed had been 
recognised by many of the European states and princes; that 
they had long maintained their liberty by forcé of arms; and 
were still determined to maintain it to the last extremity ; and 
to reject every proposal for treating with the archduke or the 
king of Spain, either for a truce or a perpetual peace, unless 
they were acknowledged as a free state, over which these princes 
could pretend to no authority. 
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W i t h this answer the comraissioners returned to Brussels, 
The United from whence they wrote a letter to the states, acquaint-
on a recog. ing them that, by the proposal which had been made, 
nition of ¿ j j g archduke did not mean to claim any authority over 
thcir frcC" 
dom, them, or to introduce any chango into their form of 
government; but, leaving all their laws and institutions on 
their present footing, to put a period to the miseries attendant 
upon war, by a peace or truce ; and, soon afterwards, another 
commissioner was sent into Holland, in whom it should seem 
Albert could put greater confidence than in his first commis-
sioners. This person was Ney, or Neyen, a nativo of Antwerp, 
who had been educated in the Protestant religión, but having 
afterwards embraced the Popish faith, had resided for several 
years in Spain, and was at this time general of the order of 
Franciscans; a man of considerable learning, and of great inte-
grity and abilities, and highly distinguished for his eloquence and 
address. Having been upwards of twenty years of age before he 
left the Netherlands, he retained a warm aífection for hie nativo 
country; he was at the same timo animated with zeal to sig-
nalise himself in the service of the archdukes and the court of 
Spain, and undertook the task imposed upon him with great 
alacrity. 
He had no sooner, after his arrival in Holland, had an inter-
view with some of the principal persons in the republic than he 
discovered that it would be vain to hope for success in the execu-
tion of his embassy, unless the states were, in the treaty proposed, 
to be acknowledged free and independent, and for this reason he 
immediately returned to Brussels, in order to convince the arch-
dukes of the necessity of making this concession. 
These princes, confonnably to the tenor of the above mentioned 
letter, written by Wittenhorst and Gevart, at their desire, were 
willing to agree that no mention should be made in the treaty of 
their right of sovereignty ; but, expressly to disclaim this right, 
and formally to acknowlcdge the sovereignty of the states, they 
considered as equally dangerous and dishonourable. It would be 
in words to acknowledge what in their hearts they must disavow; 
it would be to give their sanction to rebellion, and thereby to 
afford encouragement to their subjects to imitate the examplo of 
the rovolted provinces. 
Being conscious however, from the state of their finances, that 
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they were utterly unable to carry on the war, they resolved, in 
conformity to the advice of theír counsellors, to yield at least so 
far as to impower their commissioners to declare, that they were 
willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people, over 
whom they pretended to no authority: a form of expression 
which might be adopted, they thought, consistently with their 
honour, as it only denoted a matter of fact, but did not import 
either a renunciation of their own right to the sovereignty, or an 
acknowledgment of a right inherent in the states to indepen-
dence. 
In the hopes however, that it might satisfy the confederates, 
A letter ^ e y was immediately sent back to the Hague with a 
from the letter addressed to the states, and signed both by Albert 
to the Unit- and Isabella, of which the following were the principal 
ed sutes, contents: That being extremely solicitous to put a stop 
to the effusion of human blood, they were ready to treat with the 
United States as with a free people, from whom they claimed no 
submission or obedience: that they were willing to treat either 
for the purpose of establishing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, 
of twelve, fifteen, or twenty years, during the continuance of 
which, the contending partios should retain what they at present 
possessed ; unless it should be mutually agreed, for the common 
interest of both, to make an exchange of certain towns and 
territorios: that, in order to prevent all suspicion of fraud or 
sinister inteiition, ambassadors, natives of the Netherlands, should 
be nominated by the archdukes, and an equal number named by 
the United States: that the states should have their cholee of 
the time and place of meeting; and that, while the negociation 
was carrying on, there should be an entire suspensión of hostili-
ties for eight months, both by sea and land. 
F rom the sequel, it will appear that all the members of tho 
states were not equally disposed to agree to these proposals; but 
by a great majority they were thought a sufficient ground for a 
negociation or treaty. 
No objection was made to the words in which the declaration 
of the independence of the republic was expressed. The states, 
conscious of the superiority of their naval forcé, refused to 
consent to the cessation of hostilities at sea; but they agreed 
that no hostile enterprise should be undertaken against any of 
tho towns or provinces of the Netherlands, and no new forts 
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erected. It was declared that the truce of eight months should 
commence on the fourth of M a y : and the archdukes engaged to 
procure a ratification of the present convention, including the 
declaratory clause, within three months, from the king of 
Spain*. 
This agreement having been first made with Ney, and a few 
days after confirmed in proper form by Albert and Isabella, 
was immediately communieated by the states-general to the 
particular states, and a day of thanksgiving to Heaven for the 
prospect of peace appointed to be observed throughout the 
provinces. 
The people in general sincerely rejoiced on this occasion, and 
The pro- were greatly olated when they reflected on the proof 
spect of which the proposal and concession of the archdukes 
terof joy'to afforded of the difficulties to which they were reduced. 
the people The war had now subsisted for almost forty years; 
oftheUnit- , , , , . „ , . , <• 
ed Pro- and though, dunng a part oí that time, only some ot 
vincas. them had been much exposed to the calamities which 
are commonly attendant upon war, in the immediate scenes of 
action, yet most of them had experienced these calamities in 
some degree. They had, on numberless occasions, been disqui-
eted with the most dreadful apprehensions; and they had long 
groaned under the weight of those enormous taxes, which the 
supporting of so many fleets and armies made it necessary to 
impose. 
There was a considerable proportion however of the people 
whose interest and prosperity depended on the continuance of 
the war, and particularly those who held employments, which 
must either be suppressed, or rendered much less lucrativo in the 
time of peace- B y such persons peace was no less dreaded than 
A party ¡n it was desired by the generality of their countrymen; 
States" ^ 4 an(^ ^16 archdukes1 proposals were represented as deceit-
present the ful and insidious. Unhappily many of the clergy joined 
proposaU as *n represeuting them in this l ight ; and, by their 
insidious. inflammatory harangues from the pulpit, contributed to 
increase the difficulties which the states afterwards encountered 
in carrying on the treaty. 
This negociation was a matter of great surprise to the 
• Grotius, lib. xv i . ; Baudius, lib. i . ; Bentivoglio, lib. viii. ; and Meteren, lib. 
xxviü. 
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neighbouring states and princes. They could not suppose 
The negoci- ^^at the archdukes would have ventured to make such 
ationfor humiliating concessions, i f they had not beforehand 
peace mat- i • j i 
ter of sur- obtamed the consent of the court of Spain; and tliat 
ndghbour- c o u r * ' ^hey thought, would never have consented 
ing states to it, but in order to procure by artífice what they 
n pnnces. ^ggjj unabie to accomplish by force of arms. 
They were not wholly unacquainted with the disorder that had 
taken place in the Spanish finances; but they could hardly 
believe that a prince possessed of such copious resources as 
those of Phi l ip , could be reduced so low as to find it necessary 
to treat with his rebellious subjects on equal terms. They 
. were therefore euspicious that the Spanish ministers 
L i k e w i s e a n r l , ' ' , 
objectof had secretly formed some design, by which their 
jeaiousy. in^erest or the intcrest of Europe might be affected; 
and they were confirmed in their suspicion, by reflecting on the 
secrecy with which the negociation had been carried on. A t 
Brussels i t had been communicated only to a very small number 
of the archdukes' ministers. A t the Hague, the states-general 
alone had been privy to i t ; and at both these places it had been 
carefully concealed from all the foreign residents, t i l l it was made 
known by the states-general to the particular states, when they 
appointed the day of public thanksgiving. These precautions 
gave a mysterioús appearance to the conduct of both partios; 
yet they had probably been used with no other view, but either 
to avoid the perplexity arising from too great a multitude of 
counsellors, or to prevent opposition to the treaty in its infancy, 
and before the resolution was fully formed whether it should be 
rejected or embraced. 
There were no princes so well entitled to be consulted on this 
occasion by the states as the kings of Great Bri tain and Franco, 
to whom the provinces had been so much indebted for their 
assistance in carrying on the war. The former of these princes, 
from the narrowness of his revenue, joined to his bad economy in 
the administration of it, had never been able to furnish them 
with pecuniary supplies; but notwithstanding the difficulties in 
which he was involved, he had consented that the one half of the 
money with which the French king supplied them, should be 
deducted from the debt which that prince owed to the crown of 
England, and had at all times afforded encouragement to their 
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levies of troops in Britain ; while he had secretly discountenanced 
those which, in consequence of the permission granted in the 
treaty of peace above mentioned, were attempted by the arch-
duke or the king of Spain. 
The obligations however of the states were much greater to 
the French than to the Brit ish monarch; for Henry was not 
only more able, but more disposed to contribute to their support. 
Before the peace of Vervins, he had always considered their 
Conduct of cause and interest as his own; and after that peace, 
kingFto-nch ^ac^ £*ven them every proof of friendship that was 
wards the consistent with fidelity to those engagements which he 
States*1 after i^ac^  come under to the king of Spain. H i s protestant 
the peace of gubjects had beeu freely admitted to enter into their 
Vemns. serviceí an¿ hsbd, every campaign, formed a consider-
able proportion of their troops. When, in order to procure 
tranquillity to France, he found it necessary to engage that he 
would not any longer afford assistance to the states, he had 
solemnly declared to the Spanish ambassadors, that he did not 
thereby mean to preclude himself from repaying those sums to 
the states, which they had lent him in the time of his distress. 
And, for some years, the repaying of these sums * was the only 
assistance in money which he afforded them. But after 
discovering that, in violation of the peace of Vervins, the court 
of Spain had formed intrigues with the Mareschal Biron, and his 
other dissatisfied subjects, the object of which was the subversión 
of his government, thinking himself then at liberty to retaliate 
upon them for so great an injury, he had been more open and 
liberal than formerly in lending his assistance to the United 
Provinces. H e spared no pains to persuade the king of England 
to enter into an alliance with him for their support; and had, 
yearly, advanced them sums of money for the payment of their 
forces. 
It would be absurd to suppose, that in the kindness which 
Henry had manifested to the states, his conduct had entirely 
proceeded from motives of friendship and generosity. 
I t can seldom happen that a prince, in his conduct towards 
foreign states, could be justified for acting under the influence of 
such motives. A regard to the interest of his subjects, was, as 
* The amount of thcse sums waa seven millions thrce hundrcd aud gevcntj -cight thou-
«and and eight hundrcd livres. Sully, liv. xxi. 
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it ought to have been, the ruling principie of Henry's conduct; 
and his liberality towards the United Provinces proceeded from 
his conviction, that on their prosperity, in some measure, 
depended the peace and tranquillity of his own dominions. 
Having formerly suffered so much from the arms, and after-
wards from the intrigues of the Spaniards, he was Btill disquieted 
with apprehensions of the danger to which he was exposed from 
their turbulent ambition. H e had long beheld with pleasure 
their fruitless contest in the Netherlands, which had contributed 
so much to exhaust their strength. But having, in concert 
with some of his wisest ministers, formed a plan for the 
humiliation both of the Germán and Spanish branches of the 
Austrian family, which required leisure before he could bring it 
to maturity*, he was not displeased to hear that the states had 
agreed to the archdukes' proposals for entering into a treaty; 
but not having been previously consulted upen the subject, and 
the archdukes having made greater concessions than he expected, 
he dreaded that the court of Spain must have formed some deep 
insidious design, either against the states themselves, or the 
princes in alliance with them; and therefore he resolved to 
bestow all that attention upon the present negociation in the 
Netherlands, which a transaction of the highest consequence 
deserved. 
H i s affairs in that country had hitherto been managed with 
great prudence by his president, monsieur de Burerwall ; but, 
being determined, i f possible, to acquire a direction of the 
present negociation, and vigilantly to watch over the conduct of 
The presi- the contracting powers, he sent to the Hague, in quality 
nfn'senT11' 0^ ambassador extraordinary, the president Jeannin, a 
ambassador minister of great experience, who is equally celebrated in 
Hague from the annals of Henry's reign, and in those of his successor, 
France. for hig fidelity, his cloquence, and his political abilities. 
This able negociator had no sooner arrived than he required 
admission into the assembly of the states ; where, after reminding 
them of the zeal with which his master had for so many years 
exerted himself in their behalf, he inveighed, with much severity, 
against those who had falsely accused the king of aiming at the 
sovereignty of the Provinces; and then gently reproached the 
states with giving a colour to this aspersión, by entering into a 
• Sully's Memoirs, p, 324, &c. 
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treaty with the enemy, without his knowledge or consent. But 
as no prince, he added, could more easily forgive his enemies ; so 
there was none more ready to overlook the omissions of his 
friends : ándito prove the sincerity of his friendship for the states, 
the king had now seut him in the character of ambassador, with 
powers to assure them of the continuance of his assistance, in 
case a continuance of the war should be found expedient; or, i f 
they chose to put a period to it, to assist them in establishing an 
honourable and lasting peace. H e concluded with requesting 
that a committee of the states might be appointed, to whom he 
might more particularly communicate his instructions, and with 
whom he might occasionally delibérate conceming the measures 
which it might be proper to pursue. 
The states readily complied with this request, and expressed 
how sincerely they rejoiced to find so great a king disposed to 
take so warm an interest in their affairs. 
This interposition of Henry gave equal uneasiness to the 
court of Spain, as i t afforded joy to the states. They knew 
that all his influence would be employed, either to prevent an 
accommodation, or to render it derogatory to the honour and 
interest of Spain. A n d they were well acquainted with the 
superior talents of Jeannin, who, while he would keep the 
states perpetually on their guard, would encourage them to 
persist in their most exorbitant demands. 
The courts of Spain and Brussels had reason likewise to look 
for opposition from the Brit ish as well as from the French 
monarch. F o r James had no ground, they thought, to enter-
tain any jealousy of the D u t c h ; as their dependence on him 
for their English and Scotch troops, which formed so great a 
proportion of their army, his possession of the cautionary towns, 
which were so many keys of the Netherlands, the situation of 
his dominions, and the coincidence between his subjects and 
those of the states in religious opinions, seemed to render him 
secure of their alliance. It could not therefore but be agree-
able, they imagined, to this prince, to contribute his endeavours, 
in the treaty of peace, to promote the interest of the states, at 
the expense of Spain. They supposed it, however, to be more 
likely that he might exert his influence to render this truly 
abortivo from an apprehension which they had given him ground 
to entertain, that i f Spain were at peace with the United Pro-
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vinces, sho might employ her leisure in fomenting the disoontents 
of his popish subjects in Ireland. 
But they afterwards found that they had erred in this conjec-
The king of ture. Indolence, and an aversión to war, were pre-
^nclirawith dominant principies in the character of James; and 
theFrench these, on this occasion, determined him, in opposition 
promoting to his political interest, to concur with the French 
peace. monarch, in promoting the establishment of peace ; 
beeides that, he could not decently have attempted to dissuade 
the Dutch from listening to the proposals which had been made 
to them, without being more liberal than the narrow state of 
his finanees would permit, in contributing to their assistance. 
James had been no less alarmed than Henry, by the intelligence 
which he received of the negociation between the states and the 
archdukes ; and had expressed to Carón, the Dutch resident at 
London, his surprise at the seerecy with which it had been car-
ried on. But the states, solicitous to preserve his friendship, 
having sent two of their number to explain to him the motives 
of their conduct, he readily admitted of their apology, and soon 
affcer sent sir Ralph Winwood and sir Richard Spencer, in the 
character of ambassadors, to assist them in bringing the treaty 
to the desired conclusión. 
About the same time ambassadors arrived in Holland from 
the king of Denmark, the elector Palatino, the elector of 
Brandenburg, the landgrave of Hesse, and several other pro-
testant princes of Germany; who, having no interest of their 
own to adjust or secure, could have no other motive in eending 
them, but to afford to the states, on this important occasion, 
a proof of the concern which they took in their prosperity*. 
In the mean time an event happened, which, by elevating the 
hopes of one of the contending partios, while it depressed those 
of the other, contributed to basten the treaty to a conclusión. 
Operations states having, early in the spring of this year, 
of the Dutch equipped a fleet of twenty-six ships of war, besides 
der admirai transports with stores and provisions, they put it 
Heemskirk. un¿er command of Hoemskirk, one of the bravest 
officers and most skilful navigators in the Netherlands, with 
instructions to sail for the wcstern coasts of Spain and Por-
tugal, and by watching the motions of the enemy, to provide for 
• liaudius, lib. i . Bentivoglio, Cirotius, and Winwood, vul. ii. 
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the safe arrival of the East India fleet. The preservation of 
this fleet, which there was ground to believe the Spaniards were 
prepared to intercept, the states informed him, was to be con-
sidered as a principal object of his expedition ; but they 
required besides, that he should give all possible annoyance to 
the enemy, and remember, that the archdukes having made 
proposals for a treaty of peace, the issue of this treaty, and 
consequently the future prosperity of the United Provinces, 
would greatly depend on the success with which his arms in the 
present enterprise should be attended. 
Heemskirk, flattered with the trust reposed in him at so 
critical a juncture, assured the states, wheñ he received his 
instructions, that whether he should die or survive, they should 
not have reason to repent of the honour they had conferred on 
h im; and, in order to express his confidence of success, he 
declared that he would not accept of any reward or pay, unless 
the booty should amount to more than five hundred thousand 
florins ; in which case he would accept only of his share of what 
should remain after that sum was deducted. He was already, 
says Grotius, possessed of a greater fortune than his manner of 
life required; and, being animated more by the love of glory 
than that of riches, under the simple show and modérate deport-
ment of a citizen, he concealed all the qualities of a hero. 
Having left the Texel on the 25th of March, he first directed 
his course towards Lisbon; but being informed on his arrival in 
April lo ^ e m o u ^ 0^ ^16 Tagus, by some merchants whom he had 
sent before him, under neutral colours, to procure intelli-
gence, that the first división of the Portuguese and Spanish fleet, 
intended for the Indies and America, had already sailed, and that 
the ships belonging to the second, were neither fully equipped ñor 
had got their cargoes on board; but that a Spanish fleet of 
ships of war was then riding at anchor in the bay of Gibraltar, 
Apni 24 he immediately set sail for that place, and soon arrived 
or 25. within sight of the enemy. 
The Spaniards having, for several days, observed him steering 
his course along the coast of Andalusia, had given notice to the 
Admiral Don John Alvarez Davila of his approach; and Davila 
had full leisure to put his fleet into a proper posture of defence, 
It consisted of twenty-one ships, nine of which were greatly 
superior in size to those of the enemy, and was drawn up under 
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the cannon of the fort, having the admiraPs galleon, which was 
much larger than the rest, in front. Heemskirk was fully aware of 
the great advantage which the Spanish admiral must derive from 
his situation; but this eonsideration rather served to confirm him 
in his purpose, than to deter him from carrying it into execution. 
" For the greater,1' said he to his officers, in a council of war 
which he held before the engagement, " the danger to which we 
shall be exposed, and the more arduous our attempt, the greater 
will be the glory we shall acquire, and the more important the 
eervice we shall perform to our country, i f our arms shall be 
crowned with victory. Many illustrious exploits have our coun-
try men achieved in different quarters of the globe, but we are the 
first who shall adventure to attack the royal fleet in the strongest 
port of Spain ; and, by our success, shall show how little reason 
the Spanish monarch, with his long proud list of titles, has to 
boast that he is the sovereign of the seas. Let us not be 
disheartened by the enormous size of the enemy's ships, for this 
very circumstance, by rendering them unwieldy in all their 
motions, will facilítate our conquest. I require you to do 
nothing, of which I shall not set you an example. But when the 
engagement shall be begun, we must remember it will be no 
longer possible to escape, we must either conquer or perish. 
Ñor is i t only our own preservation that depends on the fortitude 
we shall display in our present enterprise, but the safety of the 
rich fleet that is on its way from India, the safety of all our 
countrymen, who are engaged in trade in this part of the world^ 
and the terms likewise of peace which the states shall obtain from 
the enemy. Let us only exert ourselves as we have done on 
former occasions, and discover that contempt of danger which is 
the surest pledge of victory, and we shall enjoy the glory and 
felicity of putting a period to the war, and thereby secure to our 
countrymen that liberty, for which they have fought for more 
than forty years.'1 
Having delivered these exhortations with that natural military 
eloquence, which hepossessed in an eminent degree, and received 
from all the officers present, the most solemn assurances, con-
firmed by an oath, that, to the utmost of their power, they would 
imítate his example and fulfil his commands, he communicated 
to them his plan of attack, and, as soon as they had returned to 
their respective ships, he gave the signal to advance. 
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When Davila perceived them approaching, he ordered the 
master of a Dutch merchantman, whom he had a prisoner on 
board his ship, in chains, to be brought upen the deck, and 
enquired of him what he imagined might be his countrymen's 
design : " To attack your fleet,1' answered the prisoner; to which 
Davila, smiling contemptuously, replied, that he could not 
suppose it, since his single ship, he thought, would prove an over-
match for all the Dutch vessels that were in sight. " That may be 
true,11 said the other, " but, either I know nothing of the cha-
racter of my countrymen, or the battle will be instantly begun." 
Heemskirk himself led the van, and steered his course directly 
Heemskirk towards Davila, who, instead of that contempt which 
Spanlshfleet 1^6 ^ia(^ so r e c e n ^ y cxpressed, being now overwhelmed 
riding at an- with astonishment at the sight of such unprecedented 
bayVf Gi i^ intrepidity, gave orders to slip his anchors, and to 
raitar. retire behind his other ships ; hoping that the enemy 
would thus be induced to exhaust their fury upon them, and that 
afterwards he might come in for a share of the victory. 
But Heemskirk, agreeably to his resolution, which he had 
communicated to his officers, that he himself would attack the 
admiraFs galleen, without hesitation entered within the line of 
the Spanish fleet, and still continued to advance, keeping up his 
fire t i l l he had come within musket-shot of the enemy. Davila 
having, before his approach, given the first broadside, it was now 
retumed by Heemskirk, whose fire being more skilfully directed, 
did greater execution. But soon after, while this gallant seaman 
stood giving orders, on the most conspicuous part of the deck, his 
left leg was carried off by a cannon-ball, and his thigh being at 
the same time torn and shattered, he perceived, from the great 
effusion of blood, that he could not have many minutes to survive. 
These he employed in exhorting those about him to persevere in 
the attack, and to remember the oath which they had taken, and 
the duty which they owed to themselves and to their country; 
after which, having recommended himself to the Divine mercy, 
Death of and appointed an officer of the ñame of Verhoeve to 
Heemskirk. comman(j the ship, he cxpired. 
So great a disaster was calculated to fill the minds of the 
spectators with dismay and terror ; but that intrepid spirit with 
which his example had inspired them, far from being oxtinguished 
by his death, was rather nourished up into rage and fury, by 
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their desire of taking signal vengeance on the enemy. The 
battle, which had been suspended for a little while, was instantly 
renewed with the same vigour as before; and another captain, 
called Lambert, coming up to support Verhoeve, they united 
together in their assault on the Spanish admirara ship, and 
battered her at once on both sides with uncommon violence. 
In the meantime the rest of the Dutch fleet had begun their 
attack upen the other galleons, with the same alacrity and 
ardour; and the Spaniards long gave proof of equal bravery in 
their defence. But at length, two of their ships were set on fire 
and burnt by the enemy, a third was sunk, a fourth, from some 
accidental cause, blew up, and all the rest, except the admiral's 
galleen, run ashore. 
The admiral himself had been killed about the same time with 
Heemskirk, but the officer who succeeded him in the command, 
had maintained the combat with inflexible fury, and the issue for 
several hours remained doubtful. -At length, a third Dutch ship 
arriving to the assistance of the other two, the Spanish com-
mander hoisted a white flag, as a signal that he was ready to 
surrender. 
But the Dutch, animated by the same implacable and vindic-
Vindictive ^ve ^ 1 " ^ which their war against the Spaniards 
fury of the had gencrally been conducted, paid no regard to this 
Dutch' signal, and still continued firing t i l l they had beaten 
down the flag. The hearts of the Spaniards then sunk within 
them, and their efíbrts began to relax. The Dutch perceiving 
this, instantly boarded their vessel, and attacked them with so 
much fury, that they were quickly overpowered. Most of them 
were put to the sword, and the rest compelled to jump over-
board into the sea, where many of them were either shot or 
They oh- drowned. In this engagement the Spaniards lost near 
taia a sig- two thousand men; and, besides the ships above men-
nai victory. j^one(j^  ^ i c h Were burnt or sunk, almost all the rest 
were rendered unfit for future service; whereas not a single 
Dutch ship was either lost or destroyed, and only about a 
hundred men were killed. 
So signal a victory, which excited the most dreadful appre-
hensions in the minds of the people along the southern coast of 
Spain, might have been attended with the most important con-
sequences, i f Hoemskirk had lived to improve i t ; and either 
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Cádiz or Gibraltar might have been reduced. But the officers, 
on whom the command had devolved, were satisfied with the 
glory they had acquired, and, in two days after the engagement, 
retired to Tetuan, on the African coast; from whence, after 
repairing their damages, and sending home two of the transporta 
with the sick and wounded, and the body of the admiral, they 
sailed in different squadrons to the coast of Portugal, Azores, 
and other places, where they expected to enrich themselves by 
the capture of the merchant ships. 
But although this victory was not attended with any new 
conquest, it had considerable influence on the temper and 
conduct of the contending partios at the present crisis. It con-
tributed to inspire the Dutch with greater confidence of success 
in the prosecution of the war, and to render them more intrac-
table; while it tended, on the other hand, to produce a more 
complying temper on the part of the Spaniards, and to heighten 
their solicitude for the establishment of peace. 
The archdukes had given the most convincing evidence how 
Effccts of strongly they were actuated with this solicitude. They 
this victory had not only made the first advances to the states, and 
ten(iingCOn roadily agreed to preliminary terms, which, by all the 
parties. powers of Europe, were thought humiliating; but no 
sooner had a cessation of hostilities been agreed to, which 
extended only to hostilities at land, than they set at liberty, 
without a ransom, all the Dutch sailors, who had been taken 
prisoners by their ships of war, and showed themselves deter-
mined, i f possible, to put an end to every species of hostility. 
These princes had, from the beginning, taken too little pains 
to save appearances, and had suífered their eagerness for peace 
to betray them into an act of indiscretion, which, by putting the 
states more than ever upon their guard, tended to increase the 
difficulty of accomplishing their design. Their agent having, 
agreeably to his instructions, requested a prívate interview with 
Aersens, the Dutch secretary, after returning him thanks for his 
good offices with the states, desired him to accept of a diamond 
of considerable valué for his wife, and acquainted him that the 
archdukes, deeply impressed with a sense of his good intentions, 
had given orders for the restoration of his house in Brussels; 
while the marquis of Spinola had sent him an obligation for fifty 
thousand crowns, fifteen thousand of which should be paid upon 
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demand, and the rest as soon as either a peace or a long truce 
should be concluded. Aersens, having conjectured what might 
be Ney's intention in wishing for an interview, and having pre-
viously consulted Prince Maurice concerning the part which he 
should act, accepted, though with seeming reluctance, both of 
the diamond and Spinola's obligation for the money; but, agree-
ably to his concert with Maurice, he delivered them up to the 
council of state, to whom he gave a particular relation of the 
whole affair in a few days after*. 
This transaction, therefore, served only to excite suspicions of 
Eagemess^ the archdukes' designa ; while it afforded a striking 
dukes for proof how extremely averse they were to the continu-
peace en- ance 0£ ^ war an(j contributed to confirm the 
couragesthe . „ . . . 
Dutch to states in their resolution of msisting upon tne most 
hig^tenns. advantageous and honourable terms. 
The court of Spain was not in reality less anxious with regard 
to the issue of the present negotiation than that of Brus-
sels ; but, whether from pride or policy, théy better concealed 
their anxiety, and artfully acted for some time as i f the treaty 
had been entirely the plan of the archdukes, to which the king 
found himself under no necessity, arising from the situation of 
his own aífairs, of yielding his consent. 
O f the truth of this, their conduct, with regard to the ratifi-
cation of the late agreement between the states and the arch-
dukes, affords sufficient evidence. In order to obtain that 
ratification, Ney, the Franciscan, had gone to Madrid, and after 
a delay of several weeks, during which he had occasion for all his 
address and eloquence, he had now returned with it to Brussels. 
It was immediately after carried to the Hague by Verreiken, 
Albert's principal secretary; to whom the states, impatient to 
know particularly the contents of his instructions, granted an 
audience on the next moming after his arrival. They had been 
beforehand informed, by a letter from Spinola, that their agree-
The United men^ with the archdukes had been ratified by the 
states dissa- king, and that it Was in order to communicate to 
Phiiip's ra- them the deed of ratification that Verreiken was sent 
tification of jn^0 Holland. But they were extremely dissatisfied, 
the prelimi- » i « • •• ^ i . 
naiiea of wheu they cxamiued this deed, both with the form and 
Pcace- the contents. 
• Grotiu», 620. 
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It was conceived in vague and general terms, and not in the 
common form of a compact or convention. It did not compre-
hend the essential clause relative to the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of the United Provinces. Even in the copy of the 
archdukes1 agreement, whieh was prefixed to the deed, that 
clause was omitted; and, in contradiction to the spirit and 
meaning of it, the archdukes were styled the sovereigns of the 
Netherlands. It was subscribed by Phil ip, " I, The K i n g , " 
( Y o el Rey,) a form of subscription which he used only where 
his subjects were addressed. It was sealed with his small seal, 
instead of the great one ; and it was written on paper, and not 
on vellum, as was usual in all transactions of importance. 
These omissions and informalities were instantly perceived by 
all the deputies; but, that their conduct might not appear pre-
cipítate, they appointed another meeting for the maturo consi-
deration of them; after which they unanimously resolved to 
reject the deed of ratification, as being neither such as the 
archdukes had undertaken to procure, ñor affording a sufficient 
ground for proceeding in the intended treaty. Verreiken, to 
whom this resolution was communicated, laboured to persuade 
the states that the defects and informalities complained of must 
have been entirely owing to carelessness on the part of the tran-
scriber, i t being impossible to doubt that the king would have 
entirely rejected the agreement, if h» had not meant to grant his 
ratification of the whole. 
But the states remained inflexible in their purpose ; for it was 
equally impossible, they thought, to suppose that a deed of so 
great importance, in the consequences of which not only the 
archdukes, but the king himself, were so deeply interested, could 
have been left by his ministers to be devised by an inferior clerk 
or secretary. It was impossible but his ministers must have 
perceived the want of so essential a clause as that which related 
to the independence of the provinces ; a clause which was obvi-
ously of such a nature, that it was impossible to doubt of its 
having been purposely omitted, but without which they were 
unalterably resolved to decline all farther negotiation, either 
with the archdukes, or with the court of Spain. 
Verreiken, perceiving that no arguments he could employ 
would prove effectual, requested liberty to remain at the Hague 
for six days longer, t i l l he should acquaint the archdukes with 
what had passed, and receive their instructions for his futuro 
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conduct. W i t h this request the etates complied; and, before 
the expiration of the time specified, a letter from the archdukes 
arrived, in which they engaged, that, though they could not per-
ceive the validity of those objections which the states had made 
to the foma of the king's ratification, who thought, that, as he 
had ratified a part of the convention without objections to the 
rest, the deed ought to be considered as a ratification of the 
whole ; yet, in order to remove every obstado to the treaty pro-
posed, and to show how sincerely they desired the establishment 
of peace, they would procure another ratification in the form 
required: but, in the mean time, they hoped, and requested, that 
the states would give proof of sincerity on their part, by recall-
ing their fleet from the coasts of Spain. 
On this occasion a violent contest aróse among the deputies, 
The treaty ^ and sevcral of them discovered an inclination to break 
bein? bro- off the treaty without delay. It was now sufficiently 
kenoff. manifest, they alleged, that the Spaniards were not 
sincere in their professions. It was absurd to expect that an 
enemy, so invetérate and implacable, would ever seriously think 
of peace on fair and equitable terms, t i l l they were compelled by 
some diré necessity. It was evident that their object had, from the 
beginning, been to disarra the confederates, and to procure a 
respite from the war, t i l l their preparations for prosecuting it 
with greater vigour were complete. The fleet, therefore, ought 
not to be recalled, but to be reinforced, and the people roused 
from their present lethargy, by apprising them of the snare 
which had been laid for their destruction. 
These were not, however, the sentiments of the greater part 
of the deputies ; for although the whole assembly were disposed 
to ascribe duplicity and artífice to the court of Spain, only some 
of them thought there was any ground for calling in question 
the sincerity of the archdukes, who, in the opinión of the 
generality had, to the utmost of their power, fulfilled their 
engagements, and could not be justly blamed for the defects or 
informalities of the ratification. 
It was therefore resolved, partly from the respect due to 
The United these princes, and partly from dread of the imputation 
fo^recal?"6 of insincerity in the profession which they had made of 
iheir fleet their desiro of peace, that the fleet should be recalled. 
coTuSf But they, at the same time, required that the ratifica-
Spain. i [on^ executed in proper form, should be produced 
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within a liraíted time specified; and, in order to prevent any 
future omission or error, they delivered to Verreiken three 
copies, precisely of the same import, one in Latin, another in 
French, and a third in Dutch, declaring, that, without a faith-
ful transcript of one or other of these, they would instantly 
break oíf the negotiation, and apply themselves to the prosecu-
tion of the war. 
It was Barnevelt who made this declaration, in the ñame of 
the other deputies; after which he reminded Verreiken of the 
attempt which had been made by the Franciscan to corrupt the 
secretary. " There,11 said he, " is the diamond, and here is the 
marquis of Spinola's obligation for fifteen thousand crowns. Let 
them both be restored to their proper owners; such presents are 
not necessary for the purpose of obtaining peace, i f your masters 
wish for it, on equitable terms; and if they are not willing to 
agree to such terms, their presents will not be sufficient to pro-
cure it. Were it possible that one or two persons could be 
found in this assembly so base as to accept your bribes, and, for 
the sake of them, to make a sacrifico of the liberty of their 
country, yet a great majority will retain their integrity, and 
render your largesses, though they were much greater than your 
masters can aíford, of no avail*.,1 
Verreiken, being unprepared for this attack, was thrown into 
some confusión, and replied, that " Ney must certainly have done 
what he was accused of without any authority from the arch-
dukes." It was impossible that the states could give credit to 
this assertion; but, being satisfied with having so publicly 
expressed their resentment, the meeting was immediately dis-
missed, Verreiken permitted to return to Brussels, and soon 
after the fleet was recalled. 
The archdukes, at the same time, renewed their applications 
at the court of Spain ; and at length, though not without consi-
derable difficulty, obtained such a ratification of their convention 
from the king as they hoped the confederates would accept. 
In this new deed all the same clauses were inserted, which the 
copies transmitted by the states contained, and nearly the same 
form of expression was observed ; but to the declaration that the 
king and archdukes were willing to treat with the confederates 
as with a free people, over whom they pretended to no authority, 
• Grotius and Baudiiu. 
M 
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a clause was annexed, declarin^, that in case the negotiation 
should be broken off on account of religión, or any other disputed 
point, the ratification should be void, and all matters remain on 
their present footing. Besides this, the deed was incorrectly 
written, some words being interlined, and others wholly omitted. 
It was written in Spanish, and not in Latin, French, or Dutch, 
as had been requested ; upon paper, and not on parchment, and 
subscribed like the former one, not with the ñame of the king, but 
with the words " I, the K i n g , " as i f Philip had still considered 
the confederates as his subjects. 
These latter circumstances, though they afforded a proof of 
extreme carelessness, or of the most childish obstinacy, on the 
part of the Spanish ministers, were deemed of small importance; 
and it was preved that even the king of England, in his late 
treaty of peace with Spain, had acquiesced in the same form of 
subscription. But the deputies could not be so easily reconciled 
to the clause annexed to the declaration of their l iberty; for 
although, as they represented to the archdukes1 commissioners, 
they were free, whether the king of Spain should acknowledge it 
Or not, yet the annexed clause seemed to imply that their free-
dom depended on the will of the k ing ; and to accept of the ratifi-
cation with a clause of this import, might be interpreted as an 
acknowledgment, on their part, of the truth of the position 
which the clause implied. Besides that, from the manner in 
which mention is made in this annexed clause of religión, and 
other disputed points, there was ground to suspect, that, in the 
treaty proposed, the king intended that the establishment of 
religión, and other matters which respected the intemal govern-
ment of the provinces, should be discussed. 
To this the peoplo of the United Provinces would never be 
persuaded to consent. To insist upon it, would be to treat them 
as a dependent, and not as a free people; and, therefore, to the 
states i t appeared extremely doubtful, whether, in order to save 
a great deal of unnecessary trouble, it were not expedient that 
the negotiation should be instantly broken off. But, as they 
should be sorry to give ground to suspect that they were not 
desirous to put a period to the calamities of war, they had 
resolved to refer the whole matter to the states ^ of the particular 
towns and provinces, that the people might have an opportunity 
of judging for themselves, in a matter in which they were so 
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deeply interested, W i t h this answer the commissioners retumed 
to Brussels, after receiving an assurance from the states, that, in 
seven weeks from the present time, information would be trans-
mitted to the archdukes whether the ratification was rejected or 
received *. 
A t this juncture, both the people and their rulers differed 
Disputes widely in their sentiments with regard to the question 
and partiea that was now before them; while one party maintained 
ed Pro- that the ratification ought, without hesitation, to be 
vinces, rejected, the other thought, that although it was not 
altogether such as they wished i t to have been, yet it ought to 
be admitted as a sufficient foundation for the treaty that was 
proposed. Prince Maurice was at the head of the former of these 
parties, and Barnevelt of the latter; and each of these leaders 
exerted himself with great activity and zeal in gaining converts 
to his opinión. There was ground to suspect that the motives 
by which the prince was actuated on this occasion, were not 
perfectly puré and disinterested, but that he dreaded the dimi-
nution of his power, i f peace were established, and, partly on this 
account, was desirous of the continuance of the war. The 
reasoning, however, which he employed, was specious, and raade 
a strong impression on the minds of many of his countrymen. 
As the court of Spain, he said, had on former occasions given 
the most unquestionable evidence of their duplicity, so at present 
it was impossible to doubt of their being actuated by some sinister 
design. In their first ratification, they had not only declined to 
• Baudius, Grotius, &c. Jeannin, tom. i. Lettre au Roy, Oct. 27, 1607. 
The states, on this occasion, required that the original deed itself should be left in 
their hands. The commissioners having no instructions on this head, the Franciscan 
went himself to Brussels to receive them ; and the archdukes agreed to the request of 
the states on these conditions, that they should give an obligation in •writing to restore the 
deed if required, and should, at the same time, declare that the archdukes, in procuring it 
from the king, had fully performed the engagement which they had come under in their 
first agreement with the states. The states refused their consent to these conditions, but 
still insisted, that, as the deed was addresscd to them, it should be suffered to remain in 
their possession. Ney retumed to Brussels a second time, and prevailed on the archdukes 
to yield to their demand. Though the ratification was not such as the states wished it to 
have been, yet it should seem to have been no sraall gratification to them, that the king 
bad granted a declaration, however qualified and expressed, of their being a free people, 
over whom he pretended to no authority. In return for the complaisance of the archdukes 
on this occasion, they would gladly have given the declaration required, that these princes 
bad fully performed their engagement, but thonght it was impossiblc to give it consistently 
with truth. 
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acknowledge the independence of the states, but had expressly 
affirmed, that they were subject to the dominión of the arch-
dukes. To their second, they had subjoined a clause which 
rendered their independence contingent and precarious, and 
wholly dependent on the will of the K i n g . Whoever considers 
the vast dominions of Spain, and her invetérate habite of domi-
nation and pride, would not be easily convinced that she intended 
to observe a truce, or peaee, any longer than it might suit her 
views of tyranny and conquest. It was the design of that ambi-
tious and politic nation, to break the spirit of the confederates 
by the habits of indolence and luxury. The martial spirit would 
leave the republic, and would not be easily revived. The citizens 
wonld become remiss and inattentive to the defence of objects, 
which, when they knew them to be in danger, they considered as 
dearer than life. None are so easily subdued as those who think 
they have nothing to fear. The fear of the enemy is a bond of 
unity, and produces both military discipline and civil obedience, 
while states living in security, opulence, and ease, are subdued by 
habits of effeminacy, torn by intestino discords, and thus fall an 
easy prey to some ambitious and warlike neighbour. It was for 
this reason, that Scipio Nasica opposed, with so much wisdom, 
the false policy of Cato, who advised the destruction of 
Carthage. 
When the minds of the confederates should cool, and their 
patriotism begin to languish, the Spaniards hoped, by various arts 
of corruption, to bring them again under the yoke of their forraer 
sovereigns. But whatever might be the eífect of such artífices, 
they would recruit their exhausted strength, and whenever a fit 
opportunity should offer, viólate the peace they now solicited. 
Their army, at the present period, was universally discontented 
on account of their want of pay. Great numbers had already 
mutinied ; and if the war coritinued, there was ground to expect, 
that the greatest part would refuse to submit to the control of 
military discipline. W i t h such an army, no prudent general 
would venturo to engage in any important enterprise. A n d the 
people, among whom they were quartered, being grievously 
oppressed, both by the government and the mutineers, were 
ready to shake off a yoke which had become intolerable. 
The Spaniards were still less formidable at sea than at land. 
Frora the great decrease of their trade, they found it impossible 
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to procure sailors sufficient to man their ships of war ; and their 
fleets, far from being able to contend with those of the states, 
were even unable to defend theraselves in their harbours, under 
the cannon of their forts. 
Such was the present state of the Spanish fleet and army ; 
whereas those of the confederates had never been in so flourishing 
a condition, Their army was at present, as it had always been, 
under the most perfect discipline ; regularly paid, and abundantly 
supplied with everything necessary to enable i t to act with 
vigour : while their fleets, more numerous than ever, had in almost 
every quarter of the globe preved an overmatch for those of the 
enemy ; and had obtained over them several important victories, 
which had been attended with a great increase of trade, and 
wealth, and power. They had established trade in many places, 
which, t i l l lately, had been visited only by the Spaniards and 
Portuguese, They had got possession of several of the most 
important branches of the Indian commerce; and if they did not 
suffer themselves to be diverted from the prosecution of their 
naval enterprises, they would ere long make themselves masters 
of the whole. The war, therefore, which they had carried on 
against the enemy at sea, had already preved, and would still 
continué to prove, a mine of gold to the United Provinces; while 
their military operations at land had neither exhausted their 
riches ñor their strength. Their army in a great measure 
consisted of foreign troops, while the natives were permitted to 
apply themselves to manufactures and trade; and all the money 
expended for the support of the army, was spent at heme, either 
in purchasing the manufactures of the country, or those commo-
dities which merchants found it so beneficial to import from 
foreign parts. It had indeed been found necessary to impose 
taxes on several commodities; and many persons complained of 
the burden of these taxes, yet both the riches and the number 
of the people had every year increased, since the taxes were 
imposed ; and no country abounded more in the necessaries and 
conveniences of life. 
Of the truth of these observations, the Spaniards were suffi-
ciently aware, They had come at length to perceive that the war 
had to the confederates preved a copious source of prosperity ; 
while their own strength had been exhausted by it, and their 
commerce almost ruined ; and they were for this reason desirous 
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of a temporary peace, hoping thereby to avert the danger to which 
they saw themselves exposed ; to deprive the confederates of the 
advantages which they at present enjoyed ; to sow discord 
among the provinces, and to accomplish, by fraud and artífice, 
what they had hitherto been unable to attain by force of anns. 
That such was their intention, appeared from the disingenuity 
of their conduct with regard to the deed of ratification. 
But whether this was in reality a design or not, no doubt 
could be entertained that, as it was for the interest of the 
Spaniards that peace should be established, ít was no less for 
that of the states that the war should be prosecuted with vigour, 
t i l l the enemy were reduced to the necessity of acting with 
greater sincerity, and more equitable terms could be obtained 
than they had ground to expect at the present period. 
This reasoning produced the desired effect, chiefly in Holland 
and Zealand, where the people were conscious that their pros-
perity had been in some measure owing to the war ; while their 
eituation rendered them more eecure against its attendant 
calamities than the inhabitants of the inland provinces. But 
the reasons on the other side, which were urged by Barnevelt, 
were generally thought to be more deserving of attention and 
regard. 
There was too much ground, he allowed, for the imputation 
The reason. which had been cast upon the court of Spain, of insin-
bgSBUrged ceT*ty m their conduct, with regard to the deed of 
•eh for ratification. It was evident, from the manner in which 
P68**- they had acknowledged the independence of the states, 
how extremely reluctant they had been in granting that 
acknowledgment. The clause annexed to it, declaring that, in 
case the negotiation should be broken off, the ratification should 
be void, ought not to have been inserted. It was even unne-
cessary to insert it for any purpose which the Spaniards could 
have in view, because, in every treaty, the validity of any par-
ticular concession must depend on the event of the treaty, and 
if it prove abortivo, all the claims of the contending parties, 
whether real or pretended, must remain as before its commence-
ment. From the insertion, however, of this clause, it could not 
be inferred that the court of Spain had formed any insidious 
design. Their reluctance to acknowledge the independence of 
the states might justly have been expected; and the little pains 
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which they had taken to conceal it, afforded a strong presumption 
that their intentions were sincere. 
But although they should in reality intend to viólate the 
peace which they novv solicited, was this a sufficient reason for 
refusing to treat with them, or for declining to accept of peace 
upen equitable terms ? Ought peace to be rejected in every case, 
vvhere it was possible that the conditionsof it might be violated? 
Ought states to live in perpetual war, because there was ground 
to apprehend that they might not be able to maintain a per-
petual and uninterrupted peace ? If the Spaniards shall here-
after revive their claim of sovereignty over the provinces, will 
this claim derive any validity from the present treaty, in which 
they have so explicitly renounced it 2 W i l l they not then justly 
expose themselves tothe reproach of having acted with duplicity; 
and is it not the natural tendeney of such a conduct, to increase 
the number of their enemies, while we shall then, as well as now, 
be possessed of arms to maintain our liberty, and have the same 
or more numerous friends to assist us in counteracting their 
tyrannical designa ? 
Great disorders, it was true, prevailed at the present period in 
the Spanish monarchy : the royal navy had suffered a considerable 
diminution, and the arclidulíes' army was extremely i l l paid and 
mutinous. But although this consideration might justify the 
states in demanding the most advantageous terms of peace, i t 
would not justify them for resolving to persist, at all adventures, 
in the prosecution of the war. F rom negligence and inattention, 
but chiefly from the folly of engaging at once in too many difficult 
and expensive enterprises, Spain was weakened ; but it would 
be madness to proceed on the supposition, that her strength 
was spent, for she was still possessed of inexhaustible resources; 
and nothing but greater prudence and moderation were requisito 
to render her formidable to all her enemies. During the last 
campaign, she had exerted herself more vigorously than for 
several years preceding ; and if the rivera that year liad not been 
swelled to an unusual height, her troops might have penetrated 
into the heart of the provinces. She might still continué, and 
perhaps redouble, her exertions; and if she were incensed, 
as she would justly be, in case the states should obstinately 
refuse to treat with her, she might be determined to direct 
her whole attention against the dominions of the states, and 
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put forth a degree of strength which they would be unable to 
withstand. 
Their arms had hitherto been attended with greater success 
than could justly have been expected against so potent an enemy; 
but of all human events, they should remember, those of war were 
the most fortuitous. The republic had, in former periods, been 
brought so low, that the states would gladly have submitted to the 
sovereignty of a foreign prince : and one unfortunate campaign, 
or the loss of a fleet, which depended for its preservation on the 
mercy of the winds and waves, might again reduce them to the 
like desperate condition. 
They had been.enabled to attain their present prosperity, by 
the friendly assistance of the queen of England, and the king of 
France ; but the former of these princes, who had long been their 
principal support, was dead, and her successor either not so able, 
or not so willing, to assist them; while the latter, being far 
advanced in years, was desirous, for reasons which could not be 
easily penetrated, to have the war brought to a conclusión; and 
although, during his life, they might trust that he would not suffer 
them to be oppressed, yet he might ere long leave his kingdom 
to an infant son, during whose minority, the Spaniards were 
likely to have greater influence over the French counsels than the 
United States. 
The great object as well as the end of war was peace; and 
advantageous terms of peace could never be so easily obtained, as 
when the enemy found it necessary to apply for it, in order to 
retrieve the ruined state of his affairs. The object of the present 
war had, from the beginning, been, to shake oíf the yoke of the 
Spanish government, and to assert their liberty. This object 
was now secured, and the king of Spain himself was ready to 
treat with them as with a free people, over whom he pretended 
not to any authority. Could they be justified in their own eyes, 
or could they be justified in the opinión of the world, i f they 
should refuse to treat with him? Would the pretext that he 
was insincero in the acknowledgment which he had made of their 
independence, and that possibly he would hereafter revive his 
claim, and refuse to fulfil his engagement, aíford a vindication of a 
conduct so singular, so haughty, and contemptuous l Was the 
war to be prosecuted t i l l they had accomplished the dissolution of 
the Spanish monarchy ? Was this an event either to be expected 
1607.] P H I L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 169 
or desired ? Were the people of the United Provinces to be the 
only people on earth who were never to enjoy the blessings of 
tranquillity ? 
The war indeed had been the occasion of prosperity to some, 
who ought to rest satisfied with the advantages which they had 
already derived from i t : but to great numbers, it had often been 
a copious source of distress and misery. Many groaned under 
the burdens which the war had made it necessary to impose; 
and many lamented the loss of their friends, and the ruin of their 
fortunes, which are the inseparable concomitants even of the 
most successful war. It was surely desirable to put a period 
to these calamities"; and i f they did not embrace the present 
opportunity of doing it, provided it could be done consistently 
with their honour and their futuro security, they would be 
answerable for all the blood that should be spilt, and could not be 
justified in the sight either of God or man. 
This discourse, which was delivered in an extraordinary 
assembly, where deputies from all the provinces and almost all 
the towns were present, deriving weight from the character of 
the speaker, as well as from the solidity of the reasoning which 
it contained, was listened to with great attention; and, while i t 
produced conviction in the minds of the greater part, it imposed 
silence upon the rest, and extorted their consent to the measure 
which it was intended to recommend. Prince Maurice, supported 
by the deputies from the province and towns of Zealand, proposed 
that the form of an explicit and unconditional acknowledgment 
of their independence should be transmitted to the archdukes, to 
be subscribed by them as a preliminary article ; but this motion 
being rejected as harsh and offensive by a great majority, it was 
at length resolved to appoint ambassadors for the purpose of 
D 24 h neS0^^a^*nS P62106 ? an(l notice of this resolution was 
immediately sent to the court of Brussels*. 
It was, at the same time, proposed to the archdukes that tho 
conferences should be held at the Hague, which for some time 
past had been the seat of government in the United Provinces; 
and, in order to induce them to comply with this proposal, it 
was suggested, that, as the ambassadors of the states could not 
* Grotius, lib. xvi, Bent. part. iii. lib. viii. The time fixed for the suspensión of arms 
heing expired, it was prmogued on the present occasion, and aftenvards, from time to lime, 
on diíftrent occasions, till the treaty was concluded. 
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be invested with very araple powers, they might often have 
occasion to consult their constituents; and if any other place of 
meeting, or any town within the territories of the archdukes, 
were made choice of, much time would be lost, and the nego-
tiation be unneeessarily prolonged. 
The archdukes, solicitous to avoid every cause of delay, readily 
Commis- agreed to this proposal, and imraediately appointed for 
uoners for ^ Q ^ J . commissioners the marquis of Spinola, Mancicidor, 
peace on the > * , . 
pan of a Spaniard, their secretary at war, Richardot, tlie 
sPJ,n- president of their privy council, Verreikens, their 
prívate secretary of state, and Ney, the Franciscan, to whose 
activity and address they thought themselves much indebted for 
having brought the negotiation thus far. 
The commissioners appointed by the states were nine in number, 
And on that seven 0^ whom were nominated by the seven provinces, 
of the Unit. and the remaining two by the ancient body of the nobles, 
ed Sutes, r p j ^ ^ w^o were count Wi l l i am of Nassau, a near 
relation of Prince Maurice, and Walraeve, lord of Brederode; 
and those appointed by the several provinces were among the 
raost respectable persons in the commonwealth : but the con-
fidence of the people of all ranks, at this important crisis, was 
chiefly placed in Barnevelt, who was nominated coinmissioner by 
the province of Holland. 
This virtuous and able statesman was indefatigable in his 
attention to every step of the present negotiation; and, before 
the conferences were begun, he devised an expedient admirably 
calculated to promote the end in view. The predominant passion 
o . in the minds of his countrymen was still, as it liad been 
Spain tho for many years, suspicion of the intentions of the court 
mnt0^!' 0^ ^pain. It had been chiefly from this quarter that he 
•ion of the encountered so much difficulty in persuading them to 
agree to the archKlnkes"* proposals of a conference ; and 
he still dreaded that the same cause might prcvent this conference 
from being attended with the desired effect. This distrust of the 
Spaniards he apprehended would shew itself on every occasion, 
and on the slightest grounds; and it would be carefully fomented 
by Prince Maurice and others, who wished for a continuance of 
the war. In order, therefore, to quiet the apprehensions of the 
people, to deprive the prince and his partizans of a pretext, of 
which he knew they would readily lay hold, and at the same 
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time to intimídate or overawe the Spaniards, he proposed to the 
French and Bri t ish ministers that, before the conferences were 
opened, their masters should enter into a new alliance with the 
states; that they should engage to employ their endeavours to 
procure for them an equitable peace; and, in case of their 
procuring it, should farther engage to afford them such assistance 
as should be necessary for maintaining it inviolate. 
This proposal did not meet with the same favourable reception 
from the Bri t ish as from the French monarch. Though James 
was determined by the motives above explained to concur with 
Henry in promoting the establishment of peace; yet, having 
ground for doubt whether the interest of his own dominions did 
not rather require that the war should be continued, he was never 
so deeply interested, as he desired that the states should believe, 
in the success of their present negotiation*. Besides that, 
he knew how much it was in the power of the Spaniards to 
disturb his tranquillity by their intrigues with the Irish Catholics, 
and was therefore unwilling to incur their resentment. Influenced 
by these considerations, he declined at this time to enter into 
the proposed alliance. But Henry, more decided in his conduct, 
and less afraid of the consequences of giving offence to the court 
of Spain, readily yielded his consent, and sent orders to the 
president, Jeannin, to fínish the treaty without delay. 
Against this measure, which no pains were taken to conceal, 
the Spanish ministers having warmly remonstrated at the court 
of Franco, and having received no other answer, but that, i f 
rightly understood, it must contribute to basten the establishment 
of peace, they from thence perceived that it was become neces-
sary for them, and therefore resolved, i f possible, to procure the 
French k ing^ assistance in their negotiation with the states. 
For this purpose, but under a different pretext, the marquis of 
* This appears from several passuges in Winwood's Memorials, and particularly from 
the lettei-8 writ by the earl of Salisbury to Sir R. Winwood, Sir Richard Spencer, and 
Sir Charles Cornwallis. " You added, (says Salisbury, in a letter dated March 20th, 
1607, to the two former,) that this comfort you have, that both partios desirc the peace 
with more than ordinary affection. Which words I rather judge to proceed out of a con-
templation of the tediousness which this business is to biing with it, than out of any aífec-
tionate desire or good judgment of the effects which this business is to bring with it; 
considering that the best iu that kind that can be hoped for, is like to add but trouble and 
care to us in these parts; and yet I woulJ not have yon now gathcr that I would have jou 
break it." Vol. ii. p. 378. 
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V i l l a Franca was sent to Paris, in the character of ambassador, 
and from that time Henry acted as a mediator between the 
contracting powers, although it was well understood how much 
more he favoured the pretensions of the Dutch than those either 
of the archdukes or the king of Spain*. 
In the mean time the archdukes' commissioners arrived at the 
jgos. Hague, and a few days after the conferences were 
Feb. 6th. begunf. The two or three first sessions having been 
employed by the commissioners in examining their powers, and 
in discussing certain objections against thera, which, after some 
altercation, it was agreed were not sufficient to stop their pro-
cedure; the Dutch commissioners required, as a preliminary 
article, a solemn acknowledgment, in the ñame of the king of 
Spain and the archdukes, of the independence of the United 
Provinces; including an explicit renunciation of all right to 
authority over them; together with an obligation, binding on 
their successors as well as on themselves, that they should not 
henceforth use the arms or titles of the provinces, or any other 
marks of their ancient sovereignty. 
The commissioners of the archdukes were much offended at the 
latter part of this requisition ; and, besides remonstrating against 
it to the Dutch commissioners themselves, they bitterly com-
plained to the Brit ish and French ambassadors of the arrogance 
discovered in making so unusual a demand. It had been the 
ordinary practico, they observed, of princes, to retain the titles 
of the states or kingdoms which they had lost. The Catholic 
king was styled king of Jerusalem, and duke of Burgundy; the 
king of Franco called himself king of Navarro ; and the king of 
England still assumed the title of king of Franco. In requiring 
his Catholic majcsty, therefore, to renounce his titles as well as 
his sovereignty, the states were not only guilty of arrogating to 
themselves the privilege of introducing a new practico, but of 
impeaching the conduct of the greatest sovoreigns in Europe, and 
* Bcntivoglio, Grotius, &c-; and Jcannin, tom. ¡i. p. 69. 
f A great nnmber of people from the other towos liad come to the llague at this time, 
chiefly moved hy their curiosity to »ee Spinola, who for »ori)o jear» had been an object of 
their highest admiration, which wa» on «orne occasions mixed with terror. Prince Mauríce 
having gone out to meet him, received him into hi» own coach, and conducted him to the 
Hague. And both thcíc great mcn, it ii »aid, were well plcatcd to find the high opinión 
whirh thry had formed of each other'» abilitic*, from their actions, justiñcd by their dis-
coune which they held together in the prescnt interview. 
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particularly of the kings of France and Britain, who had no less 
reason to be offended at the demand of the Dutch commissioners 
than the king of Spain. 
The French and English ambassadors, however, declined on 
this occasion to interpose, and the archdukes' commissioners, after 
having obtained the consent of the archdukes, acquainted those 
of the states at the next meeting, that they were ready to grant 
the renunciation required in its full extent. The Dutch were 
agreeably surprised at the facility with which the Spaniards thus 
yielded to their request; but when Richardot, who vvas the 
speaker on this occasion, added that, in return for so liberal 
a concession, it was expected that the states would agree to 
abstain for the futuro from all commerce in the Indies, and rest 
satisfied, as they had done t i l l about ten years before, with the 
trade which they had carried on with Spain, and other countries 
The Dutch m Europe, they were inflamed with indignation, and 
refnse to exclaimed, that one moraent the king and archdukes 
trade'to 61 acknowledged them to be a free and independent 
India, people, and the next shewed they were determined to 
treat them as slaves, and, i f possible, to deprive them of the 
most valuable branches of their liberty: that these princes, in 
renouncing their claim to the sovereignty of the provinces, liad 
given nothing to the states which they did not possess before; 
while, in requiring them to relinquish their trade to India, they, 
in eífect, required them to abandon what was known to be the 
principal source of their wealth and power; but they declared 
that no consideration would ever induce them to comply with a 
demand which was equally exorbitant and unjust; for, under 
what pretext could the Spaniards claim the exclusive privilege of 
trading to the Indies ? Those countries were not the property 
of the Spaniards, but belonged to a great number of independent 
princes, many of whom chose rather that their subjects should 
engage in trade with the Dutch than with the Spaniards or 
Portuguese. Those countries were likewise of an immense extent; 
they could furnish materials for trade to all the commercial 
nations in Europe; and it was a violation of the law of nature, 
and contrary to the general good of mankind, for any one nation 
to endeavour to engross the whole. The states would not refuso 
to agree to any arrangement with regard to the Indian trade, 
which was calculated to promote the mutual interest of both 
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nations. But, having been reduced by the Spaniards themselves 
to the necessity of having recourse to this new branch of com-
merce, having begun it in the face of difficulties, which it had 
required an enorraous expense, and the most vigorous exertions, 
to surmount, having established a company for carrying it on, 
and already tasted of the profits arising from it, they were deter-
mined, whatever should be the consequences, to persevere. The 
Spanish commissioners had no other reply to make to this answer 
of the states, but that the Spaniards and Portuguese had long 
been in the solé possession of the trade to India, and that the 
king of Spain had not only refused to grant a participation in 
that trade to the French and English, but likewise to his well-
affected subjects in the Netherlands : but no regard was paid to 
these considerations by the commissioners of the states; and 
they were confirmed in their purpose by the unanimous voice of 
their countrymen, joined to a representation which was made on 
this occasion to the states by the India company. 
The trade, they represented, with Spain and Portugal, had 
never been, and could never be, productivo of any advantage to 
individuáis or to the public, equal to that which aróse from the 
trade to India. In this, and the other branches of foreign 
trade, of which the Spaniards wanted to deprive them, upwards 
of a hundred and fifty ships and eight thousand sailors were 
employed. These ships were all of a considerable size, and 
might at any time be converted, at a small expense, into ships of 
war, when the public exigencies should require. The Indian 
trade was not only infinitely more profitable than the Spanish, 
as it consisted in going to the fountain-head for those commodi-
ties, which they had formerly purchased at second-hand from the 
Spaniards and Portuguese, but was likewise much more safe and 
oertain, becausc it did not, like the other, dopend on the caprice 
of the king or of the ministers of Spain. They had formerly 
experienced how little they had to rely on the trade with Spain 
and Portugal. Their sailors had been seized and imprisoned, or 
sent to the galleys to work as slaves, and their ships and goods 
had been confiscated. It would be always in the power of the 
Spaniards to exercise the same oppressions. They would renew 
them under various pretexta, on the slightest grounds of offence; 
and, after having persuaded the states to abandon their Indian 
commerce, they would next exelude them from that of Spain and 
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Portugal, in the hopes that by thus reducing their naval power, 
they might again compel them to submit to their authority. The 
states might judge of how much importance the trade of India 
was to the Spaniards, from the eagerness which they discovered 
to prevent any other nation from partaking in i t ; but it was of 
still greater importance to the people of the United Provinces, 
who depended almost entirely upon that trade for their subsist-
ence, and, without the resources which they derived from it, 
would be utterly unable to maintain their liberty and independ-
ence. Ñor was it interest only which the states would sacrifico 
by granting the request of the Spanish commissioners, but like-
wise their integrity and honour ; since alliances had been formed 
with the Indian princes, and some of these princes, trusting to 
the protection of the company, acting by the authority of the 
states, had shaken oíf the yoke of the Spaniards, and thereby 
exposed themselves to their severest vengeance, if, by any article 
in the present treaty, the company were to be prevented from 
fulfilling their engagements. 
The states were more than ever determined, by these consi-
derations, to reject the request of the Spanish commissioners; 
but, that they might aíford some proof of the sincerity of their 
desire of peace, they gave them their choice of the three follo'w-
ing proposals. The first, that, conformably to the ordinary 
tenor of treaties of peace, both parties should equally enjoy the 
liberty of commerce by sea and land. The second, that the 
United Provinces should abstain from all commerce with 
countries under the government of Spain on this side of the 
northern tropic, while, on the other side, all matters should 
remain on their present footing; the states being satisfied that 
peace should take place on this side, while hostilities, i f unavoid-
able, might continué on the other. A n d the third, that Spain 
should give no molestation to the Dutch in India for seven years, 
before the expiration of which a new treaty should be set on foot, 
in order to devise some proper means of accommodation. The 
Spanish commissioners replied, that they were not possessed of 
power to agree to any of these proposals. They knew that the 
king of Spain had renounced his sovereignty over the provinces, 
in the hopes of their consenting entirely to desist from the Indian 
trade; but they should appoint one of their number to go to 
Madrid for new instructions. The Franciscan was accordingly 
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dispatched for that purpose; and, in the mean time, the com-
missioners proceeded to take some of the other points in question 
under their consideration. 
The Dutch having from the beginning suspected, on account 
of the mention of religión in the King 's second ratification, that 
it was intended to propose some chango in their established 
religión, required of the Spanish commissioners to declare 
whether they had received any instructions on that head, and 
what their instructions were. The commissioners acknowledged 
that they were indeed instructed to make a proposal to the states 
with regard to religión; but added, that they could not enter 
on the discussion of this article t i l l several others had been 
discussed. Of all the articles they knew, there was none in 
which the king and the duke of Lerma were so deeply interested; 
but since their arrival in Holland, they had come to be persuaded, 
from private information, that no proposal which they were 
empowered to make on this subject would be listened to by the 
states. They were likewise afraid that the discussion of a point 
of so delicate a nature, on which the passions of the Dutch would 
be so easily inflamed, might occasion a sudden dissolution of the 
conferences; and from the sequel, it is probable that they had 
sent the Franciscan to Madr id as much for the purpose of sound-
ing the inclinations of the court, and knowing their ultimate 
resolution on this head, as on that of the Indian commerce. 
Although they were repeatedly urged, therefore, by the Dutch, 
to declare what they were instructed to propose with regard to 
religión, they as often declined complying with their request, and 
insisted that it was better previously to examine the other 
questions in dispute. 
One of these related to the duties which, during the war, had 
been laid by the Dutch on all goods imported by the Scheld to 
Antvverp. The archduke8, commissioners insisted that all those 
duties should be taken off: ñor were those of the states unwilling 
to abolish such of them as had been imposed in consideration of 
the war ; but they required that the same duties should still be 
paid by the subjects of the archdukes and the king of Spain as 
were exacted from the subjects of the states, to enable them to 
defray the expenses of the fortifications on the banks of the 
Scheld, and of the ships of war that were necessary for the pro-
tection of their commerce. This was the pretext which they 
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employed, although it is probable they were chiefly actuated by 
their dread lest the trade of Antwerp should be revived, to the 
prejudice of that of their own commercial towns in the maritime 
provinces. 
Another point which engaged the attention of the commis-
sioners, regarded the mutual exchange of those towns and 
districts which the contending powers had acquired by conquest 
from one another. The states were at this time in possession of 
Sluys, and the isle of Cadsant in Flanders, and of Breda, Bergen-
op-Zoom, and Gertrudenberg, in Brabant; all of which places 
were of the first importance, on account of their situation and 
strength. The Spanish commissioners, however, proposed and 
urged that these places should be given to the archdukes, who 
were sovereigns of the provinces in which they lay, and that the 
states, in compensation for them, should accept of Oldenseel, 
Groll, and Lingen. But the Dutch commissioners rejected this 
proposal with great disdain, alleging that the towns possessed by 
the states were of infinitely greater valué than those which were 
offered in exchange for them; and declaring, that as no conces-
sions which the archdukes could make were a sufficient equivalent, 
both parties, agreeably to what the archduke had proposed in 
the beginning of this negotiation, should retain what was at 
present in their possession. 
A third question related to the boundaries between the domi-
The pro- nions of the states and those of the archdukes; a fourth, 
pertyofindi- to the rcstitution of the eífects belonging to individuáis 
stored by * which had beeu confiscated; and, besides these, there 
the treaty Were several other matters treated of, concerning which 
for peace. . 0 
the opposite parties contended with great warmth, and 
discovered a wide diversity of sentiment. 
Many weeks passed in fruitless altercation. The parties seemed 
to be more than ever exasperated against each other; and the 
difficulties which prevented them from coming to an agreement 
seemed daily to increase. 
The Dutch were extremely tenacious of their claims, and the 
Obstinacyof archdukes*1 commissioners often complained of this 
theDutdi. obstinacy to the English and French ambassadors; 
but their conduct was, at the same time, explicit and undigguised; 
and, from the commencement of the negotiation. they had openly 
declared, that, whatever concessions they might bp induced to 
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make in other matters, there were two points, religión and the 
trade to India, on whieh no such concession was to be expected 
as the Spaniards were likely to require. 
To procure some new instructions with regard to these impor-
tant articles, had, as already mentioned, been the purpose for 
which the Franciscan had been sent to Madrid. The time fixed 
for his return was expired, and no satisfactory account of his 
delay was given by the archdukes1 commissioners, who studiously 
avoided all discourse concerning him, and maintained an obstí-
nate silence with regard to his success. 
The Dutch were exceedingly disgusted at this behaviour: they 
knew not to what cause it could be ascribed: they were not 
without suspicion of some insidious design; and they at length 
resolved, that either the archdukes1 ambassadors should give 
them satisfaction concerning the cause of Ney's delay, or that the 
treaty should instantly be broken off. 
Having, accordingly, in most peremptory terms required to 
know what was the ultímate determination of the king of Spain 
with regard to the Indian trade, the ambassadors, thinking it 
unnecessary any longer to conceal what they knew, replied*, 
,„ that Ney had not been able to obtain a more favourable 
Auguat 10. . . . 
answer to his apphcation than this, that the king, from 
his ardent desire of restoring peace to his dominions, was still 
ready to renounce his claim of sovereignty over the 
concerning provinces in the form proposed; but, in return for so 
tbeCatholic orreat a sacrifico, required that the states should abstain 
religión and 0 I T T I « I 
the indian from all commcrce to the Indios, and permit the exer-
trade- cise of the Catholic religión throughout the whole 
extent of their dominions. 
Of this declaration the deputies of the states gave immediate 
information to the states general, and the English and French 
ambassadors. James, having lately entered into that defensive 
alliance with the states which he had formerly declined, and 
Henry, besides concluding such an alliance, having empowered f 
Jeannin to acquaint them that, in case the present treaty were 
not broken off without his consent, he had resolved to assist 
them in the prosee ution of the war ; both these princos were 
well entitled to be consulted on the present occasion. Henry 
* Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. Metercn, liv. xxx. folio 652, &c. 
f Négociations de Jeannin, tom. i . p. 44. Seconde Inatruction au Monsicur Jeannin. 
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could not decently have neglected the opportunity, which was 
presented to him, of ihterposing in behalf of the religión which 
he professed, and therefore he had instructed Jeannin to advise 
the states, i f possible, to grant to their Catholic subjects the 
indulgence which Phil ip had demanded for them; but he did 
not insist on their compliance with his advice: he was sensible 
that this indulgence might endanger their internal peace, 
especially if it was granted at the request of the king of Spain ; 
and therefore left them at liberty to determine, both with 
regard to religión and their Indian trade, whether any con-
cession could be made consisten tly with their interest and 
security. • 
The states themselves unanimously thought that there was 
no'room for hesitation on the subject. W i t h the consent of 
Jeannin, as well as of the English ambassadors, they rejected 
the conditions that were proposed ; and, at the next meeting 
with the archdukes1 commissioners, it was declared by those of 
the states, that they considered the insisting upon these con-
ditions as a violation of the promise which had been made of 
treating with them as with a free people; that they could not 
consider the conduct of Spain as consistent, fair, or candid, and 
were therefore determined to break off the present treaty ; and, 
without suífering themselves to be any longer deceived, to re-
sume the prosecution of the war *. 
The states seem to have received sufficient provocation on 
this occasion for the resentment with which they were inflamed; 
but, from a letter of the president Jeannin's to the king of 
France, it appears that it was not the court of Spain so much 
as the archdukes"1 commissioners, of whom they had reason 
to complain. F o r Philip, it appears from this letter, had, 
from the beginning of the negotiation, declared that he would 
never consent to renoilnce his sovereignty, but on the condition 
that the free exercise of the Catholic religión should be estab-
lished in all the provinces; and he had charged the commis-
sioners to open the conferences by acquainting them that this 
was his unalterable resolution. But the commissioners had 
thought it expedient to change the order of their instructions, 
and to begin with an acknowledgment of the freedom of the 
states, hoping thereby to render them more obsequious in other 
• M f tcreu, liv. xxx. folio baU, &c. 
N2 
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articles; and afterwards, when both parties were in better 
humour with each other, to obtain from Philip some relaxation 
in his demand with regard to the Catholic religión *. 
This Information was communicated to the deputies of the 
states, and afterwards to the states-general, with an intention 
to soothe their resentment; but it served rather to turn it into 
another channel, by directing it against the arcbdulces' com-
missioners instead of the court of Spain. A n d it likewise 
served to rivet their convietion, that no solid peace could ever 
be obtained from that court, whose bigotry was the same in the 
present as it had been in the former reign, without a concession 
on their part, which they deemed to be no less contrary to good 
policy than it was inconsistent with sincerity in their profession 
of the Protestant faith. They were confirmed, therefore, in this 
resolution of declining to proceed any farther in the treaty, 
and seem to have satisfied the English and French ambassa-
dors, that they had sufficient motives to justify their conduct. 
These ambassadors, however, still believed it to be practica-
ble to restore tranquillity to the United Provinces, although 
not by a perpetual peace, yet by a long truce between the con-
tending powers. The obstacles to the establishment of peace 
had chiefly arisen from the pride and bigotry of the court of 
Spain ; but these obstacles, they thought, might be more easily 
surmounted in attempting to conclude a truce than a peace, 
because, if only a truce were concluded, that court might flatter 
themselves with the hopes, that, at the expirajtion of it, they 
might recover their concessions, and accomplish the several 
objects in which they were so deeply interested ; besides that, 
there was ground to suspect, that, from the beginning of the 
negotiation, it was a truce, and not a perpetual peace, that was 
intended by the Spanish ministers. 
The president Jeannin, having previously concerted with the 
The presi. English ambassadors certain preliminary articles, with-
«lentJearinin out which he kncw that all farther treaty must prove 
an^udLice abortivo, rcquestod an audience of the states, and, 
of the states. being admitted into their assembly, after expressing 
the concern of the French and English monarchs on account 
of the unsuccessful issue of the late conferences, he added, 
that these princes, being deeply impressed with a conviction 
* Négociations de Jeannin, totn. ii. p. 403, 404. 
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of the necessity of putting a period to the war, had, in case 
it should be found impracticable to establish a lasting peace, 
commanded their ambassadors to recommend to the states a 
truce of several years, provided that such a truce could be 
obtained on advantageous and honourable ternas. For , in 
recommending this measure, he subjoined, It is by a regard for 
the true interest and honour of the provinces, that the French 
and Brit ish kings are prompted, and therefore they exhort you 
to adopt it only on the following conditions : first, that the king 
of Spain and the archdukes shall treat with you as with a free 
people, over whom they pretend to no authority; secondly, that 
during the truce, you shall enjoy a free commerce both in Europe 
and in the Indies; and, thirdly, that you shall retain all the 
towns and territories which are at present in your possession. 
During this truce you will have leisure to rectify the disorders 
which have sprung up during the continuance of the war, to pay 
your debts, to reform your government, to extend your trade; 
and, i f you study to maintain internal unión and tranquillity, 
this truce, it is probable, will termínate in a lasting peace, by 
which the advantages you have obtained wil l be perpetuated 
and secured : whcreas, i f at this time the war were to be 
renewed, we foresee innumerable difficulties to which you will 
be exposed; and perceive that, in order to ensure success, 
your friends must be much more liberal in their assistance, 
than is convenient for them in the present situation of their 
affairs. 
Y o u are cKssatisfied with the conduct of your adversarles; 
but let not your resentment prevent you from listening to the 
counsel of your friends. It is our intention to offer them the 
same counsel; and, i f they refuse to follow it, to acquaint them 
that the kings of Franco and Bri ta in are determined to give 
you every proof of faithful friendship in their power. But in 
return for this, these princes expect that you will not, by your 
obstinacy, engage them in a war to which they are utterly 
averse, and for which, i f this truce can be accomplished, there 
is no necessity. 
It will be difficult, we know, to obtain the consent of the 
Catholic king to the preliminary articles; but, i f that prince 
shall be found equally uncomplying and intractable, as you have 
hitherto experienced, and the treaty for a truce, like that for 
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peace, shall, through liis fault, prove abortive, you will be justi-
fied for again having recourse to arms; and the princes too 
whom we represent will be justified for resolving to exert them-
selves with greater vigour in your behalf *. 
To this proposal the states-general made no immediate reply, 
but that they would submit it to the consideration of the states 
of the particular provinces. 
It was soon after communicated to the marquis of Spinola, and 
the rest of the archdukes1 commissioners, by whom it was received 
with all the satisfaction which might be expected from tlieir 
well-known aversión to the continuance of the war. But 
although they acknowledged how much pleasure it would give 
them, i f any means of an accommodation could be devised, they 
dreaded that the archdukes would be unable to persuade the 
court of Spain to agree to the preliminary articles ; and, for 
this reason, they laboured to persuade Jeannin to omit the two 
first articles altogether, and to attempt to conclude a truce 
without any other condition than that both partios should 
retain what they possessed. I t had been with the utmost 
reluctance, they represented, that the king of Spain had for-
merly consented to acknowledge the independence of the states, 
even when he expected thereby to gain some concession from 
them in favour of the Catholic rel igión; and to exelude them 
from the Indian trade, had been his principal motive for desir-
ing to put a period to the war. To procure his consent, there-
fore, either to the first or to the second of the preliminary 
articles, would be attended with difficulties, which, there was 
ground to apprehend, would be found insuperable; and no 
other agreement was likely to be obtained than a cessation of 
hostilities, or a truce in the common form, during which both 
parties should retain what was at present in their possession. 
Jeannin was sensible of the truth of this representation, and 
foresaw the difficulties which the archdukes must encounter, if 
they listened to his proposal; but, besides that these princes were, 
above all things, solicitous to be delivered from a ruinous war, 
which filled their minds with perpetual disquietude, and would 
employ all their influenco to overeóme the pride and obstinacy of 
the court of Spain, he knew that the Spaniards were at present 
extremely i l l prepared for the recommencement of hostilities, and 
* Jcau. i¡ . 412. 
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hoped that on this account they might be induced to agree to 
térras, which, on another occasion, they would have rejected 
with disdain. 
He would not, tlierefore, have been inelined to withdraw the 
preliminary articles, even although he had found hiraself at 
liberty; but they were a part (he said) of the archdukes' 
comraissioners' proposal to the states, and the honour both of 
the French and English monarchs, in whose ñame this proposal 
had been made, was now pledged either to procure the aceeptance 
of them by the archdukes and king of Spain, or to furnish the 
states with such assistance as might be necessary for the 
prosecution of the war. This declaration he made to the arch-
dukes1 comraissioners in the most explicit t é r r a s ; and added, 
that while it might be difficult to obtain the king of Spains assent 
to the proposed conditions, it was extremely doubtful whether 
these conditions were such as would satisfy the people of the 
United Provinces; but the .comraissioners might firraly be-
lieve that nothing less than was contained in the prelimi-
nary articles would give satisfaction either to them or to their 
friends. 
O f the truth of this assertion, as far as it regarded the 
confederates, there was iraraediate proof in the difficulty which 
Jeannin encountered in persuading them to agree to his proposal. 
The greater part of the deputies of the particular provinces, 
being sincerely solicitous for the establishraent of peace, were 
satisfied with the preliminary articles, and gave their opinión 
that the truce, with the conditions contained in these articles, 
ought not to be refused. But there were many, who, whether 
frora motives of prívate interest, or a regard to the public safety, 
being desirous of a continuance of the war, maintained that no 
agreeraent whatever should be raade, but on condition that the 
archdukes, and the king of Spain, should grant the sanie soleran 
acknowledgraent of the liberty and independence of the states, 
to which they had forraerly consented in treating for a perpetual 
peace, including an explicit renunciation for ever of all their 
clairas of authority over the United Provinces. 
The forraer of these parties was headed by Barnevelt, supported 
by the French and English arabassadors; and the latter by 
Prince Maurice, whose opinión was espoused not only by the 
whole province of Zealand, over which his authority was alraost 
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without control, but by the deputies of Amsterdam, and those of 
several other cities in the province of Holland. 
The former endeavoured to persuade the latter, that it vvas 
Parties for unreasonaWe to expect the same liberal concessions from 
and against the enemy, in the case of a truce, as where a perpetual 
t e pcace. peace wag ^0 established ; and that, while the states 
were conscious of being free and able to maintain their liberty, 
i t was of no importance whether the Spaniards should acknow-
ledge, or refuse to acknowledge, their independence ; for it was 
sufficient for every valuable purpose which they could have in 
view, i f the Spaniards would treat with them as with a free 
people, and conclude an agreement upon equitable terms. 
But these considerations had no weight with Prince Maurice, 
or his partisans. They were averse to the truce on other 
accounts, besides their objection to the declaratory clause, and 
laboured to convince their countrymen that a truce, on whatever 
terms, at the present period, though it might be necessary for 
Spain, must prove pemicious and dangerous to the Dutch 
republic. They omitted no opportunity of inculcating their 
opinión, whether in public assemblies or k i prívate societies, 
and published innumerable letters and pamphlets, which being 
universally perused, became the subject of discourse in every 
company. Of these writings some were of the most inflammatory 
kind, intended to instil suspicions into the minds of the people, 
that Barnevelt and his friends, unable to resist the allurement of 
Peruvian gold, had sold their country to the Spaniards; and 
even the French and Bri t ish monarchs, it was insinuated, by so 
earnestly recommending the truce, intended rather to serve the 
court of Spain than the United Provinces. Their suspicions on 
this head were heightened by the arrival at Paris and London of 
two ambassadors, who had been sent on their present embassy by 
the Spanish ministers, though under a different pretext, yet, 
probably, with no other view than to procure the good offices of 
James and Henry in the present negotiation in the Netherlands. 
No pains were spared by the French and English ambassadors 
at the Hague, to convince the Dutch that their apprehensions 
were without foundation. Above all the rest, Joannin laboured 
assiduously for this end ; and by giving the deputies of the states 
the strongest assurances that his master's friendship was invi-
olable, and that nothing could be more remote from his intention 
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than to enter into an alliance with Spain to the prejudice of 
their republic, he seems, with regard to this matter, in which 
they were so deeply interested, to have set their minds at ease. 
The aversión, however, of a great number of them to the truce, 
and their animosity against such of their countrymen as prometed 
it, were as strong as ever. Their resentraent was principally 
directed against Barnevelt, who, by his eloquence and address, 
his great abilities, and long experience, had acquired an entire 
ascendant over most of the deputies: he appears, however, to 
have been too sensibly affected on this occasion by the odium to 
which he found himself exposed, Having one day bitterly com-
plained, in an assembly of the states, of the cruel treatment 
which he received in the libéis daily published on the subject of 
the present controversy, he appealed to the deputies, whether he 
had given just ground for such injurious imputations as had been 
cast upon him ; and then left the assembly with a resolution to 
retire from public life. But he soon recovered his tranquillity ; 
and, at the earnest desire of the states, he retumed to the 
assembly, and afterwards continued to apply himself to the 
conduct of public affairs with the same indefatigable attention as 
before*. 
It would be injurious to the character of Prince Maurice, to 
suppose that he would demean himself so far as to be concerned 
in those anonymous pamphlets and incendiary letters, replete 
with threats against Barnevelt and his adherents, which were 
published on this occasion. He took no pains to conceal his 
resentment, and openly inveighed against their conduct, as being 
calculated to involve the provinces in ruin. Having visited 
several of the towns in Holland, he laboured to bring over the 
deputies to his opinión, and with the same intention he wrote a 
circular letter to all the other towns in the province. 
What he said and wrote on this occasion was principally 
intended to inspire the deputies with mistrust of the archdukes 
and the court of Spain, whose conduct, in the present negotia-
tion, he said, had been inconsistent with their professions in the 
beginning, and who could not have any reason for declining to 
grant the most explicit renunciation of their r;ght of sovereignty 
over the provinces, but that they secretly designed to assert that 
right when a more convenient season should arrive. 
* Grotius, &c. lib. xvi. 
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They would observe the truce only so long as they found it 
necessary for retrieving the ruinous condition of their affairs; 
and meanwhile, the people of the United Provinces, deceived by 
a false appearance of tranquillity, would not only quit their arms, 
but would lose their military spirit, and be induced to agree to 
whatever terms should be prescribed to them, rather than again 
expose themselves to the dangers or inconveniences of war. 
The Spaniards, it was evident, being utterly averse to a per-
petual peace, hoped to be able, during the truce, to apply some 
effectual remedies to the disorders which prevailed in their 
finances ; whereas the states, having so great a number of fron-
tier towns, where numerous garrisons must be maintained, would 
have nearly the same expenses to defray as during the continu-
ance of the war. It would, however, be infinitely more difíicult, 
after their apprehensions of immediate danger were removed, to 
persuade the people to pay the taxes which it would be necessary 
to impose; and the enemy would, at the same time, practise on 
their fidelity, and sow the seeds of discord among the different 
towns and provinces, of which they would not fail to avail them-
selves, without thinking it incumbent on them to delay hostilities 
t i l l the expiration of the truce. 
A s this reasoning of Prince Maurice coincided with the preju-
dices which the Dutch had, for many years, entertained against 
the Spaniards, it made a strong impression on the minds of many 
of the deputies ; ñor was i t considered, either by Barnevelt or 
Jeannin, as frivolous. On the contrary, they treated it with the 
respect which was due to the person by whom it was employed, 
although they, at the same time, laboured assiduously to show 
Memorial of argumcnts on their side had greater weight; 
"^Td"1*™5 an^ ^eann^n' ^n his own ñame and that of the other 
the United ambassadors, presented a memorial to the states, of the 
States. following purport, intended to remove the objections 
that were urged by Maurice and his adherents. 
" The princes whom we represent being deeply interested in 
your prosperity, and believihg the truce proposed, to be neces-
sary, in the present situation of your affairs, are therefore much 
concerned to observe the opposition which it meets with from 
so many respectable members of your state. 
" Y o u ought not, they allege, to be satisfied that the arch-
dukes and the king of Spain are willing to treat with you as with 
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a free people, over whom they pretend to no authority, but you 
ought to require a declaration that they will consider you in this 
light for ever afterwards, as well as during the continuance of the 
truce. 
" But in the opinión of the princes, our sovereigns, your 
liberty is equally well secured by the former of these declarations 
as by the latter; because the former, not being limited to any 
particular time, but expressed in terms that are general and 
indefinito, it must be understood by all the world in the same 
sense, as i f the words 'for ever1 were subjoined. Besides this 
consideration, it is not of the king of Spain and the archdukes 
that you are to hold your liberty. Y o u have long maintained 
that you are already free, having asserted your liberty by a 
public solemn deed, founded upon reason and necessity, and 
bravely defended it for many years against your oppressors, by 
the forcé of arms. Y o u ought, therefore, to rest satisfied with 
that simple acknowledgment of it which is implied in the decla-
ration of being ready to treat with you as with a free people. 
You would be satisfied with such an acknowledgment from any 
neutral or friendly power. Y o u have equal reason to be satisfied 
when it is made by the archdukes and the king of Spain. A n d 
you ought not, with so much solicitude, to require these princes 
to be more explicit, in declaring you to be free, lest you be con-
sidered as thereby tacitly confessing that still they have a right 
to your obedience. 
" But, even allowing, that the king of Spain should not think 
himself excluded by the form of words made cholee of from his 
claim of sovereignty, will he cali you before a court of justice, do 
you suppose, in order to have his rights examined by the rules of 
law ? It is not in this manner that sovereigns assert their claims; 
it is only to the sword that they appeal: and if you be able, when 
the truce expires, to maintain your liberty as you have hitherto 
done against the forcé of arms, you will then, as well as now, 
with justice despise your enemy^ pretensions to dominión over 
you. It wil l be sufficient then, as it is at present, to find your-
selves in actual possession of your liberty. A n d , in whatever 
sense the words of the truce may be understood by the king of 
Spain, you ought to be satisfied with the assurance which has 
been given you, and which we now repeat, that, by the princes 
whom we represent, whoso friendsliip you have so long expe-
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rienced, and on whose assistance you may with confidence rely, 
these words are considered as a clear and unambiguous declara-
tion, that you are a free people over whom authority cannot ever 
be justly pretended by the king of Spain. 
" It is farther objected by those who oppose the truce, that it 
will afford leisure to the Catholic king to retrieve the ruinous 
condition of his finances, and to prosecute the war, after the 
recomraencement of hostilities, with greater vigour. Ñor can it 
be denied, that if he was to listen to the advice of wise and faith-
ful counsellors, it might be, in some measure, attended with this 
effect. . But is it to be presumed that a young king, at the head 
of a nation noted for restless and inordinate ambition, with 
ministers inattentive to eeonomy, when the exigencies of his 
aífairs required it, will be more attentive when his situation 
renders it unnecessary ? Is it not rather to be presumed, that his 
treasure will, more than ever, become a prey to the avarice or 
profusión of his ministers 1 that it will be more than ever lavished 
on idle pomp and show; or that, by quarrelling with his neigh-
bours, he shall ere long be engaged in some ambitious and 
expensive enterprise ? 
*' It is from your republic, and not from the king of Spain, 
that those prudent measures may be expected, which are 
necessary to repair the mischiefs that have been oecasioned by 
the war : you are equally distinguished for your private and your 
public eeonomy; and you are not less distinguished for your 
industry, your activity, and enterprise. W i t h these qualities, 
which you possess in so eminent a degree, your trade must every 
year be more extended; and, being carried on with smaller risks, 
and at less expense, the profits arising from it will be greater 
than ever. Y o u will thereby be enabled to discharge your public 
debts, to relieve your people from the load of taxes under which 
they groan, and, when the truce expires, to prosecute the war 
with less dependence on your allies, and a greater probability of 
success, 
" It will still, indeed, be necessary for you to maintain garri-
sons in the frontier towns, and to retain a considerable propor-
tion of your troops in pay, that, whether the truce be observed or 
violated, you may be always found in a proper posture of defence. 
" But at least the one half of your army may be disbanded. 
Your trade will, in the mean time, be carried on with much 
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greater advantage than hitherto, and all those losses by sea and 
by land avoided, which yon have so often represented to the 
kings, our raasters, as the cause why you were unable, of your-
selves, to defray the necessary expenses of the war. 
" But y our enemies, it is alleged by the opposers of the truce, 
will have access, during the continuance of it, to carry on their 
intrigues among the people ; to sow dissensions among the towns 
and provinces, and to persuade some of them perhaps to abandon 
the confederacy; while the people themselves, delivered from the 
apprehensions of immediate danger, will refuse to pay the taxes 
which the states shall find it necessary to impose. 
" W i t h regard to these objections, as we do not pretend to 
any certain foresight of futurity, we will not affirm that they are 
entirely destitute of foundation. There is no state of human 
society that is not subject to inconveniences and dangers; and 
there are dangers attending peace as well as war: but the 
dangers raentioned are such as, with prudent precautions, it is in 
your power to avoid. The objections founded on the apprehen-
sions of them are equally applicable to a peace,, as to a truce; 
and i f they are sufficient to deter you from listening to our pro-
posal of a truce, they ought to determine you to persist in the 
prosecution of the war, t i l l you have accomplished the utter ruin 
of your enemy. But you are too wise to propose to yourselves an 
object inadequate to your strength. A n d , therefore, unless you 
choose to live in perpetual war, which must much sooner prove the 
ruin of your republic than of the Spanish monarchy, you must, 
sooner or later, agree to bring the war to a conclusión, either by 
a peace, or by a truce. A peace on the terms which you require, 
is at present unattainable; and even although it were in your 
power to procure it, yet, in the opinión of many of your friends, 
a truce is more desirable. For it is a sort of médium between 
peace and war; and it might prove dangerous for you, before 
your political institutions have acquired that stability which time 
alone can bestow, to pass at once from the one extreme to the 
other. It might occasion too great a relaxation of the vigour 
which you have been so long accustomed to exert, and expose 
you an easy prey to the resentment of your enemy. 
" But during the continuance of the truce, you will look for-
ward to the expiration of it. B y keeping your fortifications in 
repair, and your troops under proper discipline, joined to a 
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prudent administration of your finances, you will provide for that 
event; and thus, when the Spaniards shall perceive that you are 
well prepared for your defence, they will more easily agree to 
those equitable terms of peace, which at this time their pride 
and their sense of shame have determined them to reject. 
" The example of the Swiss cantons, whose fortune so nearly 
resembles yours, ought to engage you to listen to the counsel 
which we offer. L ike you, they had thrown off the yoke of their 
oppressors, and their arras had generally been attended with 
success ; yet they agreed to a truce, when proposed to thera, on 
much less advantageous térras than those which you are exhorted 
to accept; and, during the leisure which it afforded thera, they 
put their civil government and their military establishments on 
so respectable a footing, as effectually determined their ancient 
masters to lay aside the thoughts of a farther prosecution of the 
war, From the same conduct it is likely that you will derive 
the same advantages. The king of Spain will more easily consent 
on equitable terms, to a truce than to a perpetual peace, because 
he may think that his dignity will suffer less from making tera-
porary than perpetual concessions: but many circumstances, it 
may be presuraed, will concur to deter hira frora a renewal of 
hostilities. His animosity and resentraent will be abated; his 
ancient sovereignty over you will be, in some measure, obsoleto 
and forgotten: having tasted the sweets of tranquillity, he will 
desire to preserve it undisturbed: he will have experienced that 
it is the interest of his subjects at home, and still more of those 
in the Indies and America, to live at peace with you. And, as 
it will be impossible, unless you be greatly wanting to yourselves, 
but that, some years henee, you must be possessed of greater 
resources than at present, he must perceive the danger of 
engaging in war with you, after your power is established and 
confirmed ; when he considers, that in the very infaney of your 
state, his most vigorous efforts to reduce you to obedience were 
of no avail. 
" Wha t has been said will be sufficient, it is hoped, to evince 
that the objections against the truce, which have been urged by 
its opposers, ought not to deter you frora agreeing to it, in case 
the consent of the king of Spain can be procured to the terms 
proposed. These objections indeed are urged by some of the 
most respectable members of the state, whose zeal for the pros-
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perity of the republic is unquestionable. But the wisest men are 
subject to error. It may be true, that sorae inconveniences inay 
arise from the truce, but it should seem that much greater are 
to be dreaded from a continuance of the war. And , it is a first 
principie of prudence, of two evils to raake choice of the least. 
"• Before we conclude this memorial, it is necessary to remind 
you of two things, which deserve your attention. Firs t , that it 
is not only the counsel, but the earnest request. of those princes, 
to whom you have been chiefly indebted for assistance, that you 
should adopt the measure we have recommended : and, secondly, 
that so favourable a concurrence of circumstances as the present, 
for obtaining equitable terms of accommodation, may never 
again occur. The arehdukes are princes on whose fidelity you 
can with safety rely for the punctual performance of their engage-
ments: they are fond of peace; at their earnest entreaty the 
king of Spain hath already made, and is still likely to make 
more ampie concessions, than could otherwise have justly been 
expected; and in conducting the treaty proposed, you will have 
all the assistance that can be given you by two powerful 
monarchs, who consider your interest as their own 
This memorial did not immediately produce the desired eífect 
upen all the deputies. Several of the towns in Holland, an¿ the 
whole province of Zealand, with Prince Maurice at their head, 
still remained as averse to the truce as ever ; and Maurice still 
continued to employ his influence to confirm them in their 
resolution of opposing it. B y his emissaries, and his letters, 
he attempted to gain over the other towns and provinces to his 
opinión. H e sometimes talked as if both the French and Brit ish 
monarchs were pursuing their private interest at the expense of 
the republic. H e insinuated that, unless they should drop the 
proposal of a truce, and immediately agree to assist the states 
more liberally than hitherto in prosecuting the war, the more 
distant parts of the provinces ought to be abandoned, and the 
territorios of the republic contracted within such narrow limits, 
as might be defended by the forces which the Dutch themselves, 
without foreign assistance, were able to support. He alleged, 
that no matter of so great importance as was at present under 
deliberation, could be adopted without the unanimous consent 
* Négociations de Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 9. Escrit fait par monsieur Jeannin, au noiu de 
tous les ambassadeurs, jour treiziéme octobre, et mis és mains de messieurs Les Estats. 
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of all thé tovvns and provinces: and threatened that the pro-
vince of Zealand, if forsaken by the other provinces, would alone 
maintain the war against the Spaniards, t i l l more ampie conces-
sions were obtained*. 
The French monarch could not avoid feeling some resentment 
at his conduct, which he considered as equally violent and 
injurious. But Henry's candour would not suffer him to divest 
himself of that esteem which he had long entertained for the 
prince's character; ñor to believe the suggestions of his ene-
mies, that he was actuated by some sinister design. H e still 
wrote to him as to a friend whom he highly respected, sparing no 
pains and employing every argument to engage him to adopt his 
views. 
Henry's endeavours were well seconded by Jeannin, who 
acted with the most consummate prudence, and carefully 
avoided giving any personal offence to Prince Maurice, while he 
exerted himself with great activity in counteracting his designs. 
B y the eloquenee and address of Bamevelt, joined to the influ-
ence which he derived from his great experience, and the high 
opinión which was justly entertained of his public spirit and 
integrity, Amsterdam and all the other towns in Holland were 
reconciled to the truce, on the terms proposed; and not long 
after, Prince Maurice and the province of Zealand, with whom 
Jeannin and the English ambassadors, assisted by deputies sent 
thither by the other provinces, assiduously employed all their 
influence, were persuaded to relinquish their opposition. 
The archdukes were employing in the mean time their interest 
Reluctance ^ Madrid to obtain the consent of Philip ; who, from 
ofPhilip to ¿he beginning, had discovered no less reluctance to 
ledge the Jeannin1^ proposal than Prince Maurice or the pro-
mdepend. vinee 0f Zealand. F a r from being averse to a truce, 
ence of the _ . 0 # 
United this prince was exceedingly desirous that it should take 
place, provided it could be concluded on the ordinary 
condition of both parties retaining what was at present in their 
possession. But to acknowledge the independence of his rebel-
lious subjects, and formally to grant them his permission to 
earry on their trade in India, were conditions with which he 
himself and many of his subjects thought it ignominious to 
comply. 
* Jeannin, toin. iii. 
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The archdukes endeavoured to convince him, that ifi making 
these concessions, they would do nothing more than had been 
already done in consenting to the suspensión of arms, and that 
no more important consequences could arise from it. They 
engaged to have the article relativo to the Indian trade expressed 
in such a manner, that it should not materially affect the interest 
or the trade of Spain. 
They represented, that the declaration so eamestly required 
by the United States, could not do any prejudice to the king's 
right of sovereignty, that it could not remain in forcé but while 
the truco subsisted, and that the Hollanders would find it of no 
avail, after the renewal of hostilities, if his majesty's arms were 
crowned with victory. They added that this was the opinión of 
the ambassadors of the mediating powers, and likewise of many 
members of the states of the revolted provinces, who opposed the 
truce on account of the insignificancy of the clause which con-
tained the declaration of their liberty. 
These considerations, urged by such powerful solicitors, had 
great weight with Philip, who would have yielded his consent, 
provided that some concession could have been obtained in favour 
of the Catholic inhabitants of the United Provinces. A n d he 
had some ground, he thought, to entertain the hopo of being 
able, in some measure, to accomplish this object, in which he 
was more deeply interested than in any other, when he con-
sidered that the prince who was the chief mediator in the 
present negotiation, was himself a Catholic. But the archdukes 
having informed him, that Jeannin, whose zeal for the popish 
faith was unquestionable, had declared that it would be in vain 
to attempt to introduce any proposal concerning religión among 
Religious ^ e Pre^m^nary articles, Phil ip doubted whether he could 
scrupie» of cúter with a good conscience into any treaty with such 
Phihp, determined herética ; and therefore hesitated, for some 
time, whether he should not utterly reject the truce, whatever 
consequences might follow. 
In order to dispel his semipiés, the archduke sent to Madrid 
his confessor, Ignatio Brizuela, a Spaniard of noble birth, emi-
nently distinguished for his piety and virtue, and of great expe-
rience in the affairs of the Netherlands, 
Brizuela knew well how to make impression on the timid, 
superstitious mind of P h i l i p ; and judiciously employed religión 
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itself as 1i motive, which should induce him to comply with the 
archdukes1 request. If in the course of the treaty, said he, any 
indulgence can be procured for the Catholic inhííbitants, tbe 
French ambassador will exert his most strenuous endeavours in 
their behalf; but it is necessary, he added, even for the interest 
of religión, that tbe truce should be concluded, lest, considering 
the difficulties under which the archdukes must labour in 
resuming the war, instead of re-establishing the Catholic faith in 
the rebellious provinces, it shall be exposed to danger in those 
which have been brought back to their allegiance. 
To this reasoning Phil ip listened with great attention, and 
seemed to be in a great measure satisfied, that he ought not any 
longer to withhold his consent; but chose, as usual, before he 
gave an explicit answer, te hear the opinión of his favourite the 
duke of Lerma. The duke had not, it should seem, as yet 
formed a decisivo resolution with regard to the part which it 
would be most prudent for hira to act on the present occasion. 
H e had long experienced the most insurmountable difficulties in 
furnishing the necessary expenses of the war ; and he dreaded, 
if it were not speedily brought to a conclusión, that some great 
disaster might happen in the Netherlands, which would not be 
ascribed to the marquis of Spinola, who had so often given the 
most unquestionable proofs of military prudence and capacity, 
but to him, by whom that general had been disappointed in the 
supplies and reinforcements which had been promised him. For 
this reason, and perhaps too as was suspected by his contempo-
raries, from his jealousy of Spinola, who had rendered himself of 
so great importance as to rival him, or at least to enjoy too 
large a share in the royal favour, he had from the beginning 
been extremely intent on the establishment of peace. Observing, 
however, that both the pride of the Spanish nation, and Phi l ips 
superstition, were alarmed by the concessions demanded by the 
states, he had not ventured to advise a compliance with their 
requests. But it would be much easier, he was persuaded, to 
reconcile the Spaniards to the truce, than to a peace, as the 
concessions to be made in the former were not to be perpetual; 
and Philip's religious scruples being in a great measure removed 
by what the confessor had represented to him, he laid aside that 
hesitation and reserve with which he had hitherto acted ; and 
uniting his influence to that of Brizuela, and of several other 
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Spanish ecclesiastics, who were devoted to his interest, he soon 
Philip rati- persuaded Philip to grant his ratification of the preli-
hminar/ar- minary articles. It was iraraediately transmitted to 
ticies. the archdukes, accompanied with a recommendation, 
to avoid, if possible, the consenting to an express permission of 
the Indian trade; and, i f possible, likewise to procure some 
indulgence for the popish inhabitants in the United Provinces*. 
During the confessor's stay at Madrid, the French and 
English ambassadors were employed in preparing at the Hague 
the several articles of the treaty. A n d as the archdukes' com-
raissioners had some months before, at the desire of the states, 
who dreaded their secret practices among the deputies, returned 
to Brussels, the negotiations between the mediators and them 
had hitherto been carried on by letters. 
But as this method of conducting the treaty was attended 
with the most tedious delays, Jeannin, in his own ñame, and that 
of the other ambassadors, proposed to the archdukes that they 
should send their commissioners to meet with them at Antwerp. 
This proposal was readily complied with, and both parties 
arrived in that place in the beginning of February ] 609. 
The ambassadors had brought with them a copy of the articles 
of the truce, of which they had obtained the approbation of the 
states: and they had engaged, that unless the archdukes"* com-
missioners should adopt it without any material alteration, within 
eight days after their arrival in Antwerp, they should break oíf 
the conferences, and decline all further negotiation on the sub-
ject. Both the archdukes and Spaniards, they knew, were at 
present utterly unprepared for the renewal of the war, and 
nothing, they believed, would contribute so much to quicken 
their resolutions, as the dread of its being instantly renewed. 
But when the resolution of the states was communicated to 
the Spanish or archdukes1 commissioners, they complained that 
their masters were rather used unhandsomely, and represented 
that the time allowed was too short for the despatch of business 
of so great importance. The ambassadors were sensible of the 
truth of what they said, and obtained the consent of the states 
to prolong the t ime; after which both parties began seriously to 
* Bentivoglio passim. Négociations de Jeannin, tona. üi. p. 223, 224, and 329, 330. 
Grotius. Wimvood, vol. ii. p. 338, 100, &c. Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 10, et tom. ii. 
p. 335. 
o 2 
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apply themselves to the discussion of the several articles of the 
treaty. 
Against-tlie fundamental article, which regarded the liberty 
and independence of the revolted provinces, the commissioners 
offered no objection, except to the title assumed in it by the 
etates, of High and Mighty Lords, which they so obstinately 
opposed, that instead of the terms high and mighty, the ambas-
eadors were obliged to substitute the word illustrious. A n 
article relating to contributions, amounting yearly to 300,000 
crowns, which had been paid to the Dutch, by the inhabitants 
of the open country in Brabant, in order to procure an exemp-
tion from being plundered, was the occasion of much altercation. 
The states very unreasonably required that these contributions 
should be continued during the truce. But the mediators, 
having represented to them the injustice of this request, and 
that the levying of contributions was equivalent to a continu-
ance of hostilities, they at length consented that the article 
should be expunged; and in return for this concession, the arch-
dukes agreed to yield to them some extensivo districts adjoining 
to Bergen-op-zoorn, Breda, and other places, in the possession 
of the states, upon condition that such of the inhabitants of these 
districts as were Catholics should be indulged in the free exercise 
of their religión. 
A proposal was made for a mutual exchange of towns, which 
the contending partios had lately conquered from each other; 
but as the conquests of the Dutch had been much more im-
portant than those of the archdukes, no expedient could be 
devised to which the former thought ¡t their interest to agree : 
and for this reason, it was at length determined that both par-
tios should retain the towns at present in their possession. The 
Dutch were equally averse to another proposal, which was urged 
with much earnestness by the Spanish commissioners, that all 
those duties should be abolished which were exacted in Zealand 
from ships entering the Scheld, in their way to Antwerp. They 
gave some ground however to expect that this matter might 
afterwards be amicably adjusted: and the archdukes were the 
more easily persuaded to drop their request, as they hoped to 
be able in the time of peace to improve their posts on the coast 
of Flanders, and thereby to rival the Dutch in those branches of 
commerce which they had engrossed during the subsistence of 
the war. 
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But of all the articles of the present treaty, the most difficult 
Contests to be adiusted to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, 
about the . . 
imiiantmde. was that which regarded the Indian trade. The 
archdukes were aware that unless the Dutch were gratified in 
this point, no accoramodation whatever could take place: ñor 
were they or their subjects personally interested in refusing to 
comply with their request. But being well acquainted with the 
obstínate and absurd reluctance of the Spaniards against making 
any concession on this subject, they still suspected, notwith-
standing their sanguine hopes of the success of Brizuela's appli-, 
catión, that the king would never consent to ratify the truce, i f 
this concession were explicitly expressed. They were, for this 
reason, extremely solicitous to persuade the French and English 
ambassadors to agree to such an indirect forra of expression, as 
might not alarm the pride or prejudice of the Spaniards, while 
it would admit of being interpreted in favour of the Dutch. 
The ambassadors were not averse to this expedient; and they 
afterwards prevailed upon the states to consent to it, by giving 
them a declaration in writing, that notwithstanding the gene-
rality and obscurity of the térras in which the article was 
couched, they understood it as containing a full perraission to 
the Dutch to carry on their trade in every part of India that 
was not under the dominión of the crown of Spain ; and by 
engaging likewise in the ñame of the kings whom they repre-
sented, to guarantee this article relative to the Indian trade, as 
well as all the other articles of the present treaty *. 
Such were the principal points discussed between the arch-
dukes' cominissioners, and the French and English ambassadors, 
in the conferences that were held at Antwerp. Soon after, the 
confessor arrived at Brussels with Philip's ratification of the pre-
liminary articles ; and nothing now remained, but to settle soma 
matters of smaller consequence, and to give the treaty its just 
forra, in order to its being signed by the contending powers. 
In consequence of perraission frora the archdukes, the Dutch 
coraraissioners forraerly raentioned, who liad hitherto remained 
at the Hague, repaired to Antwerp : and that no solemnity 
might be wanting to a deed of so great importance, an extra-
ordinary asserably of deputies frora all the provinces and towns 
of the unión, was suraraoned to raeet at Bergen-op-zoora, where 
they might be at hand to ratify the several articles of the 
* Bcntivoglio. GrotiuB, lib. ult. &c. 
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treaty, as soon as they should be digested by the commissioners 
into proper íbrm. A s the confederates had not for many years 
been engaged in any matter in which they vvere so deeply inte-
rested, there weíe more than eight hundred deputies present in 
this assembly. 
The commissioners, together with the French and English 
ambassadors, had meetings every day in the Hotel de Vi l le of 
Antwerp ; and there was still considerable diversity of senti-
ments among them with regard to certain articles of the treaty, 
and particularly with respect to the time during which the truce 
should subsist. It was at length agreed, that it should be 
concluded for twelve years from the present period; and as 
soon as this and the other points in dispute were settled, and 
the treaty drawn up in the usual form, it was transmitted to 
Brussels and Bergen-op-zoom, to receive the sanction of the 
archdukes and of the states; and was finally concluded on the 
9th of A p r i l 1609. 
It consisted of eight-and-thirty articles, the most important 
Treaty for a 0f which were tliose which have been already men-
peace con- _ , * ' • 
cluded. tioned. The rest had been prepared by Barnevelt, 
and were equally calculated to promote the security and interest 
of individuáis and of the state*. No individuáis had merited so 
highly from the republic as those of the family of Nassau ; and 
all partios readily concurred in giving them proof on this occa-
* Amoug other articles it was stipulated, that, duiiug the continuance of the truce, all 
hostilities should cease by seas, rivers, and land, between the subjeets, inhabitants, and 
persons resident in the territorics of the king of Spain and the archdukes, on the one hand, 
and the United States, on the other, without any exception of places or persons whatever. 
That either party should retain safe and entire possession of whatever provinces, cities, 
places, lands, and principalities it then enjoved; and that the same conditions should be 
observed with regard to distriets, villages, and lands and territories thereon depending. 
That the subjeets and persons residing in the dominions of Spain and the archdukes, of 
the one part, and of the United States, of the other, should mutually cultivate good-will 
and friendship. 
That all reproach, resentment, and revenge, on account of past hostilities and injuries, 
should cease ; and that there should be a free and equal trade between the subjeets of the 
contractiug parties by rivers, seas, and land. 
That it should not be lawful to stop or lay hands on merchants, proprietors of ships, 
shiptnasters or their crews, or the ships, or merchandise, or goods of any kind, on any pre-
tence : but that justice should have its usual rourse for the recovery of debts, and in 
criminal prosecutions. 
If any judgments or seutences had been passed against the adherents of either party, on 
the footing of contumacy, aud that such persons had been condemned without bein'_' 
defended, either in civil or criminal causes, such judginenls or tentences were not to lo 
1609.] P H I L I P I I L K I N G O F S P A I N . 199 
sion of their respect and gratitude. B y one article of the truce 
it was provided that none of the descendants of Wil l iam, the 
first prince of Orange, should be Hable for the debts which that 
prince had contracted from the year 1567 t i l l his death. A n d 
by another, that such of his estates, within the territory of the 
archdukes, as had been confiscated, should be restored, and his 
heirs permitted to enjoy them unmolested during the continu 
anee of the truce*. 
carried into execution during the truce, either against the persons or goods of individuáis 
so condemned. 
Such persons, or their heirs and executors, as had suffered the loss-of tlieir property 
tlnough the rage of party, or the violence of war; by the rapiñe and injustice of individuáis, 
and without the authority of the magistrales, and the countenance and protection of the 
laws; such persons were to he reinstated, in virtue of the present treaty, in the full pos-
session and enjoyment of their effeets and estates, even although they should have actually 
passed hito the condition, and assumed the appearance and nature, of goods confiscated : 
whether they might have been deposited as pledges, given away aa donations, or alienated 
and transferred by any species of bargain, transaction, or renunciation. 
If the goods or estates shall have passed out of the exchequer, and been disposed of to 
prívate possessors, then it was stipulated, that interest should be paid to the right owners of 
the goods, or estates, at the rate of six and a quarter per cent, per annum. And if this 
payment should be delayed, it was agreed that the proprietors should be paid out of the 
stock or capital. But if the disposal or transference of such goods and estates, by the 
exchequer, had been accompanied with such solemnities as constitute legal deeds, and the 
ñames of the right owners been erased and superseded, by such legal formalities as consti-
tute legal rights and claims, yet, even in that case, it was provided, that their estates, 
rights, and properties should be restored to the right owners, they refunding to auy persons 
that might be at that time in possession, the bona fide price (where any had been given) 
which such persons might have paid on pnrehasing any of the said lands or properties since 
the confiscation, within the space of a year from the date of the present treaty. 
That no length of time, not even the whole space from the very beginning of the com-
motions in 15G7, should be considered as having conferred a prescriplive right to property. 
Persons who, during the course of the present war, had retired into the dominions of 
neutral powcrs, were to be comprchended, and have the full benefit and advantage of the 
treaty : they were to return, if they were so inclined, to the places of their fomier abodes, 
or to settle in whatever place they should choose; provided always, that they should comply 
with established man nei s, laws, and cusloms. 
It was declared, in general terms, that all confiscations, and disinherisons, and transfer-
ences of property that had originated in the violence of civil war, and the bitteniess of 
party-7,eal, should be broken, cancelled, and to all iutents and purposes nuil and void. 
* Besides these proofs of attachment to the family of the prince of Orange, the states 
had, some time before the conclusión of the truce, resolved that Prince Maurice's appoiut-
ments, as admiral and captain-general, should not suffer any diminution from the reduction 
of the forces. They even gave him an additional revenue, as a compensation for his share 
of ihe prizes and contributions ; and they likewise augmented the appointments of Prince 
Henry Frederick, and Connt William Lewis of Nassau. Such was the conclusión of that 
negotiation, wliich, for more than two years, had cinployed the attentiou, not only of the 
contracting parties, but likewise of most of the other princes and states in Europe, 
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The archdukes engaged that these and all the other articles 
ehould, within the space of three months, be ratified by th^ king 
of Spain; and the king's deed of ratification was accordingly 
delivered to the states a few days before the expiration of that 
term, to transfer to his brother and his children the several high 
employments which he held, at whatever period he should think 
fit. These resolutions of the states seem to have originated from 
the French monarch, and were formed at the instance of Barne-
velt, whom Jeannin had engaged to enter into his master's views. 
No person questioned that Prince Maurice's family were well 
entitled to every mark of favour which the states could bestow; 
it was rather unfortunate hovvever for the prince^ character that, 
after so violent an opposition to the truce, his acquiescence in it 
was so quickly followed by pecuniary rewards. But although his 
eneraies were disposed to insinúate that these rewards were rather 
to be considered as the price of his silence than as rewards for 
his former services, there is nothing to justify these insinuations 
in the numeroüs letters extant in Jeannin's negotiations, either 
of the king or the ministers of France. 
The Dutch were henceforward considered as a free and 
independent people. Having gained immortal honour by the 
magnanimity which they had displayed during the continuance of 
the war, they were now considered as having obtained the reward 
which their virtue merited, and were everywhere respected and 
admired. Their ministers at foreign courts were now received 
with the same distinction as those of other sovereign powers; and 
their alliance was courted by nations who had formerly regarded 
them as rebels, that must speedily submit to the yoke which they 
had shaken off. 
On the other hand, the reputation of the Spanish nation 
received a mortal wpund ; and their power ceased to be regarded 
with the same dread as formerly. They had been foiled by a 
handful of their own subjects, and would not, it was supposed, 
any longer pretend to give law to other nations. The high-spirited 
nobility, and the people in general, were secretly mortified by the 
concessions which the Dutch had been able to extort; and were 
ready to ascribe the humiliation which the nation had suffered, 
not so much to any insurmountable difficulty in the contest in 
which it had been so long engaged, as to misconduct and want of 
vigour on the part of government. 
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THE Spanish nation was now at peace with all the world, except 
the piratic states of Barbary; and it might justly have been 
expected that the king and his ministers would have instantly 
applied themselves to the healing of those wounds which the 
monarchy liad received during the continuance of the war. But 
their incapacity for government, joined to their bigoted zeal for 
theCatholic superstition, prevented them from availing themselves 
of the tranquillity which they enjoyed, and determined them to 
engage in a new enterprise, which, although their endeavours 
were attended with greater success than liad accompanied their 
attempt to subdue the United Provinces, preved no less pernicious 
to the national prosperity. The Spanish arms had been unsuc-
cessfully employed against foreign nations, for more than half a 
century ; and all ranks of men had felt the necessity of putting a 
period to the war; yet no sooner was peace established than it 
was resolved to expel from the bosom of the kingdom several 
hundred thousands of its most industrious inhabitants. 
The Morescoes had lived in Spain for more than eight hundred 
Account of years ' an(l s^^» after so long a period, remained a 
tbe Mores- sepárate people, distinguished from the Spaniards by 
their language, their religión, their character, and 
their manners. 
The present race were the descendants of those fanatic warriors, 
who, issuing forth from the deserts of Arabia, actuated with the 
wild ambition of compelling mankind to embrace the Mahometa» 
superstition, had, with most astonishing rapidity, reduced under 
subjection to their caliphs Persia, Syria, Palestino, and Egypt, 
and had afterwards extended their conquests as far as the 
Straits of Gibraltar along the coast of Africa. From Africa 
they transported an army into Spain, where in less than two 
years they expelled the Christian inhabitants from all the open 
a h á more fertile parts of the kingdom, and obliged them to take 
shelter in the mountainous regions of Asturia, and the other 
northern provinces. 
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Spain had, about three centuries before, been conquered by 
the Goths, who had not only embraced the religión, but had 
likewise, as far as could be expected from ignorant barbarians, 
adopted the language of the former inhabitants, and the distinc-
tion between the conquerors and the conquered had long been 
lost. Their language was that corrupt dialecí, of the Roman 
tongue, with a mixture of the Gothic, which is still the language 
of Castile; and their religión was the Christian, mingled with the 
superstitions of the church of Rome. They held the religión of 
their invaders in great abhorrence, and being at the same time 
zealously attached to their own, great numbers of them chose, 
rather than be guilty of apostacy, to abandon the fertile provinces 
which they had so long inhabited, and to fly, with their wives and 
children, to those uncultivated parts of the kingdom, where, 
amidst caves and rocks, they might maintain their religión and 
their liberty. 
The Moors, in the mean time, established their dominión iu 
Portugal, in the greater part of Castile, Murcia, Andalusia, 
Valencia, and Granada. Their kings made choice of Cordova for 
their place of residence ; and, as numerous supplies of people 
every year arrived from Africa, they soon attained such a degree 
of strength as convinced the Christians that no attempt to recover 
their possessions could pro ve effectual. 
A predatory war however was begun, within half a century 
after the conquest, and the Christians, excited and conducted by 
Pelagio, and other descendants of their ancient kings, give many 
signal proofs of heroic bravery; but their success did not fully 
correspond to their exertions, t i l l a considerable time afterwards, 
when various causes concurred to render the contest lessunequal. 
The Moors, naturally prone to ease and pleasure, had lost 
Their cha- much of that warlike spirit, which they had derived from 
racter. {¡he sanguinary genius of their religión. Their kings 
were weak men, dissolved in luxury, had been from the beginning 
extremely i l l obeyed by their viceroys. and at length these 
viceroys, on whom their kings, agreeably to the oriental maxims 
of government, devolved too great a share of their authority, 
shook off their allegiance, assumed the titles of kings themselves, 
and erected their govermnents into sepárate and independent 
states. They were often engaged in war against oach other, or 
the king of Cordova, from whom they had revolted. Their 
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strength was thereby much impaired ; and they could seldom act 
in concert against their common enemy. 
It was long before the Christians could rightly improve the 
opportunities which were thus afforded them. For they too were 
divided into several unconnected sovereignties; and, for many 
years, through misunderstandings, joined to the distance at which 
they lay from one another, they found it no lesa difficult to act in 
concert than the Moors. But, at length, several of these little 
sovereignties being united under one head *, the war was carried 
on with greater vigour than ever on the part of the Christians. 
The Mahometans were, in numberless rencounters, overpowered. 
They were expelled from many parts of the open country, of 
which they had long held possession, and liad much reason to 
apprehend that, i f they did not correct the errors in their 
govermnent, or conduct, which had occasioned their misfortunes, 
they must ero long sink under the growing power and superior 
bravery of the enemy. 
Their downfal was long retarded by the folly of the Christians, 
who, on numberless occasions, suífered equally with the Moors, 
from the want of concord. F a r from taking warning from the 
misfortunes of the Moors, they were almost continually at war 
with each other, and» often seemed to be no less intent on one 
another's destruction than on that of their common enemy. I t 
often happened that, by the conquests which they obtained over 
each other, states of a considerable magnitude were formed, the 
sovereigns of which, if they had acted wisely, must have preved an 
overmatch for the Moors. But these states were no sooner 
formed than they were again dissolved, through the pernicious 
practico adopted by the kings, of dividing their dominions among 
their children. This practice, of which there are many instances 
in the history of Spain, was, at diíferent periods, a copious source 
of animosity and discord. It preved equally pernicious to the 
people and to the families of the kings, and long rendered it 
impossible for them to make any considerable effort against the 
infidels. 
Their exertions, however, were generally much more vigorous 
and successful than these of their opponents; and before the end 
of the thirteenth century, they had acquired the kingdoms of 
Castile, Navarro, Arragon, Murcia, and Valentía. Their intes-
• Under Sancho, an. 1035. Mariana, lib. viii. 
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tine divisions still rose, at times, to the same height as formerly; 
and the Christian, as well as the Mahometan parts of Spain, 
exhibited, almost every year, some new scenes of bloodshed and 
devastation; t i l l toward the end of the fifteenth century, when, 
by the marriage of Ferdinand with Isabella, the crown of Castile 
was united to that of Arragon : an event which, while it in a 
great measure secured internal tranquillity to the Christians, 
gave them a decided superiority over their ancient enemies. 
A t this period the only Moorish kingdom which remained 
unconquered was that of Granada, which contained a great 
extent of fertile country, and several of the strongest tovvns in 
Spain. F rom the situation of some of the chief of these towns 
on the sea-coast, the Moors could easily receive assistanee from 
their friends in Africa ; and Ferdinand was on this account the 
more solicitous to deprive them of so important a pos^ession. 
This artful prince was seldom at a loss to find pretexta to 
colour his ambitious enterprises ; and the present juncture was 
the most favourable to his design which could justly be expected. 
There were two competitors, at this time, for the crown of 
Granada, Albohardill , and his nephew Boabdilla : and the whole 
kingdom was torn in pieces by the contending parties, who often 
satiated their vengeance in each other's blood. 
Ferdinand could not suffer so favourable an opportunity to 
escape : he first entered into an alliance with the nephew against 
the únele, under the cover of which he made war upon the latter, 
and expelled him from his territories; and soon afterwards, he 
turned his arms against his ally, made himself master of the city 
of Granada*, and all his other fortified places; and, although 
he still affected to treat him with respect, he soon rendered it 
necessary for him to abandon his dominions, and retire to 
Africa. 
In the prosecution of the war, Ferdinand gave proof of great 
abilities, as well as of the most consummate artífice. Notwith-
standing which, it was protracted to the unusual length of ten 
years; and, from the difficulty which he encountered in his ope-
rations against a people so much weakened by intestine divisions, 
it is probable that he would not have been able to complete their 
eubjection, if their whole forcé united had been employed in 
repelling his attacks. Their kings had, in a great measure, lost 
• A n . 1492. 
1609.] P H I L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 205 
their affection by their folly and misconduct; and, for this 
reason, they were not so reluctant, as they would otherwise have 
been, against transferring their allegiance; but they required, 
and Ferdinand judged it expedient, to grant thern such con-
ditions as they thought would put them nearly on the same 
footing with his other subjects. 
Of these conditions it was one, that they should be permitted 
the free exercise of their religión ; and for the first seven years 
after the conquest, no violence was oífered them on that account. 
Ferdinand expected, that after the abolition of their government, 
they might easily be converted to the Christian faith. But 
finding that the instructions of the ecclesiastics on this head 
were not attended with the desired effect, he resolved, notwith-
standing his engagement confirmed by an oath, rather to employ 
compulsión than any longer to indulge so great a proportion of 
his subjects in the exercise of a false religión. 
He made choice of the celebrated Ximenes, archbishop of 
Toledo, to carry his design into execution ; and for this purpose 
ordered him to repair to Granada, with full power to employ 
whatever measures he should judge to be most expedient. 
Ximenes began with caressing, and making presents to some of 
the leading raen araong the Morescoes, and thus persuaded sorae 
of them to submit to be baptized. But, making little progresa 
in this way, and his natural impatience and severity quickly 
prompting hira to have recourse to other methods more agree-
able to his disposition, he threw all such of their leaders as 
The Mores- refused to comply with his request, into prisons and 
cutedPby the dungeous, where they were treated as if they liad been 
Spaniards. guilty of the most atrocious criraes. 
The people, highly incensed against him on account of this 
violent procedure, took up arras, and having surrounded his 
palace, deraanded that their leaders raight be released. But 
having no person among them invested with authority to con-
duct their operations, they were quickly dispersed by the count 
de Tendilla, the governor of the citadel; iraraediately after 
which, Ferdinand, by the advice of Ximenes, sent judges to 
Granada, and by these judges the people were found guilty of 
rebellion against his government. It was declared by these 
judges that the whole Morescoes in Granada, though only a 
small part of them had been concerned in the insurrection, were 
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yet, on that account, Hable to be capitally punished; and the 
king was well prepared with his army to carry the sentence into 
execution. But having offered them a pardon, on condition of 
their embracing the Christian religión, upwards of fifty thousand 
of them, all citizens of the town of Granada, submitted to be 
baptized. 
The inhabitants of the country were treated with equal 
violence: for they too, upon receiving intelligence of what had 
passed in Granada, had begun to put themselves in a posture of 
defence. The count de Tendilla was ordered to march against 
them with an army of veteran troops ; and this general, in order 
to intimidate them, put all the inhabitants of one of their towns, 
men, woraen, and children, to the sword. Sti l l , however, they 
refused to lay down their arms, t i l l Ferdinand himself, at the 
head of a numerous army, having reduced all their fortified 
places, the greater part of them consented to purchase their 
lives at the expense of their religión ; and the rest, upon paying 
ten doliars each of them, as a ransom, were permitted to trans-
port themselves to Barbary. 
F rom this time, the Granada Morescoes were considered by 
the Spaniards as Christians, although it can hardly be supposed 
that any of them were sincerely converted to the Christian faith. 
They were styled the New Christians, in contradistinction from 
the Spaniards, who were called the Oíd. They were not 
admitted to the enjoyment of any office, either in the church or 
state. But when they discovered, on any occasion, an attach-
ment to Mahometism, they were treated by the inquisition as 
apostates; and great numbers of them were, every year, con-
demned by that tribunal, and committed to the ñames. 
B y this treatment, which was equally impolitical and unchris-
tian, their prejudices against the Catholic religión, and the 
Spanish government, were strengthened and confirmed. Their 
i l l humour, however, showed itself only in murmurs and com-
plaints: and the Morescoes in Granada are scarcely mentioned 
in the Spanish history, t i l l the reign of Phil ip II . , when in 
consequence of fresh oppression, having made an unsuccessful 
attempt to vindícate their liberty, most of them, as formerly 
related, were transplanted into Castile, and other inland pro-
vinces. 
It is not to be doubted that Philip would havo treated the 
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Morescoes of Valentía in the same manner as those of Granada, 
had he not been deterred by his experience of the expense and 
danger with which the reduction of the latter had been aecora-
panied. The Moorish kingdom of Valentía had been conquered 
by James L , kíng of Arragon, before the middle of the thír teenth 
century; and thís prínce had been extremely solícitous to have 
the people converted to the Christian faith. He had, for thís 
purpose, erected schools where the ecclesiastics might learn the 
Arabio; and, ín obedíence to his commands, several Dominicana 
and other friars had applied themselves to the study of that 
language, after acquiring which, they had entered on the office 
of missionaries among the Morescoes. But whether they were 
not sufficiently acquainted with the language, to be able to teach 
in it, or had not sufficient patience for so arduous a task as that 
of combating the religious prejudíces of a people noted for their 
bigotry, they soon began to represent the Morescoes as obstínate 
infidels, whom it was in vain to expect to convert by instruction. 
Even miracles, they pretended, had been wrought among them 
without success, and, therefore, compulsión was now the only 
expedient that could prove eífectual. 
A t the instigation^ of these ecclesiastics, Pope Clement, the 
fourth of that ñame, having advised the kíng to expel the Mores-
coes from his dominions if they should still refuse to be converted. 
James would readily have embraced his counsel, if he could havo 
persuaded his cortes to consent. But by the free constitution of 
the government of Arragon, to which Valentía was now annexed, 
the consent of the cortes was requisite ; and, although the clergy 
and commons were willing to gratify the kíng, yet the barons, 
who foresaw the ruin of their estates if the Morescoes, their 
vassals, were expelled, opposed the measure with such inflexible 
obstinacy, that James found it necessary to relinquish his 
design. 
From thís period, to the conquest of Granada by Ferdinand, 
The t ran almos^ ^ o hundred years had elapsed ; and, during all 
ny of King that time, the Valentía Moors had been indulged in the 
m t ó n c d ^ree exercise of their religión. But when the barons 
by f'e heard of the violence with which Ferdinand had treated 
the Moors of Granada, they dreaded an extensión of his 
tyranny to their vassals in Valen t ía ; and, ín order to prevent it, 
they required, and, though with some difficulty, obtaíned his 
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assent to a law passed in the cortes, in the year 1610, when it 
was enacted that no Moresco, within the kingdom of Valentía, 
should either be expelled from the kingdom, or compelled to 
embrace the Christian faith. 
Ñor were the barons satisfied with taking this precaution; 
but, in order to prevent the court or the ecclesiastics from 
reviving their design, in any future reign, they resolved to make 
it henceforth a part of the king's coronation oath, that, on no 
pretence whatever, he should attempt to expel the Morescoes 
from Valentía, or employ forcé to engage them to embrace the 
Chrístian religión ; that he should never attempt, dírectly or 
indirectly, to procure a dispensatíon from thís oath, ñor even 
accept of a dispensatíon, in case ít should be offered hím, 
This oath was sworn, a few years after, by Charles V . at his 
accession; and the barons seemed then to possess the utmost 
security which they could desire agaínst any future oppression 
of their vassals. But they soon experienced, how ineffectual the 
wisest precautions sometimes pro ve against the events of fortune. 
A bloody war having broken out between the commons and 
nobles of Valentía, in the year 1520, the former, actuated partly 
perhaps by religious bigotry, but princípally by revengo against 
the latter, published a manifestó, requiring all the Morescoes, 
under the penalty of death, immediately to embrace the Catholic 
religión. The nobles were, at that time, unable to afford them 
protection against their enemies; and as the Morescoes were 
themselves sufficiently acquaínted with the violent eharacter of 
the commons, they knew that it vvould be in vain to offer any 
remonstrance on the subject. Without delay, therefore, almost 
the whole of them consented to be baptized, in the hopes that, 
when tranquillity should be restored, no advantage would be 
taken by the court of this deed of theírs, which was known to be 
the effect of lawless forcé and violence. 
But no sooner were the civil commotions of the kíngdom com-
posed, than Charles, having convened an assembly of the clergy, 
to consider of the validíty of that baptísm, to which the Mores-
coes had been oblíged to submit; it was determined by this 
assembly, that although they ought not to have been compelled 
to submit to be baptized, yet the eharacter thereby impressed 
upon them was indelible, they were henceforth to be considered 
as Chrístíans, and in the case of a defection from the Catholic 
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religión, to be treated as apostates; that the ñame of God, as is 
subjoined ¡n the decree, may not be blaspheraed, ñor contempt 
brought upon the Christian profession. 
The Morescoes, conscious of a sincere attachment to the 
Mahometan faith, and being at no loss to understand, that by 
this decree it was intended they should henceforth be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the inquisition, they had no other expedient 
left to save themselves from the cruelty of that barbarous tribu-
nal, but to assert (which great numbers of them did) that they 
had not been baptised; and as, amidst the confusión of civil 
discord, no register of their baptisms had been kept, it was 
impossible in most cases to disprove their assertion. 
Of this difficulty the ecclesiastics gave information to the 
emperor; and, about the same time, a dispensation from his 
coronation oath was sent him by the pope*. Charles had 
acquired a great accession of power by his suppression of the 
late rebellion ; and the power of the nobles had suífered a pro-
portional diminution. Being no longer afraid, therefore, of any 
opposition which he might receive from the Valentia barons, and 
being delivered from his religious scruples by the pope's dispen-
sation from his oath, he firstf gave orders to the clergy to apply 
themselves to the instruction of the Morescoes in the Christian 
faith, commanding the barons to require a punctual attendance 
from their vassals, on the instructions that should be given them; 
and in the following year, he ordered all the Morescoes, who 
denied their having been formerly baptised, either immediately 
to submit to that initiatory rite, or to quit the Spanish dominions, 
under the penalty of perpetual servitude. 
The Morescoes of Pianaguazil refused to accept of this alter-
native, and had recourse to arms in their defence; but these 
men having been easily reduced to obedience, it was believed 
that, after the year 1526, there was hardly a single Moresco in 
Spain who had not submitted to the rite of baptism. 
There was no reason, however, to suppose that any considerable 
number of them were sincerely converted to the Christian faith; 
and, as it is impossible for men who act a fictitious part 
uniformly to conceal their real sentiments, the history of Spain, 
during the reign of Charles and that of his successor, is filled 
* Clement VII. Vide Gcddcs. 
t A n . 1525. 
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with complaints against them * on account of their infidelity. 
Frequent councils were held at Madrid, to consider of the proper 
means of effectuating their conversión. Orders were repeatedly 
sent from thence, requiring the clergy to exert themselves with 
greater activity in instructing them; and the inquisition every 
year exercised against great numbers of them its wonted rigour 
and severity. 
St i l l , however, it would seera that their attachraent to the 
Mahometan superstition, as well as to their ancient manners and 
customs, remained as strong as ever. 
Ñor will this appear surprising, if it is true that men are com-
monly attached to a false religión in proportion to its absurdity; 
because, not being accustomed to employ their reason on the 
subject of religión, they are incapable of being convinced by 
reason. But, besides this consideration, there were other causes 
which concurred in producing that inconquerable obstinacy which 
the Morescoes discovered in their adherence to Mahometism. 
They were proud of professing a religión, which was the religión 
of all those mighty empires that had been founded by their 
anees tors. 
They had often entertained the hopes of being rescued by 
The attach. nieuns of the Turks, and other Mahometans, from the 
Moretees*5 Spanish yoke, and could not resolve entirely to abandon 
to the Ma- a religión which they expected, sooner or later, to be at 
religión ac- Hberty to profess. Their hereditary hatred of the 
countedfor. Spaniards, which had been nourished by an uninter-
rupted course of hostilities during several centuries, had been 
riveted, since the conquest, by the severity with which they had 
been used; while their aversión to the catholic worship was 
heightened by the appearance which the use of images in that 
worship gave it of idolatry, against every species of which all 
Mahometans are actuated with the most irreconcileable aver-
sión. When to these considerations we add, how little qualified 
the Spanish ecclesiastics were to instruct them in the principies 
of Christianity, and that most of the Morescoes lived detached 
from the Spaniards in towns and villages, and distriets by them-
selves, seldom associating with any but those of their own per-
suasión, and speaking a language of which the ecclesiastics, as 
well as the people, were extremely ignorant; when all these 
• The reader will remember that the Morescoes herc spoken of, aro those of Valentía. 
1609.] P H I L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 211 
circumstances are considered, it will not be so surprising, as at 
first sight it might appear, that so small a number of tliera 
should have been converted to the Christian faith. 
It miist, at the same timé, be acknowledged, that their infi-
delity afíbrded just ground for uneasiness to the Spanish 
monarchs, who could hardly expect to gain the affections of a 
people, difléring so widely from themselves, and frora their Spa-
nish subjects, in matters regarded as the most important and 
essentiaL The most invetérate enemies of Spain had for many 
years been the Turks, and the Moors of Barbary ; and it could 
scarcely be supposed that, in the case of an invasión by these 
powers, the Morescoes would be averse to exchange their pre-
sent masters for others, whose religión, customs, and manners, 
were so nearly similar to their own. 
(xood policy, therefore, required that no pains should be 
spared, on the part of the kings of Spain, to accomplish the 
conversión of their Moresco subjects. Ñor does it appear that 
these princes were at any time neglectful of an object which 
they justly deemed so highly deserving of their attention. They 
had instituted schools, as already mentioned, for teaching the 
Arabic tongue. They had often inculcated upon the clergy, to 
whora the instruction of the Morescoes was intrusted, the neces-
sity of greater diligence in their endeavours to reclaim them. 
The royal commands on this head had, on different occasions, 
been enforced by the Román pontiffs; and, in order to engage 
men properly qualified to apply themselves to this important 
work, they had augmented the church livings in many of those 
parts of the kingdom where the Moors resided. 
These were, perhaps, the only means which the religious pre-
judices of the people, and the maxims or genius of the Spanish 
government, would permit to be employed; and if the Mores-
coes had, at the same time, been used with greater kindness, or 
even with greater lenity and forbearance, it is probable that, 
sooner or later, these means would have been attended with the 
desired success. But , besides that the faith which the Spanish 
princes had pledged to them when they submitted to their 
authority had been often violated, they had been from the 
beginning treated with every mark of jealousy and suspicion; 
they had been excluded from all the honours, and from every 
important office in the state; encouragement had been given to 
p 2 
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the most minute and malignant investigation of their prívate 
conduct; and after the power of the barons, who had long acted 
as their protectors, was reduced, they were exposed a defence-
less prey to the avarice and cruelty of the Inquisition *. 
The kings of Spain were too deeply tinctured with the 
bigotry of the Romish chureh, and their maxims of government 
too despotic, to allow them to perceive the absurdity of these 
measures, so extremely i l l calculated to promote the purpose for 
which they were designed. Charles the Fifth, hovvever, and 
Philip the Second, two princes noted for their political discern-
ment, being aware of the prejudice which the kingdom would 
sustain, if the Morescoes, who formed so great a proportion of 
their subjects, were expelled, had given no ground to suspect 
that they would ever consent to their expulsión; nor does it 
appear that the clergy, who earnestly wished that this measure 
might be embraced, ever attempted to recommend it either to 
Charles or his son. But , soon after the accession of the 
present king, they conceived the hopes of being able to accom-
plish their desire ; because both Phil ip and his minister, they 
thought, would be influenced more by religious than political 
considerations; and, in case they could be persuaded that the 
interest of religión was concerned in the expulsión, would be 
easily reconciled to the political inconveniences that might 
attend it. 
The motives which determined the ecclesiastics in their con-
duct on this occasion were not merely such as were suggested 
by religious zeal or bigotry. The obstinacy of the Morescoes in 
adhering to Mahometism had been generally ascribed to the 
remissness or negligence of those who had been employed to 
instruct them -f; and the clergy were sensible that much greater 
pains were requisito for this end than they were willing to 
bestow. Besides which, their revenues had been taxed for 
augmenting the Morescoes* vicarages, and for building and 
endowing an additional number of churches for their instruc-
tion. They were, on both these accounts, inflamed against the 
Morescoes with a peculiar hatred; and, in order that they 
might at once avoid the labour necessary for converting them, 
and the censure which they must incur in case of their declining 
* Carta de Don Pedro de Valentía, MS. No. 1. 
f B7 a brief from the pope Gregory, XIII, an. 1576. 
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it, they earnestly desired their expulsión ; and, in order to effec-
tuate it, were perpetually inveighing against them as an incur-
able race of infidels, of whose conversión, without a miraculous 
interposition of Divine Power, no hopes could justly be enter-
tained. 
Of all the ecclesiastics, the person who discovered the most 
unrelenting hatred against this unhappy people was Don John 
de Ribera, patriarch of Antioch, and archbishop of Valentía, 
an aged prelate, who was held in high veneration by his coun-
trymen for his piety and learning; and, in different histories 
of his life, published in Spain and Italy, is celebrated as one 
of the brightest ornaments that ever adorned the Christian 
Church. 
But there is nothing for which the historians ha ve been so 
liberal in his praise as the flaming zeal which he displayed in his 
unwearied exertions for the expulsión of the Morescoes, in which 
they suppose him to have been equally animated by a patriotic 
concern for the safety of Spain, and a pious solicitude for the 
preservation of the Catholic faith. 
It has been questioned, however, whether his motives were in 
reality so puré as his admirers would have us to believe; for 
there is ground to suspect, that, after the Pope, at the request 
of Philip H« imposed a new tax of between three and four 
thousand dollars yearly on the revenues of his archbishopric, for 
augmenting the salaries of the curates employed in instructing 
the Morescoes, his zeal for their expulsión became more violent 
than ever. This tax, it is said, neither he, ñor any of the 
clergy in his diocese, ever paid ; and although the king, in 
order more easily to reconcile the Morescoes to Christianity, 
had obtained from the Pope an edict of grace in their favour, 
containing a plenary pardon of all their past offences, on 
condition, that, within the space of four years, they should 
make confession to certain commissioners, to be appointed by 
Ribera and the other bishops, yet this edict was not published, 
ñor any commissioners appointed t i l l after two years and a half, 
when Philip I I I . interposed his authority for that effect. 
In defence of the archbishop^ conduct, in these instances, it 
may be alleged, that, from long experience, and many fruitless 
tnals, he believed the infidelity of the Morescoes to be incurable; 
and that he would not have thus ventured repeatedly to disobey 
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the orders of his spiritual superior, had he not known that the 
sovereign pontiff, having tlie same opinión as himself of the 
vanity of all farther attempts for their conversión, did not 
seriously desire to have his orders carried into execution. But 
whatever were the motives of this prelate's conduct, and though 
i t justly exposed him to the imputation of wishing rather to 
have the Morescoes expelled than converted, no person had 
greater influence on thk occasion with the king and his min-
isters in recommending the measure that was afterwards era-
braced. 
From the arguments which he employed in two memorials on 
Memoríais the subject, presentcd to the king, the reader wil) be 
of SplinÍng ^et*er a^e 2n^Se 0f the motives by which both he 
against the and the court of Spain were determined. In his first 
Morescoes. u ^ m o r j ^ dated in the year 1602, his principal design 
was to sound their inclination, and to awaken in them a sense of 
the danger to which the kingdom was exposed. 
" After all the pains," he said, " which had been bestowed in 
attempting to convert the Morescoes to Christianity, they were 
still as strongly as ever attached to the Mahometan superstition. 
In the kingdom of Valentía, the bishops, the rectors, and 
preachers had in vain used their most strenuous endeavours to 
persuade them to avail themselves of the Pope's edict of grace, 
which had been lately published. In reasoning with their leading 
men, it had been observed, that, as often as they were put to 
silence by the arguments employed to convince them, they 
changed colour, and were so inflamed with indignation, as 
evidently showed how much they desired to be able to employ 
forcé in defence of their opinions. They corresponded with 
those of their own sect in the most distant part of the country, 
and sent their emissaries everywhere, to encourage the people to 
persevere in their infidelity. They all spoke with one mouth, 
and had the same answer to return to their instructors, that 
they were already Christians; that they had already confessed 
all the sins of which they were conscious, to their respective 
priests; and that, being occupied with their proper business, 
they had not leisure to attend to the conduct of others, and 
therefore knew not of any persons who practised the rites of the 
Mahometan religión. They had often been convicted of falsehood; 
but on these occasions they were eithcr silent, or they repeated 
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the same reply to the questions that were put to them. Since 
the publioation of the edict of grace, they had celebrated the 
festivals of their religión with greater solemnity than before; 
and, with much effrontery, had caroused together, on receiving 
intelligence of the unsuccessful issue of the expedition of his 
majesty's forces against Algiers. 
" From this conduct of the Morescoes," continued Ribera, 
" which I have represented with my wonted impartial regard to 
truth, two important consequences follow, which require your 
majesty's most serious attention. 
" The first is, that the bishops, and other pastora of the 
chureh, are laid under the painful necessity of doing what many 
learned doctors of the church think unlawful, the administering 
of the sacrament of baptism to those who they know will , sooner 
Or later, become apostates from the faith ; for there is a moral 
certainty that every Moresco child, whom we baptize, will, 
through the example and instruction of his Mahometan parents, 
become himself a Mahometan. A n d this we are taught to 
expect, not only by reason and experience, but by the Spirit of 
God, who, in speaking of the infidelity of Rehoboam, makes 
twice mention, in one chapter, that he was the son of Naama, a 
Gentile; which is equivalent to declaring that to be the child of 
a mother who is an infidel, and to be educated by her, is a cer-
tain means of making the child an infidel. 
" In baptizing the Moresco children, therefore, our consciences 
are greatly disturbed with the apprehension that we are guilty 
of violating the commandment of our Lord Jesús Christ, who 
has prohibited the giying of holy things to dogs, and the cast-
ing of pearls before swine. 
" Ñor is this the only unhappy consequence arising from the 
incurable infidelity of the Morescoes. But the kingdom of Spain 
is therefore exposed to the greatest risk of becoming an easy 
prey to the hostile designs of our enemies. This kingdom was 
ruined in former times by the intrigues of a single person, count 
Julian, at whose instigation it was invaded and subdued by the 
Saracens, when they had no friends within the kingdom to 
second their attempt. A n d from thence may be perceived how 
great occasion there is for the most disquieting apprehensions at 
this time, when there are established in the kingdom ninety 
thousand men fit to carry arms, and all of them actuated with 
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the most irreconcileable aversión to the present government. 
The Turks and Moors are the most invetérate enemies of Spain, 
because she is the principal bulwark of Christendom; the 
French, from jealousy, or envy of her greatness; and the Eng-
lish, on account of her zeal for maintaining the purity of the 
Catholic faith. Is there not just ground to dread that these 
our foreign enemies, allured by the hopes of assistance from 
those whom we nourish in our bosom, shall unite their forces, 
and undertake the subversión of the monarchy? Especially 
when it is considered that, with the powerful assistance they 
would receive from the Morescoes, a small number of troops 
would be sufficient, and no extraordinary preparations or ex-
pense required. 
" The Morescoes, in Granada alone, had withstood the whole 
forcé which the late king could muster against them, although, 
besides his Spanish troops, he brought into Spain a numerous 
reinforcement of Germana and Italians. But, i f all the Mores-
coes in the diíferent parts of the kingdom were to take arms, 
which it is unquestionable they would do, if either the Turks, or 
French, or English were to attempt an invasión, our condition 
would then be the most deplorable and desperate, and, like our 
ancestors, we must resolve either to yield our necks to the yoke 
of conquerors, or to take shelter, as they did, among the rocks 
and mountains of Asturia. 
" A s often as I have reflected on the imminent danger to 
which this mighty monarchy stands exposed, I have thought it 
unaccountable that, during the long reigns of two such wise 
and powerful monarchs as the emperor and the late king, no 
sufficient security against it was provided. Ñor can I account 
for their negligence in this respect, but on the supposition that 
God, who rules the hearts of kings, thought fit to reserve this 
important work, so worthy of your royal breast, on purpose to 
adorn the annals of your pious reign; as he reserved the 
deliverance of his chosen people for Moses, their entrance into 
the promised land for Joshua, the conquest of the Philistines 
for David, and the inflicting of vengeance on the Amalekites 
for Saúl. 
" Either this has been his intention, or he hath so long 
prevented the Spanish monarchs from perceiving the necessity 
of delivering Spain from so great a danger, that, by means of 
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the Morescoes, he may punish us for our sins. But, in my 
opinión, one of the greatest of these is the permitting of so 
great a number of invetérate enemies of the church and state 
for so many years to retain their power of doing mischief; ñor 
is it reasonable to expect success in foreign enterprises, t i l l the 
kingdom shall be purged of its domestic foes. 
" In the year ] 588, when the great Armada was destroyed, 
I was emboldened, by my zeal for the interest of religión and my 
country, to represent to your royal father, that, after having 
long and carefully enquired why it had pleased God to permit 
so great a calamity to befall us, I was persuaded that H e 
intended thereby to instruct the king, that, t i l l he had extir-
pated heresy from his own dominions, he ought not to have 
suffered his attention to be diverted by anything that passed in 
foreign states. A n d , in like manner, confiding in your majesty's 
clemency for forgiveness of the liberty which I take, I must 
declare that, after the most mature consideration, it appears 
to me, that no other account but this can be given of the late 
failure of your expedition against Algiers, in which there was 
nothing omitted which human prudence could suggest to insure 
success. 
" It is the will of Heaven, that your majesty should first 
próvido for the safety and tranquillity of your own dominions; 
and, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary that your 
domestic enemies, those apostates from the faith, who are 
equally enemies to the state and to our most holy religión, 
should be deprived of the power of disturbing your repose. 
No object surely can be more deeply interesting; and, there-
fore, I trust, I shall be pardoned for presuming, with due 
humility, to exhort your majesty to require your ministers, 
without delay, to apply themselves to the consideration of it, 
with all that serious attention which it so highly deserves, 
excluding from all the comiséis which shall be held for that 
purpose, all those persons whose private interest may hinder 
them from perceiving what is conducive to the public good 
This memorial was most graciously received by the king and 
the duke of Lerma, both of whom wrote letters of thanks to the 
patriarch for the wholesome counsel which it contained, and 
required him to give them his opinión with regard to the proper 
• Vida do Kibcra. 
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means of obviating that imminent danger, to which it appeared, 
from his memorial, the kingdom was exposed. In compliance 
with this request, and emboldened by the confidence reposed in 
him, Ribera soon after presented another memorial, of which 
the purport was, partly to persuade Philip that no other means 
could prove effectual but the utter extirpation of the Morescoes; 
and partly to take off the forcé of such objections, as either 
religión or humanity might suggest, to deter him from having 
recourse to this expedient. 
In sacred writ, he said, there was no precept so often repeated 
to the chosen people of Grod, as that of rooting out from among 
them those infidel nations whom they found in possession of the 
promised land. A strict obedience to this precept was particu-
larly inculcated on the kings and rulers of the people; and the 
first king, whom God himself had appointed to rule over them, 
incurred the divine displeasure, and was deprived of his kingdom, 
merely on account of his disobedience. The pernicious conse-
quences of permitting the Morescoes to remain in Castile and 
Arragon were the same as those which the children of Israel 
experienced from their communication with the idolatrous 
heathens; for the faithful in Spain were in equal danger from 
the infection of their example, and the extirpation of these infidels 
was therefore equally incumbent on the catholic king, as that of 
the heathens on the kings and captains of the Jews. 
In following the example of David, and other good kings of 
Israel, Philip would likewise imítate the conduct of some of the 
best and greatest of his predecessors; by whom the Jews had, at 
different periods, been expelled from Spain, though their provo-
cations had never been so great as those of the Morescoes; for 
the Jews were not heretics and apostates as they were, and were 
never accused of holding correspondence with the enemies of the 
state. 
H i s illustrious grandfather Charles V . , the wisest and greatest 
prince of the age in which he lived, had published an edict, 
requiring the Morescoes either to submit to be baptized, or to 
depart from Spain; expecting that by submitting to be baptized 
they would become both Christians and friends. It now appeared 
how much he was mistaken in this exgectation; but, from the 
tenor of his edict, it was manifest how much he thought it his 
duty, and how necessary he believed it for the safety and 
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prosperity of his people, to extírpate infidels from his do-
minions. 
The pernicious effects of tolerating apostates from the faith, 
had been severely felt by the French monarchs, whose kingdom 
had thereby been reduced to the lowest ebb, and their Catholic 
subjects exposed, for almost half a century, to all the miseries of 
civil war ; whereas, i f they had acted conformably to the measures 
of the church, and either put to death their heretical subjects, or 
expelled them from the kingdom, all those unhappy consequences 
might ha ve been prevented, and the purity of the faith preserved. 
The temporal as well as the spiritual interest of the king's 
catholic and loyal subjects, required that the Morescoes should 
be expelled ; because, if they were not, there was much ground to 
apprehend they would ere long become masters of all the riches 
in the kingdom. They were not only industrious, but frugal afid 
parsimonious to excess. They could labour for much lower 
wages, and were satisfied with much smaller profits in trade, than 
were requisito for the subsistence of the Spaniards; great numbers 
of whom were thus excluded both from trade and labour, and 
thereby reduced to indigence. The Spanish villages, all over 
Castile and Andalusia, had fallen into decay ; while those of the 
Morescoes increased and flourished; and the Spanish farmers 
were unable to pay their rents, though they cultivated the most 
fertile parts of the country; while the Morescoes, who generally 
lived in the most barren parts, after paying the third part of their 
crops to the proprietors of their farms, were not only able to 
support themselves and their families, but annually to inorease 
their stock. 
In consequence of this, their number had of late been greatly 
augmented ; and there was ground to dread that, i f some remedy 
were not speedily applied, the natives would in a few years be 
outnumbered and overpowered. But no remedy whatever, he 
believed, would be found effectual, while the Morescoes were 
permitted to continué within the kingdom. The king's humanity, 
he supposed, would revolt at the thoughts of putting so many 
hundred thousands to the sword, and therefore the only expedient 
which remained, was to transport them into foreign parts. 
He did not however think it advisable to expel them all at once; 
for, as those of Valentía livcd in a great measure detached from 
the Christians, in villages and districts by themselves, there was 
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little danger from the infection of their example; besides that, 
the Moors of those parts practised various useful arts, which were 
unknown to the Christians, but were extremely necessary for the 
comfort and convenience of life. If all these Moors were to be 
at once expelled, those arts would be entirely lost, and a great 
part of the country would become waste and desoíate. But 
although for these reasons it might be judged expedient to delay 
their expulsión, they ought, in the mean time, to be loaded with 
taxes' for the maintenance of an army, sufficient to prevent any 
prejudice that might arise from permitting them to remain ; their 
numbers ought, as quickly as possible, to be diminished, by 
sending annually some thousands of their young men to the galleys 
and the mines, and Christians, acquainted with their arts, ought 
gradually to be substituted in their room. 
But a different course, he thought, ought to be pursued with 
regard to the Morescoes in the other provinces, who were, on 
many accounts, much more formidable than those of Arragon and 
Valentía, They had everywhere intermixed with the Christians; 
their example was consequently more infectious ; and the churches 
and altars were profaned by their hypocritical and mock compli-
ances with the holy rites of the true religión. They spoke the 
Castilian language; their minds were more cultivated and 
improved ; they were better acquainted with the state of Spain, 
and much more capable of giving dangerous intelligence to her 
enemies ; besides which, great numbers of them, having served in 
the royal array, were thereby not only qualified to act as spies, 
but to afford assistance to the enemy, in the case of an invasión 
or attack, or to any foreign enemy, by whom the kingdom should 
be attacked. 
B y these considerations he was induced to believe that the 
preservation of the kingdom, as well as the interest of religión, 
required that all the Morescoes in Spain, those of Arragon and 
Valentía excepted, should be instantly expelled. They were all 
to be considered as obstínate heretics, or as apostates from the 
faith, whom the king, i f he thought fit, might justly punish with 
death; and there could be no room therefore to doubt of the 
lawfulness of transporting them to foreign countries, which was 
the mildest punishment that, consistently with the safety of his 
kingdom, he could inflict. 
Their children, under seven years of age, might be detained, 
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in order to be educated in the Christian faith; and the king 
might, without any scruple of conscience, compel any number of 
those who were grown up, to serve on board his galleys, or in the 
mines of Amer ica ; while, for the benefit of his exchequer, he 
might sell the rest for slaves to his Christian subjects in Spain 
and Italy. It could not be unjust to punish men in this manner, 
who by their crimes had forfeited their lives ; and if it was just 
to punish them either with slavery or death, the simply expelling 
them frora Spain, and transporting them to other countries, 
where their own religión was professed, could not be considered 
in any other light than as an act of clemency and mercy on the 
part of the king. 
It might be difficult, he acknowledged, to effectuate their 
expulsión, without endangering the internal peace of the kingdom; 
but God, he trusted, would enlighten the minds of the king's 
ministers, and enable them to discern the most proper means of 
carrying so laudable a design into execution; for, as the counsel 
he had oífered was equally dictated by his regard to the spiritual 
and to the temporal interest of the kingdom, he could not doubt 
that it was acceptable to G o d ; and when he reflected on his 
great age, his natural temper and disposition, and the habits 
which he had long indulged of a retired and sequestered life, he 
could hardly suppose that the zeal and resolution with which he 
felt himself inspired in his address to the king, on the present 
occasion, could proceed from any other cause but the secret and 
all-powerful influence of the spirit of God upon his mind*. 
The reasoning in this memorial was admirably fitted to make 
impression on the superstitious and timid temper of the king ; ñor 
was its efficacy lessened by the patriarcas vain pretensión to 
The effectof ^^116 íHumination. But although both Philip's religious 
thereason- scruples, and his apprehensions of impending danger, 
ra^the* were easüy excited, his natural disposition, which was 
mind of the gentle and humane, rendered him extremely averse to a 
king' measure feo replete with cruelty, as that which Ribera 
had exhorted him to adopt. H e could not, therefore, resolve to 
comply with the counsel that was given him, and his irresolution 
was increased by a memorial which was soon afterwards presented 
to him by the barons of Valentía. 
They had received intelligence frora some of their friends at 
* Vida de Ribera, p. 388. Por Escriva. 
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court of the patriarch^ two memorials. They knew that he had 
advised the king to permit their vassals to remain for sorae time 
longer, which they ascribed to his dread of their resentment; but 
they believed that the expulsión of the other Morescoes, would 
be quickly followed by that of those of Valentía, and for this 
reason they were equally alarmed as if he had counselled the 
whole to be expelled. 
In order to deter the king from listening to his proposal, they 
unanimously remonstrated against the expulsión, as a measure 
that would be attended with the most pernicious consequences; 
for the Morescoes were not only a frugal, températe, and 
Remon- industrious race of men, but they were the most skilful 
etrance of farmers, and the most ingenious manufacturers in Spain. 
of Valentía There were several manufactures, equally necessary for 
agamst the jnternal consumption and foreisrn trade, with which they 
expulsión of r , 0 , . . ^ 
the Mores- alone were acquainted; and without their skill and 
labour, it was an unquestionable fact, that a great 
partofthekingdom would lie waste, and innumerable families of 
the highest rank, who entirely depended on the rents of their 
lands, be reduced to indigence. 
It had been affirmed that they were all Mahometans, but no 
sufficient evidence had been produced to pro ve the truth of this 
assertion. They had all been regularly initiated, by baptism, 
into the Christian church; they all professed themselves to be 
Christians ; and although many of them, perhaps, were not able 
to give a satisfactory account of the doctrines of the Christian 
faith, yet the same thing might be said of innumerable other 
Christians of the lower rank besides the Morescoes. 
But i f many of them were in reality ignorant or unbelieving, 
this could not justly be imputed to them, so much as to those to 
whom their instruction had been committed. Sufficient pains to 
instruct them, and proper methods of dealing with them, had 
seldom been employed. They had, at first, been dragged into 
the church by forcé and violence, and had afterwards been treated 
with inhumanity; as i f bitter invectives, corporal punishments, 
and the confiscation of their effects, were the proper means of 
enlightening their understandings with the knowledge of the 
truth ! In order to engage them to listen to instruction, it was 
necessary that their instructors should study to conciliate their 
affections. This end could be obtained only by gentleness and 
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forbearance : and if the king would be pleased to take effectual 
care to prevent them from being treated more like brutes than 
men, and still more, if, as a reward for their relinquishing the 
Mahometan superstition, he would grant them accessto the same 
immúnities and privileges that were enjoyed by his other subjects, 
there would be no ground to despair of their conversión. 
They had been accused of holding a treasonable correspondence 
with the enemies of the state; but ought a vague and general 
assertion to be held as a sufficient evidence of their guilt ? was not 
this crime of such a nature, that it must necessarily be confined 
to a few ? ought the guilt of a few to be imputed to so great 
a number? ought even the few who had been guilty, to be con-
demned without a hearing, without a trial, and without the 
smallest evidence ? 
This imputation had been often cast upon the Morescoes by 
speculative and sequestered men, who had no access to know the 
truth of their assertion, but were prompted by their zeal and 
prejudices to believe it. It had always been disregarded by the 
wisest of the king's predecessors; and justice, they hoped, would 
determine the king to imítate so laudable an example, t i l l some 
proof or evidence was adduced.—This remonstrance, which the 
barons presented in a cortes or parliament held in theyear 1604, 
j t was not altogether without eífect. In compliance with 
the intention of it, Philip resolved to delay the expulsión 
of the Morescoes for some years longer, and, in the mean time, 
to make a further trial, whether it was possible to effectuate their 
conversión to the faith; and for this purpose, he procured a brief 
Paul v from the pope, imposing a tax on the ecclesiastical 
revenues, a part of which he was authorised to employ 
in building and endowing a Moresco college ; and in order to 
induce men of abilities to accept of curacies among the Morescoes, 
he was empowered, from the same fund, to augment the salaries 
of the curatos. 
But no greater regard it would seem was paid to this than to 
the other brief above mentioned. The college was not endowed, 
and the church livings remained the same as before : from whence 
there was but too much ground for the suspicion which was 
entertained, that the king had neither been able to interest the 
pope ñor the Spanish ecclesiastics in the execution of his plan. 
The latter laboured assiduously to convince both the pope and 
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the king, that everything already had been done for the conversión 
of the Morescoes that was in the power of man to perform. The 
archbishop of Valentía presented a third memorial to the king, 
containing, as he pretended, a full reply to what had been asserted 
by the barons, but consisting principally, either of invectives 
against the Morescoes, or of denunciations of divine judgments, 
which must, ere long, overtake the kingdom, i f they were not 
speedily expelled*. 
Ribera was powerfully seconded by several other ecclesiastics, 
and particularly by Bleda, a Dominican friar, distinguished for 
his acquaintance with the learning of his time, and equally noted 
for his activity, his zeal, and bigotry; who composed several 
bitter invectives against the Morescoes, and, dividing his time 
between Rome and Madrid , employed all his eloquence to 
persuade the pontiff and the king of the necessity of their 
expulsion. 
; Bu t the archbishop's most powerful associate was Don Ber-
nardo de Roias y Sandoval, brother to the duke of Lerma, who 
was the cardinal-archbishop of Toledo, inquisitor-general and 
chancellor of Spain. This prelate approved and seconded every 
part of Ribera's memorials, except where he advised the king to 
retain such of the Moresco children as were under seven years of 
age, and to suffer the Morescoes in Valentía to remain t i l l their 
place could be supplied by Chrís t ians; for í t was more advisable, 
this cardinal maintained, to put them all, men, women, and 
children, to the sword, than to have the Spanish blood contami-
nated, as it would be, i f either of these exceptions were admitted 
by a mixture of the polluted blood of infídels. 
The duke of Lerma, who, from the beginning of his adminis-
tration, had studied, with great assiduity and solicitude, to 
ingratiate himself with the court of Rome and the Spanish 
ecclesiastics, readily espoused his brother's sentiments; and, as 
the duke was at this time in unrivalled and full possession of the 
royal favour, nothing now was wanting to fix the resolution of 
the k ingf . 
* Some prodigies are recorded by Ribera in bit Memorial, and by otber writers, as clear 
and certain indications of tbe will of Heaven on the present occ i s ión: sucb as tbat the 
church bell of Villila rung of itself for scveral days, &c. But it dees not appear •whether 
arguments of this kind were despised or regarded by the king. 
f Fonseca, Traycion de Morescos, p. 196. 
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It was accordingly resolved, that all the Morescoes in Spain, 
Expulsión ^ose ^n Valentía as well as those in the other provinces, 
of the Mo- should be expelled. The cardinal-archbishop went him-
rescoes. ¿gjf ^0 jtome? with the design, it is believed, to persuade 
the sovereign pontiff to grant his sanction to the expulsión by 
some public deed : but, i f this was the intention of his journey, 
it did not produce the desired effect. The pontiff, probably, 
chose that the odium which must attend a measure so barbarous 
and so unprecedented, should rather fall on the court of Spain 
than on the holy see; and, therefore, we do not read of any 
other papal bull or brief published on the present occasion, but 
one addressed to the bishops of Valentia, commanding them to 
assemble together, in order to consider whether any method of 
converting the Morescoes could be devised. This bull was dated 
in the year 1606, a few months before the cardinal-primate set 
out for Rome, but was not published t i l l after his return, in 
1608. I t was published in the month of A p r i l of that year ; and, 
in compliance with it, the bishops soon after met together, and 
spent several months in deliberating on the subject. But, as i f 
the design of their meeting had been to condemn the Morescoes, 
and not to consider of the means of converting them, they at 
length pronounced the following sentence; " That the Mores-
coes of the kingdom of Valentia were all apostates from the 
Christian faith, and were, besides, so obstinate and inflexible in 
their infidelity, that, whatever means should be employed, no 
hopes could justly be entertained of their conversión.''1 
This sentence, having been transmitted to the court, contri-
Birda, p. buted to confirm the king in the resolution which he 
503- had formed. It was agreed, however, that the expulsión 
should be deferred t i l l a more convenient season ; and that, in 
the mean time, the strictest secrecy should be observed. It was 
judged necessary to keep the design secret, lest the Morescoes 
should, either of themselves, or instigated by the barons, have 
recourse to arms; and, as no court was ever more distinguished 
for maintaining the most inviolable secrecy in its counsels than 
that of Spain, it would seem that no suspicion was entertained, 
either by the Morescoes or barons, of the king's determination 
in a matter wherein they were so deeply interested, t i l l every 
necessary preparation was made for carrying it into execution. 
The court having determined to begin with the expulsión of 
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the Valentian Morescoes, orders were secretly given to the naval 
coraraanders in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, to receivo a certain 
number of troops on board their ships, and to rendezvous, in 
August, 1609, at Alicant, Denia, and other sea-ports in the 
Mediterranean, on the coast of Valentía. About the same time, 
Don Augustin Mexia, an old experienced officer, governor of 
Antwerp, was sent to the city of Valentía to concert wíth the 
víceroy, the marquis of Cararena, and others, concemíng the 
measures necessary to be taken withín the kingdom to prevent a 
tumult or ínsurrectíon, The pretext employed for assemblíng 
the fleet was an expeditíon against the Moors ín Barbary. But 
the barons, observíng that frequent conferences were held, by 
níght and by day, at the víceroy's, wíth regard to the subject of 
which they were kept entirely ín the dark, and being informed 
that the archbíshop, (who assísted at these conferences,) as íf he 
expected to be besíeged, had conveyed ínto hís palace an extra-
ordínary quantíty of provísíons, besides some troops and arms, 
they soon came to suspect what was the real purpose of the 
naval armament; and havíng, conformably to a prívílege whích 
belonged to them by the constítutíon of Valentía, summoned one 
of those assemblíes of theír own number, termed the Mílítary 
Arms, they sent deputies to the víceroy, requestíng hím to 
acquaínt them wíth the desígn of the present preparat íons. To 
thís inquíry, the víceroy, wíthout pretendíng ignorance of the 
kíng's intentíon, replíed, that, whatever ít was, the barons might 
rest assured that no resolutíon could be formed, eíther by the 
kíng, who had ever regarded them as hís most faíthful vassals, or 
by the duke of Lerma, theír countryman, whose estates were 
intermíngled wíth theírs, whích ín the íssue would not be found 
conducive to the true interest of Valentía. 
B y thís answer the barons were confirmed in theír suspicions; 
and, as they could not but suppose that the víceroy would have 
chosen, had ít been ín hís power, to díspel theír apprehensíons, 
they could no longer doubt that the object of all the preparatíons 
whích had been made was the expulsión of theír vassals. They 
instantly convened agaín, and drew up a remonstrance to be 
presented to the k íng ; of whích the purport was, that Valentía 
would be entirely ruined íf the Morescoes, by whom most of the 
work ín that kingdom was carried on, were expelled. 
A t the desire of the víceroy, who dreaded that thís step might 
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give an alarm to the Morescoes, the justiza, or chief justice in 
criminal matters, having attempted in vain to divert them from 
their purpose, was so violently agitated with grief and rage, that 
he dropped down dead in the assembly. This accident prevented 
thera from coming to an immediate decisión ; but next morning 
they had another meeting, in which they appointed deputies to 
carry their remonstrance to the king. 
It was expressed in the strongest terms, dictated by a deep 
Remon- conviction of the melancholy truth which it contained ; 
th^ baron^ ^ ^6?11^8' though received by the king and his 
of Valentía minister with rnuch distinction and respect, were told, 
e^uhionof k ing^ resolution, having been formed after the 
the Moors. most maturo deliberation, was unalterable; that the 
barons had been too late in presenting their petition ; and that 
the edict of expulsión was already published. 
A strong body of Castilian troops had actually entered 
Valentia about the time of the arrival of the deputies at 
Madr id ; and the Morescoes were now acquainted with their 
fate. 
In the edict of expulsión, which was published with the usual 
formalities, by the viceroy, in the beginning of September, 1609, 
they were all commanded, men, women, and children, under the 
penalty of death, to be ready within three days to repair to the 
seaports appointed for their embarkation, and there to go on 
board of ships prepared for carrying them into foreign parts. 
It was ordained, under the same penalty, that they should all 
remain in the places where they were, at the time of publishing 
the edict, t i l l the coramissaries appointed to conduct them to the 
sea-coast should arrive; that if any of them should, before the 
arrival of the commissaries, presume to chango the place of their 
abode, they might be carried by any person before a judge ; and, 
in case they should make resistance, might instantly be put to 
death. 
It was enacted, that all their effects should belong to the lords 
whose vassals they were, except such as they could carry along 
with them; and, that in case they should conceal or destroy any 
part of their effects, they should be punished with death. 
For the preservation of the sugar-works, granaries of rice, 
drains or aqueducts, and in order that the Christian inhabitants 
might be instructed in the works and manufactures which had 
Q 2 
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hitherto been carried on by the Morescoes, it was declared that 
six families, to be named by the barons, out of every hundred, 
might remain. 
It was ordained, that all children nnder four years of age 
might remain, provided their parents or guardians should 
consent; that children under six or seven, one of whose parents 
was an oíd Christian, might remain, and the mothers with thera, 
though they were Morescoes; but i f the fathers were Morescoes, 
and the mothers Christians, that the fathers should be expelled, 
while the children might remain with their mothers; that all 
such of the Morescoes might remain, who, for any considerable 
time, had demeaned themselves as Christians, who could produce 
certificates from the parish priests of their having received the 
sacrament, by permission of their respective bishops, or who 
had not for two years attended any of the Moresco religious 
meetings. 
They were all permitted to depart into any country, not 
subject to the crown of Spain, provided they should leave the 
kingdom within the time specified ; and an assurance was given 
them, that no violence xyr injury should be offered them, by those 
who should be employed in transporting them to Barbary, or any 
other country they should make cholee of*. 
The several concessions contained in this edict were considered 
by the ecclesiastics and the court of Spain as proofs of extra-
ordinary elemeney on the part of the king ; but they could not 
be regarded in the same light by the Morescoes. They were 
equally overwhelmed with astonishment, and with anguish and 
distress. They were surrounded with enemies on every hand. 
The king, they perceived, though they had been taught to 
believe his distinguighing character to be gentleness and merey, 
was their irreconcileable and mortal enemy; and their hearts 
sank within them, when they reflected on the misery which they 
were doomed to undergo. They were not only disquieted with 
so near a prospect of the loss of their most valuable possessions, 
joined to that of perpetual banishment from their nativo coun-
try ; but they violently dreaded that they were all to be 
butehered as soon as they were put on board the ships 
appointed for transporting them to foreign parts-f. They had 
never had any friends to whom they could look for assistance, 
* Fon?eca, lib. iv. cap. 3 . f Ibid. cap. 8. 
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except their patrons the barons, whose interest was inseparably 
linked with theirs; but the barons, they knew, were unable to 
afford them protection on the present oecasion, and all the good 
offices which they had interposed in their behalf had been with-
out avail. They had little reason, therefore, to expect that 
anything which they themselves could do to avert the impending 
storm would prove effectual. Thafc nothing, however, in their 
power might be omitted, their leading men, having met together 
privately in the city of Valentia, drew up a petition, and sent a 
deputation of their number to present it to the viceroy; in 
which, after solemnly asserting their innocence of the crimes 
imputed to them in the edict, they offered, in case the king 
would be persuaded to recall it, to maintain a certain number of 
galleys for the protection of the coast against the corsairs; to 
build several new forts, and to support the garrisons not only of 
these, but of such as were already bu i l t ; to redeem all the 
Christians of Valentia who should ever be taken captivos by the 
Moors; and, besides, to furnish the king with a considerable 
sum of money*. But the viceroy, though he was himself 
extreinely averse to the expulsión, without taking time to 
delibérate on their proposals, immediately replied, that there 
was now no room left for any petition or remonstrance; that 
the king was unalterably determined to put bis edict into execu-
tion, and they must instantly prepare themselves, however 
reluctant, to submit-f". 
When this answer was reported by the delegates to the 
assembly in Valentia, their minds were variously agitated with 
grief, despair, and indignation. It was proposed by some of 
them that they should instantly have recourse to arms; for it 
was better, they maintained, to die fighting like men for their 
property and lives, than tamely to suífer themselves to be stripped 
of their possessions, and afterwards, perhaps, to be butchered 
like sheep, by an implacable and cruel enemy, to whom they 
had never given any just oecasion of offence; besides, that it 
might not be impossible for them to defend themselves in the 
mountainous parts of the country, t i l l some foreign power, 
friendly to them, and hostile to the Spaniards, should come to 
their relief. But this proposal was rejected as d espérate and 
* MSS. of Cottington's letters in Lord Hardwicke's possession. Mad. 8th Oct. 160y, 
t Fonseca, lib. iv. cap. 7. 
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impracticable, by agreat majorityoftheassembly; who represented 
that, as they were not provided either with arma or military 
stores, had no practico in war, and had been utterly unaccus-
tomed to military discipline, it was impossible they could hold 
out for many weeks against so potent an enemy. The Spanish 
regular forces, under the most experienced officers, were already 
distributed all over the country, and were everywhere prepared 
to attack them on the first appearance of opposition or resist-
ance. No time would be allowed them to put themselves inte a 
posture of defence. They would instantly be either cut to 
pieces, or reduced to slavery; and an opportunity would be thus 
afforded to the Spaniards of gratifying at once, still more than 
by their expulsión, their avarice and their cruelty. It could 
not be supposed that the king would have incurred the expense, 
which his preparations for exporting them must have cost him, 
had he intended to destroy them on their passage, since he 
could have done it more easily without incurring so great an 
expense; besides, that so useless and so wanton a piece of 
treachery would cover his ñame with indelible disgrace. They 
might with confidence therefore expect to be safely conveyed to 
Barbary, and this was surely preferable either to death or to 
slavery in Spain. But while, for these reasons, al l thoughts-of 
resistance ought to be laid aside, they ought not to accept of 
either of the two offers that were made to them in the edict of 
expulsión. Neither their children under age, ñor the six 
families out of every hundred who were permitted to remain, 
ought to be left behind. The Spaniards intended, by these 
concessions, to serve themselves, and not the Morescoes; and 
the latter should, for that reason, unanimously resolve to reject 
them with disdain. 
This resolution was warmly embraced by the whole assembly; 
Tlie Mores- and not by them only, but by all the other Morescoes 
írdefcnd^ in ti16 kingdom of Valentia, except those who, inhabit-
thciuseives- ing certain mountainous parts of the country which 
they deemed impregnable, formed the desperate resolution of 
maintaining their possessions by forcé of arms. Before the 
meeting at Valentia, great numbers of those who lived in towns, 
and in the more fertile parts of the country, had. earnestly 
solicited the barons to procure them to be named among the 
families who were to be permitted to remain; but no sooncr 
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were they raade acquainted with the determination of their 
leaders, than, with one heart and one voice, they declared that 
no consideration should now induce them to stay behind their 
kinsmen and companions. 
This declaration was a matter of deep concern to the barons, 
who had, in some measure, been reconciled to the expulsión by 
the promise which had been given for six families out of every 
hundred to remain, and now dreaded the utter ruin of their 
estates, i f the Morescoes should persevere in their present 
resolution. Of all the barons the duke of Gandia was likely to 
prove the greatest sufferer, as his estates chiefly consisted of 
those manufactures with which the Morescoes alone were 
acquainted. B y employing all his influence with them, and 
making them the most advantageous offers, he at length ob-
tained their consent, on condition that they should be allowed 
the free exercise of their religión. The duke solicited the 
viceroy to grant them this indulgence, t i l l the Christians should 
be instructed in the manufactures, which would not require 
more than two or three years at most; but was told by the 
viceroy, that, agreeably to his orders from the king, it could 
not be granted for a single day*. This answer being commu-
nicated to the Morescoes, there was not one person of more 
than a hundred and fifty thousand who could be persuaded to 
remain. 
Ñor were they less inflexible in refusing to leave their children 
behind them that were under six years of age. They were well 
aware, as they said to the ecclesiastics who applied to them on 
this head, of the great inconveniences and dangers to which 
so many thousand children, with their mothers and nurses, none 
of whom had ever been at sea, must be exposed from being 
crowded together on board the ships and galleys ; but they were 
unalterably determined to carry them along with them to what-
ever part of the world they themselves should go, and chose 
rather to see them perish before their eyes than to leave them in 
the hands of a people by whoiji their parents had been treated 
with so much cruelty f . 
* The viceroy rcceived a letter of thanks from Philip on this occasion, beginning thus : 
Yo os aggradeseo mucho lo que respondiste», y el parecer que days, que no por una hora si 
consienta que es muy conforme a lo que de vueatra mucha Christianidad, se podia esperar, 
&c. Fonscca, lib, iv. cap, 8. 
t The ecclesiastics, howcvcr, and somc religious women of rank, detaiued a considerable 
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The army having been distributed into the several stations, 
where they might most effectually prevent any disturbance or 
insurrection, and the ships of war and transporta fully equipped 
for their intended voyage, the viceroy, without any farther delay, 
began to carry the royal edict into execution, by sending com-
missioners, with a sufficient body of troops, to collect the 
Morescoes in different quarters together, and to conduct them to 
the coast. The vassals of the duke of Gandía, amounting to 
more than twenty thousand men, were the first who embarked, 
and, after a prosperous voyage, they were safely landed at Oran, 
a Spanish fortress on the coast of Barbary. 
A t Oran they were well received by the eount of Aguilar, the 
governor of the fort, and, on his application to the viceroy of 
Tremezen, which stands at the distance of two days'' journey from 
Oran, leave was granted them to come to take up their residence 
in the former of these places. In their joumey thither they were 
deeply affected, and few of them could restrain their tears, when 
they compared the desert barren plains, through which they 
passed, with the fertile and delightful regions of Valentía. It 
afforded them, however, no small consolatíon ín theír distress to 
reflect that, as the dread which they had entertained of being 
murdered by the way had preved groundless, they had now found 
a prince of their own religión, disposed to grant them his 
protection. Upon their arrival at Tremezen, they were suffered 
to retain all their wealth which they had brought along with 
them, and admitted to all the same liberties and privileges as the 
natives of the place. 
A n account of the treatment which they received having been 
carried to Spain, by ten persons who were suffered to return for 
that purpose, it contributed, in some measure, to reconcile the 
other Moreseoes in Valentía to their fate; and, as the winter 
season was fast approaching, when they must encounter greater 
difficulties in theír passage, they even díscovered a degroe of 
impatience to be permitted to embark *. 
No time was unnecessaríly lost on the part of the víceroy. 
number of the children, partly by stealtb, and partly by compulsión ; beliering that, in doing 
so, they performed a meritorious service in the sight of God, and sáved the souls of the 
children from pcrdition. Fonscca, p. 233. Dio principio a este santo latrocinio, Donna 
Isabel de Velasco Virreyna de aquel Reyno, la qüal dio orden que le traxessen a casa 
algunar Morisqnillas, aunque fuesse hurtándolas a sus curadores, como se hizo, &c. 
* Fonseca. 
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The Morescoes, conducted by his commissaries and the royal 
troops, and many of them accorapanied, from compassíon and 
humanity, by the barons whose vassals they had been, were every-
where in motion, and hastening in crowds, with their wives and 
children, to the coast. The ships whioh had been provided for 
transporting them, having been found extremely inadequate to 
the purpose, many more were collected from the seaports in Spain, 
Majorca, and Italy. Of these many were hired by the Morescoes 
themselves, who desired as soon as possible, to emancípate 
themselves from the power of the Spaniards ; while the greater 
number went on board the ships provided by the king. A n d in 
a few weeks about a hundred and twenty thousand men, women, 
and children, had embarked. 
Many of these were persons of substance and condition ; some 
of them, on account of their early profession of Christianity, had 
been raised to the rank of nobility, by the emperor Charles V . 
And the elegance and beauty of the young Moresco women is 
highly celebrated by a cotemporary Spanish historian, whose 
bigotry often prompts him to exult in their distress. 
Widely different from the sentiments of this bigoted ecclesi-
Humanity as^ ^c were those of the Valentía barons ; who gave their 
of the barons vassals, on this melancholy occasion, every proof of 
generous compassíon and humanity. B y the royal edict 
they were entitled to all the property belonging to their vassals, 
except what they were able to carry about their persons : but the 
barons, despísing this right which the edict bestowed on them, 
allowed the Morescoes to dispose of whatever part of their effects 
could be sold for money, and likewise permitted them to convey 
their most valuable furniture and manufactures on mules and in 
carriages to the ships. Many of them accompanied their vassals 
in person to the shore, and some of them, having embarked 
along with them, saw them safely landed on the coast of Africa *. 
* Of the barons who thus distinguished themselves by their tenderness and humanity 
on this occasion, and who remained at the sea-ports during the whole time of the embarka-
tion, employing all their interest to protect the Morescoes from injury, and to procure them 
the best accommodation possible on board the ships, Fonseca has recorded the ñames of the 
followiug, adding that there were many others whom he has not named : the duke of 
Gandia, whose great estáte was almost cntirely ruined; the marquis of Albada, the count 
of Alaguas, the count of Bunol, the count of Anna, the count of Sinarcas, the count qf 
Concentayna, and the dukc of Maqucda, who went over in the first embarkation to the 
port of Oran. 
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But this kind attention of the barons served only for a little 
time to mitígate their distress. Their exile from their native 
country, which justly excited in them the most bitter regret, and 
gave them so much ground for anxiety with regard to their 
future fortune, was soon succeeded by still greater calamities. 
Hard fate of ^rea* numbers were shipwrecked on their passage, and 
the Mores- never reached the African coast; while many others 
were barbarously murdered at sea, by the crews of the 
ships which they had freighted: this latter calamity befel only 
those who had chosen to transport themselves in private ships, 
and instances are recorded of such inhuman cruelty exercised 
against this harmless, persecuted, and defenceless people, by the 
owners and crews of these ships, as equals anything of the same 
kind of which we read in history. The men butehered in the 
presence of their wives and children; the women and children 
afterwards thrown alive into the sea; of the women, some, on 
account of their beauty, preserved alive for a few days to satiate 
the lust of the inhuman murderers of their husbands and brothers, 
and then either slaughtered or committed to the waves; such 
were some of the horrid deeds of which these barbarians were 
convicted upon their trial, to which they were brought, in conse-
quence of quarrelling with each other about the división of their 
prey; and such, i f we may credit a contemporary historian, was 
the unhappy fate of a great number of the Morescoes*. 
Ñor was the fate of the greater part of those who reached the 
coast of Barbary less deplorable. They had no sooner landed on 
this barren inhospitable shore, than they were attacked by the 
Bedouin Arabs, a wild banditti who live in tents, and support 
themselves by hunting and by plunder. The Morescoes, unarmed, 
and incumbered with their wives and children, were often robbed 
by those barbarians, who came upon them in numerous bodies, 
amounting sometimes to five or six thousand men; and, as often 
as the Morescoes attempted, with stones and slings, their only 
arms, to make resistance, put great numbers of them to the 
sword. Sti l l greater numbers perished of fatigue and hunger, 
joined to the inclemencies of the weather, from which they had 
no means of shelter, during their tedious journey through the 
African deserts, to Mostagán, Algiers, and other places, where 
they hoped to be permitted to take up their residence. Few of 
" Fonseca. 
1609.] P H I L I P a i . K I N G O F S P A I N . 235 
them ever arrived at these places. Of six thousand, who set out 
together from Conastal, a tovvn in the neighbourhood of Oran, 
with an intention of going to Algiers, a single person only, of the 
ñame of Pedralvi, survived the disasters to which they were 
exposed; and of the whole hundred and forty thousand, who 
were at this time transported to Africa, there is ground to 
believe, from the concurring testimony of persons who had access 
to know the truth, that more than a hundred thousand men, 
women, and children, suífered death in its most hideous forms, 
within a few months after their expulsión from Valentia *. 
Compared to the dreadful fate to which this unhappy people 
were doomed by the Spaniards, it would have been an act of 
mercy on the part of the K i n g , had he either commanded them 
to be put to the sword, or committed to the flames; as their 
misery would, in this case, have been of short continuance. The 
knowledge of what had befallen them ought, at least, to have 
deterred him from exposing the rest of his Moresco subjects to 
the like calamities. 
But the sentiments of humanity in the ecclesiastics and court 
of Spain were overpowered by those of the most illiberal super-
stition. They considered that inexpressible misery, which they 
themselves had brought on the Morescoes, as a signal of divine 
judgment against that unhappy people, which served to justify 
the cruelty which they had exercised, and to prove that what 
they had done was acceptable in the sight of God. Far from 
feeling remorse or sorrow for what had happened, they rather 
triumphed and exulted in i t ; and were confirmed in their resolu-
tion of expelling all the Morescoes in Spain without exception, 
and without thinking it incumbent on them to make provisión 
for their reception in any of those countries to which they were 
about to be conveyed. 
But before they proceeded to the expulsión of the Morescoes 
in Castile and other provinces, it was judged necessary to reduce 
to obedience all such of the Morescoes in Valentia, above men-
tioned, as had retired to the mountainous parts of that kingdom, 
with the resolution of standing on their defence. Their number, 
including men, women, and children, amounted nearly to thirty 
thousand, Having collected together a considerable quantity of 
provisions of all kinds, they had begun, while the viceroy was 
* Fonseca, Gonsalcz, Davila, p. 146. 
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employed in transporting their countrymen, to fortify themselves 
as well as they were able, and to block up the narrow passes by 
which the Spaniards must approach. But, besides being utterly 
destitute of military skill, they were extremely i l l furnished both 
with arms and ammunition ; and the folly of their attempt 
quickly appeared in the feebleness of every effort which they 
made to repel the attacks of the enemy. The viceroy having 
sent against them the flower of the regular forces, under the 
command of Don Agustín Mescia, who had acquired consider-
able military experience and renown in the wars of Flanders, a 
great part of them were compelled to surrender, through the 
want of water, from which Mescia had found means to cut them 
off; and soon after, the rest were beaten from their intrench-
ments, and put to flight. 
In the pursuit no mercy was shown, either to the aged or to 
the women and children, though rolling in the dust, and implor-
ing raercy, by the savage conquerors. Upwards of three thou-
sand perished*. The number of those who had surrendered was 
two-and-twenty thousand, who were all soon after transported to 
Africa, except the children under seven years of age, whom the 
soldiers were permitted to sell for slaves. The K i n g decreed, 
that, after a certain number of years, they should be set at 
liberty; but, as many of them were sent to foreign countries, 
there is ground to suspect that the decree was not attended with 
the desired effectf. 
* Fonseca, p. 310.—From the style of this author, in this and many other passages, 
ihere is little ground for doubt, that with pleasure he would have acted the same bloody 
part which he describes : — *» 
Fueron Siguiendo la vittoria, los neustros, matando sin cxcecion, quantos alcanjavan, 
viejos, mojos, grandes, pequennos, hombres, y mugeres, por mas que arrodillados ellos, y 
ellas con los bracos a biertos les pedian misericordia, no mereciéndola los que siempre usaron 
mal del la. 
•f- The viceroy and the archbishop of Valentia differed widely in their opinión with 
regard to the proper method of disposing of the children. The former represented to the 
king, that all of them, who were under fifteen years of age, might be safely permitted to 
remain in the hands of the Christians, to whom they had been sold by the soldicrs, as therc 
would be no Mahometans in the kingdom by whom they conld be perverted from embrac-
ing the principies of the Christian faith. Besides, that as most of their parents and other 
relations had perished in the late insurrection, it would be less cruel to put them all to the 
sword, than to land so great a number of helpless young creatures on the coast of Burbary. 
The archbishop, on the other hand, declared that, after a certain age, no Moresco could 
possibly be con verted; and that, if the Moresco children, at fifteen, at twelvc, at ten, or 
cven seven years of age, were suífered to remain, the whole kingdom of Valentía would 
1609.] P H I L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 237 
Another order of the K i n g , which he published at this time, 
preved mere effectual. Besides the Merescees who were killed 
er taken prisoners, a considerable number, distrustful of the 
Spanish faith, or prompted by an unconquerable attachment to 
their native country, had dispersed themselves among the woods 
and rocks, where they hoped to elude the notice of the Spaniards. 
Philip put a price upen the heads of those unhappy men, and the 
soldiers were sent out te hunt for them, as for beasts of prey. 
Hardly any of them were able to escape. Some of them chose 
rather to die of cold and hunger than surrender themselves to 
the Spaniards : and at length their leader, who with his wife and 
children had concealed themselves in the most inaccessible parts 
of the mountains, was taken and carried alive to Valentía, where, 
after suffering much mockery and insult for having allowed hím-
self to be elected king of the insurgents, he was, by a solemn 
sentence, condemned and put to death*. 
again be peopled wilh Mahometans before the end of the secoml, or at most of the third 
generaticn. The king, desirous to gratify both the viccroy and the archbishop, but leaning 
more to the side of the latter, gave his permission, as above mentioned, for retaining only 
such of the children as were under seven years of age. 
* In the Appcndix (B) the reader will find other interesting circumstances relativo to 
the condition of the Morescoes in Spain, their expulsión, and subsequent fate, collccted 
from sir Francis Cottington's Letters from Spain, 1609 and 1610. 
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B O O K V . 
ABOUT the end of the fifteenth century, the several kingdoms 
Ambition of 0^ ^P3^ 11 formed one powerful monarchy, containing 
Spain ac- above twenty millions of inhabitants. It was well 
' cultivated, abounding in flourishing manufactures, and 
was governed with equal vigour and prudence by the joint 
authority of Ferdinand and Isabella. These princes, agreeably 
to the natural progress of arabition, extended their united 
power, by the superiority of their policy and arras, in Europe, 
while the inventive and daring genius of Columbus opened to 
their aspiring views an iraraense field of conquest by the dis-
covery of a new world. A n object so animating, by its novelty 
as well as grandeur, nourished those seeds of arabition, which 
had taken root in the court of Spain, and roused a spirit of 
enterprise araong the people. A succession of bold leaders, 
followed by nuraerous adventurers, allured to their standards 
by the love of chango, or the hope of plunder, united to the 
Spanish erapire alraost the whole of those vast regions which 
extend frora the.gulf of México to the Streights of Magellan. 
The collected treasures of America, over which the Cortes 
had not any control, enabled Charles V . to trample on the 
liberties of his own subjects, and to threaten neighbouring 
states with universal dominión. The ambition of the eraperor 
descended, together with his iraraense resources, to his son, 
Phil ip II . , and engaged him in projects beyond his abilities. 
The monarch was governed by a lust of power, and the people 
were seized with a spirit of eraigration. The energy of the 
nation was diverted frora doraestic industry, the true source of 
national wealth and grandeur, and turned to distant enterprises 
of colonization and of war. The raonarchy becarae faint, 
through the loss of its blood and treasure; and the power, on 
which its vast arabition had been originally founded, was sub-
verted. But ideas of uncontrollable dominión were by this 
time deeply irapressed on the Austrian race; and Phil ip III . , 
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with exhausted resources, and a feeble mínd, faintly pursued the 
same ambitious plan that had been formed or adopted by his 
predecessors on the Spanish throne, not more formidable for 
their extensivo revenues than for the vigilance, vigour, and per-
severanee of their nature. 
It is so natural for sovereign princes to exert every ñervo to 
reclaim the obedience of revolted subjects, that the continuanco 
of the war in the Netherlands t i l l the late truco, ought not, 
indeed, to be accounted any proof of extraordinary ambition; 
and the expulsión of the Morescoes, a people industrious in an 
indolent climate, seemed an act by which the Spanish crown 
voluntarily sought its own degradation. The ambitious schemes, 
however, of the court of Madrid, though better concealed, and 
apparently suspended, were not wholly abandoned. The 
aggrandizement of the house of Austria was still the first object 
in the councils of Spain. But her power corresponded not 
with her inclination; and her pursuit of greatness was sullied 
by those machinations which are the usual resources of impotent 
ambition, and which mark declining empire. 
The peace of Vervins restored the appearance, but did not 
establish the confidence of friendship, between two great and 
rival kingdoms. The court of Spain continued to encourage 
and support the enemies of the crown of Franco; and the 
French monarch, in return, encouraged and supported the 
enemies of Spain. Thus the ancient antipathies of these neigh-
bouring kingdoms were still kept alive by reciprocal 
continué be. injuries. But, whue the intrigues of Phil ip were dark 
« ^ r t l ^ and treacherous, the hostilities of Henry were ennobled 
Prance and by the occasions on which they were exercised; and 
Spam. ^jie par^ wJ1JCJ1 goun(j policy required him to act, was 
consonant to the natural generosity of his temper. This mag-
nanimous prince, enraged at the repeated injuries he had 
suffered from the ambition of the Spaniards, apprised of their 
intrigues and influence with the discontented nobles of Franco, 
and alarmed at the dangers which threatened both his life and 
his crown, conceived a project of uniting different powers in a 
league against the encroachments of a nation which seemed still 
Great plan 1^11 a* universal monarchy. Hi s ultimate design 
ofHenry in the formation of such a confederacy, was to 
establish among the nations of Europe a new sys-
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tem, and to fix a durable balance of power, by the exaltation of 
other states on the ruins of the house of Austr ia*. 
A t this time religión was the most powerful bond of union 
among men; and, consequently, religious sympathies and antipa-
thies were the great engines that governed the world. The Aus-
trians gloried in patronising the church of Rome. Henry, from 
the most urgent motives of policy, had changed the profession of 
his faith, and embraced the catholic religión, but still possessed 
and deserved the confidence of the Protestants, The French 
monarch, of course, in a contest with the house of Austria, could 
depend on the good wishes of all, as he was assured of assistance 
from most of the princes and states of the reformed religión. 
W i t h England he entered into a league for the mutual defence 
of that kingdom and of Franco. The United Provinces of the 
Low Countries, the Protestant princes of Germany, the greater 
part of the imperial towns, were ready to take an active part in 
his intended enterprise. A n d Denmark and Sweden, although, 
from their remote situations, they were not so nearly interested 
in his designs, i f they should be involved in the flames of a 
general war, i t was easy to foresee, would eepouse the cause of 
their Protestant brethren. 
* See Sully's Memoirs, The scheme, Mhich has been ascribed to Henry, of uniting 
all Christendom in ene great republic, for the promotion of general happiness, and the esta-
blishment of general tranquillity, has afforded matter of great speculation and conjecture. 
Although it is impossible to penétrate into the recesses of the minds of princes, and that 
history is more successfully employed in tracing the consequences than in exploring the 
springs of events and actions : yet, in every design of so great a man as Henry I V . we aro 
deeply interested, and it is with difficulty that we can refrain from indulging conjectures 
concerning whatever appears mysterious or doubtful in his conduct. 
The project of uniting the Christian powers into one general republic, as it was not 
unworthy, so neither was it too great for the mind of Henry, It was the perfection and 
just completion of his plan. Ñor is it improbable, that, at certain times, he amused his 
faney with the contemplation of so grand an object. But, on the other hand, it is almost 
certain that it was not the contemplation of this great end that first suggested the idea of 
the confederacy, and first roused hlm to action. A more natural or probable account of 
his original motives, iu his intended enterprise, there cannot be given than what we have 
in Sully's Memoirs. " Henry IV., recollecting the intrigues of Spain, said, ' I seo these 
peoplc will never let me alone while it is in their power to disturb me. And that the dif-
ferent jealousies of honour, of reputation, and of the interests of state, render all confídence 
and harmony between France and Spain impossible. Other foundations of security must 
be sought for than words. They will constrain me to do what I never intended. But I 
swear by God, that if I had once put my affairs in order, and raised money and all neces-
sary supplies, I will make them repent that they have roused me to anns.' " Vol . in. 
p. 33, duodécimo, Paris, I G 6 3 . 
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But the Catholic powers were not in like manner disposed to 
favour the house of Austria. For neither was the veneration for 
the ancient equal to the zeal which appeared for the new doctrines 
and forms of worship ; ñor were political motives wanting, 
which in certain Catholic governments counterbalanced those of 
religión. The prinees and states of Italy, who generally looked 
up to Henry as their protector, favoured his views secretly. But 
the Venetians entered openly into a league, offensive and defen-
sive, with a monarch through whose mediation they had been 
cnabled to maintain the civil authority of the republic in opposi-
tion to the spiritual jurisdiction of the pope, and whora they 
regarded as a bulwark against the encroachments of the Spanish 
governors of Milán. The Swiss cantons too, Catholic as well as 
Protestant, either actuated by a dread of the power of Austria, 
or, as other historians affirm, induced by a promise of Franche-
Comté, Alsace, and Tyrol , embarked in this confederacy*. The 
duke of Savoy also, a Catholic prince, but who never professed 
an inordinate zeal for the Romish faith, Henry drew over to his 
side, by a promise of his eldest daughter in marriage to the 
prince of Piedmont, and by holding up to his ambition the sove-
reignty of Milán. That sovereignty the duke had in vain 
expected to receive in partage with Catherine, a daughter of 
Spain; a mortification the more severe, that the joint authority 
of the archduke Albert and the infanta Isabella governed the 
Austrian Netherlands. 
The high esteem in which Henry held this new ally, appears 
from the terms on which he purchased his alliance. The general 
voice of admiration had bestowed on both these prinees the title 
of Great ; and their respective talents and virtues, so formidable 
to each other when in a state of mutual hostility, inspired them 
now with reciprocal confidence. 
While Henry thus prepared to carry his intentions into execu-
tion, an event happened which, according to his usual good fortune, 
gave him an opportunity of covering his real designs, under the 
veil of redressing injuries, and supporting the cause of justice. 
John Wi l l i am, duke of Cleves and Juliers, having died without 
Succession children, the right of succession to the sovereignty of 
of eleves those states was claimed by diíferent prinees. The 
r8" raost powerful of these prepared to maintain their pre-
* Mczeray, Abrégé Chronologique, 1609. 
R 
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tensions by arms. But the emperor Rodolphus II . , as well to 
support his own authority as to prevent the calamities of vvar, 
summoned the several competitors to appear before him, to 
explain the nature of their particular claims. In the mean time, 
he sequestered the fiefs in dispute, the administration of which 
he bestowed on his brother Leopold, bishop of Strasbourg and 
Passau. The administrator, seizing Juliers, levied troops, and 
began to extend his territories around that city. Two of the 
competitors, the marquis of Brandenburgh and the count Pala-
tino of Neuburgh, Protestant princes, alarmed at the conduct of 
the emperor, agreed to make a fair partition of that sovereignty 
to which they geverally made pretensions, until their diíferences 
should be terminated in an amicable manner by arbitration. 
The count Palatine took the field with an army, and assem-
bling the states of Cleves and Juliers at Dusseldorp, engaged 
them to acknowledge himself and the elector of Brandenburgh 
as the lawful hereditary sovereigns of Cleves, and all the other 
principalities that had been possessed by John Wi l l i am beyond 
the Rhine. Alarmed at these proceedings, the Catholic princes 
of the empire formed a league for the defence of the ancient 
faith, and sent deputies to demand assistance from Madr id and 
from Rome. The princes of Brandenburgh and Neuburgh, on the 
other hand, endeavoured to fortify themselves in the states of 
which they had taken possession, by adding to the support they 
received from the princes of the evangelical unión, the powerful 
aid of the king of Franco. The states of Cleves and Juliers 
annexed to the Austrian Netherlands, on which they bordered, 
would have extended the dominions of Spain beyond the Rhine, 
and bridled the power of the Seven United Provinces. It was 
not therefore with difficulty that the Protestant princes prevailed 
on Henry to espouse their cause. To the prince of Anhalt, 
whom they had sent to Par ís , he readily replied, and in the most 
obliging manner, that he would not only assist them with all his 
strength, but would himself march for their protection at the 
head of his army. This army consisted of thirty thousand foot, 
and six thousand horse, a great proportion of which troops were 
veterans, commanded by officers formed for war under his own 
standard. He had a train of artillery superior to any that had 
ever before been brought into the field, and provided with 
ammunition for sixty thousand round of shot. A n d so great and 
1610.] P H I L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 243 
judicious had been the economy oí" Henry, that he possessed 
treasures sufficient to keep on foot so great a military forcé for 
ten years, without the least oppression or injury to his subjects*. 
Besides this, there was an army in Dauphiny, of twelve thousand 
foot and two thousand horse, under the command of the 
mareschal Lesdiguieres, ready to join the duke of Savoy in an 
attack upon the Spanish dominions in Lombardy. Europe had 
not seen military preparations so great, or known a juncture 
apparently so big with revolution. The wealth of Venice, the 
valour of the Swiss, the impetuosity of the Savoyards, the juve-
nile ardour of the United Provinces, the active zeal of the Pro-
testant princes and states of Germany, the disciplined bravery of 
Franco, the good wishes of all who professed the reformed 
religión; these, in the hands of a warlike and politic prince, 
formed an engine fitted to subvert kingdoms, and to chango the 
face of the world. The forcé of the means he possessed, and the 
grandeur of the end he had in view, were a source of delight to 
the martial and sanguino disposition of Henry. Sometimos he 
would take pleasure in reviewing his troops; at others, in trying 
the arms he designed to wear in the day of battle. He slept but 
little, was constantly in motion, and conversed much with the 
ministers and officers in whom he most confided. He was impa-
tient to exchange the luxury of a palace for the dangers and 
hardships of the field, and eager to retal íate on the marquis of 
Spinola the advantagcs that had been gained over himself by 
the duke of Parma. H e had already strengthened the garrisons 
in his frontier towns, and his troops began to file oíf in sepárate 
divisions towards the general rendezvous in Champagne. H e 
acquainted the archduke Albert at Brussels of his intended 
march through part of his territorios, and desired to be informed 
whether he should be received as an enemy or as a friend. 
Nothing detained him in Paris but a desire to be present at the 
coronation of Mary de Mediéis, his queen, whom he had 
appointed during his absence regent of Franco. 
The house of Austr ia , against which this gathering storm was 
directed, beheld it with astonishing indifference. The emperor 
Rodolphus, moro intcnt on observing the motions of the 
heavenly bodies than on watching the movements of his enemies, 
* Duke of Rohan's Discourse on tlie Dcath of Henry the Great. Ménioires de Sully. 
Mezeray. 
R2 
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indulged a natural love of science, the only passion that is able 
to extinguish the pride of power in the breasts of princes. He 
liad given up, with little reluctance, to his brother Matthias, the 
government of Hungary, Moravia, and Austria, and soon after 
he also resigned that of Bohemia. W i t h the title of emperor, 
he lived a prívate man. It is matter of greater wonder that the 
king of Spain, in whom the passion of religión did not eradicate 
al l the seeds of ambition, appeared unconcerned at the warlike 
preparations of an invetérate enemy. Whether the ministers of 
Spain trusted to the success of those plots they had formed 
against Henry in his own palace ; or, that with the superstitious 
credulity of the age in which they lived, they confided in the 
completion of those predictions that about this time were so 
frequent in the mouths of Catholics conceming the sudden death 
of the king of France*; or that they weakly imagined this 
monarch had no other object in view than the expulsión of 
Leopold frora the states of Juliers; or from whatever secret 
cause, i t is certain, that amidst a general and anxious suspense, 
the court of Madrid discovered not any symptoms of alarm. 
The world, struck with the mighty preparations of France, 
wondered at the serenity of Spain, whon an event happened 
which preved how much human affairs are governed by causes 
beyond the reach of princes; which frustrated the well-laid 
designe of the great Henry, and supplied the want of vigilance 
and wisdom in the counsels of Phil ip. 
On the eve of the day fixed for the coronation of Mary do 
* This conjecture may appear at first sight, to certain readers, wholly absurd and ground-
Icsa. Nevertheless it will not seem altogether extravagant, if we rcflect on the powcr of 
univereally reccived prejudices on evcn the strongest minds. 
About this time, and even long after it, the sciencc of judicial aetrology was studied by 
philosophers of the highest reputation, with great gravity, and, as they firmly believed, 
•with great success. There is in the university of Petersburgh a very able mathematician, 
who ia making great progress in judicial astrology at this very day. It is certain that the 
duke of Lenna was a firm believer in the doctrines of this science. See Anecdotes du 
Ministére du Comte duc D'Olivarcz. 
Men of sensc, of the present times, struck with that mixture of genius and extravagance 
which distinguishes the writings of antiquity, are at a losa how to reconcile so much rcason 
with such wild excursions of faney ; and suspect that many of the opinions delivered in 
those writings were not nal , but popular and aífected. There is not a doubt but posteríty 
will entertain similar doubts conceming some of the doctrines of the seventeenth and even 
eighteenth century. Men are ever cbanging their opinions, yet ever wondering that the 
world did not always think as they do now. 
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Death of Mediéis, Henry I V . was going in his coach to the 
Henry IV. Arsenal, to converse, according to his custom, with the 
of ranee. (ju]íe 0f gully, superintendent of the finances, and grand 
master of the artillery, when he received two stabs with a knife, 
one of which pierced through the great canal which conveys the 
blood from the heart to the other parts of the body. The king 
fell down on the duke of Epemon, who was on one side of him, 
and in whose ear he was whispering when he received the first 
wound. This parricide was committed by Francis Ravaillac, a 
native and schoolmaster of Angouleme, on the 14th day of May, 
1610. The ministers of Franco, conceiving that this execrable 
deed might have been the eífect of some secret conspiracy, put 
Ravaillac to the torture, not only as a punishment due to his 
crime, but as a means of discovering his abettors and accomplices. 
But that miserable fanatic had no accomplices; and his only 
abettors were the priests of the Catholic superstition, whose 
writings and discourses had fully persuaded him that by murder-
ing the protector of the Protestants, and the enemy of the pope, 
he would save his own soul from perdition, and obtain, as a 
reward, eternal life. 
The tragical end of Henry filled one half of Europe with 
„_ . , exultation, and the other with horror. The house of 
Effects of ' 
the death of Austr ia rejoiced at the destruction of a formidable 
Henry. enemy; and the votarles of that religión which they 
patronized, applauded the pious zeal of Ravaillac, which they 
compared to whatever is most heroic in the Uves or deaths of 
saints, martyrs, and confessors. But a general consternation 
seized not only the Hugonots of Franco, but every state professing 
the reformed religión. The whole Protestant world deplorcd the 
untimely fate of the patrón of religious toleration : and nations 
differing in matters of religión, united inbewailing theloss of the 
illustrious guardián of the liberties of Europe. They indulged 
the melancholy recollection of his amiable and heroic virtues ; his 
compassion, to which, on different occasions, he had sacrificed his 
ambition ; the boldness and vigour of his genius, which, disdaining 
the windings of subtlety and refinement, pursued the paths that 
led directly to success ; his courage, which never forsook him in 
the most depressing circumstances ; his bravery in the field, which 
by a powerful contagión inspired throughout his whole army 
irresistible intropidity; his patience under hardships, and affability 
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in every fortune, which so gained on the hearts of his soldiers, 
that they served him not only with the loyalty of subjects, but 
the affection of friends. But the celebrated Benjamin, duke of 
Roban, not contented with mingling his own with the groans of 
nations, found a melancholy satisfaction in pouring forth the 
sentiments of his heart in a pathetic composition, and transmitting 
to posterity a memorial of his devotion to his beloved sovereign. 
This elegy, written in a strain of passion which nothing could 
have inspired but the deepest sorrow, is a lively picture of the 
grief and consternation which followed the death of Henry, and 
exhibits a conspicuous proof of that ascendant which he had 
acquired over the greatest minds*. 
* " I deplore (says Rohan, among other expressions of extreme and vehement grief), I 
deplore in the loss of our invincible king, that of France, and from the bottom of my soul 
grieve at the manner of his death. Our own experience will soon inform us how fit a 
subject he is for our tears: the people are alarmed and filled with melancholy presages of 
future calamities ; the towns are guarded as if they expected a siege; the nobility seek 
their safety amongst the most eminent of their own order, whose factions rather threaten 
them with danger, than consolé them with any hopes of safety. Together with the loss of 
his person, I bewail that of his courtesy and aífability, his sweet and obliging conversation, 
the honour he did me, the admittance he deigned to grant me even to his most prívate 
recesses, oblige me not only to moum for him, but even not to love myself in those places 
where the sight of my good prince once aíForded me such infinite happiness. I regret the 
disappointment of the most noble and heroic enterprise that was ever yet conceived. It is 
not credible that a military forcé of thirty thousand foot, six thousand horse, a train of artil-
lery of sixty guns, and ammunition for sixty thousand round of shot, bcsides the army then 
in Dauphiny, should be destined for the siege of Juliers, which was since uudertaken with 
eight thousand foot, and one thousand horse. Have I not good reason to lament the loss 
of such an opportunity of proving my courage, zeal, and fidelity to my king? One push of 
a pike given in his presence, would have been a greater satisfaction to me than I should have 
now in obtaining a victory. Much more should I have valued the least praise in that art 
of which he was the greatest master of his time, than the approbation and applause of all 
other captains now alive. I grieve at the manner of his deplorable death : a prince com-
poscd of sweetness and clemency; who never condemned an innocent person to death ; 
whose victories were never stained with blood ; who having once reclaimed his enemies to 
their duty, cherished them as friends, and loaded them with favours. Who that ever lived 
under this most august prince, as I have done, can take pleasure in these present times ? 1 
will thcrefore divide my life into two parts, and cali that part of it I have already passed, 
happy, since it was employed in the scrrice of Henry the Great; and that which is yet to 
come, unfortunate, and spend it in lamentations, tears, sighs, and complaints : and out of 
the honour which I owc to his memory, I will devote the remainder of my days (the king-
dom of God being preservcd entire) to the service of France, because it was his kingdom ; 
to the king, because he is hh son ; and to the qucen, because she was once his dear com-
panion and spouse." 
Sir Francis Cottington, in a letter to the lord treasurer Salisbury, dated at Madrid the 
16th of May, 1610, says, " Tho constable, in the ñamo of his king, this day vigited the 
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After the death of Henry, his friends and allies had reason to 
apprehend that the vindictive passions of the house of Austria 
would be heíghtened and inflamed by the hope of gratification. 
The Italian states especially, overawed by the power of Phil ip 
in Naples and in Lombardy, trembled lest the Spanish arms 
should overrun all Italy. But Charles Emanuel, duke of Savoy, 
whose noble mind was inspired with the pride rather than the 
despondency of grief, endeavoured to rally the broken forces of 
the league, and to unite them once more into a compact and 
formidable body. 
The house of Savoy, one of the most illustrious in Europe on 
Character account of its antiquity, is more nobly distinguished for 
of the dukcs wisdom of policy, and valour of arms. Environed by 
of Savoy. dominions of the empire, Franco, and Spain, the 
princes of Savoy are under a constant necessity of watching the 
balance of power among their ambitious neighbours, and of 
penetrating early into their designs, that, by affording timely 
support to the weaker against the stronger party, they may be 
enabled to preserve their own independence. A n d , if Providence 
has placed this family in a situation in which it is necessary to 
guard against the encroachments of superior power ; the nature 
of their country, bold, abrupt, and sublime, inspires that confi-
dence which is necessary effectually to resist them. The fastnesses 
and narrow defiles of the Alps, together with a hardy race of men 
inhabiting a mountainous and snowy región, encourage the dukes 
of Savoy boldly to enter on war, whenever the complexión of the 
times demonstrates its expediency. Thus natural have conspired 
with moral causes to form that illustrious character which the 
race of Savoy has justly obtained in the world. 
Charles Emanuel did not disgrace, but, on the contrary, added 
Character of ^m T^e to? the dignity of his birth. Nature, which had 
Charles formed this prince of a weakly constitution of body, 
adorned his soul with a splendid variety of talents and 
virtues; and these the parental care of Philibert, renowned for 
his victory over the French at St. Quentin, exalted and matured 
by a learned and liberal education. The writings of antiquity, 
French ambassador, with whom I have also been. Since the arrival of the French king's 
death—and I do assure your lordship, that though the cause be strange and great, in my 
peor judgment he discovers more passion than becomes a wisc man—his tcars and cxclama-
tions are more than can be imagined." 
248 H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F [BOOK V . 
so full of heroic actions and rapid conquests, nourished the 
natural ardour of his mind, and inspired an emulation of the 
ancient héroes of Italy. Together' with that intrepidity of spirit 
vvhich delights in pursuing great designs, he possessed in an 
eminent degree those qualities which are requisito in order to 
carry them into execution; political conduct, and military 
prowess. H i s courage was not of that calm and equal kind which 
is connected with firmness of ñervos, and which characterizes the 
vvarriors of the Nor th ; but, being derived from that vigour of 
imagination, and sensibility of frame peculiar to southem climates, 
it was ardent and impetuous. H i s genius also, liko that of the 
warmer climates, was fertile oven to excess, and prono to subtlety 
and refinement. From a temper so sanguino, and an imagination 
so luxuriant, he derived an elasticity of spirit that rose under 
misfortunes; whence, though sometimos defeated, and ofton 
disappointed, he was never discouraged. His resources were 
endless: for there could not be a conjuncture in which the 
superiority of his genius could not find some favourable opportu-
nity of pyactising on the passions, and managing the hopes and 
fears and follies of men. So various were his stratagems of policy 
and of war, that the most penetrating of his contemporaries 
professed themselves unable to form any probable conjecture 
concerning his designs. Something, howover, of the vast and 
unboundcd characterized his conduct, the ardour of his inventivo 
genius engaging him not unfrequently in projects beyond his 
utmost power to accomplish. Ñor were the powers of his 
capacious mind wholly absorbed in schemesofambition. What-
ever was elegant or great touched his soul, and he was prono to 
tho pleasures of society and love. H e was a friend to men of 
letters, a patrón of all tho arts, an enthusiastic admirer and 
bountiful rewarder of merit of every kind. A n d tho greatness of 
his mind was so happily tempered with benignity and grace, that 
the engaging aífability of his noble deportment alleviated in the 
breasts of his subjects the hardships which they suffered through 
his restless ambition. On the wholo, it is difficult to conceivo 
that qualities so opposito should co-exist in tho same person : so 
great boldness with such deep design ; such loftiness of spirit, 
with such sweetness of demeanour ; such ardour of mind with so 
much subtilty, and such profound dissimulation *. 
* In this singular cbaractcr thero ig not a trait unsuppurted by the testimony of contetn-
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This prince, who had opened his mind to the greatest designs, 
and whose natural ambition had been encouraged and fortified 
by confidence in Henry, did not abandon them after he was 
deprived by death of so great an ally. H i s penetrating eye had 
discovered the languid state of the Spanish monarchy, and he 
entertained a contempt for the counsels by which it was now 
governed *. H e did not, therefore, yet despair of being able to 
Charles extend his dominión over that fair territory which had 
Emanuel awakened his ambition. Should he be able to reunite 
revive the the scattered forces of the league, success would be 
league certain: even if France should reraain neutral, he 
agamst the > ' 
houseof hoped to raaintain a contest with the Catholic king, 
Austna. ^QWI with glory and with advantage. He, therefore, 
endeavoured to revive a powerful combination against the house 
of Austria, whose power he represented as excessive and danger-
ous. H e attempted to establish an alliance with France, by 
obtaining from the new regency a confirmation of the promise 
that had been made by Henry, of giving his eldest daughter in 
marriage to the prince of Piedmont. But, after the death of 
the French monarch, all the maxims of his policy were sub-
verted, and the schemes he had projected abandoned. The 
parliament of Paris, intimidated by the menaces of the duke of 
Epernon, who comraanded the regiment of guards, committed 
an involuntary act of usurpation-f-, by declaring Mary de 
Mediéis solé regent of France during the minority of her son, 
an infant in the ninth year of his age. This queen, uniting in 
. her character the refinement of an Italian, with the 
Character . . „ 
of Mary de fecblencss of a woman, and the superstition oí a good 
queenre- Catholic, was governed by maxims directly contrary 
gent of to those which had been adopted by the manly and 
France. liberal genius of Henry. She sought to establish her 
authority by exciting jealousies among those who wished to 
subvert i t ; and armed her enemies against herself by conces-
sions intended to conciliate their favour. She had obtained the 
porary historians, who, all of them, mention this prince with an admiration which could not 
have been cxcited but by the most amazing talents. See Bellutn Sabaudicum, &c. 
Alfonso Loschi; Battistia Nani; Sin, Memorie recóndito; Le Mercure Francia ; Histoire 
de la Régence do Maríe de Mediéis, &c. &c. 
* Batt. Nani, lib. i . Siri, Memorie recóndito, lom. üi. p. 242. 
t The right of elccting a regent had hithorto bclongod to the general cstatcs of the 
kingdom. 
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regency without opposition, but not without envy. The princes 
of the blood, highly offended at the advancement of a stranger, 
though a queen of France, to a dignity to which they themselves 
made pretensions, retired from court, and were followed by 
their nuraerous adherents. It was the policy of Mary to raise 
up in opposition to her doraestic enemies a faction among the 
rest of the nobility, and to acquire friends by a profusión of 
pensions, offices, and governments. The treasures which the 
late king had aniassed in order to overawe his enemies, she 
employed in soothing resentment, and allaying discontent. A l l 
the assiduities and entreaties, and remonstrances of Charles 
Emanuel to a princess, whose conduct was directed by these 
principies, were fruitless. F a r from joining a confederacy 
against the house of Austria, she hearkened with pleasure to a 
proposal, that had been rejected by the late king, of a double 
marriage between the dauphin of France and the eldest infanta, 
and of the prince of Spain with Elizabeth, the eldest daughter 
of France. This project was first suggested to the court of 
Madrid by the pope, who believed that, by means of these 
intermarriages the house of Austria would acquire such an 
influence in the councils of France, as would in the end exter-
minate that heresy which had so obstinately resisted all other 
efforts. 
Immediately after the death of Henry, the court of Madrid, 
having first discharged the duties of decorum by going into 
mourning, and by the strongest professions of condolence*, 
renewed to the regent queen the proposition of that double 
alliance, which had met with her fondest approbation before 
that tragical event which led to the power with which she was 
now invested. That event did not produce any chango in the 
inclinations of Mary towards a unión with Spain; on the 
* Sir Francia Cottington writes to the lord treasurer Salisbury, that the king of Spain 
and all his children, with the grandees abiding in his court, on hcaring the tidings of the 
nnfortunatc dcath of the French king, put on mourning apparul. But, notwithstanding 
those outward shows of sorrow, he assurcs his lordship that these tidings were in general 
received by the Spauiards with the most imtnodest and immoderate joy that is possible to be 
conceived. This excessive and indecent joy, he «ays, appeared chicfly among the common 
pcople. The king ordered the comedian» to leave Madrid. " The religious men in their 
pulpits (says Cottington) gave praise unto God : and the ordinary sort of courtiers dis-
course of it as a miraculous blessing to the king and state ; and in all kinds of pcople there 
is this kind of apprehcnsion; yet I am told, that his majesty himsdf was for somc hours 
very much troublcd." 
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contrary, if that union appeared formerly desirable, it now 
seemed necessary, in order to support her authority, in so 
much danger of being overturned by the turbulence of faction. 
In the month of A p r i l , 1611, the king of Spain and the queen 
Project of regent of France formally expressed their consent to 
agcTbetweén ^16 intermarriage of their sons and daughters by their 
the royal fe- respective ambassadors. On this occasion they also 
Franceand entered into a defensive league, engaging to give each 
P^^ 11' other mutual aid in case of either intestine commo-
• tions or foreign invasión. The Spaniards endeavoured to im-
prove and consolidate this unión, by engaging the French in 
a league, offensive as well as defensive ; but to this the queen, 
whose utmost ambition was to maintain, not to extend her 
power, refused, in positivo terms, to consent*. 
Thus not only was the house of Austria delivered frora the 
attacks of that confederacy which had been formed against her, 
but she acquired an accession of strength by an ascendant in 
the counsels of that kingdora which so lately appeared her most 
formidable enemy. In vain did Charles Emanuel, seconded 
by the importunities of the pope solicit the Venetians to join 
in an offensive and defensive league against the ambitious 
Spaniards. The conduct of France determined that of Venice. 
The senate, having learned the designs of Mary de Mediéis, 
replied to the duke of Savoy, that it was indeed the interés t of 
all the sovereign powers of Italy to maintain a good correspond-
ence among themselves, and to provide for the common safety ; 
but it was to be feared, they added, that such a league as had been 
proposed by his highness would serve only to excite the jealousy 
of Spain, a nation which, of all others, had the strongest motives 
to cultivate peace with all her neighbours. To his holiness, 
whom they suspected of a versatility of character, which might 
soon lead him to relapso into the views of that court, against 
which he now declaimed, they answered, that they could not be 
persuaded that his apprehensions concerning the views of Spain 
were well founded. But Charles Emanuel, not discouraged by 
the defection of both France and Venice, pursued a thousand 
schemes, and extended his intrigues all over Europe. H e held 
* Siri, Mem. rccond. tora. ¡i. p. 524. | Memoires do la Rcgencc do Mane de Mediéis. 
Histoire des Dcrniers Troubles on France. Malingre. 
t Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iü. 
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a close correspondence with the discontented lords in France. 
H e inflamed the jealousy and the resentment of the Protestant 
princes of Germany. He proposed to K i n g James a marriage 
of the prince of Wales with the princess of Savoy, and of the 
prince of Piedmont with a daughter of England. The myste-
rious character of Charles, in the opinión of some writers, 
renders it doubtful whether he believed he should, or desired he 
might, succeed in this project; and whether it was not his only 
object, by exciting a jealousy among the great Catholic powers, 
of his connexion with a Protestant prince, to dissolve the treaty 
of the double alliance between France and Spain, and to obtain 
the eldest daughter of one of these crowns in marriage to the 
prince of Piedmont*. Whatever were his views, they were 
frustated by the mean vanity of the English monarch, who con-
cealed not from the world his opinión that any alliance, below 
that of a great king, was entirely unworthy of the heir-apparent 
to the crown of England. 
In the mean time, the Spanish troops that were on foot in the 
Milanese, those of Savoy in Piedmont, and the French army, 
under Lesdiguieres, in Dauphiny, were subjects of various 
jealousies and apprehensions. The Spaniards seemed ready to 
pour into Piedmont, and the Savoyards threatened an incursión 
into Milán ; while an army, commanded by a Protestant general, 
excited an uneasiness in the queen regent herself, as well as other 
Catholic princes. 
In this situation of affairs, the Pope interceded with Mary de 
* The conjectures of these writers, which mark so strongly the general opinión that was 
entertained of the duke of Savoy, appear rather refined. I find in Chamberlayne's Letters, 
among Dr . Birch's Collection in the British Museum, that tho duke, on this occasion, 
showed every mark of sincerity and eamcstncss. To the English ambassador, at Turin, lie 
was highly munifícent. He consultcd the temper of the English monarch, by sending, as 
his ambassador to the court of London, a person who concealcd the most profound penetra-
tion under the mask of dissipation, mirth, and pleasantry. ** Fabritio (says Chamberlayne, 
in his Letters, anno 1612), spends his time merrily with the king, and is never from him." 
— " The Savoyard ambassador (says he again) gives himself buono tempe, notwithstanding 
that the match grows cold, and frequents good company,"—King James, as is well known, 
liad a passion for hunting, and delighted in a collection of wild beasts. The duke of Savoy, 
who knevv this, as a mark of attention to his majesty, sent him a present of an ounce and 
a leopard. The animáis were fetched from Londón to Thcobald's, wherc the king resided. 
Thcleopard had almost committed an unpardonablo fault, fui he íixcd on a red dcer's calf, 
nursed up at Theobald's by a womau entertained for the purposc, and much ado therc was 
to save tho poor suckling. These circumstanccs, howcvcr tiifling, are proofs that the duke 
of Savoy had studied the disposition of James, and that he wished to gaiu his affectiom. 
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Mediéis to disband the troops in Dauphiny, and importuned the 
king of Spain and the duke of Savoy to dismiss those troops 
which were a source of so much anxiety and dread to France as 
vvell as to Italy. The influence of his holiness easily prevailed on 
the queen to disband an army, commanded by a general in whose 
fidelity she did not repose entire confidence, but did not opérate 
so quickly on the minds of Phil ip and Charles Emanuel. The 
former insisted that the duke of Savoy should lay down his arms 
first, and make satisfaction for his engageraent with the late king 
of France. The latter alleged, on the contrary, that the weaker 
party ought to stand upon his guard when he seemed to be 
threatened by a more powerful neighbour *. 
The satisfaction which Phil ip demanded of the duke of Savoy 
was, that he should ask pardon for his secret treaty vvith France 
to the prejudice of the crown of Spain; and that he should send 
one of his sons to Madrid, to remain there as a pledge of his 
father's fidelity. 
Charles Emanuel, deserted by all the world, was under a 
The duke of necessity of complying with those mortifying conditions. 
gecTto make Priuce Philibert, of Savoy, set out from Turin to 
submissions Madr id on horseback ; and, while he pursued this long 
to the king I T « I I - I Í » /»I 
of Spain. and tedious joumey, he had a íoretaste oí those severe 
raortifications which he was to experience after it should be 
accomplished; for he received not, in any of the Spanish towns 
through which he passed, the least mark of attention or respect 
from the king his únele. Philip, however, received his nephew, 
at the first interview, with a decent civil i ty: not a word, indeed, 
was said of the duke, but the kindest inquiries were made con-
cerning the princes and princesses of Savoy. But the second 
audience was not so agreeable to this stranger: he was now to 
make satisfaction to the king of Spain in ñame of the duke of 
Savoy. The prince, accordingly, had framed an address to his 
Catholic majesty, sufficient, as he imagined, to satisfy the pride 
of Spain on the one hand, but, on the other, such as was not 
unworthy the independent dignity of the duke his father. This 
address he delivered with a noble grace, and with all those 
demonstrations of respect which can have place in an intercourse 
between sovereign princes. W i t h this appearance of his nephew, 
the mild temper of the king was inclined to be contented; but 
• Siri, Memorie recondite, tom. ii . p. 335. 
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in the air and manner of Philibert, as well as in the sentiments 
he expressed, there appeared to the Spanish ministers something 
not sufficiently humble and submissive; wherefore they drew up 
a new form of submission, breathing the supplications of a 
subject prostrate before his offended sovereign. The prince, 
yielding to necessity, rehearsed these haughty dictates with 
indignant reluctance. 
Phil ip now ordered his troops to withdraw from the Milanese; 
but Charles Emanuel, provoked even to madness at the indigni-
ties with which the conrt of Madr id had insulted him in the 
person of his son, refused to disband his army in Piedraont. H e 
threatened to disavow the submission that had been made in his 
ñame to the king of Spain, against whora he declaimed with 
indignation and rage; and, by various moveraents, indicated an 
inteiftion of revenging his cause either on that monarch, or his 
new ally, the queen regent of Trance. These confederates he 
attempted by various arts to divide ; but all his efforts were 
fruitless; and the united authority of the pope, Philip I I I . 
and Mary de Mediéis, compelled him at last to lay down his 
arras*. 
The storra that threatened the house of Austria being thus 
finally dispelled by its authority rather than power, Spain, pur-
suing the same pacific system, studied to maintain her dignity 
by the arts of policy, not the terrors of war. In the raonth of 
Contract of August, 1612, the duke of Pastrana was sent to París , 
mamage be- ^0 cQ^jude an( j confima a raatrimonial contract between 
tween Kli-
zabeth of Elizabeth of Franco and the prince of Spain; and 
Franceand a|)0W^ ^he same time the duke of Maine arrived in 
the pnnce 
of Spain. Madrid, in order to settle and ratify a treaty of 
marriage between young Lewis and the infanta Anne. The two 
princesses renounced every right of succession to any of the states 
of their nativo kingdoras; and their dowries were equal, being 
each five hundred thousand crowns. But these contracts were 
not performed t i l l an interval had elapsed of more than three 
yearsf. 
Contemporary writers relate, with a minute circumstantiality, 
the festivity and raagnificence that were displayed by the courts 
of Franco and Spain on occasion of these interraarriages, and 
• Ilistory of the Reign of Lewis XIII. , by Levassor, vol. i , anno 1611. 
t Hiítoire de Louis X Í I I . durant la Régence de la Reine Marie de Mediéis. Malingre. 
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describe, with equal exactness, the ceremonies that constituted 
and accompanied them. They observe, with a sort of satisfac-
tion, that the year 1612, in which the parties were mutually 
betrothed, was justly styled the year of magnificence. Fo r this 
year, also, Matthias I I . being raised to the imperial throne in 
the stead of his deceased brother, Rodolphus, all Germany, as 
well as Franco and Spain, resounded with the voice of gladness 
and exultation*. So naturally do men sympathise with the 
great, and so sincere is their joy at their prosperity f This 
disposition sufficiently accounts for those copious details of 
anecdotes/circumstances, and facts, which we find in the journal-
ists of those times; but would not apologise for a recital of 
them in a narrative addressed to another age. Such particulars, 
however, as serve to paint characters and manners are interesting 
at all times, and, therefore, ought not to be wholly omitted. 
When the duke of Maine took leave of the court of Madrid, 
before his return to Paris, he entreated the infanta to honour 
him with some commission to the king his master. " Tell bipn^ 
said the infanta, " that I am very impatient to see him.1'' This 
answer of the princess overwhelmed her governess, the countess 
of Altamira, with shame and confusión. " A h , madam,"', cried 
this lady, " what will the king of France think when the duke 
shall report to him that yon ha ve so great a passion for marriage?" 
" Y o u have taught me,11 replied the infanta, with great liveliness, 
" that one must always speak the truth."" After this frank 
declaration on the part of Anne, Lewis could do no less in return 
than express, in like manner, an impatience to see and to receive 
his bride. Accordingly, as soon as he was informed that the 
1615, infanta liad arrived in Francef, he sent a letter to her, by 
his favourite Luynes, fraught with expressions of respect and love. 
The queen-regent also wrote an affectionate letter to her 
daughter-in-law. Anne replied to the young monarch's address, 
in a manner that could not offend the delicacy of even the 
countess of Altamira. Having first expressed great satisfaction 
in the accounts she had received of his majesty's health, she pro-
fessed a desire of arriving at a place where she might have an 
* Jlist. du Regne de Louis XIII. et des principaux Evenemens arrivez pendant ce Regne 
dans tous les País du Monde. Historia de Don Felippe IV. per Don Gonzalo de Céspedes, 
lib. i. cap. 2. Mcmoires de la Régencede Maric de Mediéis. Mercure Fran^is, 1612. 
t This did not come to pass until the month of November, 1615. 
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opportunity of serving the queen, her mother, and where she 
would be free frora the languor of her present solitude *. 
The Arabian conquerors of Spain had introduced into that 
kingdom an hospitality, generosity, and refinement, unknown 
before in the West f. The court of Cordova was the 
Ine gallan- 1 
iry and ho- most elegant and polite in the world ; and thither 
Spanishna- generous spirits resorted frora all parts of Europe. 
tion ac- Together with the mechanical, the Saracens cultivated 
' the liberal arts; and while an external magnificence 
appeared in their buildings, fumiture, and dress, their poetry and 
music, consecrated to heroism and love, displayed an inward 
. generosity and elegance of mind still more noble and affecting. 
Henee the Spanish nation possessed a tasto for grandeur, a 
generosity of disposition, and a delicacy of sentiraent, which in 
the period under review were unequalled, and which have not 
yet been exceeded in any other nation. Accordingly in that 
competition of courtesy and gallantry which aróse on occasion 
of the intermarriages, the Spaniards far outshone the French. 
Not only did they exhibit greater splendour in their equipages, 
processions, and shows, but a more delicate taste, and a higher 
style appeared in their manners. The munificence of the grandees 
to the princess of Spain and the ladies of her court, to the young 
queen of Franco and her attendants, and also to the queen-regent, 
was unbounded. The French ambassador, in his way to Madrid, 
received a sumptuous entertainment at the mansión of the prime 
minister of Spain. This entertainment was so contrived that it 
appeared to have been given, not by the duke, but at the expense 
of the inhabitants of the town of Lerma, transported with joy 
at the presence of a stranger so honourably distinguished. In 
Burgos, Segovia, Madrid, and other towns in Spain, in which the 
prince had occasion to appear, the citizens celebrated his nuptials 
with fire-works, illuminations, triumphal arches, balls, masque-
* Hist. du Regne de Louis X I I I . 
" Sennor, 
" Mucho me heholgada con Luynes con las buenas nuevas, que me ha dado de la salud 
de V . M . youengo con ella, et muy desseosa de llegar donde pueda servir a my madre. Y 
ansi me doy mucha Priessa a caminar por la soledud que me haze y bezar a V . M . la mano 
a quien dios garde come decseo. Beza los manos a V . M . ANNA." 
•f* A very amusing as well as philosophical accountof the causes that formed this national 
characfer, is given by M r . Richardson, in his Disscrtation on the Langnages, Literatura, 
and Manners of Eastern Nations. 
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rades, musical and dramatical performances, and other ingenious 
diversions *. 
A t this time, there did not appear in the Spanish dominions 
any symptoms of declining trade, or exhausted wealth. The face 
of the whole empíre was gay and magnificent. But so expensive 
a display of loyalty was not approved by the duke of Ossuna, 
viceroy of Naples, a man of wit, whim, and fancy, and in every 
respect himself the most extravagant person subject to the crown 
of Spain. The men of rank in Sicily "j*, with a strange mixture 
of obsequiousness and vanity, presented a petition to Ossuna, 
humbly praying that they might be permitted to solemnize the 
publication of the double marriages as weli as the other subjects 
of the empire. They proposed, at the same time, to levy a tax 
upon themselves for this purpose. The duke greatly applauded 
this design, which he encouraged, by contributing himself to its 
execution with equal frankness and liberality; but, after the 
money of the Sicilians was all put into one bank, the viceroy, in 
the plenitude of his power, gave orders that not one maravedie 
should be wasted in idle pomp and show ; but that it should be 
distributed among certain poor virgins of honourable descent; 
adding withal, that, in his opinión, the money would be better 
employed in the multiplication, than in the solemnization, of 
marriages. The subsequent conduct of this singular person will 
recall this anecdote to the mind of the reader, and incline him 
perhaps. to conjecture that this judicious disposal of the Sicilian 
treasure did not origínate either in a disapprobation of waste, or 
in mere regard to the Sicilian damsels. 
The Spaniards had now leisure to breathe, after the toils of 
The politi war ' anc^ the authority of the Spanish ñame being in 
cal schemes some measure restored by the submission of the duke of 
orderedby' Savoy, and an advantageous connection with France, 
therestiess they endeavoured, for the presentJ, to maintain it by 
the duke of policy, rather than to extend it by a hazardous appeal 
Savoy. ^0 a r m s the ambitious spirit of Charles Emanuel, 
* Mercure F r a n g í s , 1612. Historia de Don Felippe I V . por Dou Gomjalo de Cés-
pedes, libro !. capitulo 2. 
t The Titoladi. Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii. p. 377. 
X There are writers who affirm, that at this time the Spanish ministers were so elated at 
the alliance vith France, that they considered it as the sure forerunner of the reduction of 
the rcvolted provinces. 
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incapable of rest, and impatient of disgrace, soon obliged them to 
quit that shade of ancient authority and renown, under which 
they atterapted to conceal the real state of Spain, and to prove 
its strength or its weakness in the field of battle. The duke of 
Savoy, being descended from the imperial house of the Paleologi, 
possessed ancient pretensions to the sovereignty of Montferrat, 
which was also claimed and enjoyed by the family of Gonzaga. 
In order to compose the differences which frequently aróse from 
this contested claim, a marriage was concluded between Francis, 
duke of Mantua, and Margaret of Savoy ; Charles Emanuel, in 
favour of this alliance, having resigned to his daughter and her 
children his right of succession to the marquisate in question. 
Francis died in the month of December, 1612, leaving behind 
him an only child, a daughter, in the fourth year of her age. 
Ferdinand, cardinal of Gonzaga, brother to the late duke, was, 
beyond all doubt, heir to the duchy of Mantua; but the 
sovereignty of Montferrat, which was not a fief-male, descended 
The duke of upon his niccc, the young princess María . In these 
Savoy re- circumstancos the duke of Savoy conceived the desisrn 
vives Ina _ ^ < ^ 0 
pretensions of reviviug his pretensions to that state. His right to 
reigntyof6 ^16 uiarquisate he did not consider as diminished, but 
Montferrat. rather strengthened, by that of his grand-child; and 
the guardianship of this infant would give him an entire power 
over that inheritance, which he claimed in her ñame, as well as 
his own. A n d , that the cardinal might not derive any advantage 
over him, in the contest that was likely to ensue, by immediate 
succession, he had recourse to one of those stratagems of which 
his genius was so singularly fruitful. H i s daughter Margaret, 
the widow of the deceased duke of Mantua, as well as all his other 
children, returned the fondness of his parental affections with a 
tenderness and filial reverence that knew no bounds. This lady 
he easily persuaded to declare that she was pregnant; and soon 
after, he sent the prince Victor Amadseus to Mantua, on pretence 
of consoling his sister, but, in reality, in order to conduct her to 
Turin, i f that could be accomplished, or to Milán, or to Mont-
ferrat. " It is not fit," said the prince of Piedmont to the court 
of Mantua, "that a moumful widow should pass her days in a place 
where everything around her renews her grief, by recalling to 
her imagination the object of her sorrow ; ñor is it decent that 
she should remain longer under the eye of a person jealous of the 
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succession to Mantua. A n d whithersoever my sister goes," 
continued the prince, " thither it is reasonable that the young 
princess should accompany her. Nature herself recomraends 
children to the care of their parents : and, what nature unites by 
the dearest bands of affection, it would be impiety to sepárate.1* 
But the cardinal, well knowing the end of this discourse, replied, 
that it would be improper to remove the duchess from Mantua, 
while she carried in her womb the important pledge of the 
happiness of the Mantuan state. " If the sight," said he, " o f my 
deceased brother s palace be afflicting to his widow, others are 
not wanting, whither she may retire with safety, and where she 
may live with comfort.,, 
In the mean time Charles Emanuel, the better to effect his 
designs, endeavours to engage in his cause the influence and 
authority of the crown of Spain. The Spanish governor of 
Milán at this time was John Mendoza, marquis of Inoiosa, who 
had formerly signalized his valour in the military service of the 
duke of Savoy, and who had been rewarded with the marquisate 
of St. Germán. B y this substantial mark of favour, and per-
haps not less by those honours and assiduities with which he 
cultivated the friendship of Mendoza, Charles Emanuel liad 
acquired an ascendant over his mind that seemed almost the 
effect of superior and invisible power. This man he persuaded 
to send the prince of Ascoli, accompanied by a numerous retinue, 
to Mantua, to demand the persons of the duchess and her 
daughter in the ñame of the king of Spain; not doubting that, 
if they should once be brought to Milán, he would afterwards 
be able to find means of conducting them to Turin. But the 
cardinal refused to let the princesses go ; a resolution in which 
he was confirmed and supported by the emperor, the queen 
regent of Franco, and the republic of Venice*. A t length, 
after an interval of three months, the duchess Margaret, having 
declared that she was not pregnant, was allowed to retum to 
her father's house ; but all her tears could not obtain permission 
to take along with her, her infant daughter. Ferdinand, having 
assumed the title and power of the duke of Mantua, sent the 
bishop of Diocesarea to Milán to apologise for his disobedience 
to the orders of Spain, from a regard to the decree of the 
emperor, who had adjudged to him the tutelage of his niece; 
* Batt. Nani, lib. i . 1613. Sin, Mein, recond. tom. iii. Winwood's Memoirs, vol. lii. 
S 2 
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farther enjoining the prelate to pasa on to Vercelli , to consolé 
Margaret who lived there, and at the same time to insinúate a 
proposal of a marriage between that princesa and the cardinal 
duke, as the only means of quenching the flames of discord, and 
uniting the houses of Savoy and Gonzaga both by blood and 
affection. 
The bishop, discharging his trust with fidelity and zeal, 
pressed the duke of Savoy to consent to an accommodation of 
differences. The duke discovered a readiness to converse on 
that subject, which inclined the Mantuan envoy at first to 
conclude that his embassy would not be fruitless. But Charles, 
still rising in his demands, in proportion to the importunity of 
the bishop, had nothing else in view than, by arausing this 
ecclesiastic with frequent conferences, to gain time for ripening 
a project as bold as any that had ever been conceived by any 
politician or hero. Before his eyes there lay the state of 
Montferrat, to which he had ancient pretensions, and which 
intersected and broke the strength of Piedmont, on one side 
extending itself even to the Alps, and on another stretching 
well nigh to Turin, This state, defended only by the lamenta-
tions and complaints of its present possessor, lay naked and 
exposed to the sudden attack of any hostile invader. The 
princes of Italy, enervated by luxury, would not easily be 
awaked from that profound sleep into which they had been 
lulled by long habits of indolence, subordination, and peace. 
The emperor, on that side of the Alps, scarcely possessed the 
shadow of power. The kingdom of Franco was tom in pieces 
by intestine discord; and the power of Spain, though formid-
able, was distant. The Milanese, lately disarmed, was destitute 
of military stores and provisions ; and, what was a great encou-
ragement to Charles Eraanuel, it was governed by his confidant, 
Mendoza, whose mind he might regúlate with his usual address; 
or, if he should prove unmanageable, which possessed not those 
masterly powers which are requisito to act a successful part in 
new and difficult situations., The deliberative genius of Spain 
would not act with an unusual celerity on an occasion, when a 
fear of drawing the French into Italy, would naturally recom-
mend cautious circumspection : or, i f the personal hatred of the 
duke of Lerma should prevalí in the breast of that favourite 
over reasons of state, before the hands of Inoiosa could be 
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strengthened by a reinforceraent from Spain, the power of 
Savoy might be established in Montferrat. Of all consider-
ations, that which gave the duke of Savoy most uneasiness, was 
the vigilance of the Venetian senate, to whom no revolution in 
their neighbourhood ever appeared an object of indifference. 
But he hoped that, however they might interpose their counsels, 
they would not hastily exchange the blessings of peace for the 
calaraities of war. On the whole, while distant states were 
ignorant of his schemes, and before the princes of Italy, 
involved in clouds of mutual jealousy, diffidence, and doubt, 
would unite in power or design to oppose him, he resolved to 
carry into Montferrat the thunder of his arms, and to anticipate 
resistance by decisivo conquest and firm possession. 
Ilaving secretly assembled his troops, while the bishop of 
The duke of Diocesarea yet waited for a definitivo answer to the 
vadesMoñt- ProPosal8 he had raado for reconciliation and peace, 
ferrat. Charles Eraanuel issued forth from Vercelli in the 
silence of the night that followed the 2 2 d day of A p r i l ; and 
distributing his army in three divisions, poured into Montferrat 
the terror and devastation of war. There was not anything in 
that marquisate capable of sustaining his impetuous forcé; 
Casal, the capital, in which the duke Vincenzo had planted a 
strong fortress, only excepted. A n d this also would have 
quickly fallen into his hands, if Gonzaga, duke of Nevers, who 
happened at that time to be in Italy, had not suddenly thrown 
himself into it, with a small forcé which he hastily raised on the 
coast of Genoa. B y garrisoning and fortifying such of the 
towns he had taken, as were most important for their situation 
and strength, he formed a chain of posts which opened a com-
munication between those rich and fertile countries that are 
extended along the conrees of the Tanarus and the P o : and 
m these he hoped to maintain his army by contributions and 
plunder*. 
It was now the duke of Savoy^s object to secure his conquests, 
The duke of and for this purpose, he endeavoured either to appease 
delvours to ^ose Powers whom he woll knew the violenco of his 
sccme his conduct had offended, by submissive professions of 
conquests. regpec^ an(i insidious concessions; or to divert their 
* Mercure F r a n g í s , 1613. Bat. Nan. Hist. lib. i. 1613. Hist. du Régne de Loui» 
XI1T. 
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attacks from himself, by making them objects of jealousy to one 
another. The queen-regent of France, being informed of the 
irruption of the Savoyards into Montferrat, was not untouched 
by the situation of her nephew the duke of Mantua. In the 
first fervour of passion she declared her resolution to support 
the house of Gonzaga, both with her influence and arms. 
Accordingly she immediately sent the duchess of Nevers to 
Grenoble, to engage the mareschal Lesdiguieres, who com-
manded the troops on the confines of Savoy, speedily to march 
with a powerful army to check the progress of that prince in 
Montferrat, and to chastise his presumption. But Charles 
Emanuel wrote a letter full of respect to the Queen, and, in order 
to soothe the first transports of her resentment, offered to sub-
mit his pretensions to her arbitration, and to resign into her 
hands, in the mean time, the places he had taken in Mont-
ferrat, as a pledge of his deference to her authority and her 
justice. A t the same time he instructed his partisans at the 
court of Paris, where he had found means of conciliating the 
good-will of the favourites, the mareschal and lady mareschal 
D'Ancre, to represent to the queen the impolicy of trusting a 
great army in the hands of a Protestant general; and the 
imprudence of rousing the jealousy, and inviting the resistance 
of the king of Spain. The nuncio too and the Spanish ambas-
sador having, from obvious motives, urged the same arguments, 
the queen determined to countermand the orders she had sent, 
or rather the application she had made to Lesdiguieres, and to 
employ in behalf of her nephew only her good offices at the 
court of Madr id* . 
In order to divert the resentment of Spain, or to suspend its 
eífects. Charles Emanuel employed greater art than that which 
had managed the court of France, but with less success. He 
dispatched his confessor to the governor of Milán, humbly to 
apologisc for his invasión of Montferrat, without the knowledgo 
and consent of the king of Spain. This messenger was, soon 
after, followed by the prince of Piedmont, and the prince of 
Piedmont by a number of other ambassadors in rapid succession. 
These were all of them charged with ofters so various and incom.-
patible, that the mind of Inoiosa, distracted and confounded 
• Batt, Nani, Ilist. lib. i . 1613. llistoire du Connetablc do Lesdiguieres, lib. viii. 
cb. 4 & 5. Siri, Memoric recóndito, tom, iii. p. 92, 93. 
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amidst eo great a diversity of views, knew not which to pursue, 
but reraained in a state of inactivity and irresolution. Thus the 
duke endeavoured to prevent a contest with his friend Mendoza 
in arms, by storming as it were the seat of his aífections and 
passions, whence alone flow all the operations of war and of 
peace ; and by raaking, in the language of the celebrated Nani, 
a war of wit upon his mind. But the ingenious subtlety of 
Charles Emanuel, not satisfied with preventing Inoiosa from 
acting at all , attempted to make him act in such a manner, as to 
advance the interests of Savoy in Italy, and wholly to ruin those 
of Spain. The stratagem by which he hoped to effect this bold 
design was specious. H e proposed that the governor, in the 
ñame of the king of Spain, should, with his assistance, take pos-
session of the metrópolis, the only place of considerable strength 
in Montferrat, but that every other part of that marquisate 
should be annexed to his own dominions. A t the same time;, 
that the authority of the Spanish monarch might be paramount 
over the whole province, he proposed farther, that the towns 
which he had taken, being garrisoned by Savoyards, should have 
the arms of Spain affixed to all their gates. But Mendoza, who 
wanted decisión rather than penetration, was not ensnared by 
this insidious proposal. Fo r he was aware, that should the 
Spaniards seize a part of Montferrat, while the pageantry of 
their ñame blazed over the whole, a jealousy would be excited 
among all the neighbouring powers, which the policy of Charles 
Emanuel, at a time when theMilanese was almost wholly disarmed, 
would use as an engine to subvert the Spanish power in Italy. 
The deep alarm which the invasión of Montferrat spread 
The duke of throughout all the Italian states, was a severo mortifi-
Savoy'scon- . 1 1 / » • • » a • , % i» i • 
duct a sub. catión to the loity spint of Spain, as it imphed a suspi-
tifiLtíon to' C^on' ^ e Power 0^ ^ ia* kingdom might not be 
Spain. sufficient to control the ambitious designs of the duke 
of Savoy. The Catholic king, reluctant to enter on war, endea-
voured at first to subdue the turbulence of that prince with 
menaces and frowns; and, by the mere authority of Spain, to 
quiet the fears and restore the peace of Italy. The secretary 
Vargas was despatched from Madrid to Milán, with orders to 
tho governor to announce to Charles Emanuel, that it was the 
will of Philip that he should withdraw all his troops from Mont-
ferrat, and to threaten forcé in caso of disobedience. 
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The Spanish ministers in Italy, in like manner, laboured to 
maintain the authority of their nation, by raising their language 
to the most majestic tone. The marquis of Inoiosa encouraged 
the Italian princes to trust in the protection of the king of Spain, 
rejected with disdain the idea of admitting any associate with 
that monarch in composing the diíferences of Italy, and attempted 
by various artifices to prevent Cosmo, duke of Tuscany, from 
sending assistance to his relation the duke of Mantua. Don 
Alphonso de la Queva, the Spanish ambassador at Venice, 
assured the senate, " that, without any noise or trouble, Charles 
Emanuel should be punished, and Ferdinand restored to his 
rightful inheritance ; that there was no reason to be fearful of 
any event, or to dread the turbulent ambition of any prince, 
while the undiminished goodness and power of the potentate, 
wbom he served, would not suffer any innovation in Italy, ñor 
any disturbanee of that peace which was so happily enjoyed 
under his authority *.•" 
But, although he was thus threatened by Spain, although the 
Anifices of emPeror denounced the imperial ban, and his adversary 
the duke of was directed and supported by the counsels and wealth 
of Florence and of Venice; yet the duke of Savoy 
remained undaunted, and by policy and arms steadily pursued 
his object. In order to alarm the jealousy of Spain, he threat-
ened to cali to his aid the troops of Franco. When the Pope 
exhorted him to peace, he protested that he would overwhelm 
Italy with an inundation of heretics. H e dismissed the Venetian 
ambassador with orders to inform the senate, that if they should 
persist in affording succour to the duke of Mantua, he would 
cover the Adriat ic with Turkish pirates. But while he thus 
studied to work on the fears of his adversaries, he neglected not 
to use any means by which he might conciliate their favour. H e 
offered to deposit in the hands of the Spaniards his rights to 
Montferrat, and the places he possessed in that province, on 
condition that the princess Mary should be brought to Milán, 
and remain there along with her mother : a proposition by which 
he intended at once to show his own deference to the king of 
Spain, and to sow the seeds of jealousy bctween that monarch 
and the duke of Mantua. Ñor was his design disappointed ; for 
to the measure which he had proposed the governor of Mílun 
• Batt. Nani, Hist. lib. i . 1613. 
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cordially agrecd. But Ferdinand utterly rejected it, with bitter 
complaints against Inoiosa, who presumed, without his know-
ledge, to dispose of the blood of Gonzaga. 
Charles Emanuel, having thus thrown the blame of disobe-
dience to the will of Spain on Ferdinand, endeavoured to improve 
the advantage he had gained by sending Victor Amadeus to 
represent to the court of Madrid, how much the duke, his father, 
inclined to do what should be agreeable to their desire. Of this, 
he said, he had given a signal proof, by committing into their 
hands the heir of his dominions as a pledge of the obedience of 
his whole house. 
O n the strength of all this merit with the court of Spain, the 
duke, having hastily thrown a garrison of four hundred men into 
Pontestura, under the colours of Spain, marched onward with 
his army to Nizza de la Paglia, and began to batter it from three 
different places. This town, which was but weakly fortified, was, 
however, effectually defended by the fidelity and valour of its 
governor, Manfrino Castiglione, who, by rigorous discipline, and 
by frequent sallies, gained time for its relief. 
The governor of Milán, who had by this time reinforced his 
The gover. army, roused by a general clamour, and constrained by 
n o r o f M i . ^ie orders of Spain, resolved effectually to curb the 
Jan euros * . ^ , ^ 
theambi- troublesome ambition of his fríend, the duke of Savoy. 
dnke^fsL sen* ^16 Prince 0^ Ascoli with five thousand men to 
vo.v- join the prince Vincenzo, who waited their arrival with 
three thousand more in the service of the duke of Mantua. The 
slowness of Ascoli's march seemed to indícate an intention to 
hearken to a proposition that had been made for a suspensión of 
arms; but the Mantuans urging him to advance without delay, 
the united army at last approached to Nice. The Savoyards no 
longer doubting the intention of Inoiosa to raise the siege, on 
pretence of respect to the ensigns of Spain, retreated in good 
order without being pursued. The duke of Savoy now offered 
to surrender all that he possessed in Montferrat, and peace was 
made on this condition. But this pacification did not remo ve 
the ^pprehensions of the princes of Italy ; for the duke of Savoy 
had uniformly contended for an act of oblivion in favour of count 
St. George, and other subjeets of Mantua, who had taken up 
arms to support his claim to Montferrat: and the duke of 
Mantua, on the other hand, had as constantly insisted on their 
punishment, and also on ivpar.-ition of damages. 
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These mutual pretensions appeared to the sagacity of the 
Italian states the embers of a war, ready to flame out with 
increased fury. There was evidently a collusion, they thought, 
betvveen ^Charles Emanuel and the marquis of Inoiosa, some 
secret design which would soon transpire ; for though the duke 
evacuated the towns he had taken, he did not dismiss, but, on 
the contrary, reinforced his troops; and the governor, though 
he seemed to have accoraplished the design of his military prepa-
rations, remained still in arms. Their conjectures were not 
without foundation; for Ferdinand would not pardon the parti-
sans of a competitor for the sovereignty of any part of his 
dominions, and insisted still on reparation of damages. A n d 
Charles published to the whole world, in writing as well as dis-
course, that the governor promised to hiiu that no farther 
mention should be made of damages, and that the exiles of 
Montferrat should be restored to their estates, and all the privi-
leges of other subjects; a condition froni which he was deter-
mined never to depart. 
In this contest the marquis of Inoiosa took a decidcd part in 
favour of Savoy, and in the most haughty strain threatened 
Ferdinand with all the rage of war, if he should refuse to agree 
to the terms which he had prescribed. He instantly despatched 
Antonio Pimentelli, general of the Milanese light-horse, to bring 
the young princess from Mantua to Milán. This Pimentelli 
would have done, even by forcé, if, having been conducted into 
the apartments of the child, he liad not been convinced, that, 
from illness, she was not in a condition in which she could be 
removed. Upon this the duke of Mantua sent an en voy to 
The award • ^ a í ^ r ^ ^1^1 1^8 excuse ^or no^ ^ v Í n g UP the princCSS, 
of Spain re- and another to Franco to solicit the good offices of the 
ípectmg the qUeen.renpent with the Spanish monarch, which she 
dispute con- ^ o ^ r i 
ccrning readily grantcd. The ministers of Spain at last declared 
Montfcrrat. ^ . J J ^ phü ip t,0 }je? " That the differences between 
the dukes of Savoy and Mantua concerning reparation of damages, 
and the pardon of the rebels, should be referred to the arbitration 
of the pope, the emperor, and himself; that the princess Mary 
should be brought to M i l á n ; that the duchess Margaret should 
marry Ferdinand; and that both dukes should disarm their 
forces, those of the king being sufficient to execute whatever 
should be necessary for relieving the oppressed, and subduing the 
obstinate.11 
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The marquis of Inoiosa, at the same time that he sent 
Pimentelli to Mantua, in order to preserve the appearance 
of impartiality, despatched Sanchio del Luna, governor of the 
castle of Milán, to Turin, to signify to the duke of Savoy that he 
must lay down his arms. Charles was now sensible that his 
contest with Ferdinand had no other tendency than to reduce 
himself, as well as that prince, under the dominión of Spain : 
unwilling, therefore, to disband his army, the only pledge of his 
sovereign independency, he immediately applied himself to frame 
excuses, and invent stratagems. He represented to the Spanish 
ministers at Milán, that in the province of Dauphiny there was 
an army, commanded by the mareschal Lesdiguieres, which waited 
only the queen-regent's orders to pour into Piedmont; it was, 
therefore, necessary for him to stand on his guard. Instead of 
disbanding, he insisted on leave to reinforce his army; and, as a 
pledge of his fidelity to the king, and his disposition towards 
peace, he desired that some Spanish regiments might be quartered 
in Piedmont. This, he said, would be doing him an essential 
service; because, his country being defended by the arms 
of Spain, he would be at liberty to march whithersoever the 
necessity of his affairs should cali him. But the Spaniards were 
by this time too well acquainted with the artífices of Charles to 
fall easily into his snares. They perceived that it was his aim to 
excite the jealousy of Franco, and to produce a rupture between 
that kingdom and Spain. H e doubted not, that if he could draw 
the Spanish troops into Piedmont, he would easily prevalí on the 
mareschal Lesdiguieres to cross the Alps in order to expel them. 
Hostilities, once begun, would not cease with the retreat of the 
Spaniards into their own dominions; and, amidst the contentions 
of his enemies, he might find some means of his own aggrandize-
ment. Such was the refined project of the duke of Savoy ! 
About this time, the secretary Vargas in his return to Spain, 
passing by Turin, demanded of the duke a categorical answer to 
the question, whether he would disband his troops or no ? Charles 
hesitated not a moment to show his respect to the Catholic king 
by answering in the affirmative. He immediately made a show 
of disbanding his army in the prcsence of the Spanish minister; 
but he took care to keep on foot his foreign troops, having 
dismissed only his militia, which might be quickly rcas-
scmbled. 
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The determination of the Catholic king, and his peremptory 
Effectof tone respecting Montferrat, filled Ferdinand with 
o f S p X ^ n resentinent, and Charles with indignation. Neverthe-
the minds less, Ferdinand declared that he was willing to accept 
of Savoy^8 a^ ^he other terms prescribed by the court of Madrid, 
andMantua. provided they would not insist that the young princess 
should be carried to Mantua; a condition to which they agreed 
without difficulty. But Charles Emanuel, to all the foreign 
ministers residing at his court, poured forth the bitterest 
invectives against the pride of Spain, which he represented as a 
just ground of general apprehension. " I f the Spanish monarch, 
said he, shall be suffered to impose his imperious commands upon 
me, the princes of Italy, deluded by treaties, or subdued by arms, 
will thenceforth lie at his feet, fearing punishment and asking 
pardon. If the present juncture shall prove the servility of our 
dispositions, we shall quickly be stripped of the shadow of that 
power of which we wanted wisdom to preserve the reality." 
The indignation of the duke was still more inflamed when the 
„ *. , prince of Piedmont srave him an account of his treatment 
thepnnceof at Madrid . He had no sooner arrived in Catalonia 
Piedmont at ,-i i - j i , • • x i 
the comt of than he received an order to remain in that province, 
Madrid. un t i l it should be known whether his father would yield 
obedience to the orders of the king ; and, i f he was at last 
received at court, it was with coldness and with scom. The 
prime minister spoke of the duke of Savoy with disdain and with 
hatred, and threatened the severest chastisement i f he should 
not submit, without reserve, to the authority of his Catholic 
majesty. 
This narrativo of his son fixed the resolution of Charles. He 
^ instantly declared his firm purpose to maintain his inde-
Courageous J r r 
resolution of pendeuce with his sword, or to perish in the attempt. 
Emanuel Accordingly he levies fresh troops, and exerts every 
duke of Sa- ñervo again to form a confederacy against that imperious 
race, whose incurable ambition still aimed at the 
sovereignty of Europe*. H e still kept up a cióse correspondence 
with the prince of Conde and the discontented lords in Franco, 
hoping to find employment for the arms of Phil ip in supporting 
the authority of Mary de Mediéis. A n d in spite of the positivo 
* Mercure Franyois, 1614. Siri, Momor. recon. tom. iü. p. 222, Memoires de la 
Kégcncc de Maric de Mediéis. Bat t . Nani, lib. i. 1614. 
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orders of the queen-regent, Lesdiguieres found means to pass 
several thousands of French soldiers frora Dauphiny into Pied-
mont, who greatly reinforced the Savoyard army*. 
Charles also insinuated himself, on this occasion, into the 
confidence of Maurice, prince of Orange, and engaged in his 
service some troops under count John of Nassau. But, what 
encouraged him most, was the hope of assistance from the 
republic of Venice, which, he doubted not, would readily unite 
their arms with his for the purpose of removing from their 
confines, or at least of humbling the power of an imperious 
neighbour. H e therefore despatched to Venice, John James 
Piscina, a man of distinguished abilities and powerful eloquence, 
to propose to the senate a league, defensivo and oífensive, for the 
preservation, or rather the recovery, of the liberties of Italy. 
Piscina painted, in glowing colours, the dependent condition of 
the Italian princes, and the immoderate ambition of the court of 
Spain. H e offered to refer to their arbitration the difference 
between the houses of Savoy and Gonzaga ; implored their aid 
and their advice; declaring, at the same time, that whatever 
counsels other states should follow, the duke of Savoy was deter-
mined to die with his sword in his hand, rather than to live in 
subjection to the tyranny of any power on earth. 
The Venetians admired the noble spirit of the duke, and found 
the highest satisfaction in reflecting, that the natural guardián 
of Italy f possessed all that courage and foresight which that 
important character required. Nevertheless, being unwilling to 
involve themselves in war, while there was a ray of hope that the 
liberty of Italy might be united with its peace, they declined to 
interfere in the dispute concerning Montferrat, as that matter, 
they said, had already been referred to the arbitration of the 
emperor and the king of Spain. They advised Charles to accom-
modate all differences with the duke of Mantua, and to yield to 
the superior power of Spain whatever satisfaction might not be 
unbecoming the dignity of a sovereign prince. A t the same time 
they assured him of their affection and good offices, and that 
they would not remain idle spectators of injustice and oppression. 
* Histoire du Connetable de Lesdiguieres, lib. viii. 
•f- m A l cui Senno, al cui Petto,'alla cui Destra 
Commisc il Ciel la Cura 
Delle Italicho Mura." 
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Faithful to their promise, the Venetian senate exerted their 
The duke of influence in all the courts of Europe in favour of the 
S-lVOydfb" ^u^e 0^ ^avoy- To the Spanish rainisters, particularly, 
the Vene- both at Madrid and Milán, they represented the cala-
tian senate. mities an( j the dangers of war, and expatiated on the 
advantages of concord and peace. B u l the deep wound which 
the boldness of the duke of Savoy had given to the pride of Spain 
was fomented by lenitives, and to be cured only by the sharp 
remedies of fire and sword. The Spaniards provoked, not paci-
fied, by the intercession of the Venetians in behalf of Charles 
Emanuel, proudly rejected every condition that might wear the 
complexión of treating that prince on a footing of equality, or 
even of honouring him with a capitulation. 
Inoiosa, although his own inclinations were wholly towards 
peace, in obedience to the positivo and reiterated commands of 
the court of Madrid, sent an ambassador to Turin with orders 
to Charles to lay down his arms; to require a promise, in 
writing, that he would not molest the territories of the duke of 
Man tua ; and to inform the duke, at the same time, that the 
king of Spain would not be bound by any conditions but such as 
should be dietated by his own moderation. The duke of Savoy 
listened to this message with a serene countenance, and without 
making any reply ; but he ordered the ambassador instantly to 
leave his dominions; and, tearing from his neck the ensign of 
the Golden Fleece, he returned it into the hands of that minister, 
desiring him to deliver i t to the king, and to tell him that he 
scomed to wear a badge of honour conferred by a prince who 
threatened him with chains. The duke hastened to As t i to 
collect his forces*. 
Inoiosa, whose army, lately reinforced with troops from Spain, 
consisted of thirty thousand foot and three thousand 
The govcr- r< • 
norofMiian horse, crossed the Sesia, and took up his quarters at 
fiddVtXst Caresana, not far from Vercelli, in the hope that 
the duke of Charles would humble himself before so great a mili-
tary forcé, and yield to the renown of the Spanish 
arms. But the duke, with an army in numbers greatly inferior 
to that of Inoiosa, passing over to the other side of the Sesia, let 
loóse on the Milanese all the rage of war; and, having surprised 
and burned several towns and villages, returned within his own 
* Mercure F r a i l é i s , 1614. Batt. Nan. lib. i. 1614. 
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confines with prisoners, plunder, and troops inspirited by success. 
The Spaniards, seeing the Milanese thus invaded, and knowing 
that it was naked and exposed to the frequent attacks of their 
vigilant and enterprising eneray, having set fire to Caresana and 
L a Motta, abandoned their posts in Piedmont, and retired within 
their own territorios. 
The governor of Milán, in order to make up, in some measure, 
the loss and disadvantage he had suffered in this contest with 
the duke of Savoy, encamped near Vercelli to cover the building 
of a fortress within the Spanish bounds, but so advantageously 
situated as to protect the Milanese by shutting up a passage 
through which it was open to hostile invasión, and at the same 
time to curb the power of the Savoyards in the adjacent quarter of 
Piedmont. This fortress was a mile in circuit, and, in honour 
of the duke of Lerma, called For t Sandoval. The Spaniards 
had long meditated this design, but hitherto deferred its execu-
tion, being unwilling to excite any jealousies in the princes and 
states of Italy. In this undertaking several weeks were spent; 
meanwhile the season elapsed that was fittest for action. 
When the news of the ravages committed by the duke of 
Savoy in the Milanese reached Madrid, the Spanish ministers 
were astonished at his boldness, and being unaccustomed to 
resistance in Italy, were inflamed with the highest degree of 
The rage of resentment. They vowed his destruction, execrated 
the Spaní- his ñame, and reproaching the governor of Milán with 
ards agiiinst . 
the duke of iguoranco, or want oí spint, excited him to revengo the 
Savoy. dishonour that had been done to the territorios of 
Spain, and to the royal standard. The resentment of Spain was 
farther vented in a manifestó, devolving to king Phil ip all the 
estates of Charles Emanuel which were fiefs of Milán ; and the 
imperial ambassador* denounced against Charles the ban of the 
empire, i f he should not instantly disband his armyf. 
Against those attacks of the pon. Charles Emanuel defended 
himself with the same weapon. That nono of his estates were 
fiefs of Milán, he preved from the records of history. To his 
impenal majesty he wrote a respectful letter, giving an elabórate 
and circumstantial detall of the reasons he had to be dissatisfied 
with the conduct of Spain, of the ravages of the Spanish troops, 
and the necessity he was under of keeping up a forcé to oppose 
* M Milán. t Batt. Nan, Hist. lib. i. 1614. 
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them. In conclusión, he intreated the emperor to revoke the 
interdict 'he had issued against h i m ; and farther, that he would 
employ his influence with the king of Spain, in order to engage 
him to disband his troops*. The other Spanish ministers in Italy, 
perceiving that the lofty spirit of Charles Emanuel was still 
unbroken, complained of the remissness of Inoiosa, and expressed 
to that commander a suspicion that the Spanish arras had lost 
their character of invinciblef. In order to retrieve their repu-
tation, they sent a powerful naval forcé, part of a fleet which had 
been fitted out to watch the motions of the Turks, to raake a 
descent on the coasts of Piedmont. 
The raarquis de Croix, who commanded this armaraent, finding 
Onegiia ^13^ 1^6 ^a(^ n o ^ a 0^TCe sufficient to take Nice, turned 
takenbythe his arras against Oneglia, a raaritirae town of Savoy, 
Spamards. enYjrone¿ confines 0f Genoa, cxcept where it is 
separated from Piedraont by the Apennine raountains. Disem-
barking his troops on the territories of the Genoese, he placed 
within their bounds his battering cannon, which played upon 
Oneglia with success. To this place Charles Eraanuel could not 
send any succours, without the consent of Genoa, which was 
refused. This act of hostility he revenged by reducing Zucca-
rello, a fief of the empire, under the protection of that republic. 
Oneglia was defended five days, by the valour of the marquis of 
Dogliani. Having surrendered this town on honourable térras, 
this comraander brought a part of the garrison into Maro, a 
castle situated on a rock, a little more inland, and which 
coramands some valleys full of villages, This fortress was also 
soon after reduced by the Spanish forces, increased to the 
nuraber of five thousand, by the arrival of several galleys from 
Sicily. 
The governor of Milán, urged by the reproaches and importu-
nities of his countrymen, in order to support this naval expedi-
tion, put his array in raotion, though weakened by sickness, and 
afflicted in their march by those excessive rains which at that 
season overflowed all the country. Having crossed the river 
Tanarus, not without a gallant opposition from the duke of Savoy, 
he found himself in a situation full of embarrassment: for the 
* Histoire du Regne de Louis XIII. Roy du France, et des principaux Evenemens 
arrivez pendant ce Régne dans tous les Paya du Monde. Mere. F r a i l é i s , 
f Batt. Nan. lib. i . 1614. 
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advanced season did not admit of the siege of As t i , and to cantón 
his troops in the open country, would expose them a prey to the 
vigilance and rapid movements of Charles Emanuel. He there-
fore judged it prudent to retire to the country about Alexandria. 
In the spring following, the hostile armies were reinforced, 
^ ^ f and on both sides great preparations made for war. 
peace be- But in the city of Ast i , and presence of Charles Emanuel, 
uveen the a ^reat,y was framed by Julius Savelli, nuncio at Milán, 
opamards J . '' 
and duke of and the marquis of R-ambouillet, ambassador extraor-
Savoy" dinary in Italy from France; the chief articles of which 
were, that the duke of Savoy should disband his troops, keeping 
on foot only his usual garrisons; that within fifteen or twenty 
days after, Inoiosa should also disband his army, and give his 
vvord to the pope and the king of France, that he would not 
comrait any act of hostility against the duke of Savoy; that the 
prisoners and places taken on either side should be mutually 
restored; that the jewels and dowry of Margaret should" be 
returned; and that an act of indemnity and oblivion should be 
passed in favour of such subjects of Montferrat, as had taken up 
arms in opposition to the duke of Mantua. These conditions 
were not altogether satisfactory to Charles Emanuel; neverthe-
less, having in vain endeavoured to rouse other powers to arms 
against Spain, and being desirous of conciliating the favour of the 
pope and France, who offered to guarantee the treaty they pro-
posed, he declared his readiness to accept them. It is alleged 
by some writers, that this prince would not have agreed to this 
treaty, while he had no other enemy to contend with than 
Inoiosa, if he had not imagined that it would be rejected by the 
Spanish ministers. I f this was his conjecture, he was not 
deceived; for when Rambouillet and Savelli presented it to the 
governor of Milán, in full confidence that he would sign it, he 
told them that he was deprived of all power of making peace with 
the duke of Savoy, by a late order from Madrid. 
The resolution of the Spaniards to maintain the predominancy 
WarinGcr- of their power over the princes of Italy was heightened 
man-v- and confirmed by the success of their arms in Germany. 
Prince Maurice, assisted by troops from France and England, 
on the first of September 1610, made himself master of Juliers, 
which, with all its dependencies, immediately submitted to the 
marquis of Brandenburgh, and the count Palatino of
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knovvn at that time by the title of the princes in possession. 
These princes lived upwards of two years in the sarae castle, 
and governed the states of Cleves and Juliers by their joint 
authority. But having quarrelled at last, as might have been 
expected, they broke through the agreeraent that every thing 
should be done in concert, and issued edicts, not conjointly, but 
separately. Their mutual friends, in order to heal this rupture, 
advised them to cement a friendship by marriage.* But this 
advice widened the differenee it was designed to compose. Fo r 
the prince of Neuburgh having, in consequence of this counsel, 
gone to demand the daughter of Brandenburgh in marriage, at 
a feast, when his blood was warm, and liis spirits high with wine, 
let fall some expressions, which so exasperated the elector that 
he gave him a box on the ear. This effectually cured the young 
suitor's passion for his daughter. Henceforth the princes in 
possession became avovved enemies, and thought of nothing but 
fortifying themselves against each other by strongholds, troops, 
and allies. The count Palatino, by various acts of obedience, 
courted the favour of the emperor; and, in order to conciiiate 
that of the Catholic league, the prince of Neuburgh married the 
sister of the duke of Bavaria and the elector of Cologne. The 
marquis of Brandenburgh, on the other hand, called to his aid 
the military power of the states of the United Provinces. It is 
probable, that when this infant republic consented to employ its 
arms in defence of Brandenburgh, it apprehended not any oppo-
sition from those of Spain. That monarchy, about five years 
before, had betrayed its inability to prosecute war, by its eager-
ness for peace. Since that time, it had exhibited a striking 
token of improvidence and languor, when it beheld without con-
cern, at least without any exertion, the mighty preparations of 
Henry the Great ; and the duke of Savoy had insulted it in 
Italy, as yet, with impunity. Prince Maurice, therefore, without 
any apprehension of resistance from the Spaniards, on pretence 
of carrying relief to the marquis of Brandenburgh, prepared to 
A b tion of ex*en^ ^ e boundaries of the United Provinces by new 
the United conquests in the duchies of Cleves and Juliers. Having 
States. gained the governor of the castle of Juliers, he poured 
into that fortress a strong Dutch garrison, without opposition. 
H e afterwards carne to fort Schenck with an army of eighteen 
• Interét» des Princes, [«r Monsieur de Rohan, pai t. i . disc. ir . 
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thousand men; and, penetrating into Gerraany, took Emmerick 
on the Rhine, where he placed a garrison, and many other plaees 
in the duchy of Cleves, and the county of L a Marck. 
The accession of the states of Cleves and Juliers to those of 
the United Provinces would, in the issue, have extended the 
dominión of that republic over all the Austrian Netherlands, had 
not the rapidity of prince Maurice^ conquests received a check 
from the judicious and rapid movements of the marquis of 
Prince Mau- Spinola. This penetrating genius, who had strenuously 
rice opposed gupported the pacific counsels of Prince Albert at the 
by the mar- » •» •• • j • i i 
quis of Spi- court of Madrid, now perceived the necessity of having 
nola" recourse to arms. He convinced the archduke Albert, 
and also the ministers of Spain, that the present was the proper 
time to oppose the views of that youthful state, whose successful 
struggle with the power of Spain had inspired ideas of ambition 
and nevv conquests. It was better, he said, at this juncture, to 
commit their cause to the fortune of war, and to contend for 
what remained of their sovereignty in arms, than to remain 
inactive until the power of the revolted Provinces, in the Low 
Countries, should be irresistible. On pretence of restoring the 
supremacy of the emperor and the pope over the Protestants of 
Aix-la-Chapclle, who had deposed the Catholic magistrates of 
that city, and banished the Jesuits and Romish priests, Spinola 
assembled an army of thirty thousand men, and provided a great 
train of artillery. B y seerecy and celerity he surprised Aix - l a -
Chapelle, where he re-established the papal jurisdiction and im-
perial power. Thence he bent his course to the north-east, and 
by this movement seemed to indícate an intention of laying siege 
to Juliers. But, wheeling suddenly about, he crosses the Rhine 
two leagues below Cologne, and, joining the troops of Neuburgh, 
enters Molsheim, falls down the Rhine, reduces Orsoy, and pro-
ceeds onward to Wesel, which he invests with part of his forces. 
Siege of The inhabitants of this place, by a constant and heavy 
Wesel. gre^ repujged the assailants with great slaughter. But 
Spinola, having brought up his whole army, formed his intrench-
ments with so much judgment, that his troops, covered from the 
fire of the enemy, made their approaches with celerity and with 
safety : and, having planted three batteries of eight cannon, 
he kept up so hot a fire, that within less than two hours, one of 
the city gates, and all that could oppose an entrance by that 
T 2 
276 H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F [BOOK V . 
way, was reduced to ashes. The besieged, understanding that 
prince Maurice and the marquls of Brandenburgh were coming 
to their relief, determined to malte a vigorous resistance. But 
the women, mounting the walls with their children in their arms, 
with tears and cries entreated them to surrender. The men, 
melted by the suppliant voices of their wives and screaming 
infants, sent deputies to Spinola, to ask a favourable capitulation. 
This was readily granted : it was stipulated on the one side, 
that no change sliould be introduced in the religión or govern-
ment of the ci ty; that the railitary officers of Brandenburgh 
should march out of the city with their baggage, arms, and 
warlike stores ; and that the citizens should have liberty to 
retire and settle wherever they pleased. On the other hand, 
Spinola only demanded that he should be allowed to introduce 
into Wesel a garrison of a thousand men, there to remain until the 
Dutch garrison should be withdrawn from Juliers. A s soon as he 
entered this place he began to strengthen its fortifications, and 
by all means to secure its possession. He built three hundred 
barracks near the walls, and obliged the inhabitants to furnish 
beds and other necessary furniture. H e also increased the 
garrison of Wesel with two thousand foot, and three hundred 
horse, under the comraand of Velasco. The inhabitants, in a 
strong remonstrance, represented to Spinola, that, according to 
the terms of capitulation, he was to introduce a garrison of one 
thousand men. Spinola sternly replied, that it was indeed 
agreed that he should bring into Wesel one thousand men ; but 
that he had never promised that he would at no time increaso 
their number*. Having obliged the inhabitants of Duysburgh, 
a city between Wesel and Dusseldorp, to admit a strong 
garrison, he passed the Rhine, and approachcd so near the camp 
of Maurice, that the sentinels of the opposite armies frequently 
conversed, and sometimes drank together. The prince of Orange 
sent a messenger to Spinola, to know in what prince's ñame he 
entered the states of Cleves and Juliers. Spinola answered by 
putting a similar question to the prince. 
These illustrious antagonists lay near to one another for a 
considerable time ; but neither found an opportunity of attack-
ing the other with advantage. And , without breaking the truce, 
* I n ó r e t e des Princes, pnr M . de Roban, part. ii. disc. v. Histoire du Régne de Loiiis 
XIII. tt des principaux Evénemens , &c. 
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or incurring the usual calamities of war, they had fallen on a very 
Convenient convenient method of making conquests, by a kind of 
makingcon- tacit compact, to divide between them the states they 
quest. pretended to protect. The United Provinces, alarmed 
at the success and apprehensive of the futuro enterprises of 
Spinola, at last engaged France, England, and certain Protestant 
princes in Germany, to mediato a reconeiliation between the 
princes in possession. A conference was held for this purpose 
at Santhen, a town which in this quarrel had remained neutral, 
but without effect. The articles of agreement proposed by the 
mediators of peace, though they would in all probability have 
been accepted by Brandenburgh and Neuburgh, were only a 
subject of cavil to both Maurice and Spinola, who sought not to 
compose the differences of these princes, but to fix themselves in 
the places they had taken. Thus ends this singular campaign, 
which is not distinguished bybloodybattles and splendid victories; 
but whose origin and issue convey important political instruction. 
Fo r thence it appears that concessions to a hostile people natu-
rally invite them to repeat their attacks ; that the only proper 
time for a nation to make peace is when the enemy desires i t ; 
and that no state can admit within its bounds the arms of a 
superior power, without endangering its own independence. 
A little good fortune is sufficient to revive the projects of 
1615. mortified ambition. The court of Madrid, elated by 
cess of the successful career of Spinola in Germany, felt their 
Spaniards resentment more and more inflamed against that daring 
i n f l a m e s p r i n c e who first exposed the Spanish weakness in I taly; 
inent a^d'11' an(^ no* e^ss aSa^ns^ ^ s feeble opponent, the marquis of 
ambition. Inoiosa. A letter was intercepted from the king of 
Spain to the governor of Milán, in which he upbraided him with 
the remissness of his fonner conduct, and gave orders from that 
instant to make an irruption into Piedmont, before the duke of 
Savoy, or any others of the enemies of the monarchy, could 
collect their forces, dispersed in winter-quarters, to oppose him. 
The governor, who had received repeated orders to the same 
purpose, as soon as the season of action arrived, took the field 
DukeofSa- at the head of an army of thirty thousand men. To 
voy tulccs • • • » 
the field this formidable body of veteran Spaniards the duke of 
agamst ti.e Savoy opposed an army of seventeen thousand men, 
governor of ^ Jí « o 
Milán. French, Swiss, and Savoyards, and those noble eíforts 
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of courage and conduct with which he was wont to encounter 
danger, and to raise himself above misfortune. The contest 
which ensued proved how much the success of an army depends 
on the genius of one man; and how vain are the greatest military 
preparations, if they are committed to the conduct of an unskilful 
commander. 
The first movements of the Spaniards, in the present cam-
paign, indicated an intention of surprising Cortemiglia; the 
possession of which would lay open to their incursions the states 
of Piedmont, on the side of As t i , Seve, and Canelli. Into this 
place, therefore, Charles Emanuel immediately throws three 
regiments of French, and eight hundred Swiss, under the com-
raand of the count of St. George. The duke himself, hastening 
from Turin with seven thousand men, comes up with the 
marquis of Mantua, in his route to Cortemiglia, at the head of 
five or six thousand, at Bistagno, a fortress of Montferrat, 
situated upon a height, commanding a highway from the sea to 
the confines of Milán. The thick and solid walls of Bistagno, 
and the frequent and bold sallies of the garrison, rendered all 
the efforts of the duke of Savoy to reduce it under his power 
fruitless. In the hurry of his march, he had not been able to 
bring up to this place more than two small cannon. H e 
attempted therefore to scale the walls, and attack the garrison 
sword in hand. He was persevering in this desperate and mad 
attempt, when he was informed that Inoiosa was on his march 
for the relief of Bistagno, at the head of a powerful army. He 
therefore immediately raised the siege, retreated in good order 
to Canelli*, and thence to As t i , having perceived that the 
Spaniards bent their course to this place. As t i , before the 
arrival of the duke, was garrisoned with four thousand foot, and 
a considerable number of cavalry, under the command of Prince 
Thomas. Here the whole forces of Charles Emanuel were now 
collected ; and the issue of the siege of A s t i was likely to decide 
the fate of the house of Savoy. But the city being of largo 
extent, and the walls in many places infirm, the duke deter-
mined to meet the enemy at the river Versa, on the banks of 
which Inoiosa appeared with an army of twenty-four thousand 
men. The rest of his forces he had thrown into St. Damiano 
* Hist. du Régnc de Louis XIII. 
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and ü lp iano *, towns of Montferrat, the first not far from As t i , 
and the second on the verge of Turin. The duke of Savoy, with 
fifteen thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse, opposed the 
passage of the Spaniards over the Versa, in vain. A n d Inoiosa, 
having crossed this river with his whole army, endeavoured to 
gain the heights of a hilly tract which stretched in a winding 
course to A s t i . This station he hastened to occupy, that he 
might thence be enabled not only to cut off the duke^ retreat 
to that city, but to drive him out of the adjacent plain. But 
Charles, having penetrated his design, immediately fell back to 
two posts in that strong ground, which he had already slightly 
fenced by small trenches. These posts he committed to his 
French and Swiss troops, forming together about two-thirds of 
his army, with some pieces of cannon. The Savoyard infantry 
Engage- he reserved to act as necessity might require, and with 
"ween^he ^ o cavalry he flanked his two posts in a plain imme-
dukeofSa- diately beltow them. The firra order and delibérate 
Spaniards 6 valour of the Spanisli troops sustaining the furious 
under tbe assaults of the Savoyard cavalry, and pressing up the 
marquis of . . f • 
Spinoia. hil l which was occupied by the French, gained at last 
an eminence, the possession of which decided the contest: for 
two pieces of cannon played from thence on the enemy with so 
great effect, that they retreated with such confusión and trepi-
dation to the second post, as struck a panic into the Swiss, and 
threw them also into a disorder that was soon after followed by 
a precipítate flight. The duke of Savoy, on this important day, 
which seemed pregnant with the fortune of his house, appeared 
resoluto to maintain his sovereign power, or at least to prove 
that he deserved it. Performing the duty both of an able com-
mander and gallant soldier, he directed the fight, brought relief 
to the oppressed, animated the weary, rallied the faint-hearted, 
and poured on those that fled the bitterest reproaches. But the 
terror that had seized multitudes being more contagious than 
the courage of one individual, though a general and sovereign 
prince, every eífort of Charles to withstand the steady valour of 
the Spaniards was ineffectual. A t last, yielding to adverse for-
tune, but not despairing of better, by the most extraordinary 
exertions of courage and of art, he carried off from the sceue of 
* Batt. Nan, Hist. della República Véneta, lib. i. 1615, 
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action five field-pieces, and part of that baggage wliich liad been 
left by the Swiss. 
Nothing was now wanting to make Italy tremble, but either 
the duke of Savoy at the head of the Spanish army, or the 
Spanish army under the colours of the duke of Savoy. The 
governor of Milan knew indeed how to fight; but not how to 
direct a campaign, or to improve a victory. H e suffered the 
enemy to raarch unmolested to A s t i . A n d , instead of laying 
siege to that city, fortified himself against the attacks of his 
antagonist, by the most extensive lines of circuravallation, and 
every possible method of defence. The distant and ineffectual 
bombardments of Inoiosa, the skirmishes wliich followed between 
the Savoyards and Spaniards, and the desperate but unsuccessful 
assault that was made by the former on the camp of the latter, 
might demand a particular descriptíon, were it necessary farther 
to illustrate the courage which was exhibited this campaign by 
the duke of Savoy, or that incapacity which disgraced the con-
duct of the governor of Milan . The Spanish troops lay for six 
weeks in the open air, on the hills near A s t i ; and the excessive 
heat, the unripe fruits, and the impurities of the camp, pro-
ducing diseases, there ensued a great mortality both of men and 
cattle. Although the army liad been reinforced with the troops 
left at Sandoval, and others that arrived by sea, it was not half 
so strong as when it sat dovvn before As t i . Charles, on the other 
hand, though he enjoyed more commodious quarters, experienced 
such frequent mutinies among his foreign troops, that it was 
difficult for him to determine whether they were of greater ser-
vice or disadvantage. Thus both parties were in situations 
which inclined them to hearken to térras of peace. A capitula-
tion was drawn up by the raarquis of Rarabouillet, and effectu-
ally recomraended to the acceptance of the governor and the 
duke, by the Venetian and English ambassadors. This was not 
materially diíferent from the treaty which had been fraraed by 
the pope's nuncio and the French arabassador, in the narae of 
their respective courts, towards the end of the preceding year, 
in the city of Ast i . Only it gave greater security to the duke 
against the attacks of Spain: for it was guaranteed by the 
republic of Venice; and, in case of its being violated by the 
Spaniards, a power was consigned to the duke of Savoy, of simi-
moníng to his assistance, in the narae of the king of France, the 
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mareschal Lesdiguieres, and all the governors of provinces bor-
dering on his dominions. The French arabassador, thinking he 
had now accomplished the object of his embassy, returned to 
París. But no sooner had he left Piedmont, than Ferdinand, 
whose thirst of vengeance was in proportion to the narrowness 
of his capacity, began to let loóse all the fury of his resentment 
on his revolted subjeets. A n d Charles, on the other hand, only 
made a show of disbanding his troops *, being justly apprehensive 
that the late agreement between him and the governor of Milán 
vvould be disavowed by the court of Madrid. The treaty of A s t i 
was equally violated on both sides. 
When the court of Madrid was informed that Inoiosa had 
1616. concluded a disgraceful war by a dishonourable peace, 
perseded ¡ñ ^hey were moved with great indignation. But the 
the govem- man whose wrath on this occasion blazed forth with 
tnent of 
Milán by the greatest fury. was Don Pedro de Toledo, marquis 
SvuS** of V ^ l a Franca» distinguished even in Spain by á 
Franca. haughty boldness, and a zeal for the glory of the 
monarchy. H i s temper was vehement, yet his understanding 
was at once subtle and solid, and his courage both exalted and 
constant. Such a character would have appeqxed a fit instru-
ment for inflicting the vengeance of Spain on the duke of Savoy, 
although he had not been allied by blood to the house of Mantua. 
This man, therefore, was chosen by Philip to succeed the mar-
quis of Inoiosa in the government of Milán ; and the consenting 
voice of the Spanish nation applauded his choice f . 
* He very formally disbamled his French troops, but took care that they should be all 
of them incorporated into his Savoyard companies. As to the Swiss, they could not be dis-
cliarged without payment, concerning which there aróse innumerable delays and difBculties. 
f A famous Italian historian (Batt. Nani), and others in deference to his authority, sup-
pose that Inoiosa would have been recalled sooner, had not the duke of Lerma been afraid, 
by too great military successes in Italy, to defeat the project of the double marriages, whicli 
wre not consummated (as has already been observed) till the end of the year 1615. But 
when vrc reflect on the great military forcé committed to Inoiosa, which was nearly double 
that of Charles; on the repeated orders he received from his court to act with expedition 
and with vigonr ; and of the attcmpts he made in consequence of these orders ; that cou-
jecture appe;irs ratber refined than solid. The regeney of France vvished for the final accom-
plishment of the double marriages as ardently as the court of Spain ; and if they had been 
averse to that measure, an unsuccessful struggle on the part of Spain with the duke of Savoy 
would not have been the means of reconciling them to it. The appointment of the marquis 
of Villa Franca, at this time, to the government of Milán, scemti to have been the natural 
result of the feelings of the Spanish ministry, on an occasion that wounded their pride, and 
excited thcii resentment. 
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The duke of Savoy, dissembling his suspicions of the hostile 
designs of Spain, sent a gentleman of his bed-chamber with two 
letters to Toledo, in one of whicli he congratulated him, accord-
ing to the custom of Italian princes, on his safe arrival at Milan, 
and in the other he described, in a pleasing manner, the mutual 
advantages of faithfully fulfilling the treaty of As t i . To the first 
of these letters the governor, with becoming politeness, replied, 
by returning his most humble thanks to the duke for the honour 
he liad done him, and declaring that he would not faii to 
acquaint the court of Madrid with the respect and affection his 
highness had expressed for the Catholic king. To the other he 
answered, "that the true way to regain the favour of Philip, 
and to preserve lasting concord, was, not to think any longer on 
what was intended to be done, when both parties had their 
swords in their hands V This answer, had it needed any com-
ment, would have been sufficiently explained by the governors 
common discourse, and still more by his aetions. It was his 
common talkthat the peace of A s t i was a mere collusion between 
his predecessor and the duke of Savoy, and that a powerful king 
could not be tied down to the observance of a treaty with an 
inferior prince by any other bands than those of his own mode-
ration. In the meantime he did not leave Charles in any uncer-
tainty concerning what he had to expect from his Catholic 
majesty^ moderation; for he every day made new levies, and 
reinforced his army with a great number of Swiss, Germans, and 
Italians. 
The menaces of Don Pedro did not escape from that wary 
politician through any intemperance of discourse. They were 
intended to bend the lofty spirit of Charles to a humble submis-
sion to the crown of Spain, and to prepare his mind to catch at 
the bait by which he hoped to govern his ambition. He 
insinuated to his envoy at Milan, that if the duke his master 
would ask pardon of Philip, and submit his pretensions wholly 
to his arbitration, that monarch would add to the dominions of 
Savoy the city of Geneva. But Charles Emanuel was not unac-
quainted with the artífices of the Spanish court. It was but 
lately that they had attempted to incite the prince of Piedmont 
to rise in rebellion against his father, and that Toledo himself 
had entered into a treaty with the governor of Zuccarello to 
• Sin, Mcm. recond. tom. iii. p. 409,410. 
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deliver that place into tbe hands of the Spaniards. The duke, 
provoked equally at the pride and the insidious policy of Spain, 
rejected with indignation the offer of Toledo, and prepared to 
maintain his independence and honour by forcé of arms. H e 
represented to the guáranteos of the treaty of As t i the conduct 
and the designs of Toledo, and immediately summoned to his 
aid the mareschal de Lesdiguieres, in virtue of that authority with 
which, for this purpose, he had been invested by the king of France. 
Toledo, on the other hand, inveighed against the obstinacy of 
the duke, and solicited Lewis to compel him to disband his 
The king of troops, and to deliver the places and prisoners he had 
soivesTtr taken into the hands of the king of Spain, promising 
maintain this monarch should afterwards take every step, 
the treaty of . . „ , , r 
Asti. not inconsistent with the digmty of his crown, to 
remove all jealousy of his arms. Lewis had already sent the 
count de Bethune, a man of capacity and singular address, into 
Italy, in order to accommodate those differences which disturbed 
the repose of that country. He now sends the mareschal Lesdi-
guieres to join his influence to that of Bethune, hoping that 
Toledo would yield to the presence, and reputation, and power 
of the mareschal, what he might otherwise find means to evade. 
Lesdiguieres, without delay, went to Turin, where, in conjunction 
with Bethune, he framed a treaty of accommodation, which 
being proposed to the consideration of the governor and the 
duke, both partios agreed to a cessation of arms. The mareschal, 
having assured the duke of Savoy of his warmest support, if it 
should be found necessary, departed from Turin, and retumed to 
Dauphiny*. 
Meanwhile, the Duke of Monteleon, the Spanish ambassador 
Intrigues of in Franco, as&ured the court of Paris, that the views 
Sluít of of PhiliP in Italy were not those of ambition, but of 
Frauce. justice and peace. A n d this assurance being accom-
panied by arguments that spoke directly homo to the wants of 
some courtiers, and the avarice of others, effectually changed 
those resolutions which had been taken in favour of Charles 
Emanuel. The strictest orders were issued that no troops 
should be levied in France, without the express commission of 
the king. The design of those orders was, either to obligo the 
duke of Savoy to give his consent to an accommodation, on terms 
, 
* Hist. du Connét. de Lesdigniíh-o?. 
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dictated by Spain, or to render him unable to carry on a war 
with that nation, should he refuse it-
But the duke found firmer support in the wisdora and forti-
tude of the Venetian senate, than was to be expected from the 
feeble and fluctuating comiséis of France. That republic levied 
for his service a considerable body of French troops, and cbn-
tributed, besides, a supply of seventy-two thousand ducats 
a-month, for the purpose of maintaining his army in Piedmont. 
The orders of the young king of France were in vain opposed to 
•the gold of Venice, the authority of Lesdiguieres, the duke of 
Mayenne, and other chiefs, who encouraged all soldiers of fortune 
to cross the mountains, and to join the standard of the duke of 
Savoy. But above ali, Charles was encouraged by the prospect 
of the duke of Nemours pouring down into the plains of Milán, 
from the mountains of Savoy, at the head of an army of six 
thousand men. H e was ignorant that the military preparations 
of this duke, was that which chiefly nourished the hope of victory 
in the breast of Toledo. 
Henry, duke of Nemours, chief of a branch of the house of 
The duke of Savoy cstablished in France, had been amused by 
joinsThe Charles Emanuel with the hope of marrying a princess 
Spiiniards 0f hig family, for not a less space of time than six or 
dukeofsL seven years. The disappointment made a deep im-
voy- pression on his mind, and filled him with resentment. 
Don Pedro, having learnt these circumstances, conceived the 
project of fixing Nemours in the interests of Spain, by operating 
at once on his ambition, and that spirit of revengo which was 
then his domineering passion. H e insinuated to his rankling 
mind, through the dukes of Guise and Monteleon, that, on con-
dition of his taking up arms on the sido of Spain against his 
relation Charles Emanuel, the Spanish monarch would reward 
his services with the investiture of the duchy of Savoy. The 
duke of Nemours did not hesitate to cióse with these terms. 
Counterfeiting an ardent desire to maintain the independeney of 
that sovereign family whence he derived his origin, he raised a 
forcé of seven thousand men *, which he was about to load into 
the heart of Savoy ; while Toledo, with a powerful army, was 
ready to penétrate into Piedmont. But Charles Emanuel, 
having discovered the designs of Nemours, instantly sent orders 
" Batt. Nani, iib, ii. anno IfílG. 
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to the governor of S avoy to secure those places which had been 
destined for the reception of the troops of Nemours. And the 
prince of Piedmont hastening to the northern passes of the Alps, 
seized the posts on the route which a body of troops was to take, 
that had been levied by the Spaniards in Franche-Comte and 
Burgundy. 
In the mean time the duke of Nemours had taken the field, 
and penetrated through lofty mountains, by rugged and difficult 
ways, into the valley of Sizeri. This small district yielded to the 
superiority of his power, without much resistance. He was 
preparing to improve the advantage he had gained, and to press 
forward upon the other territories of Savoy, when part of his 
troops deserted him, carrying along with them the greater part 
of both the provisions and the ammunition. The troops that 
remained, being few in number, and weakened exceedingly by 
hunger and thirst, served as pastime to the shepherds of the 
mountains, who harassed and hunted them from one place to 
another. In this extremity the duke of Nemours implored the 
succour of Spain, that he might be enabled to save the remains 
of his army from inevitable ruin by crossing the Rhone; but the 
Spaniards were deaf to his prayers. They even refused to send 
him a supply of bread and ammunition, and debarred him from 
the liberty of lodging his troops in Franche-Comté, a province 
which in those days belonged to the crown of Spain. In this 
desperate situation he found relief in the generosity of Charles 
Emanuel. That magnanimous prince, at the intercession of 
Lesdiguieres, and other chiefs of Franco, pardoned his revolt, 
and, on the disbanding of his troops, restored him to the 
possession of his estates in Savoy *. 
The governor of Milán, in expectation that the irruption of the 
Operation» duke of Nemours into the dominions of Charles would 
siovernor of distract his mind, and divert his arms, drew near, with 
Milán. thirty thousand men, to the frontiers of Piedmont. 
And, having thrown bridges over the Tanarus and the Sesia, and 
fortified and garrisoned them at either end, he waited for a 
favourable opportunity of entering that country, his head-quarters 
being fixed at Candia and Vil la ta . The duke of Savoy, on the 
other hand, lodged in Caresana and la Motta, in the province of -
Vercelli, with an army not exceeding twenty thousand. After 
* Morcnrc Fmnyoig, IBlfi. Hist. dfc R»Vnc <)o Ltmis XIII. 
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various skirmishes with the troops of Savoy with various success, 
Toledo having separated his army into two divisions, ordered one 
of these to pass the Sesia at Gattinara, and to join the other, 
which he was to conduct himself, near Crescentino, a town on the 
Po, on the confines of the principality of Vercolli and Montferrat. 
It was Don Pedro's design, by this moveraent, to inclose his 
enemy by the Sesia with fortified bridges and fort Sandoval on 
the east, by the Po with Crescentino on the south, and by taking 
and garrisoning St. Germano, a fortress equidistant from both 
these rivers. Charles was now posted in Sigliano, a place 
environed with lakes and raorasses, and accessible only by one 
narrow entrance. This station the duke had chosen, as being 
very convenient for the relief of Vercelli , the reduction of which 
seemed the object to which all the steps of his adversary 
ultimately tended. A s soon as he perceived that Toledo directed 
his course to Crescentino, he mounted two thousand rausqueteers 
behind an equal number of cavalry, and, passing by the Spaniards 
with great speed, threw succours into that town sufficient for 
its protection. The Spanish general, in revenge, ravaged the 
villages of Piedmont, and Charles, from a like motive, those of 
Montferrat. 
The autumnal rains now overflowed the country on all sides, 
;uid the hostile armies lay for some days inactive, the Savoyards 
in Crescentino, the Spaniards in Livorno and Bianze, towns of 
Montferrat. The waters having subsided, Toledo, aided by the 
treachery or cowardice of the governor, made himself master of 
St. Germano, the possession of which was a considerable stop 
towards the reduction of Vercelli . This important place was 
still his aim, though, in order to obtain it, he made a feint of 
marching to Crescentino. The duke constantly harasscd his 
troops in flank, that, by interrupting the raarch of his enemy, he 
might be enabled himself to preoccupy the plain of Apertole, 
where he might make such arrangements as would put it in his 
powor eithcr to give battle, or to stand upon the defensivo. The 
subtlety of the Spanish commander, on this occasion, practised a 
successful stratagem against the artful Charles Emanuel. Toledo 
made such a disposition of his troops as seemed to indicato an 
intention of obstructing the march of the Savoyards even at the 
expense of a battle. Upon this, the duke brings forward the 
flower of his army into the van, expecting every moment to be 
1617.] P H T L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 287 
attacked in front by the enemy. But the Spaniards, with ten 
thousand foot and some cavalry, suddenly made an attack on his 
rear, consisting of four thousand French infantry and some 
cavalry, when they were filing through a wood. The Savoyards, 
struck with surprise and terror, began to retreat in the greatest 
confusión; but the duke saved his dismayed forces, i f not from 
the disgrace, yet from the slaughter, that commonly pursues a 
flying enemy. H e despatched the intrepid count of St. George to 
check the pursuit of the victorious enemy, with a select band of 
five hundred musketeers. The brave resistance of the count, and 
the quick approach of night, enabled the French troops in the 
service of Savoy to retreat with safety to the main body of the 
army. 
The duke, whose sanguino temper contemplated the bright side 
of every object, comforted himself under this misfortune, by 
reflecting, that it would revive tho ancient animosities between 
the Spaniards and the French, and that this last nation, enraged 
at their late discomfiture, would retrieve at once his loss and 
their own honour. W i t h these sentiments he retired to Crescen-
tino. The season was now far advanced; and Toledo, having 
in vain attempted to surprise Crescentino, and finding that 
keeping the field served only to diminish tho number and impair 
the health of his troops, abandoned the posts he possessed in 
Piedmont and Montferrat, having left garrisons only in Trino, 
St. Germano, and Gattinara. This last was a town which 
commanded a passage over the Sesia, and which had been 
reduced under the powTer of the Spaniards by Don Sancho del 
Luna, governor of the castle of Milán*. 
The duke of Savoy, through excessive fatigue and agitation of 
1617. mind, about this time contracted an illness, which, 
IllncM of . . . . . 
the duke of concumng with the ngour of the advancing season, 
Savoy- seemed to premiso on his part a respite from all 
hostilities. H e could not take the field in person, and was oven 
unable to walk abroad. In this irksome confinement the activity 
of his mind amused the tedious hours by forming various projeets 
and stratagems of war. A n d , under his present infirmities, he 
felt a sensible consolatiou in the capacity, bravery, and filial 
affection of four illustrious sons, who were ready to execute with 
fidelity and alacrity whatever he should command them to 
* Batt. Nani, liK ii. 1016. LCVÍIMOI-, totn. iii. Mere. Frany. Ifilfi. 
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perform. The duke of Nemours having been constrained to lay 
Movements down his arms, the prince of Piedmont repassed the 
prince of mouiitains by the valley of Aosta, and conducted his 
riedmont. troops to Ivrea. Here he received orders to lead them 
against Gattinara, in which was a Spanish garrison of four 
tliousand men. The prince did not hesitate to carry the orders 
of the duke his father into execution. But yielding to the 
remonstrances of his most experienced officers, he exchanged an 
enterprise which appeared to be impracticable, for another which 
might be accomplished without difficulty, and vvhich was not of 
less importance. 
The principality of Masserano is bounded on the east by the 
river Sesia, and in every other quarter by the territories of the 
duke of Savoy ; a circumstance which naturally placed it under 
the protection of Spain. Toledo, with a view to strengthen that 
chain by which he designed to invest and straiten Vercelli, had 
made an offer to the prince of Masserano to garrison his capital, 
and also the fortress of Crevalcor, with Spanish forces. The 
prince, avvare of the danger of such a measure, chose rather to 
undergo the hazard of an irruption from Piedmont than to resign 
the sinews of his power into the hands of Toledo. H e returned 
the governor thanks for his proffered aid, but expressed a hope 
that it would not be necessary. Toledo had in the mean time 
marched his troops to the banks of the Sesia, and seemed ready 
to pour into the territories of Masserano. In this situation of 
affairs the prince of Piedmont, by a concealed and forced march, 
surprised and invested the capital of that small state, which 
oponed its gates without resistance. He now marched against 
Crevalcor, with eight thousand foot and four hundred horse. 
He appeared before the walls of that place on the 27th of 
January, and having seized all the avenues by which it might 
receive relief, he soon made a breach in the walls, and took the 
town by assault. T h e ' terrified inhabitants fled before the 
slaughtering sword, directing their trembling steps towards the 
castle. Multitudes were trodden to death in this scene of 
confusión and horror, and eager in the contest to enter through 
that narrow gate which was the only avenue of life. A very few 
made their way into the castle. The rest were either taken 
prisoners or slain by the sword. 
The prince of Masserano, as soon as he leamt the hostile designs 
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of Víctor Amadeus, had implored that aid which he had formerly 
rejected: and the governor of Milán had imraediately despatched 
to his relief Don Sancho del Luna, with two thousand foot and 
three hundred horse; but in the mean time the castle capitulated; 
and, in too late an attempt to relieve it, Don Sancho, with many 
officers and prívate men, lost his life *. . Thus the duke of Savoy 
contended with the power and the art of the marquis of V i l l a 
Franca, not without advantage. It is, however, probable that all 
the efforts of Charles Emanuel would have been repelled in the 
end by the valour, discipline, and ancient renown of the Spanish 
arms, directed by the genius of Toledo, i f they had not been 
supported by the raagnanimous resolution of the mareschal 
Lesdiguieres equally to consult his own glory and that of Franco, 
in spite of all the allurements and the threats of the misled 
princes, by whom it was at that time governed. 
Although fortune sometimos raises the worthless and the weak 
Character of to the highest offices, yet it must have been singular 
schaiTe^ nier^ that, in times productivo of great characters, 
diguieres. could exalt a prívate gentleman, of a very narrow 
fortune, to the first dignity of a great kingdom that can be enjoyed 
by a subject. Francis de Bonne, with a patrimony of fifty crowns 
a year, rose to the station of constable of Franco, in opposition to 
many rivals of noble birth and great power. H e was of an 
agreeable aspect, a mild temper, and easy manners; qualities 
which were not indeed very shining in themselves, but which 
contributed not a little to raise the mareschal Lesdiguieres to 
situations in which he had opportunities of displaying the greatest 
talents and virtuesf. H i s understanding was manly and solid : 
he possessed, in an eminent degree, the virtues of political and 
martial courage; and, though he was susceptible both of friendship 
and lo ve, his ruling passion was ambition. The duke of Savoy 
cultivated the friendship of this man with uncommon attention, 
and practised with unwearied diligence all his address, in order to 
gain so important an acquisition. To the mareschal Lesdiguieres 
heshowed all the respect due to a crowned head. If he received 
hiña at Turin, it was with the utmost pomp and magnificence. 
If he addressed him in writing, he bestowed on him the endearing 
and flattering appellations of "good neighbour, and faithful 
• Batt. Nani, lib. ii. 1616. Mere. Fran9. 1617, 
f Anielot «le la Ilonssaie. 
U 
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friend.,, He consulted him on every occasíon : and the mareschal 
retumed his confidence and assiduities with tlie sincerest fidelity 
and aífection. The attachment of Lesdiguieres to Charles 
Emanuel was well known to the court of Spa ín ; and they 
endeavoured to counteract its effects by operating on his natural 
ambition. The king and queen of France, at the instigation of 
the Spanish ambassador, attempted to seduce him frora the 
interests of Savoy, by calling him to court, in order to be invested 
with the privileges and rank of a duke and peer. A n d , that he 
might be enabled to support the magnificence of that character, 
the king of Spain oífered him any sum of money he should be 
pleased to demand, to be paid in any part of Europe. These 
allurements failing of success, a supply of money was oífered, 
sufficient to raise and maintain, for a year, an army of forty 
thousand men, with a suitable train of artillery, to be employed 
in making himself master of Savoy. Of this duchy the duke of 
Monteleon, in ñame of the Spanish monarch, oífered him the 
investiture, on condition of his assisting the Spaniards to conquer 
Piedmont. This temptation having been also resisted, Monteleon 
engaged Louis to transmit to the mareschal the most peremptory 
orders to abstain from levying troops, and on no pretext what-
ever to move to the assistance of the duke of Savoy. These 
orders were in vain reiterated and enforced, at the desire of the 
feeble court of Paris, by the authority of the parliament of 
Grenoble. Lesdiguieres, in a letter to the king, repre-
mous resó- sentcd to his majesty, in a firm though respectful tone, 
lution of that his duty called him to restore the dignity of France 
Lesdigueres. J ^ J ^ ^ fuifiiijng the eugagements of that kingdom 
to the duke of Savoy, and chastising the perfidy and insolence of 
Spain. A n d he added, that, however treacherous counsels might 
beguile the good intentions of his majesty for a time, he did not 
despair of his present conduct meeting one day with the appro-
bation of his sovereign *. 
On the nineteenth day of December, 1616, the mareschal 
Lesdiguieres, exhibiting a signal proof of the greatness of his own 
mind, and the weakness of the crown of Franco, set out from 
Grenoble, at the head of an army of seven thousand foot and five 
hundred horse, raised in Dauphiny by his own authority, and at 
the expense of the republic of Venice. Having crossed the Alps 
* Hist. du Connétable de Lesdiguiéres, liv. ix. 
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in the midst of winter, he arrived at Turin on the third day of 
January. Reinforced by so considerable a body of gallant troops, 
and encouraged by the presence, reputation, and aid of a great 
commander, whose natural abilitíes were matured by long expe-
rlence in the military art, the duke of Savoy was elated with the 
hope of vindicating his own independence, and inflicting severo 
vengeance on that haughty court which threatened him with 
subjection. The united forcea of Lesdiguieres and the duke 
were irresistible. St. Damiano, Alba , and Montiglio, with other 
places of inferior importance, reduced under the power of 
Charles, with a rapidity corresponding to the ardour of his mind, 
nourished his hopes of raaking other conquests, still more impor-
tant. The reduction of Montiglio is eminently distinguished, not 
Reduction by any noble display of generosity or courage, but by an 
gfi^lnd a incident extremely humiliating to man; as i t reminds 
memorable him how much he partakes of the nature of those fero-
that hap- cious and noxious animáis which are the constant objects 
pened on 0f j^g hostility and abhorrence. A contest haviner arisen 
that occa- t ' / . i » i 
sion. concermng the garnsomng of that fortress between the 
French and the Savoyards, the fierce disputants, inflamed by 
their engagement with the common enemy, directed their unset-
tled fury and reeking swords against each other. Upwards of a 
hundred had fallen, on either side, before the authority of the 
general, the count of St. George, was able to prevent a mutual 
and complete massacre. The savage thirst of blood being now 
excited, and incapable of being suddenly quenched, loudly 
demanded an inhuman gratification-, and found it in the slaughter 
of the garrison that had capitulated on favourable terms*. 
The discontents in France had now drawn to a crisis which 
The blind threatened the crown with all the violence of civil war. 
ness of am- These discontents Charles Emanuel, as above related, 
had assiduously nourished with his usual dexterity and 
address. But the most enlightened genius sees not far into 
futurity ; and often the most sagacious ambition blindly labours 
for its own destruction. The intestino discords and commotions 
of France obliged the king to recall Lesdiguieres; and instantly 
the marquis of V i l l a Franca, who, yielding to a torrent which 
could not be resisted, had resolved to confine his troops within 
narrow limits, and to act wholly on the defensivo, renewed his 
• Bat. Nani, Hist, lib. iii. 1617. 
u 2 
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May attacks on the duke of Savoy, commencing his opera-
SiegeofVer- tions with the siege of Vercelli . He sat down before 
this important place towards the end of May, with a 
strong army and a very great train of artillery. When Charles 
was informed that the governor of Milan had begun to put his 
troops in motion, he was not at a loss to discover his intention; 
and, with a view to disappoint it, having speedily increased the 
garrison of Vercelli to the number of four thousand, he deter-
mined to march his army from Gabbiana, and, by reducing the 
fortress of Pontestura, to oppose with advantage the progress of 
the Spanish army. But, while he meditated this scherae, he 
discovered that other dangers threatened him than the siege of 
Vercelli . 
Don Pedro, coHstrained to relinquish for a time all open 
attacks on the states of Charles Emanuel, had eraployed tho 
natural subtilty of his active mind in laying plots against that 
prince^ person and family. Different persons were suborned to 
cut off the duke by assassination or by poison; and a conspiracy 
was formed, by certain French officers of the garrison of St. J a , 
to seize the prince of Piedmont, who commanded that fortress, 
and to deliver him into the hands of the Spaniards. The disco-
very of these ignominious plots* diverted the design of the duke 
• It is remarkaLIc, that, although there never was a people more distinguished than the 
Spaniards for honour and fidelity, yet there is not auy period in the history of any nation 
more disgraced by plots and conspiraeies than that which forms the subject of this narrativa. 
When resentment, ambition, or other passions, cannot fiud gratification openly, and in the 
direct road of superior forcé, thcy have recourse to stratagem ; as fully appears from the his-
tory of nations as well as individuáis. Perhaps, too, ideas of superior dignity have a tendency 
to blunt the sense of injustice committed against inferiors. The different prices or compen-
sations for wounds, and even for murders, that took place about eight hundred years ago, 
in so many nations pf Europe, is a striking proof how much this iniquitous sentiment natu-
rally prevails in the human mind. Thero is as great injustice in wantonly maiming, or 
otherwise torturing, or putting to death a dog, a horse, or other animal, as there would be in 
wounding or destroying a man; yet there are but few wbose consciences would be stung 
with remorse at the commission of such crimes ; a matter which is to be accounted for only 
from that immeasurable distance which our fancy, still more than nature, interposes between 
men and the inferior animáis, and which precludes all sympathy. A nation accustomed to 
think itself vastly superior in dignity to all others, and to arrógate to itself an exclusive pri-
vilege of dominión, fancies it has a right of asserting that privilege by all nieans, however 
inconsistent with justice. The inhabitants of Calais were saved from the furious resentment 
of Edward III,, of England, by the transcending virtue of six of their fellow.citizens, who 
devotcd themselves to certain deslruction for the sake of their relations, friends, and com-
panions ; the condition required by that haughty and cruel conqueror. These six heroic 
burgesses were saved from death, not by the gcncrosity of Edward, but by the importunity 
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against Pontestura, by summoning his attention to cares more 
imraediate and urgent. The conviction and punishment of con-
spirators and assassins employed that critical time which would 
otherwise have been occupied in preventing the siege of Vercelli, 
or, by plentiful stores of provisions and ammunition, to prepare 
it for a vigorous resistance. 
The siege had not been continued above sixteen days, when 
the Savoyards were reduced to the necessity of supplying the 
place of iron balls and lead with t in and stones. The quantity of 
their powder also was insufficient; ñor could all the efforts of 
Charles eneourage the gallantry of the besieged by a fresh supply. 
Two hundred and fifty cavalry, with sacks of powder of twenty-
five pounds each, were waylaid, in their concealed march to 
Vercelli, through the vigilance of Toledo; and the fire of the 
Spaniards having been communicated to such inflammable mate-
rials, only thirty of that number made their way into the place 
of their destination. Two hundred and twenty horses, with their 
riders, miserably perished in one sudden conflagration; yet the 
besieged made a gallant defence, and repulsed the Spaniards, in 
different sallies, with great slaughter. The assailants made a 
furious effort to carry the place by a general assault; but, if the 
valour of the Spaniards was animated by the love of glory and 
the hope of plunder, the Savoyards, anticipating in their imagi-
nations the calamities and horrors that awaited themselves, and 
objects still dearer to them than life, in case of defeat, were 
roused with the fury of despair. The steady bravery of the 
besiegers gave way on this occasion to the rage which impelled 
the besieged; and, in the first moment of their retreat, a 
hundred cuirassiers, sallying with their swords in their hands 
into the ditch, made a dreadful carnage. Fifteen hundred men 
perished on the side of Spain ; on that of Savoy not a hundred. 
The duke of Savoy, being informed of the desperate intrepidity 
of his faithful garrison, was filled with all those emotions which 
the fidelity, bravery, and danger of men suffering in his cause 
were naturally fitted to produce in his generous mind. H e 
and tcars of his quccn. Yet this princc was profuse in his civilities to the Krench officers, 
who, about the same time, had fallen into his hands, although their bravery was not to be 
compared with that of the burgesses. Had six knights appearcd before him ia the guise of 
malcfactors, instcad of six citizens, he would have been shockcd at the ¡dea of orderiug 
thcm to be led to cxecution, and have been full iu his praises of their signal patriotism and 
rcsolution. 
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atterapted, a second time, secretly to convey ammunition and 
provisión into Vercel l i ; but lost, by that fruitless effort, four 
hundred men. A t last, exasperated by repeated disappointment, 
he drew near to the Spanish camp by night, by storming, or even 
making a feint of storming which, he hoped to be able to succour 
Vercelli . Having ranged his troops along the banks of the Sesia, 
he sent a strong detachment over that river, in sepárate parties, 
under the marquis D'Urfe , who was repulsed by a body of 
Spanish horse, with the loss of six hundred men. This bold 
measure of the duke was not wholly without success; for, while 
the Spaniards hastened to oppose the Savoyards in that quarter 
where D ' ü r f e directed his attack, a thousand men, loaded with 
ammunition, made their way into Vercelli by another. But this 
scanty supply was far from being sufficient; and, besides this 
circumstance, the garrison was now greatly diminished by the 
accidents of war and the fatigues of duty. In this situation 
were the besieged, when Toledo, on the 25th of July, which, 
being the festival of St. James, was deemed fortúnate for Spain, 
made a general assault, and effected a lodgment in a bastión 
against which, from the commencement of the siege, he had 
principally directed the fury of his artillery. The garrison, at 
that instant, demanded and obtained honourable terms of capitu-
lation; their baggage and arms, and all the honours of war. 
Toledo, having garrisoned Vercelli , and levied very high contri-
butions on the inhabitants, marching his army along the course 
of the Tanarus, reduced under the power of Spain Soleri, 
Felician, and Anona, with other places ; the possession of which, 
he hoped, would pave the way to the execution of an enterprise 
he meditated against the important city of As t i *. 
A n unexpected and tragical event in Franco interrupted the 
Tragicaifate career of Toledo in Italy. Concino Concini and 
schaUmi1^ Eloanor Galigai, afterwards the mareschal and the 
lady mare- ja(jy mareschal D'Ancre, made their first appearance 
sclial D A n - ' • . _ _ , 
ere. at the court of Par í s in the train of Mary do Mediéis, 
on her first arrival in that city from Florence. Their abilities 
and address, aided by that sympathy which men feel for their 
compatriots, however humble their rank of life, when in the 
course of Providence they accompany or meet each other in 
foreign lands, so gained on the favour of the indulgcnt queen, 
* Oatt. Nan. lib. iii. Hi»t. du Régnc de Louis M i l
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tliat sho raised them to a degree of power intolerable to the 
nobles, and odious to the people. Depending on the queen-re-
gent, they depended also on Spain, the great prop of her power, 
and were naturally devoted to the interests of a crown which, 
by supporting M a r y X supported also their authority. In order 
to prolong the period of their borrowed power, they diverted the 
thoughts of Lewis, now of age, from matters of state, by encou-
raging him in the pursuit of those youthful amusements which 
had hitherto occupied all his time, and engrossed all his atten-
tion. The more effectually to fix his mind in an indiíference 
towards all political objects, they provided him with companions 
of his own age, whose society, they imagined, would amuse his 
leisure, and heighten by sympathy his relish for those pleasures 
to which he was addicted. Among these, Charles Albert de 
Aibertde Luines, a young gentleman of Avignon, was distin-
comes the guished for the handsomeness of his person, the grace-
thrking6©0/ ^ness 0^ ^a a^r' an<^  ^ e obliging politeness of his 
Franco, behaviour. H e gained by degrees the affection and 
confidence of his young sovereign, and was indulged, at all times 
with familiar accessj to his person. Concini perceived the 
ascendant this young favourite had acquired over the k ing ; and? 
in order to attach him to himself, preferred him to the govern-
ment of Amboise. But Luines, prompted by his own ambition, 
and encouraged by the raurmurs and discontents that pervaded 
the kingdom, gave such an account of the conduct and designs 
of his benefactor, as filled the inexperienced mind of his prince 
with horror, and persuaded him that the preservation of his own 
Ufe, as well as his power, depended on the death of the mareschal 
D'Ancre. V i t r i , captain of the guards, undertook and accom-
plished the bloody purpose of sacrificing the lifo of the mareschal 
to the suspicions. of the king. On the 20th of A p r i l , the unfor-
túnate Florentino carelessly entered within the gato of the royal 
palace of the Louvre, which was instantly shut behind him, and 
was walking towards the apartments of the queen-regent, read-
ing a letter as he went, when the captain of the guard arrested 
him in the ñame of the king, and beckoned to his accomplices, 
who stood by him in anxious expectation of that signal. Three 
assassins, at that instant, poured the contents of their fire-arms 
into his body, which, after he had fallen dead on the ground, 
they spurned, and cut in different parts with their swords; but 
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the populace, greedy of every opportunity of giving vent to the 
animal ferocity of their nature, and zealous on all occasions to 
avenge on the powerful and great the unequal distributions of 
fortune, dug up the mangled corpse of Concini, which had been 
ignominiously buried, and dragged it in horrid triumph along 
the streetiS of Paris. They afterwards, having cut it in small 
pieces, roasted and inhumanly devoured i t ; and happy was the 
man who could obtain the smallest morsel of the savage sacrifice*. 
The wretched Galigai was condemned to death, on pretence of 
eorcery. She exerted, on her trial, and in her last moments, a 
constancy and strength of mind which the melting spectators 
compared with the fortitude of Sócrates, and contrasted with 
those tears which, not many years before, disgraced the exit of 
the intrepid duke of Biron. 
The authority of the queen-regent was anníhilated by the 
stroke which cut off the mareschal D ^ n c r e ; and Lnines, who 
succeeded to all the power of that stranger, agreeably to the 
common conduct of new ministers in all nations, departed at first 
from the maxims, and vehemently arraigned the conduct, of his 
predecessor. H e particularly exclaimed against that uniform 
deference which had been shown by the former administration to 
the counsels of Rome and Madr id f. In this temper was the 
court of Franco when news arrived of the surrender of Vercelli . 
Immediately it was resolved to succour the duke of Savoy. 
Lesdiguieres once more crossed the mountains with twelve 
thousand foot, and two thousand horse. In his train were many 
Lesdiguie- lords and gentlemen of Franco, volunteers; among 
tod^assisu whom was the great duke of Rohan, at the head of 
anee of the threc souadrons of cavalry. The orders of the mareschal 
duke of Sa- * . ^ • i • » 
yoy. were strenuously to aid the duke of Savoy m his efforts 
to recover his own dominions, but not to involve the court of 
Franco in a war with Spain, by insulting either the territories of 
Milán or Mantua. But Lesdiguieres had greater objeets in 
view than to expel Don Pedro from the coasts of Savoy. The 
military reputation of the Spanish commander, instead of repres-
sing the courage of the mareschal, filled him with an ardent desire 
* Bernard, Histoire de Louis XIII. Siri, Mem. recon. totn. iv. Relation de la Mort 
du Mareschal d'Ancre. Journal de Ba«8onipicrre. Memoires d'Amclot de la Huussaie. 
•|- Siri, Mem. recoud. tona. iv. p. C'8. Rélat ion de la Mort du Mareschal d'Ancre. 
Memoircí de Rulian, liv. i . 
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to take the field against an antagonist whose genius and vigour 
would give full exercise to all his abilities and experience, and 
over whom a victory would be truly glorious. However, making 
a show of respect to his majesty's commands, he ordered his 
troops to lay aside, for a while, the colours of Franco, and to 
wear those of Savoy. 
Don Pedro de Toledo, after the reduction of Vercelli, had 
distributed his army, for the purpose of refreshment, in different 
towns and villages of Montferrat, but chiefly in those of the 
province of Alexandria. In the midst of all his quarters lay the 
village of Feliziano, which was slightly barricadoed, and defended 
by two thousand men. The experienced eye of Lesdiguieres 
quickly perceived that, by surprising this centrical station, he 
would deprive the Spaniards of the most proper place of rendez-
vous in their possession, and prevent a junction of their divided 
forces. H e communicated these ideas to Charles Emanuel. 
The duke was, at first, struck with the danger of attempting an 
enterprise against a place surrounded by the posts of the enemy; 
but Lesdiguieres insisted that, by a nocturnal, rapid, and unex-
pected march, it would not be difficult, but, on the contrary, a 
very easy raatter, to make the duke master of Feliziano, from 
which centre he might turn his successful arms against the other 
quarters of the Spaniards with great glory and advantage. 
Charles acquiescing in the reasoning, or yielding to the authority, 
of the mareschal, an expedition was concerted against Feliziano. 
Thither the combined army began to march, as soon as the 
darkness of the night favoured the enterprise, in three divisions. 
The van was led by the mareschal Lesdiguieres, the main body 
by the duke of Savoy, and Schomberg, mareschal of the camp, 
brought up the rear with the artillery. But Charles Emanuel, 
taught by the reduction of Vercelli to respect the valour of the 
Spaniards, and the abilities of the marquis of V i l l a Franca, 
bethought himself, after the troops under Lesdiguieres had 
moved, that the situation and motions of the Spaniards rendered 
the expedition on which he had entered extremely dangerous : 
he therefore sent a courier to the mareschal, advising him to 
return on his steps. The mareschal, who, in an advanccd age, 
possessed all the fire of youth, replied to the messenger, with 
much emotion, " I have folio wed the profession of arms abo ve 
fifty years, without having ever turned my back on the cnemy ; 
298 H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F , [BOOK V . 
an honour of which I am determined my conduct on this day 
shall not deprive me. There is more shame in retreating than 
danger in going on." Having said this, he jumped out of the 
litter in which he had hitherto been borne, and, notwithstanding 
some feverish symptoms that were about him, mounted on horse-
back, placed himself at the head of his troops, and continued his 
march*. H e arrived at Feliziano about the dawning of tho 
day ; and the duke of Savoy having joined him soon after with 
the main body of the army, which he condueted by a prívate 
way with astonishing celerity, the place was immediately invested 
and taken by assault. A U the common soldiers, and many of 
the inhabitants, were put to the sword. The officers were raade 
prisoners. Not a man of Feliziano escaped with his liberty and 
his l ifef. Quatordeci, Renfracora, Anona, Rocca, and Nice, 
were also quickly subdued by the united arms of Charles Ema-
nuel and Lesdiguieres ; the rapidity of whose conquests, in the 
space of a week, weakened the Spanish army by a loss of more 
than five thousand men. Don Pedro now abandoned his design 
of besieging As t i , and retreated from Soleri into the Milanese; 
all his forcé, vigilance, and art, being necessary to put that 
country in a posture of defence against the threatened irruptions 
of the duke of Savoy. But the duke of Monteleon having 
assured the king of Franco that Vercelli should be restored, and 
the trcaty of As t i executed with fidelity and promptitude on the 
part of Spain, Lesdiguieres was recalled in tho full career of 
victory. The mareschal, having in vain remonstrated that tho 
present juncture presented a glorious opportunity for recovering 
the Milanese to the crown of France, yielded obedience to the 
reiterated commands of his sovereign. Toledo agreed to a 
cessation of arms, and promised to use his utmost endeavours to 
effcctuate an entire accommodation, and, particularly, came under 
an engagement to Bethune, at Pavia, the 9th of October, that, 
on condition of the duke's disbanding his army, and restoring 
the places he had taken in the course of the current month, he, 
on his part, would give up Vercelli , with the other places he had 
seized, and disarm his troops, in November. This agreement 
being made, the mareschal marched back to Grenoblo *. But 
• Hist. du Régnc de Louis XIII . et des Evéncments príncipaux, &c. 
f Batt, Nan. lib. iii. 1617. Mem. de Roban, liv. i . 
* Ilist. du Counútable de Lcsdiguieics, liv. ix. 
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the ministers of Spain, not satisfied with the return of the French 
troops into Dauphiny, rcmonstrated to the court of France, 
that the keeping on foot so great a forcé, BO near the confines 
of Savoy, would be an infraction of the treaty of A s t i . They 
declared that Vercelli would not be delivered up to Charles 
Emanuel while the Swiss troops hovered in the country of Vaux, 
and his friend, Lesdiguieres, was ready, on the shortest notice, 
to march to his aid at the head of an army. Lewis, who was 
willing to maintain the independency of Savoy, but averse to 
any violent rupture with the Catholic king, not only disbanded 
his own troops in Dauphiny, but also urged Charles to preclude 
Toledo from every pretext of war, by laying down in good 
earnest his arms ; assuring him of his warmest support and pro-
tection, in case the Spaniards should attempt, either by open 
forcé or secret artífice, to elude the execution of the treaties of 
Pavia and A s t i . The promise of the king having been warranted, 
at his majesty's desire, by the superior authority and credit of 
the mareschal Lesdiguieres, Charles Emanuel disbanded his 
army. Upon this, the French ambassadors, Modene and Bethunc, 
went from Turin to the governor of Milán to assure him of this 
fact, and to engage him to imítate the duke's pacific example. 
They soon perceived, from his affected difl&culties and evasions, 
not only that he had no mind to restore Vercelli , but that it 
was his intention to make fresh attacks on the duke of Savoy. 
Lewis, who, in the solitude of rural scenes and amusements, 
The gover- had hitlierto concealed an elevated courage, was moved 
avemto30 e(lua^ indignation and surpriso at the treacherous 
peace. conduct of Toledo. " I am not at a loss," said he to 
the Spanish ambassador, " to conjecture the cause to which I 
ought to ascribe the delays of Spain to give satisfaction to the 
duke of Savoy. The king, your master, thinks I daré not go out 
of my kingdom without leaving it full of distractions; but I wish 
him to know that it is not altogether in so bad a condition as he 
imagines it to be ; and, if my kingdom should be ruined, and my 
sovereignty annihilated by my absence, I am determined to cross 
the mountains, and, at the hazard of my life and of my crown, to 
fulfil my promise to the duke of Savoy, and to obligo the king of 
Spain to make good his word to me." The voice, the looks, and 
gestures of the young king mado an impression on the mind of 
Monteleon, which he communicatcd to the court of Madrid. 
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Orders were immediately despatched from thence to the govern-
ment of Milán, to execute with promptitude and good faith all 
the articles of the treaties of A s t i and Pavía*. But the court 
of Spain found that it was as hard a task to incline the marquis 
of V i l l a Franca to peace, as it had been to rouse Inoiosa to arms. 
His first excuse for not disbanding his troops was, that the Swiss 
regiments, lately in Piedmont, had not returned to their own 
country, but halted in the country of Vaux, ready to obey the 
nod of the duke of Savoy, from whom they still drew their usual 
pay. Bethune protested, in writing, that the troops of the duke 
were disbanded, and charged Toledo with all the calamities that 
might arise from his disbelief of a matter of fact, of which he 
might easily obtain the most undoubted evidence. The gover-
nor, driven from this ground, privately offered the duke of Savoy 
the greatest advantages, i f he would abandon his connexions with 
Venice and Franco, and unite his interests with those of Spain. 
Provided that Vercelli should remain in the hands of the 
Spaniards, and that Casal should also be added to the state of 
Milán, he promised to extend the dominión of Charles over all 
the rest of Montferrat. This artífice having failed of success, he 
endeavoured to persuade the duke of Mantua to insist on a com-
pensation for damages, and on, what he had always so much at 
heart, the liberty of punishing such of the subjects of Montferrat 
as had espoused the cause of his adversary. But neither did 
this stratagem succeed. He next had recourse to a contrivance 
which he deemed infallible : he attempted to excite the jealousy 
of the duke of Savoy by circulating whispers that, when Ferdi-
nand should be restored to the sovereignty of Montferrat, the 
house of Gonzaga would give it up to Spain, in exchange for 
other possessions. But Charles having disregarded these false 
reports, Don Pedro devised yet another expedient, which might 
subdue the wary, but spirited, duke, by provoking his indignation. 
His sccretary, Carene, who was then at Milán, along with the 
Frenqh ambassadors, Toledo haughtily ordered instantly to leave 
the territories of Spain, and to go about his business. B y this 
artífice he surprised the mind of Charles, and gained an advan-
tage over his understanding through the agency of his passions. 
The high-spirited duke, not adverting that Toledo was now 
* Discours de ce qni s'est passé dans 1c Piedmont et TEtat de Milán, &c. Apud Hist. 
du R^gne de Louis XII1. 
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practising such ingenious stratagems on his own mind, as he 
himself had employed when he carried on a war of wit on that 
of Inoiosa, instantly suspenda the evacuation of the places he%had 
taken, and sends advice to Modene and Bethune to return from 
Milán. The subtilty of the Spaniard (such is the advantage of 
making an attack !) would have triumphed o ver that of the 
Savoyard, which was equal, i f not superior, had not the French 
ambassadors conjured the latter not to make sport to the former, 
who sought for nothing else than a pretext for reviving hostili-
ties, The duke, admonished by the prudence of these ministers, 
restored, on the 6th of A p r i l , all the places he possessed in 
Montferrat: he also evacuated Zucarello, Anona, and Masserano, 
and every other fief he had seized of the empire. His prisoners 
he delivered into the hands of the French ambassadors. News 
having arrived of all these things at Milán, the governor, equally 
surprised and chagrined, exclaimed, " It appears that the treaty 
of As t i must at last be executed, since heaven and earth will 
have it so*." H e released his prisoners, and evacuated St. Ger-
mano, but still held fast possession of Vercelli . 
The court of Madrid , in the mean time, had sent repeated and 
positive orders to fulfil all the conditions, without exception, of 
the treaty of A s t i ; and, in order to give the world a striking 
proof how much they disapproved the conduct of Don Pedro, 
they determined to recall him, and to appoint the duke of Fer ia 
his successor in the government of Milán. This intention was 
not kept a secret from Don Pedro; yet he persevered in the 
invention of new evasions. " It is not consistent," said he, " with 
the honour of the monarchy to restore Vercelli while the French 
ambassadors remain at Milán. The restitution of that place 
raust not seem to be extorted by the threatenings of Franco, but 
to be, as it really is, a voluntary deed on the part of Spain." 
This pretext was removed by the immediate departure of Modene 
and Bethune. " Before I give up Vercelli,,, said Don Pedro, 
once more, " I insist that Garesio (a town of Montferrat belong-
ing to the count de St. George, but now garrisoned by the troops 
of Savoy) shall be restored to its right owner." Garesio was 
restored; and Toledo, all his artífices being now exhausted, 
began with proud reluctance, and by slow degrees, to carry away 
from Vercelli the ammunition and the arms. But, after this 
* Batt. Nan. Hist. lib. iii, anno 1618. 
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operation was begun, he bethought him of yet another pretext 
for gaining time. - H e required a new promise from Charles 
Emanuel, that he would not give any occasion of offence to the 
duke of Mantua : but the ministers of Ferdinand, impatient of 
these multiplied delays, and more suspicious of Toledo himself 
than of any of the princes of Italy, declared in writing, to his 
great vexation, that they required not any other assurances of 
the pacific intentions of the duke of Savoy tlian those they had 
already obtained. 
Men's astonishment at the public conduet of the marquis of 
V i l l a Franca was heightened when they remarked its coincidence 
with that of the duke of Ossuna. 
Don Pedro Girón, knight of the Golden Fleece, and a grandee 
Characterof 0^ ^ 16 ^rs^ c^as8 0^ Spain, inherited from a long line of 
the duke of ancestors the pride of noble birth, and the command of 
Ossuna. ^ princely fortune; circumstanees which are sometimos 
indeed found in conjunction with meanness of sentiment, but 
which fostered that natural sublimity of imagination that carried 
Ossuna to pursue grand designs by extraordinary means. His 
temper was uncommonly fervent, and his fancy Kvely, even to 
extravagance. Henee, though his understanding was quick and 
penetrating, his conduet was neither regulated by the common 
maxims of policy and prudence, ñor his demeanour, in the inter-
courses of life, by the rules of propriety and decorum. In the 
presence of his sovereign, he would talk with a gaiety and bold-
ness unknown in the courts of kings, and which appeared to the 
sage gravity of his compatriots to border upen madness. But 
his conversation in all companies, and on all occasions, was 
adorned with a brilliancy of wit, which, in the eyes of most men, 
would more than compénsate many levities and indiscretions. 
This duke is justly censured by grave historians for his gallan-
tries, which were not veiled or palliated by delicacy of sentiment; 
but, on the contrary, were sensual, open, and licentious. Y e t that 
grosser species of love was attended with this advantage, that it 
left his mind free and disengaged, and did not interfere in any 
respect with his projeets of ambition*. H e had served in the 
army, in the war with the United Provinces, in a high rank, and 
with great glory; and his merit, as a soldier, was either the 
• What was said of Sylla, is applicable to Ossuna. Voluptatcm cupidus, gloiúe cupi-
dior; otio, luxurioso csse, tamen a negotiis nunquain voluptas remorata. 
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cause, or, as oftener happens in courts, the pretext, for his 
preferment to the important station of viceroy of Naples. 
In this station he amazed the world with the singularity of 
his character, and disturbed its repose by the boldness of his 
ambition.* 
When the race of Ottoman extended their conquests from 
History of ^16 ^ a c ^ ^ea ^16 Gulf of Venice, a number of the 
the Uscoc- ancient inhabitants fled from the terror of their irresis-
cbl" tibie arms to the forests and mountains on the fron-
tiers of the countries now known by the ñame of Turkey in 
Europe : and, having acquired, from their wandering and 
unsettled manner of life, a ferocity of character, they gradually 
became careless of their herds and flocks, and subsisted chiefly 
by hunting and rapiñe. The üscocchi (for that is the ñame by 
which those fugitivos are distinguished) were no longer that 
effeminate race which yielded without resistance their fertile 
possessions to the invasions of their enemies. Impelled by the 
hardships and the courage of barbarians, they made frequent 
inroads into the settlements of their conquerors, and satisfied 
their wants by plunder, while they gratified their revengo by 
devastation. In this vagabond state they lived for many years, 
wandering from place to place, still directing their course to 
those wild and rugged abodes which prosperous nations avoid, 
but which the unfortunate court, as the seats of freedom. The 
Austrian coasts on the confines of Istria, broken by the opera-
tions of the elements into a thousand rocks and creeks, and 
small islands of difficult access, appeared a fit habitation to the 
Üscocchi: and the emperor Ferdinand, desirous by all means 
to form a barrier against the irruptions of the Turks into 
Hungary, bestowed on this fierce and warlike people the strong 
town of Segna, which became their capital. In the neighbour-
hood of these fugitivos lay the territorios of a people similar in 
their origin, but more prosperous in their fortunef, whose wealth, 
both on sea and land, invited the rapacity of men who had no 
other profession than that of robbers and pirates. The Üscocchi, 
instead of punishment for these offences, received protection 
* Batt. Nan. Hist. della República Véneta, lib. iv. 1620. Historia de Don Felippe 
IV,, Rey de las Espanas, por Don Gonjalo de Céspedes, lib. segundo, capitulo seg. 
f The Venetians found an asylum from the fury of Attila in the insignificancy, still 
more than the natural strength, of fens and morasses. 
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from Ferdinand, archduke of Gratz, within whose government 
Segna was situated. This produced a war between the Austrians 
Warbe- an(i ^he Venetians. The menaces of the Turks*, and 
tween the ^he prospect of an expensive election to the crown 
.md Vene- of Bohemia, soon inclined Ferdinand to hearken to 
tmns. terms of accommodation with the republic, whose army, 
powerfully reinforced by soldiers of fortune from Holland, liad 
invested the capital of Goritia, and reduced it to the greatest 
extremity of distress. The Spaniards would have willingly fur-
nished the means of carrying on a war against a people that, on 
every occasion, strenuously opposed their domineering schemes 
in Italy. But their contest with Charles Emanuel fully employed 
all their resources, and prevented a disjunction of their forces. 
Ye t , whatever could be done in favour of Ferdinand and the 
Uscocchi, was performed by the duke of Ossuna and the marquis 
of V i l l a Franca. Amidst the heat of the campaign in Piedmont, 
Toledo kept up a considerable military forcé near the Venetian 
borders, and made other preparations which seemed to threaten 
a diversión in favour of the Austrians. This, the truce with the 
duke of Savoy, brought about by the mareschal Lesdiguieres, 
enabled him afterwards to accomplish. Whi le Don Pedro, by 
his menaces, and by his attacks on the Venetians by land, 
endeavoured to relieve the Austrians, Ossuna, by various opera-
tions at sea, and with great success, laboured for the same end. 
B y his orders, a Spanish fleet cruised in the Mediterranean, in 
order to intercept any succours that might be sent to the repub-
lic by that channel; while another interrupted the sources of 
their wealth and power by seizing their merchant-ships in the 
Adriat ic . These were brought in triumph into the port of Naples, 
which became the rendezvous of corsairs and pirates. Here, 
such of the Uscocchi as had been driven from their strong-holds 
on the Austrian coast, found freedom of trade and personal 
protection. The profuso genius of Ossuna did not afford shelter 
to the Uscocchi and other pirates, that he might share in their 
plunder, but that he might collect a sufficient number of despe-
rate men for the execution of any daring enterprise. In the 
mean time, the Neapolitan merchants found means of represent-
ing to the court of Madrid , that the piratical trade which was 
* Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii. A letter from sir Dudlcy Carleton, dated Venice, 
27th of February, 1612. 
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now carried on at Naples, liad ruined fair coramerce, and of 
course diminished the royal revenues. Happily for the Neapo-
litans, their complaints coincided, both in time and intention, 
with the remonstrances of France. A n order was dispatched to 
all the foreign ministers in Italy to suspend hostilities, as a 
negociation was now on foot for a general peace between Savoy 
and Spain, and the Venetians and Ferdinand of Austria. 
The marquis of Bedmar soon after paid his compliments to the 
Venetian senate on its happy conclusión *; and Toledo withdrew 
the troops he had sent into the states of the republic, into the 
territories of Milán. But Ossuna, enraged at the very ñame of 
peace, sends a fleet into the Adriatic, under the command of the 
famous admiral Rivera, and denounces immediate death against 
the man who shall daré to complain to the court of Madrid of 
the interruption of commerce. Both this fleet and that which 
was sent to oppose it from Venice, after a slight encounter, were 
dispersed by a storm. The Spaniards took shelter in Brundisium, 
the Venetians in St. Croce, a port which they had occupied for 
some time, with a view to prevent Ossuna from fortifying, as he 
threatened, several rocks on the confines of Ragusa, a small 
republic protected by the Turks. The Ragusians, a commercial 
people, were naturally disposed to give every encouragement to 
a power that disputed the empire of the Adriatic with a nation 
whom they had long considered as their oppressors : accordingly, 
they had receíved, at different times, Ossuna's fleets into their 
harbours, and both refreshed them with provisions and recruited 
them with sailors. The Venetians now chastised this avowed 
partiality for their enemies ; and the Ragusians complained of 
their conduct, and represented their designs as dangerous to the 
Ottoman Porte. A military forcé was immediately stationed along 
the coasts of Dalmatia and Albania ; and Ossuna, taking advan-
tage of this circumstance, endeavoured to spread, throughout all 
the Italian states, the terror of a Turkish invasión. The best 
possible expedient on this alarming occasion, he said, would be to 
strengthen his hands with such a naval forcé as might be 
sufficient to defend the liberties of Europe, and raise, among the 
* It was agreed that the Venetians shonld restore their conqucsts without reserve: and 
on the part of the Austrians, that they should restrain the piracies of the Uscocchi; banish 
their ringleaders, and also the banditti of the republic that lived among that people; that 
they should change the governor of Segna, and bridle that place by a Germán garrison ; and 
finally, that they should give up all the captures of Ossuna. 
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Infidels, the name of Christians. But the vigilance of the 
Venetian senate discovered, that at this very time Ossuna was 
practising on all the passions which usually determine the public 
conduct of the Porte, in order to draw the fury of their arms 
upon the island of Candía, at that time subject to the dominión 
of the republic. This fact, announced to all the courts of Europe, 
confounded the subtlety of Ossuna, and left him, for a short time, 
without the resource of a single stratagem. The Spanish fleet 
in the mean time, and numbers of privateers, continued to 
plunder the ships and to ravage the coasts of Venice. The pope 
and the ambassadors of France interposed their good offices with 
Ossuna, in behalf of the republic, in vain. Philip himself, by 
letters written with his own hand, commanded him to abstain 
from all hostilities, and to restore all that he had taken from 
Venice. His catholic majesty had not better success than his 
holiness and the count de Bethune. Ossuna offered, indeed, in 
consequence of the orders of the king, to restore the empty vessels, 
but declined to give back their valuable freights. H e continued 
his piracies and depredations, deigning, however, to cover his 
disobedience to the commands of the king, by those excuses 
which the various course and accidents of war readily suggest to 
the imagination of an ingenious commander. " It is not fit," he 
would say at one time, *' that I should sit still, while the Venetians 
are fortifying the harbour of St. Croce.,'! " I will persist," he 
would exclaimwith vehemenceat another, " i n my present oonduct 
so long as the Venetians shall retain in their pay the most 
invetérate enemies of the king my master." When he was ordered 
to deliver an account of the merchandize he had seized, he seemed 
to sport with the orders of Philip, by giving an inventory so 
imperfect as the Venetian ambassador refused to accept, and 
even complained of the mockery. The Venetians, thus plundered 
and insulted, equipped a fleet, which retaliated on the Spaniards 
all the piracies and depredations of the viceroy of Naples : but, 
at the same time, the senate regretted the necessity they were 
under of defending themselves by making such reprisals. To the 
marquis of Bedmar, the Spanish ambassador, they complained of 
the never-ceasing hostilities of Ossuna, and professed themselves 
at a loss to reconcile the actions of the viceroy of Naples with 
the declarations of the court of Spain. The ambassador, in 
reply, touched with an imposing delicacy on the irregularity of 
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Ossuna's disposition, and insinuated that the conduct of that 
duke was neither under the controul of the king, his master, ñor 
of any fixed principies or regular system of action. In reality, 
the behaviour of Ossuna seemed to furnish matter for such an 
apology, while he directed the Spanish arms, in spite of repeated 
orders from his sovereign, against a state with whom he had not 
declared war ; and constantly meditated hostile designs, of which 
he talked without reserve to all around him, although, from their 
nature, the utmost secrecy was necessary to their execution. 
His conversation turned wholly upon surprising the Venetian 
ports in Istria, plundering their islands, and even making a descent 
on Venice. He had himself carefully studied the plan of that 
city, and he now described it with infinite accuracy to all who 
possessed his confidence. He contrived flat-bottomed boats, 
with machines to facilítate their motion, and made daily experi-
ments of the weights which the several depths of water were 
capable of bearing, according to the different constructions and 
dimensions of vessels. To the Venetians, transactions so open 
and avowed, were a subject of laughter, and gave weight to the 
defence which had been made for the viceroy by the marquis of 
Bedmar. They were ignorant that the hostilities, of which they 
complained, proceeded from the secret machinations of this 
minister himself, which were more eífectually concealed by the 
extravagance and apparent folly of the duke, than they could 
have been by the most studied secrecy and circumspection*. 
The princes and states of Italy, enervated by luxury, or 
Prequency employed in commerce, committed themselves to the 
alsalsi'na-11'1 Protection of mercenarics f, distinguished by the ñames 
tions ac- of Leaders of Bands +. The transition was not unnatural 
countcdfor. from mercenary goldiers to prívate assassins. The 
military and generous spirit of ancient Rome was subdued by 
despotism and by luxury, and^ throughout the whole of Italy, 
broken into innumerable principalities by the dissolution of the 
Reman empire; the petty sovereigns had recourse on all occasions 
to stratagems and plots, not the valour of arms. And , as 
customs and manners always descend from the higher to the 
lower ranks of men, plots and assassinations became common 
* Batt. Nan. lib. ili. 1617. Conjuration des Espagnols, &c. par M . L'Abbe St. Real, 
t Nichol. Machiavelli, Historia Florentina, lib. i. 
+ Condottieri. 
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araong the people as well as their princes. Conspiracies, together 
with other practices and arts, were diffused from Italy over 
other parts of Europe ; and especially over those countries 
between which and Italy there was a close intercourse and 
connection *. It is the nature of every passion to tend as directly 
as possible towards its objectf. The love of power, and the 
desire of revenge, wait not the slow process of conspiracies, nor 
trust to their uncertain issue, when they can gain their end by 
the plain and direct road of superior forcé. It was a proof of 
the decline of Spain, that she adopted a practico, founded in fear 
and weakness. 
But of all the conspiracies or plots which were formed or con-
Spanish uived at by the Spanish ministers in this or any other 
agahlsTve- Perí0(i, that which was framed against the republic of 
nice. Venice, by Don Alphonso de la Cueva, marquis of 
Bedmar, was the most remarkable, and the most important, 
whether we have respect to its end, or to that complicated 
raachinery by which it was- to be accomplished. That the 
marquis was a person of very extraordinary abilities sufficiently 
appears from this circumstance, that, at a time when the cabinet 
of Madr id had an option of distinguished abilities, he was 
appointed ambassador in ordinary at Venice, of all the courts of 
Europe the most refined in its politics, and determined in its 
counsels. From an intimate acquaintance with ancient as well as 
Cbaracter of mo(íern history, which he read with the eyes of a philoso-
the marquis pher and statesman, and much observation on the scene 
of Bedmar. ^ human Ufe, in which he was at once an important 
* It is confessed, that plots and assaasinations are to be found in the history of all 
nations : yet it will readily be allowed, that these are more frequent in that of modera 
Italy than in the accounts we have of any other country, if the reign of Philip III. of 
Spain does not form an exception to this position. As writers commonly choose for the 
subjects of their productions, things not wholly unknown, but which they suppose to need 
new proofs and illustrations, so the famous Machiavel did not interweave into his political 
gystem those dishonourable artífices which set all justice and fidelity at defiance, from a mis-
cbievous originality in bis own mind. He laid down rules for conspiracies, because conspi-
racies were in everybody's mouth, and everywhere practised. To plan and accomplish an 
ingenious plot, formed, in bis time, a branch of political education. Archbishop Spotswood, 
in bis History, relates, that when he visited the earl of Gowrie, who formed a conspiracy 
against James V I . , king of Scotland, he found him reading a Latin book. De Conjuration-
ibus. The earl had been a professor of philosophy in Italy, from whencc he had jnst 
returned. 
f Unde feritur eo tendit gesdtque coire. Lucret. 
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actor and judicious spectator, he acquired a sagacity to which 
the council of Spain looked up with an almost superstitious vene-
ration, To a deep insight into the nature of political affairs, he 
added those qualities that are so requisite in a practical poli-
tician ; a facility of speaking and writing with an inexpressible 
grace ; a quick discernment of characters; an air and manner 
always frank and unreserved; and at the same time such forcé 
of mind, that, under the most trying feelings of the heart, and 
the severest agitations of the passions, he betrayed not the 
smalleet symptom of perturbation ; but, on the contrary, retained 
the most unequivocal appearance of perfect serenity*. W i t h 
these qualities, which distinguished his character, he possessed in 
an eminent degree another which is common to all Spaniards; a 
zeal for the glory of the monarchy, and the honour of the Spanish 
ñame. This had of late undergone an eclipse, and the marquis 
was willing to revive its lustre by the total ruin of a power that 
had contributed so greatly to its decay, the republic of Venice. 
He was invited to attack this state by various circumstances: 
the war with the Austrians had drained Venice both of arms and 
men • the fleet was confined to Istria, the seat of the war; the 
land army was equally distant; the exigencies of war had occa-
sioned the most oppressive taxes, which, as the people suspected, 
were not wholly applied to the public use : the marquis, therefore, 
persuaded himself that the revolution he had planned would not 
only be practicable, but to the generality of the people, accept-
able; nay, of the nobility, not a few were discontented with the 
government, and rejoiced in all the misfortunes of the state, as 
the effects of raeasures which they had disapproved. The more 
necessitous of that order, the marquis knew, by experience, 
might be prevailed on, i f not to act a part in the tragedy, yet 
to give such intelligence as might in reality promote the catas-
trophe of Venice. Another ground of encouragement was, that 
the flower of the Venetian army consisted of Hollanders and 
Walloons, mercenarios, whose officers he trusted might be 
seduced by the allurements of gold, to betray the cause of Venice, 
and to espouse that of Spain. The fleet of the republic was 
indeed formidable, but there too he hoped to make havoc with 
the same weapons he proposed to employ in weakening the 
Venetian army. It only remained, that he should attach to his 
* Conjuration des Eepaguols, &c. St. Real. 
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person, and to the terrible object he had in view, a sufficient 
number of determined confidants, by means of whom he might 
combine the efforts of thousands in a scherae, with the nature of 
which they were not to be entrusted until the moment of execu-
tion. He imparted his project to the marquis of V i l l a Franca, 
and the dulce of Ossuna. These ministers were delighted with 
the novelty and the boldness of his ideas, and without hesitation 
promised to contribute all in their power to its accomplishment. 
It does not appear that he communicated his design to the court 
of M a d r i d ; but he was sufficiently acquainted with the ideas of 
ambition that still reigned in the council of Spain, to know, that 
if the project should be carried happily into execution, of which 
he did not entertain any doubt, it would meet with their hearty 
applause and admiration. But while this project was ripening 
by degrees, the court of Spain was obliged, by the vigour of the 
young king of France, to make gradual advances towards a 
general peace in Italy. This would have disarmed the troops of 
Spain, and deprived the conspirators of those Instruments with 
which they hoped to subject to the monarchy the states of Venice. 
Henee the various artífices of Toledo and Ossuna to prolong the 
war, and to prevent a final accommodation of differences. The 
marquis had by this time entered into the most intímate corres-
pondence and confidence with a number of men, who, confiding 
in the transcendent powers of his mind, and contemplating the 
rewards that were exhibited to their view, were ready to execute 
his orders with promptitude and alacrity. These men were 
highly distinguished from the multitude, by constaney in the 
most trying situations, by unshaken fidelity to their engagements 
and by a bold and daring courage. Nothing was wanting to 
entitle them to the highest praise but the exertion of these 
virtues in a worthy cause. 
The principal arrangements in this conspiracy were these: 
fifteen hundred veteran troops, chosen from the Spanish army in 
Milán, by Don Pedro himself, were to be introduced into the 
city of Venice, not in a body, but a few at a time, and unarmed. 
They were to receive arms from the marquis of Bedmar. But 
lest any unforeseen accident should mar the intentions of Toledo, 
five thousand Hollanders, who lay at the Lazaretto, not above 
two miles distant from the city, were ready to be introduced, 
man by man at first, and afterwards, in the tumult and confu-
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sion that was expected to ensue, in a body. Brigantines and 
barks were to be sent from Naples into the chaimels and porta 
of Venice, having on board six thousand men. A number of 
large ships were afterwards to cast anchor on the shores of 
Friul i . Under the countenance of the latter, and amidst the 
confusión and horrors to be excited by the former, the conspira-
tors were to act their several parts in the intended tragedy : one 
was to set fire to the arsenal, others to the diíferent parts of the 
city; some were to take possession of the mint ; some to seize 
the principal places of strength ; and the part allotted to many, 
was to annihilate the constitution of Venice by murdering the 
senators. Arti l lery was to be drawn up to the highest eminences, 
for the purpose of laying the city in ruins, in case the inhabitants 
should attempt resistance. Field-pieces were to be disposed in 
diíferent quarters of the city, pointing into the principal streets. 
And as it was necessary to be in possession of some inland town 
in the territories of the republic, which might serve as a barrier 
against the return of the Venetian land army, i f called to Venice 
to oppose the conspirators, and as a magazine for the Spanish 
army, Don Pedro held a cióse correspondence with certain officers 
of the garrison of Crema, who were to betray that town into the 
hands of the Spaniards. Another plot was yet necessary to give 
full effect to the grand conspiracy. A port was to be occupied 
in the Venetian gulf, which might receive the Spanish fleet if, by 
any accident, it should be obliged to seek a retreat, when employed 
in that sea^ There is a place of considerable strength, called 
Maraño, in an island bordering upon Istria, with a harbour 
capable of receiving a large fleet. The officer second in command 
in the garrison of Maraño engaged to assassinate the governor, 
whenever he should receive orders from Toledo, and to hold the 
town in the ñame of the Spaniards*. 
Such was the complicated scheme formed for the destruction 
of the renowned city and republic of Venice: a scheme which 
involved in its nature whatever human ingenuity could plan, or 
the courage of man daré to execute, but which failed of success 
from some of those unforeseen accidenta that so often happen to 
* CoDjuration des Espagnols, &c. St. Real. Conspiration et Trahisou admirable des 
Espagnols, &c. en 1618. Histoire du Connetable de Lesdiguiéres, liv. ix. Batt. Naui. 
Historia della República Véneto, lib. iii. 1618. 
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intimídate the hearts of assassins, and to disconcert the projects 
of conspirators*. 
A conspiracy so important in its end, and at the same time so 
various in its means, does not occur in history. That of Catiline 
against the Román republic, pointed to equal horrors, and to 
still greater revolution; but the means by which he hoped to 
accomplish it were more simple, and consequently less absurd 
than those employed by the bold imagination, rather than the 
solid judgment, of the marquis of Bedmar. It was probably in 
imitation of that circumstantial and interesting narrativo which 
the Román historian has given of the Catilinarian conspiracy, 
that the eloquent and profound Saint Real composed his beauti-
ful account of the Spanish conspiracy against Venice. This 
copious narrativo, though heightened in some instances by the 
colourings of poetry, and the circumstantiality of fiction, is yet 
true in the most material particulars, and serves, in the words of 
the author, to display the " power of prudence over human 
affairs, and the dominión of fortune; the extent of the limits of 
the human mind, its greatest strength, and its secret frailties; 
the numberless considerations to which the politician must attend, 
who aspires to govern his fellow men; and the difference between 
true and false refinement.,, It is this last reflection which per-
petually recurs to the reader, and strikes him with peculiar forcé. 
Nothing but the extravagance of hope, and the blindness of 
passion, could have seduced the judgment of Don Alphonso de la 
Cueva to believe that he should be able, by any efforts of genius, 
to combine into one harmonious machine so many and such 
various springs. The various ideas and corresponding emotions 
and passions which rise in the mind on different occasions, and in 
different circumstances, render the views and designs of men 
fluctuating and uncertain. The smallest incident, in health or 
fortune, is sufficient to shake a resolution pregnant with danger 
and death. The minds of men are so delicate, refined, and vari-
able instruments, that a thousand accidenta disturb their opera-
tion. The most fortúnate adventurers in life are those who do not 
pretend to form, but who have vigilance and sagacity to improve 
* The Abbé St. Real fuye, that the conspiracy was digcovered by one of the conspirators, 
who was struck with horror and remorse at the intcnded ruin and bloodshed : Battista 
Nani, that it was discovcred by two French gentlcmen, who had come to the knowledge of 
it, relations of the mareschal Lesdiguicus. 
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conjunctures. Political revolutions are not to be effected by 
the subtleties and refinements of a genius profound and metaphy-
sical; but by the boldness and dexterity of a Caesar or a Crorawell, 
who know to seize the important moment of decisivo execution. 
But i f so vast a project as the conspiracy against the city and 
republic of Venice had not been altogether beyond the reach of 
human abilities, it might possibly have been accomplished by the 
united efforts of Toledo, Ossuna, and the marquis of Bedmar. 
Though the revenues of Spain were greatly diminished, and a 
manifest languor and irresolution appeared in her counsels, her 
military genius was yet entire and unbroken ; ñor in the history 
of any people is there to be found a greater compass of political 
ability and art than at this time distinguished the Spanish nation. 
While the ministers of Spain in Italy, by the most extraordinary 
Characterof e^ >or^ s *0 suPPort or retrieve the glory of the monarchy, 
the Spanish signalized at least their own ingenuity and courage, the 
abilities of her ambassadors generally managed the 
courts at which they resided with equal dexterity and success. 
The ties of interest and blood, which united the two branches of 
the house of Austria, obscure the praises that are due to the 
abilities of the Spanish ministers at the courts of Ferdinand and 
Matthias. But in Franco, Monteleone knew how to adapt his 
tone to the timidity of Mary, the high spirit of Lewis, and the 
different passions and views of their respective favourites. A n d 
in England, Gondomar gained mightily on the favour of the 
pedantic, social, and impolitic king, by talking false La t in* , with 
other facetious humours, and by amusing him with the hope 
of a marriage between the prince of Wales and the second 
infanta f. 
* Mr. Arthur WiUon, in his Life of King James, informs us, among other curious anee-
dotes of that good-naturcd monarch, that "Gondomar, in his merry fits, would teli the 
king that his majesty spoke Latin like a pedant, but that he himself spoke it like a gentle-
man." The king, we may presume, accepted this as a high encomium. There was 
nothing in which James exultad so much as in that superiority which he undoubtedly pos-
sessed over most of his courtiers, in literature. " Sir Edward Conway," says Mr. Wilson, 
" governor of the Brill, one of the cautionary towus, was made by king James, secretary 
of state : a rough unpolished piece for such an employment! But the king, who wanted 
not his abilities, would often make himself merry with his imperfect scrawls in wríting, and 
hacking expressions in reading, so that he would break into laughter, and say, had everman 
such a secretary, that can neither read ñor write?" Gondomar had perfectly understood 
the eharacter of the king : and he practised on his weaknesses with infinite dexterity, 
t Franklyu, p. 71. 
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A war with the Saracens, prolonged, with few intervals, for 
Digression eight hundred years, nourished in the Spaniards a vigour 
concerning 0f character, a love of their country, and a passion for 
ter of the glory. The necessity of continually engaging, formed 
Spamards, ag many héroes as there were men in each c i t y ; mil i-
tary renown was the great object of their vows ; and the tombs 
of the deceased were adorned with a number of obelisks equal to 
that of the enemy they had slain in battle *. Whi le they lived 
exposed to continual dangers they acquired that gravity of deport-
ment, that delibérate valour, that perseverance and vigilance, 
which still distinguish the Spanish nation. Before the ambitious 
and warlike reigns of Ferdinand, the emperor, and Philip II . , the 
sagacity and vigilance of the Spaniards appeared formidable to 
the other nations of Europe t. These reigns continued to cali 
forth and exercise the spirit of the nation, and to support, i f not 
to heighten, that national character which had been formed by 
the wars with the Moors. A n d this national character still 
shone forth with undiminished lustre after the imprudence of the 
court, and exhausted resources, had undermined the foundations 
of the grandeur of the empire. A s prosperous war rouses the 
genius of a nation, the glory of letters would have corresponded 
to that of the Spanish arms,hadnottheprogress of taste and know-
ledge beencheckedby the tyranny of the inquisition, and that des-
potism which was introduced into the government. But although 
these circumstances have prevented among the Spaniards the 
growth of sound philosophy in their poetry, history, romances, 
and even their commentaries on the sacred scriptures, as well as 
on Aristotle, whose metaphysical notions were deemed so ortho-
dox by the Catholic church, we recognize that boldness and in-
vention, that subtlety and refinement, which were conspicuous for 
ages in the military and political conduct of Spain. 
Thus, that power of genius and valour among his subjects, 
which at once adorned and disgraced the feeble reign of Phil ip 
I I I . seems deducible from a train of moral causes, as obvious in 
their existence as powerful in their nature. But when the reader 
revolves what is left on record concemig ancient Spain, he will 
* Johannes Genesius Sepulveda de Rebus Gestis, Caroli V . lib. i . 
t Machiavel says, in his Account of the State of France, that the French were afraid of 
the Spaniards on account of their sagacity and vigilance. It is truc, that this account was 
written after Ferdinand had begun to reign ; but it was before the exertions of that princo 
could have stamped on the miuds of his subjects a national character. 
1618.] P H I L I P III. K I N G O F S P A I N . 315 
be inclined perhaps to subscribe to the opinión of an ingenious 
writer, that the characters of nations, as well as families, are 
influenced by accidents antecedent to birth *, and particularly 
by climate, acting either immediately with powerful energy on 
the fabric of their being, or as a local circumstance leading to a 
variety of action in the economy of civil life. A t all times, 
valour and genius have ennobled the character of the Spaniards. 
Not the robust Germán, impelled by the fury of a savage religión, 
displayed such enthusiasm in arms, and contempt of death, as 
shone forth in the invincible resolution of the inhabitants of 
Numantia, Astapa, and Saguntum. A greater hero than 
Viriatus is not to be found in the history of ancient Rome f 
Between the times of the Scipios and those of Augustas, there 
intervened a period of two hundred years. During this long 
space, Spain maintained a contest with the policy and disciplined 
valour of Rome: and it seemed uncertain which master the 
world was to obey, the Spaniards or the Romans. The destiny 
of Rome to give law to the nations finally subdued all resistance, 
and Spain had the glory of being the last that yielded to the 
Román yoke. But it was the fortune of the vanquished to 
receive literature and refinement from the conquerors of the 
world: and, in return, Trajan added lustre to the Román 
purple; and the ñames of Quintilian, Mart ia l , Mela, Séneca, 
Lucan, and Florus, appeared in his list of Lat in authors. 
A l l the valour and artífices of Spain were found unable to 
Thedukeof ^^116 ^16 índopendence of the Duke of Savoy and the 
Savoy and Venetian republic. A n d the discovery of Bedmar's 
mdnub9 conspiracy was quickly followed by the restoration of 
their ¡nde- Vercelli to the duke, and that of their ships and mer-
pendence. Q ^ ^ ^ Q Venetians. The court of Madrid, at 
the desire of the senate, recalled De la Cueva ; but a commis-
sion to„ act as first minister in the Netherlands, a department 
which the situation of affairs in Germany rendered equally 
difficult and important, preved how much they approved his 
designs, as well as confided in his abilities. 
* Essay on the History of Mankind, &c., by Dr. Dunbar. 
t This man, who had resisted the Román arras for twenty years, and who was deemed 
invincible, was at last insidiously cutoff by the Romans, who bribed his body-guards. 
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B O O K V I . 
THE astonishing efforts of that extraordinary triuravirate, 
Bedmar, Ossuna, and V i l l a Franca, to restore the predominancy 
of Spain in Italy, was an eruption of that ardent spirit which 
had been bred in times of national enterprise and prosperity. 
The monarchy, drained of its blood and spirits by emigrations, 
and by war, was in a state of languor which naturally sought for 
repose. To maintain the dignity of the Spanish nation in that 
languisíiing state, was the arduous task devolved by the feeble 
hands of Phil ip on the dulce of Lerma. That pacific and prudent 
minister, unwilling to expose the weakness of the empire, avoided 
as much as possible all appeals to arms, and it was not without 
reluctance that he drew the sword which he had sheathed at 
Antwerp, in the dispute concerning the succession to Juliers, 
and in the contest with the duke of Savoy. I t was his chief 
study to support the authority of Spain by intrigue, and by 
external magnificence and profusión. The court of Madrid was 
the most brilliant in Europe : and a veil of pomp and splendour 
thrown around all the departments of govemment, concealed from 
intemal po- ^ e vulgar eye the symptoms of its decay. The duke 
licyofSpain. aigo rnade some attempts to recruit the vigour of the 
state, as well as to hide its infirmities, by reviving agriculture, 
and protecting commerce*. 
The frequent exámples of immense and rapid fortunes, made 
in the Indies, inspired a very general contempt of tillage, the 
profits of which, though certain, were slow and inconsiderable. 
ü n t i l the fatal year 1609, Spain possessed a remedy against this 
evil. The Morescoes, excluded by the laws from America, and 
from the profession of arms, were not only expert manufacturers, 
but skilful and industrious husbandmen; but their expulsión 
was followed by a total neglect of agriculture, and a scarcity of 
the necessaries of life punished the people for the bigotry of the 
court, and their own indolence. The duke of Lerma, in order 
to repair the loss of the industrious Saracens, issued an edict, 
• See Appcndix C . 
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offering an order of nobility* to every man who should give 
proofs of industry and skill in agriculture. It is remarkable 
that this measure, the propriety of which seemed to be founded 
in the national passion for lofty titles, was altogether fruitless. 
A n exemption from all military service was then promised to all 
industrious men ; but neither had this proffered indulgence any 
considerable effect. A great part of the land still lay waste; and 
in the succeeding reign, strangers were invited to cultivate the 
fields of Spain, with several advantages of great iraportance. 
The commerce of the Spaniards in the Mediterranean Sea 
having been disturbed by the corsairs of Barbary, Don Lewis 
de Faxarado received orders to build a strong fort on the gulf 
of Marmora. This was happily eífected in the month of August 
1613, and contributed not a little to scour the sea from the 
pirates-f*. But commerce still languished as well as manufactures 
and agriculture, and the exactions of a government profusely 
expensive, were seyerely felt by the oppressed people. Ñor 
were the exigencies of the public the only source of those taxes 
which afflicted the nation, The minister amassed an immense 
fortune from the spoils of the people. From royal grants, added 
to his paternal inheritance, he drew an annual revenue of six 
hundred thousand ducatsj. Even the good qualities of the duke 
multiplied the oppressions of his administration. Hi s love of 
splendour and magnificence, his liberalities to his servants, his 
dependants, and to all men who had recourse to his bounty, 
rendered his paternal inheritance wholly inadequate to his 
constant profusión, which he supported at the expense of the 
public. The great offices of state, too, he either seized himself 
or bestowed upon particular favourites. A n d although caution 
and prudence are qualities generally and justly ascribed to the 
duke of Lerma, in the distribution of offices, he was not always 
governed by motives of policy, but sometimes those of personal 
attachment. But of all his favourites the chief was the famous 
Don Roderigo de Calderona, whose singular fortune and fate 
Don Rodé , demand particular attention. H e was the son of a 
rigo de Cal . poor soldier of Valladolid, and Mary Sandelen, a native 
of Flanders. He possessed fine talents, and there was 
• The title and rank of Esquire. Les Dél ices d'Espagne et de Portugal, 
t Summarium de Robus Hispanise. Mariana. 
X Sir John Dighv's Letten from Spain. 
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something highly interesting and engaging in his manner. He 
entered on the career of ambition in the character of a menial 
servant to the duke of Lerma, then marquis of Denia, and 
gained over the mind of his master such an ascendant as that 
favourite possessed over the mind of the king. Having risen 
through all the principal offices in the household of the duke, he 
was advanced by the unbounded favour of his patrón to places of 
great power and trust in the state, created first count of Oliva, 
then marquis of Siete Iglesias, and acquired an estáte of an 
hundred thousand crowns a year. Agreeably to the natural 
progress of human wishes, Calderona considered all the favours 
of fortune only as so man y steps to farther preferment. He 
openly aspired, not only to a viceroyalty, but to the rank of a 
grandee of Spain. He was at first ashamed of the meanness of 
his descent, and affected to conceal i t : a frailty to which he 
afterwards showed himself far superior, by receiving his father 
into his family, procuring for the oíd soldier offices of emolument 
as well as honour, and treating him throughout life with the 
greatest tenderness and respect. Though he had risen from the 
lowest rank of life, there was nothing in his behaviour unworthy 
of the highest birth. The dignity both of his sentiments and 
manners was such as might beseem a prince. The vanity of 
Calderona which had made him ashamed of his father, was now 
converted by an excess of prosperity into a haughty boldness 
and overbearing pride, His temper, naturally violent and impe-
tuous, was unrestrained by any of those condescensions and 
regards, which were so necessary in his situation, to soothe 
jealousy and disarm the rancour of envy. H e mingled in all the 
intrigues at court; he delighted in the exercise of power; his 
favour was the surest road to preferment, and this he distributed, 
for the most part, according to his own fancy and caprice, and 
without any regard either to merit or natural pretensions. H e 
had audiences as i f he had been a sovereign prince, held frequent 
consultations, and shared, in one word, the administration of 
public affairs with the duke of Lerma. The haughtiness and 
impetuosity of Don Roderigo was contrasted by that decent 
moderation which appeared in the whole conduct and deport-
ment of his father. This man frequently told * his son, that his 
* Gon9ale8 de Cespides, lib. i. cap. vii. Amelot de la Houssaie, Discours Historique, 
p. 142. Las Memorias, &c., con Escolios de Don Juan Vitrian, 11, 13. 
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bark, which had so little ballast, i f he should continué to crowd 
sail, would infallibly be overset in a storm: a prediction which 
was afterwards fatally verified. 
• The nobles of Spain, whose power and influence had been 
reduced in the two preceding reigns, from the highest to the 
lowest pitch, were called to the court of Phil ip III. , and many 
of them enjoyed important political stations. But during those 
reigns the order of nobility, if it was depressed by the vigour and 
the tyranny of the court, had not the mortification to see any 
subject exalted so far abo ve them in the royal favour as to 
possess in reality the power of the sovereign. To the grandees 
of Spain, a favourite was a hateful novelty, and the immoderate 
aggrandizement of Calderona seemed a studied insult on nobility 
of blood. Ñor was the present administration distinguished by 
any prosperous events, which might drown the general murmura 
of discontent in the voice of applause and acclamation. The 
prime minister was, accordingly, a general subject of satire and 
invective, both in discourse and in writing. The complaints of 
the nation served as an engine in the hands of his enemies to 
effect his fa l l ; which was embittered by this cruel circumstance, 
that his power was subverted by those very men who were the 
most bound, by the ties of blood, or of gratitude, to support it. 
Having risen to the highest power attainable by a subject, and 
Fall of having no farther object of ambition, the duke of Lerma 
Lerma. oniy laboured to establish the authority he possessed 
in the councils of Spain on the firmest foundations, and to 
perpetúate it, if possible, in his family. W i t h this view he intro-
duced his son, the duke of Uzeda, at proper times, into the 
presence of the king, and used every art to recommend him with 
effect to the royal favour. A n d well knowing that the influence 
he possessed on the mind of Philip might be either strengthened 
or overeóme by any argument that should make its appearance 
in the guise of religión, he brought Lewis Aliaga, a monk, from 
his convent to court, and advanced him to the office of confessor 
to the king. Aliaga was a man of a narrow capacity, and the 
duke entertained a high opinión of his probity. F rom a 
character of this kind he imagined he had nothing to apprehend. 
And, as the monk owed everything to his favour, he trusted 
that he would be entirely devoted to his interest. Uzeda was 
one of those insignificant characters, whose understandings are 
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rather below mediocrity, and who are neither reraarkable for vice 
nor virtue. But he possessed in an eminent degree the polished 
manners of a court, and by his constant assiduities to please, soon 
obtained as high a place in the affections of the king as Lerma 
still maintained in his esteem. The bewitching smiles of 
sovereignty, equally dissolving filial reverence and paternal tender-
ness, occasioned a rival ty between the father and the son, which 
terminated in an animosity that proximity of blood seemed only 
to irr í tate . Aliaga perceived the power which this dissension 
placed in his hands, and deliberated whether he should cast the 
balance in favour of Lerma or Uzeda. The alternative he 
embraced is worthy of attention, not only on account of its 
political consequences, but as it seems to prove that there is in 
the mind of man a disposition to expect, in his own behalf, a 
higher degree of virtue from others than he is conscious of 
possessing himself. Fr iar Aliaga, equally unmindful of that 
creative bounty which the generosity of a patrón so readily 
extends to the person whom he has already obliged, and of the 
treachery and ingratitude of his own heart, determined to abandon 
his benefactor, and to unite his interest with that of Uzeda, 
imagining that he had more to expect from a minister on whom 
he had conferred, than from one to whom he owed, the greatest 
obligations. The duke of Lerma endeavoured to counterbalance 
the growing influence of his son, by raising up a rival to him in 
the affections of the king. For this purpose he now laboured to 
insinúate into the royal favour his sister's son, the count of Lemos, 
a nobleman of high spirit and sublime genius. He hoped to 
excite such movements of jealousy and envy between the count 
and Uzeda, as that he himself should be equally necessary to both, 
and able to hold in his own hands the balance of power between 
the contending rivals. But the pliant mind, and gentle manners 
of Uzeda, were more congenial to the nature of Phil ip than the 
erect and independent spirit of Lemos. The king was constantly 
attended by his new favourite and his confessor, and surrounded 
with numbers of discontented nobles, with whom these men kept 
up a cióse corresponden ce. 
In the midst of these intrigues the duke of Lerma solicits and 
obtains the rank of a cardinal, hoping that this religious dignity 
would prove the means of prolonging his power over the mind of 
the pious king, or, at least, that it would place him above the 
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malice of his enemies and the enquiries of justice. But it was the 
fortune of this duke to undermine his own power by those very 
measures which were intended to support it. The indolent Phil ip 
was displeased to be under the necessity of exchanging the ease 
of former familiarity for those ceremonies of respect which were 
due to the purple. The regard that had been everywhere shown 
to the duke of Lerma was well pleasing to the king, so long as all 
that he enjoyed was derived from his own bounty. The respect 
that was paid to the creature of his power he considered as an 
homage done to himself. But all his aífection for the duke ceased 
the moraent he attained to an equality with kihgs, and derived 
the splendour of his character from another source than the grace 
of his sovereign. The presence of the cardinal was uneasy to 
him ; and if he received hira with formalityj he received him also 
with coldness. 
The estrangement of the king from his oíd minister was not 
unobserved by the eager eyes of the courtiers. The enemies of 
the cardinal duke, who had hitherto conducted their attacks by 
regular and slow approaches, now resolved to carry that fortress, 
which had so long defended him, and in which he still fondly 
confided, by assault. Upon the plausible pretext of zeal for the 
service of the king, and aífection for his person, they represented 
the nation as one scene of oppression, disorder, and discontent, 
and threw the blame of the whole on the duke of Lerma. That 
minister, they affirmed, bestowed the most important offices on 
persons who possessed not any other merit than that of being 
agreeable to his fancy, and the creatures of his power. And as 
the appointment to offices was a matter that depended solely on 
his favour, so the exercise of the power he bestowed was 
determined by his w i l l ; for he over-ruled the freedom of delibe-
ration in the different councils established for the conduct of 
public affairs, and assumed the prerogative of dictating on every 
subject. The judges, in all cases where he chose to interfere, 
being obliged to give sentence according to his orders, the very 
tribunals of justice were organs of his pleasure. On the distresses 
of the people they insisted with peculiar zeal, lamenting that the 
poor of a whole nation should be despoiled of the few things they 
possessed, and even deprived of the necessaries of life, for the 
purpose of supporting the magnificence and mad extravagance of 
one man : a man who by various impolitic measures, and 
T 
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particularly by the circulation of brass money, had contributed so 
fatally to the decline of manufactures, the ruin of commerce, the 
depopulation and impoverishment of the kingdom. Passing 
beyond the limita of Spain, they reviewed the conduct of the duke 
in the dependencies of the monarchy. The revenues of Sicily he 
had converted into a prívate estáte. The war in Piedmont, so 
unavoidable in its progress, and in its issue so dishonourable to 
the Spanish ñame, might have been crushed in its beginning by 
forcé of arms, or prevented by a timely attention to the situation 
and designs of foreign states. A s in war an able commander 
makes it his chief study to divide the forces of his enemy, so the 
art of government consists not in resisting, but in preventing 
confederacies. Wars which, even if successful, cannot be advan-
tageous, ought never to be undertaken. The lion, said they, in 
the proverbial manner of Spain. is not honoured by a victory over 
the lamb. A superior power, if not greatly deficient in foresight, 
can never be at a loss to restrain the turbulence of an inferior, 
without coming to an open rupture, and resting its authority on 
the doubtful events of war. From Italy they tumed the eyes of 
the king to the seven United Provinces, once a part of that fair 
inheritance to which he had so just a claim as the heir of the duke 
of Burgundy. The truce with Hol land ; the formalities and 
solemnities with which that treaty had been ratified, and 
particularly the pompous title that had been given in that 
contract to the rebela, they mentioned with particular marks of 
indignation. They contrasted the virtue and ability of the 
pensionary Barnevelt, with the incapacity of the duke of Lerma, 
and his indifference to the prosperity and glory of the nation. 
Unable to conduct the war, the Spanish minister, they said, 
aought to establish his own power in peace; a peace that waa 
disgraceful in its nature, and which involved in its conaequencea 
a greater loas to the monarchy than it had incurred during a war 
of forty-five years that preceded it ! Whi le the war continued 
in the Netherlands, the main forcé of the rebela, concentrated in 
those provinces, acted only on the defensive. But the ignomi-
nious treaty of Antwerp had let loóse that forcé on the widely 
scattered settlements of Spain in both the Indios, which were 
either torn from the monarchy, or demanded such additional 
garrisons for their protection, aa might have been employed with 
greater honour, as well as advantage, in proaecuting the war on 
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the theatre of rebellion. If the Spanish crown, in a glorious 
contest to maintain its just rights, should have proved unsuccessful, 
nothing more disastrous could have ensued than what had actually 
happened: while on the other hand, to have continued the 
struggle, would have supported the honour of the nation among 
foreign powers, and, in the end, might possibly have derived 
some advantage from the chance of war, or that chango which is 
incident to the policy and the views of states and princes. These 
and many other charges against the duke of Lerma, were 
comstantly sounded in the ears of the king, by his confessor and 
his favourite, and confirmed by the testimony or the authority of 
all whom they permitted to have access to his person. 
Though sovereign princes, from the supereminence of their 
stations, be naturally capricious and fickle in their attachments *, 
it would be unreasonable, after these remonstrances, to ascribe 
the fall of Lerma to any inconstancy in his sovereign. There 
never was a prince, however despotic, so secure against the 
resentment, so insensible to the applause, or so unconcerned for 
the prosperity of the public, as to oppose, for the sake of a 
favourite, the general voice of his people. The constant appoint-
ment to offices, in contradiction to the recommendation of Lefma, 
fully illustrated the nature of that reserve, which had given that 
minister so much pain, and was an unequivocal proof that he had 
wholly lost the royal favour. In this extremity he laboured to 
acquire the good graces of the prince of Spain, fondly hoping 
that the rays of the rising would brighten up the gloom of the 
setting sun. The count de Lemos, and don Ferdinand de Bor-
gia, a man of sound understanding, and possessed of talents for 
business, both lords of the bedchamber to the prince, had been 
raised to that dignity by the duke their únele. Betrayed and 
injured by the cunning of Aliaga and Uzeda, the duke of Lerma 
had recourse to the friendship of his nephews. He met with 
virtue and honour where one would wish to find them, and where 
in reality they are oftenest to be found, in conjunction with 
vigour of understanding and sublimity of genius. The count of 
Lemos and don Ferdinand de Borgia were united by the ties of 
blood, of friendship, and gratitude to their únele. They readily 
undertook to use their good offices with the prince in behalf of 
" "Go," says Agamcmnon to Achilles, if yon have-a mind: there ar^ not wanting 
others who will show mfi honour." First Iliad. 
Y 2 
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their beloved relation ; they represented to his highness the 
weak capacity of Uzeda; and expatiated on the talents, virtues, 
and political experience of the duke his father. A n d their 
authority and address, prevailing o ver the subtleties and assidu-
ities of the conde duke of Olivarez, consoled Lerma with the 
hope of living in the favour of the heir-apparent to the Spanish 
empire. But this intrigue was not long concealed from the 
king, and, like all the other efforts of the minister to prolong his 
power, served only to precipítate his fall. The image of death 
which was held up to the imagination of the king by the court 
that was pald to his successor, converted his indifference to 
Lerma into aversión. The count of Leraos had gained so much 
011 the favour of the prince, that he was in the practico of con-
versing wlth him, sometimes for hours, after he went to bed. 
Orders were now sent to the count to forbear this practico in 
future ; but to these he did not yield a ready obedience. The 
king therefore dismissed from the service of his highness * four 
officers of his bedchamber, who were in the confidence of Lemos, 
and appointed his cousin and faithful friend, Don Ferdinand de 
Borgia, viceroy of Arragon. The high-spirited count, deeming 
the disgrace of the officers, and the exile of his friend from 
court, an affront and injury to himself, had the boldness to ask 
the king his reasons for reinoving Don Ferdinand from the ser-
vice of the prince, adding, that i f Ferdinand should be banished 
from court, he would accompany him to the place of his retire-
ment. The king replied, in an angry tone, that it was his plea-
sure to treat Don Ferdinand as he had done ; and that the 
count, i f he were so minded, might accompany him in his exile. 
Lemos was mortified by so severo a reply; yet he made another 
effbrt to keep Borgia at court, and that almost in spite of the 
king. H e engaged the council for Itallan affairs, of which 
Borgia was president, to remonstrate against the removal of a 
minister, who, of all men in the world, was the best informed 
with regard to the affairs of Italy. The king answered, that he 
would appoint as successor to Don Ferdinand the count of 
Benavento, whose knowledge of Italian affairs was unquestion-
able. Upon this the count of Lemos retired from court, consol-
ing himself with the reflection that he had made no mean com-
pliances to gain the royal favour, but had performed the duties 
* Su Altezza, so the prince was distinguished. 
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of friendship, and m the whole of his deportment maintained the 
noblest propriety and dignity of character. 
The magnanimity of the count seemed to arraign the conduct 
of the duke of Lerraa, who, even after the disgrace of his friends, 
lingered about the Eseurial, and manifested the most eager 
desire still to hold his office. The king, finding that no marks 
of his disgust, however striking, were able to induce his oíd 
minister to prevent the disgrace of a formal dismission, in a 
billet, written with his own hand, ordered him in express terms 
to withdraw himself from Madrid ; but permitted him to retire 
to whatever place he should choose, and to enjoy in peace the 
effects of his formar bounty. In these circumstances the duke 
condescended to appear as a suppliant at the feet of the treach-
erous Aliaga. H e entreated the monk to intercede in his behalf 
with the king. It is superfluous to inform the reader that this 
humble application was wholly fruitless. H e then sent a message 
to his brother, the archbishop of Toledo, whom he had raised to 
the high dignity and opulence he enjoyed, and who at that time 
resided at Madrid, earnestly soliciting him to come to the 
Eseurial, and to support him with his countenance, his advice, 
and his influence with the king. The archbishop excusecí him-
self from undertaking that ungracious office, by alleging that he 
was in a bad state of health ; but he sent to the assistance of his 
brother father Jerome, of Florence, a Jesuit, a preacher for 
whom the king entertained a particular respect. Father 
Jerome, in his prívate discourse with the king, endeavoured 
with great address to revive in his mind sentiments of favour 
and regard to the duke of Lerma. But Phil ip did not receive 
his favourite preacher with his usual affability, ñor listen to his 
instructions with the wonted attention. The Jesuit, perceiving 
this alteration in the deportment of the king, did not persevere 
in his commendations of Lerma, and only pleaded, in favour of 
that minister, for a short respite, which was refused in positive 
terms. 
The duke of Lerma now summoned up all his fortitude, and 
by the propriety and dignity of his deportment atened for the 
meanness of his former solicitations. On the 4th day of October, 
1618, being still in his apartments in the palace, he wasready to 
take his journey to his paternal estáte, with a train of attendants 
suitable to his high rank, when the prince of Spain, who hap-
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pened to take a walk in the garden, came up to the door of his 
charaber, and calling him aside, conversed with him at consider-
able length in the language of tenderness and complacency. The 
duke then went to take leave of his sister, the countess of Lemos, 
first lady of the bed-chamber to the princess of Spain. Having 
paid his compliments to that lady, with great respect, he went 
into bis chariot, and repaired for the last time to the mansión of 
the king. On his approach, he alighted from his carriage, and 
vievving the royal apartments with an eager eye, he ardently 
poured forth his blessing on them, and on the royal family, 
Having performed this duty, he remounted his chariot, and 
drove straight to Guadarrama, where he lodged all night. A t 
this place he received a letter from the king, the contenta of 
which were never revealed to the curious and speculating world, 
with a present of a stag, slain by his own hand that day in the 
chase. Thus both the king and the prince of Spain, with a 
generosity worthy of their exalted stations, mixed the bitter 
cup of Lerma with refreshing spices : and as no minister ever 
descended from a greater height of power, so none was ever 
laid more softly down *, and few perhaps ever deserved a gentler 
fall. 
The duke of Lerma was a personage of a noble mien, gentle 
ciiaracterof m a n n e r 8 i and a bencficent disposition. The natural 
the duke of benignity of his heart appeared in the mildness of his 
aspect, the tone of his voice, and innumerable acts of 
magnificence and liberality. H i s promotions to public offices 
were chiefly determined by political motives and personal friend-
ship. Ye t , it may be safely affirmed, that during his adminis-
tration, all the places of principal trust and importance were 
filled with men of extraordinary abilities. The judgments of men 
are commonly influenced by their natural temper. Agreeably to 
the mildness of his own disposition, and his love of magnificence^ 
he was of opinión that the dignity of the Spanish monarchy was 
best maintained by peace, pomp, and paradof. A n d though he 
• Historia de Don Felippe III. por Don Gon9alo de Cespides, lib. i. cap. 3, 4 ; Ub. ¡i. 
cap. 1, 17. Anécdotas du Ministére du Conde Duc d'Olivarez. Las Memorias de 
Comines con Escolias proprio» de Don Juan Vitrian. Amelot de la Houssaie. Disc. 
Histor. Addiciones a la Historia de Malvezzi. 
t He was very careful to exact every mark of respect to the crown of Spain from neigh-
bouring nations, and sometimes discovered a jealousy on this head which was unworthy of 
a great nation. I find in Chamberlayne't Letters, MSS. anno 1616, in the Britiíh 
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might, perhaps, have pursued this plan with greater economy, as 
it is certain that his profusión was not the main cause, so it is 
probable that all his savings, had he been ever so rauch inclined 
to frugality, would not have been able to alleviate in any consi-
derable degree the distresses of the nation. Though his capacity 
was but moderóte, his soul was elevated, and his mind was firm. 
If he descended from his natural dignity to humble applications, 
in order to preserve the good graces of his prince, we ought not 
on that account too hastily to stigmatize his memory with mean-
ness of spirit. The greatést political and military courage has 
sunk under the deprivation of royal favour. Neither the resolute 
Ximenes, ñor the undaunted Albuquerque, was able to support 
the frowns of his sovereign. Notwithstanding the invectives of 
Lerma's enemies, the most respectable Spanish historians* not 
only celébrate the beneficence of his disposition, but do justice to 
the moderation of his power, and the prudence of his public 
conduct. These, indeed, were afterwards confessed by the whole 
nation, when the vast ambition, and sublime but irregular genius 
of ülivarez, by stretching the sinews of the. empire beyond their 
utmost tone, threw it into convulsions, and only rendered the 
dissolution of its strength more violent and painful. 
The whole employments of the duke of Lerma devolved on his 
son Uzeda, except that of governor to the prince, which was con-
ferred on Don Balthazar de Zuniga, a man of cultivated genius, 
and great experience in political affairs, particularly in embassiesf. 
Soon after the disgrace of Lerma, the count of Oliva was 
Tragicai end arre8ted by order of the king, and thrown into prison, 
of Don Ro- where he languished for the space of two years. H i s 
Caiderona, r^se ^rom so low & station to so great a height of power 
count of gave birth to an opinión that he was a sorcerer, which 
01iva- Z - • : x • + + TJ 
his enemies were at great pams to propágate. Me was 
charged with having poisoned the queen, who died in 1612; a 
charge as improbable in itself, as it was found to be unsup-
ported by any evidence; for Don Roderigo stood as liigh in 
the favour of that princess, as the duke of Lerma did in the affec-
Museum, the following passage : " Tbe Spanish ambassador complained to the king, at 
Theobalds, that whereas we kept ambassadors at Venice and in the Low Countñes , au 
agent scrvcd the turn in Spain and wiih the archdukes." 
* Gouyalcs de Cespides y Menescs. Don Juan de Vitrian, &c. 
t Geniales de Cespides, lib. i . cap. 4. 
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tions of the king. Many other groundless accusations were 
brought against hira : but at last he was found guilty of having 
been accessory to the murder of two Spanish gentlemen: a 
matter which, according to some historians, was never clearly 
proved; he was, however, conderaned to death, and his estáte 
was confiscated. The evidence on which he was convicted was 
not direct, but cireumstantial; and if we may judge from some 
of the circumstances left on record, as the principal ground of 
his condemnation, we may infer, that the deficiency of the proof 
was supplied by the zeal of both his accusers, and judges. The 
trial and confinement of Calderona were prolonged for two years 
and six months; a measure calculated to keep alive the general 
odiura against his patrón the duke of Lerma, and to prevent the 
return of that ancient favourite to court, of which the new 
ministry were not a little apprehensive. During all the time 
that Calderona lay in prison, there was not one among the multi-
tudes he had obliged, except the cardinal Don Gabriel de Trejo, 
whose ñame deserves to be recorded, nephew to the countess his 
lady, who had the humanity and the courage to attempt his 
relief, or to afford him any comfort. The cardinal was no sooner 
informed of the imprisonment of Calderona, than, impelled by a 
generous gratitude, he set out from Rome to pay his respecte to 
his patrón in a dungeon, and determined to move every engine 
that his utmost eíforts could command in order to reléase him. 
But the cardinal was neither permitted to visit the court ñor the 
prison. H e lingered, however, a long time in Spain, in anxious 
hopes of finding some fortúnate occasion of saving his friend; but, 
on the death of pope Paul V . , which happened in February 1621, 
he returned, by order of the king, to Rome. 
Don Roderigo bore confinement, solitude, and torture, with 
incredible patience. After his doom was fixed, he was visited, at 
his own earnest desire, by the ministers of religión. H i s great 
soul, which had braved all the rage of his enemies with such sin-
gular constancy, discovered, on the approach of death, a nobler 
heroism, in the most perfect resignation to the will of G o d ; and 
in the most candid confession, and sincerest contrition for the 
errors of his life. The ardour of his mind was now displayed in 
the severities of self-mortification. H e was covered with hair-
cloth: he watched and prayed night and day: he afflicted him-
self with fasting, and with stripes; and, had not his confessor 
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interposed, he would, in all probability, have anticipated the 
stroke of the executioner, by an excess of voluntary pain. On 
the 19th day of October, 1621, the first year of the reign of 
Philip I V . , he received intimation that within two days he should 
die. He received the messenger of this welcome news with a 
cheerful countenance, and tenderly embraced him. He now 
abstained from sleep and food, and spent his time in acts of 
devotion. About eleven of the clock on the 2 l8t of October, 
he carne to the door of the prison, encompassed by the officers of 
justice. Affliction had softened the natural dignity of his looks 
and mien: and his grey hairs, his beard, and his dress, suited to 
the present sad occasion, conspired with the expression of his 
countenance to impress the spectators with sentiments of vene-
ration and love. H e yet possessed sufficient strength to mount 
on a mulé that waited for him at the prison. This he did with 
great tranquillity, and passed through the streets to the place of 
execution, embracing and adoring a crucifix which he held in his 
hands, amidst the tears and lamentations of the surrounding 
multitude. The executioner held the reins of the mulé, and as 
he went along, proclaimed aloud the foliowing words: " This is 
the judgment, which, by the orders of our sovereign lord the 
king, is inflicted on this man for his having been the instigator 
of an assassination; and accessory to another murder; and 
divers other crimes which appeared on his t r i a l ; for all of which 
he is to be beheaded, as a punishment to him, and a waming to 
others." Having arrived at the scaífold, the resigned sufferer 
beheld with a serene countenance the Instruments of his approach-
ing death ; the chair, the sword, and the man whose office it was 
to use it . H e conversed, for some time, with his confessor and 
other divines. A n d , having been received into the bosom of the 
church, he took leave of his attendants, and sat down on the 
seat from which he was never to rise. Before his hands and his 
feet were made fast, he made a present to the executioner, and 
twice embraced the man, who was bathed in tears, as a token 
that he bore him not any il l-wil l on account of the office which 
he was about to perform. Then, making bare his neck, he 
yielded his limbs to be bound, with the utmost composure. The 
instant this operation was performed, he reclined himself back-
wards*, and while he was in the act of recommending his soul to 
• l a Spain, traitore alone are beheaded with tVeir face» downwards. The Spaniah word 
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God, his head was in a moment severed from his body. As the 
last impressions are commonly the strongest*, men forgave and 
forgot the imperiousness of his former conduct and behaviour, 
and thought and spoke only of that mixture of humility and for-
titude, that patience and piety, which he displayed in the last 
stage of his life-f*. 
The eounsels of Spain. had, for many years, been distinguished 
by a singular unión of a desire of power, with a love of peace : 
but it was found impossible to gratify at once those opposite 
passions. The intrigues of ambition excited the violence of 
arms. The commotions of Italy were followed by those of 
Germany. A war was kindled, the most signal and destructive 
in modem annals. Famine and pestilence succeeded to the de-
stroying sword, and the direful power of hunger equally overéame 
the strongest antipathies, and violated the tenderest affections of 
nature : so bloody was that tragedy which concluded, so happily 
for the liberties of Europe, in the famous peace of Westphalia ! 
The male line of Maximilian I I . having terminated in Matthias, 
Maximilian, and Albert, who were now advanced in years, 
without progeny, the succession to the hereditary dominions of 
Austria in Germany might ha ve been claimed, on plausible 
Ongin of groun(^ by the king of Spain But a natural love 
the thirty of tranquill ity, the desire of preserving in his house 
faGermany, imperial crown, and the dread of that dignity 
that termi- devolving on the head of a heretic, determined Phil ip 
peace of to comply with the request of the Austrian princes, 
Westphaha. an(j ^0 yjei¿ Up hig pretensious in favour of those of 
Ferdinand of Gratz, great-grandson of Ferdinand L , and distin-
guished by his zeal for the Catholic religión. He, accordingly, 
made a solemn cession of all his rights to the Austrian provinces, 
to Ferdinand and his brothers, and their issue male. But, if 
that should fail, it was stipulated, that the provinces should 
return to the house of Spain, of which the females were to be 
preferred before those born in Germany. On this occasion, 
Phil ip and Ferdinand entered into a family compact, the object 
is degollar, couper la gorge. The executioner performs his office face to face with the 
BufFerer. % 
* Sed plerique homines postiema meminere. Julius Csésar, ap. Sallust. 
t Saavedra Devisas Politicaa. Amelot de la Houssaie. Disc. Ilist. Article Calderoua. 
Historia de Don Felippe IV. por G o i ^ l o de Cespides, lib. ii, cap. xxxvii. 
\ The son of Anne, daughter of the cmperor Maximilian II. 
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of which was not only to maintain the strength of their common 
stock, but to extend its branches over the neighbouring nations. 
They made a league, offensive and defensivo. They engaged to 
support their respective rights and claims, by reciprocal succours; 
and to prefer the general interest of the Austrian race, before 
any particular or transient advantage to any of its members. 
The date of these transactions was the year 1617- In the same 
year, on the seventh day of June, Ferdinand was raised to the 
crown of Bohemia,"and in the year following, to that of Hungary; 
with this reservation, that the regal power should remain with 
Matthias during his life. 
The confederacy between the two branches of the house of 
Austria, and the steps that had been taken to continué in that 
family the imperial dignity, inflamed the jealousy that had long 
prevailed of Austrian ambition, and diffused among the Protest-
ants of Germany a general alarm. Ferdinand had banished 
from his dominions all who persevered in the open profession of 
the reformed religión : a severity which prognosticated all the 
cruelty of religious zeal, wherever his power should be established. 
The apprehensions of men were increased, when they considered 
his strict alliance with the Catholic king, with whom he was 
connected by blood, by religión, and by interest. A s he depended 
for support chiefly on the treasures and arms pf Spain, so it was 
probable, he would be governed chiefly by Spanish counsels, 
whose constant aim was to wreathe aroynd the necks of mankind 
the yoke of religious and civil tyranny. A s the power of the 
emperor would be strengthened by an alliance, or rather a species 
of unión with the vast monarchy of Spain, so his claims, it was 
dreaded, would be increased in proportion, and the enlarged 
prerogatives of the imperial crown, i f the succession to that 
dignity should not be interrupted on the death of Matthias, 
would descend as an inheritance to the latest posterity of the 
family of Austria. 
But the man on whose mind these considerations made the 
deepest impression, was Frederick elector palatino, a prince 
young, high-spirited, and in power not inferior to any of the 
Protestants, the duke of Saxony perhaps excepted. He visited 
all the members of the electoral college, to whom he represented, 
that as the present conjuncture deñianded, so it presented a fit 
occasion of forming a barrier against the progress of Austrian 
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ambition. He entreated them, by a timely interposition, to 
check the growth of an authority which must otherwise become 
irresistible; and by a spirited and judicious exercise of their 
privileges, to perpetúate them in their families. The Catholic 
electors, as he had expected, he found attached to the house of 
Austria : and these were four in number, while the Protestants 
were only three. But, in order to over-balance this inequality 
of numbers, Frederic, with the consent and approbation of his 
Protestant brethren, made a tender of the imperial crown to 
the duke of Bavaria, not doubting but the archbishop of Cologne, 
one of the Catholic electors, would interest himself in the fortunes 
of the duke, his brother, and be forward to promote his great-
ness. This plan, in which there was not anything subtle or 
profound, was the more solid and judicious, that it was obvious 
and natural. But it was disconcerted by a cause that was 
scarcely to be suspected. The duke of Bavaria rejected the 
proífered dignity of the imperial crown; and all that the policy 
and zeal of the palatine was able to effect, was a short delay in 
the election of a king of the Romans*. 
The sparks of discord which in other parts of the empire had 
produced only murmurs, jealousies, and intrigues, having fallen, 
in Bohemia, on more combustible matter, had, by this time, 
blazed into the flames of war. A s that kingdom is the highest 
Description ground, most mountainous, and, by nature, the strongest 
ofBohemia. 'm Germany; so its inhabitants had at all times been 
distinguished by the loftiness of their spirit, and the vigour and 
success of their struggles for civil liberty and religious toleration. 
It is bounded on the east by Moravia and Silesia, the countries 
of the ancient Quadi and Marcomanni; on the west by Bavaria, 
part of the ancient Noricum ; on the south by ancient Pannonia, 
now Hungary, with other provinces of Aus t r ia ; and on the north 
by Saxony. It is almost surrounded by the mountains of the 
famous Hyrcanian forest, whose sides, broken into many sloping 
ridges, intersect this lofty and spacious amphitheatre, and form 
a landscape, bold, various, and of great beauty. This country 
is remarkably fertile, and before the spirit of the inhabitants 
was broken, and their industry checked by despotic government, 
so populous, that it was computed to have contained above three 
millions of souls. 
• Batt. Nan. Hist. della Repub. Venet. lib. iv. 
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The Bohemians of those times are represented by cotem-
porary historians, as a people of a ruddy complexión, and of 
enormous stature and forcé of body; and in their dispositions 
intrepid, fierce, proud, quick in resenting injuries, of a haughty 
mien, lovers of a rude magnificence and pomp, and addicted to 
reveis and intemperance. The native language of Bohemia is 
the Sclavonic, which also appears to have been the mother 
tongue of the Tartars, and their offspring the Turks ; and of all 
the nations inhabiting those regions which extend from the 
northern parts of Russia to Turkey in Europe*. The metrópolis 
is Prague, a city of large extent, stretching along the banks, and 
on either side of the river Muida, adorned with many sumptuous 
edifices, and particularly two strong castles, one of which was 
the residence of the ancient Bohemian kings, The rich provinces 
of Silesia, Moravia, and Lusatia, were dependent on Bohemia, 
and formed a great addition to its power and importance in the 
scale of nations. 
The authority of the church of Rome was never so great and 
universal as wholly to banish from the Christian world 
procesa of a spirit of onquiry and a love of knowledge. During 
at oaef0rm ^ e ^ c ^ e s ^ darkness of the middle ages, a star appeared 
here and there in the firmament, which reflected the 
light of ancient times, and formed a presage, that although the 
sun of science was set, it would return to enlighten bewildered 
nations. So early as the eighth centupy, Claud, bishop of Turin, 
sowed the seeds of reformation in the valleys of Piedmont, whence 
they were gradually transplanted into other countries. In the 
thirteenth century, the Waldenses, or Vallenses, or Albigenses, 
for by these, and other ñames, the disciples of Claud were 
distinguished, liad spread so far, and become so numerous, that 
the pope thought it necessary to exert his utmost efforts to 
suppress them. For this purpose, the first crusade was proclaimed 
of Christians against Christians, and the office of inquisitor was 
established. Such a war as liad been waged with the Infidels, 
was now carried on against these unfortunate heretics. In France 
alone, i f we credit the authority of Medet , ten hundred thousand 
perished by the sword. According to an author less liable to the 
• Russia, Poland and Lithuania, Hungary, Transylvania, Sclavonia, Croatia, Istria, 
Wallachia, &c. &c. 
f Vidc Mcde in Apocalypsin, p. 503. 
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suspicion of aggravating the horrors of the inquisition, the 
Waldenses in that kingdom were either cut off by fire or sword, 
or dispersed into remote regions, or driven to the fastnesses of 
neighbouring woods and mountains. Some sought an asylum in 
the Alps adjoining to Pro vence, part withdrew into Calabria, 
part obtained refuge in Britain, and others, turning to the east, 
took up their abode among the Bohemians, and in Livonia and 
Poland*. In Grermany they grevv and multiplied so fast that, in 
the beginning of the fourteenth century, it is computed there 
were eighty thousand of them in Bohemia, Austria, and the 
neighbouring provinces. A n d so greatly had their number 
increased in the space of the next hundred years, that they 
avowed and maintained their religious tenets, in spite of the 
tyranny of the pope, supported by the power of the emperor. 
In 1410, Robert L , the count palatino, being emperor of 
Germany, and Winceslaus, who had been deposed from that 
dignity, on account of his egregious misconduet, king of Bohemiaf, 
the doctrines of the Albigenses were maintained by the learning, 
eloquence, and irreproachable lives of John Huss and Jerome of 
Fragüe. These reformers were condemned to the flames by the 
council of Constance, and suffered with the usual fortitude of 
martyrs. A civil war was kindled from their ashes. The 
Bohemians revolted against the emperor Sigismond, who, with 
many respectable qualities, was a zealous bigot to the Catholic 
religión, and under the conduct of Zisca, defended their opinions 
not only with arguments but arms. The emperor was defeated 
in several battles, by this bold leader, who gave law to the 
kingdom of Bohemia t i l l his death, which happened in 1424. 
• Thuani prsefatio ad Hcnricutn IV. p, 7. 
•f Winceslaus was continually immersed ¡n debauchery, and in his fits of intoxication 
frequently exercised the most enormous cruelties on people of all ranks. From a strange 
mixture of cruelty, whim, and indeeency, he contracted an intimacy with the public execu-
tioner, whom he honoured with the appellation of " gossip." His cook having offended 
him, he gave orders that he should be roasted alive. On account of these irregularities, and 
his selling the rights of the empire, both in Italy and Germany, he was deposed, by the una-
nimous voice of the electors, from the imperial throne. Winceslaus was so little mortified 
at the news of his deposition, that he said, with the most perfect acquiescence, " We are 
overjoyed to be delivered from the burthen of the empire." He sent a message to the impe-
rial cities, requesting them to ?end him, as the last token of their loyalty, some butts of 
their best wine. He aftcrwards shut himself up in the castle of Visigrade, in Prague, aban-
doning himself to the gratification of his appctites. Such a character was not likely to 
intenueddle in religious disputes. 
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He gave orders that a drum should be made of his skin, and 
what is equally extraordinary, his orders were faithfully earried 
into execution. Zisca's skin, after undergoing the necessary 
preparations, was formed into a drum, which was long the symbol 
of victory. Procopius, a Catholic priest, converted by the writings 
of one of the disciples of John Huss, revived the spirits of the 
Bohemian brethren, many of whom, after the death of Zisca, had 
retreated to caves and mountains. This charapion, who uniting 
the military with the sacerdotal character, supported the cause 
of his party with great courage and bravery, fell in a battle with 
the Catholics. Yet , so terrible liad the ñame of the Hussites 
become to Sigismond, that he allowed them the cup in the 
sacrament of the eucharist (the deprivation of which had been 
the main source of their complaints) together with a general 
amnesty, and a confirmation of their privileges. But verbal and 
even written premisos are easily retracted, where there exists not 
any power of enforcing their accomplishment: and a right avails 
nothing without a remedy. The dispersed brethren ceased to be 
formidable. Sigismond renewed his tyranny. His immediate 
successors on the imperial throne were, like him, zealous Catholics. 
A n d the reformed in Germany were languishing under the 
pressure of an arbitrary government, when Mar t in Luther raised 
up nations to their aid, revived their drooping spirits, increased 
their numbers, and exalted their power. 
Had the whole Christian world at the time when Luther 
began to preach against indulgences been devoted to the Romish 
faith, however absurd the doctrines of the clergy, and however 
profligate their lives, it is impossible that he could have met with 
any considerable success : so great is the power of established 
authority,. and universally received opinión ! But the never-
ceasing contests between the popes on the one part, and the 
emperors with other sovereign princes on the other, diminished 
of themselves the reverence for the papal jurisdiction ; and also 
tended wholly to subvert it, by rousing an enquiry into the 
grounds on which it was established. This enquiry was facilitated 
by the revi val of literature, which, fatally to the reigning church, 
explored the foundations both of its powers and doctrines. The 
discoveries of grave theologians and antiquarians were followed 
by the ridicule of wit and humour. A n d the learned and pious 
labours of Savonarola, Berengarius, and Wickliffe, were aided 
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by the raillery of Dante, Petrarch, and Erasmus. In the 
beginning of the 16th century, the primitive doctrines of Christ-
ianity had taken root in most countries in Europe. The mate-
rials for reformation were collected, and the foundations laid 
deep, before Luther and Calvin raised and completed the super-
structure. The minds of men being thus prepared, the doctrines 
of these reformers spread far and near. In Bohemia, with its 
dependent provinces, where similar tenets had been already 
adopted, and where ideas of opposition to the emperor, and 
contradiction to the pope, were so familiar and common, their 
progress was unusually rapid. A n d the number of Hussites and 
Evangelists, (appellations which cotemporary writers seem to 
consider as synonymous) soon equalled that of the Catholics, 
and was daily increasing. From their numbers they derived 
power, and from power a spirit of persecution. In Prague they 
committed many outrages on the property and persons of the 
clergy. The archbishop was driven from the city. A n d it was 
evident, from the whole tenour of their conduct, that they aimed 
at nothing less than the whole power of government, both civil 
and ecclesiastic. Their encroachments received a check from 
the first Ferdinand, who, uniting vigour of conduct with lenity 
and moderation, asserted the rights of the established church, 
at the same time that he used not any other means for reclaiming 
the Protestants than the influence of authority, and the power 
of persuasión. H e entreated them to submit to the decisions of 
the Christian fathers now assembled in council at Trent. A n d 
on the other hand, that the authority of the fathers might have 
greater weight, he took the liberty of exhorting that venerable 
order to take measures for reforming the lives of the clergy. H e 
re-established in Prague the exiled metropolitan, with other 
Catholic priests; and sent to their aid a strong reinforcement of 
Jesuits. The labours of these preachers, fostered and encouraged 
by the countenance of the emperor, sustained awhile the declining 
interests of the Romish faith. The memory of Maximilian and 
Rodolphus, the immediate successors of Ferdinand on the imperial 
throne, is stigmatised by Catholic writers with a coldness and in-
difference in matters of religión which was extremely favourable 
to the growth of heresy. This charge, as far as it concerns Ro-
dolphus, appears not to have been wholly groundless. Fo r while 
the Protestant partyon the onehand required an extensión of their 
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privileges, and the Catholic on the other, begged that the heretics 
raight be laid under closer restrictions, the emperor declined at 
first to gratify the desire of either. But a fortúnate conjuncture 
gave weight to the applications of the Protestants, and crowned 
them with success. Matthias, who had already usurped the 
government of Moravia, Austria, and Hungary, aspired now to 
the crown of Bohemia; and in order to pay his court to the 
Protestants, professed the principies of toleration, and aífected a 
zealous concern for all their rights and privileges. B y these arts 
he effectually attached to his interests the leaders of that party, 
so formidable for its numbers, boldness, and disposition to action. 
His indulgence to the reformed religión covered the violence of 
his usurpations with a specious ve i l : and his Protestant partisans 
were not ashamed to support his unjust pretensions. E m -
boldened by the favour of Matthias and the justice of their 
cause, they took up arms, and in that hostile attitude presented 
anew their petition to the emperor for a confirmation of sundry 
privileges. Rhodolphus had hitherto exercised over Bohemia 
the power of a sovereign ; and though he had neither inclination 
ñor ability to prolong that power by forcé of arms, he was not 
so wholly indifferent to the attractions of a crown, as to resign 
it, i f it could be retained by a few concessions respecting modes 
and doctrines of religión. The Protestants accordingly obtained 
a royal edict, authorising a free exercise of their religión in 
Bohemia and the adjacent provinces; a consistory or council for 
ecclesiastic affairs, with other institutions relating both to the 
government and defence of the churches of the reformation; and 
also to the establishmentof schools, colleges,and places of worship. 
It is reasonable to suppose, that the utmost extent of this last 
concession, was a permission to the Protestants to build churches 
on their own lands. But they, interpreting it in the most com-
prehensivo sense, began to build religious edifices oven on the 
estates of the ecclesiastics : a freedom which appeared to the 
whole Catholic party an excessive outrage. Complaints of these 
encroachments having been carried to Matthias, who by this 
time had suoceeded to his brother Rhodolphus, both on the 
Bohemian and imperial throne, a letter of royal authority was 
instantly issued, prohibiting the erection of all Protestant fabrios 
on lands belonging to the church. In consequence of this pro-
clamation, one or two mceting houses were demolishcd. A n d 
338 H I S T O R Y O F T H E R E I G N O F [BOOK V I . 
the Protestants were thrown into the utmost ferment, their 
resentment against the emperor being exasperated by the recol-
lection of those deceitful promises with which he had beguiled 
them when a candidate for the kingdom. 
The Bohemian Protestants by means of their DEFENDERS, 
whose business it was to watch over the interests of the church, 
to spread an alarm in times of danger, and to concert measures 
for common defence*, were enabled to combine in any effort that 
might be deemed necessary for the preservation of the true 
religión. Henry, count Thorn, perceiving the force of this great 
machine, and also how easy it would be, in the present juncture, 
to set i t in movement, conceived the bold design of turning it 
against the house of Austria. This nobleman was indeed of an 
enterprising and turbulent disposition ; but in the part he acted 
on this occasion, he was actuated not so much by any inquietude 
of temper, as by the passions of resentment, fear, and religious 
zeal. Deprived of his paternal inheritance by the tyranny of the 
archduke of Gratz, on account of his steadfast adherence to the 
doctrines of the Reformation, and driven from his nativo country, 
he found refuge among the Protestants of Bohemia. H i s zeal 
and his eufferings in the cause of the Protestant faith, gained 
him the favour and confidence of this people, and the superiority 
of his genius their esteem. A t the time when Matthias deemed 
it good policy to court the Protestants, he affected a desire to 
establish the fortune of the count: and accordingly, when he seized 
the crown of Bohemia, he invested him with the command of 
Carlestein, a fortress in which were deposited the regalía of the 
kingdom. But when the power of Matthias was firmly established 
by the death of Ilodolphus, he threw off the mask of good-will 
towards the Protestants, and openly patronised the faith in which 
he had been educated, and which was most favourable to regal 
power. The independent principies of count Thorn the emperor 
regarded with jealousy and distrust: for having determined to 
repress the pretensions of the herética, he foresaw a conjuncture 
in which it would be dangerous to intrust places of strength in 
any other hands than those of Catholics. That nobleman was 
therefore deprived of the govemment of Carlestein, which was 
bestowed on count Martinitz, a devoted instrument of both 
* The Defenders appear to have been the principal men of their communion, cithcr in 
their seveni rongregations, or in the different distrícts of the country. 
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ecclesiastic and regal authority. The succession of Ferdinand 
to Matthias afforded not to the exiled count any hope of prefer-
ment frora royal favour: on the contrary, the bigotry of that 
severe prince threatened him with still farther oppression. In 
these circumstances he saw no resource but in civil commotion 
and revoluti on. These were justified to the count by the enthu-
siasm of religión, and the same passion, as has been already 
observed, conspired with others in rousing him to attempt them*. 
He flew to different quarters of the kingdom, and, hastening 
from place to place, laboured, both in public assemblies and 
prívate societies, to rouse a sense of danger, and a spirit of free-
dom. The boldness of his genius, and the fervour of his zeal, 
inspired a like boldness and fervour in all with whom he conversed. 
The ñame spread from breast to breast, formed a concert of 
wills, and united all ranks of men in a resolution to defend their 
religious rights with their lives and fortunes. A n d at his 
instigation, the defenders, or chiefs of the Protestants, called a 
general assembly of the states of the kingdom, for the express 
purpose of concerting measures for the redress of grievances. 
The emperor, considering this spirit of association as the 
forerunner of rebellion, issued a proclamation, debarring all 
assemblies of the states, until he himself should come among 
them in person, or should give farther orders to his ministers. 
Notwithstanding this prohibition, the defenders, with numbers of 
other powerful barons, accompanied with armed servants and 
retainers, and a multitude of the inhabitants of Prague, con-
vened at that city on the 20th day of May, and having heard a 
sermón, and joined together in prayer, mutually pledged them-
selves to defend their religión and their churches, not only in 
Prague, but in every part of Bohemia. It was also resolved to 
publish to all the world an account of their present conduct and 
futuro views. A manifestó was drawn up for this purporc. 
Manifcítoof exordium contained the strongest expressions of 
the Bohe- loyalty to the emperor, as king of Bohemia. The 
general estates lamented the dangers which obliged 
* The principal authorities for this account of the origin of the troublcs of Bohemia are 
these : Annalcs de TEmpirc, tom. i i . ; Heiu . Hist. de TEmpire; Batt. Nan. Hist. lih. ÍT. 
ann. 1618, ct passim ; Gon^ilez de Cesp. lih. prim. cap. v. et passitn ; Veritable Recit de 
ce qui s'ett passé a Prague, le 21 May, 1618; Everhardi Wassemburgii Embricensis de 
Bello inter Imperatorcs Fcrdinandos et eorum Hoste\ &c. ; Wilson's History of Kiug 
James. 
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them to take measures that appeared to supersede an authority 
they wished to preserve in vi oíate. Their only design was to 
frústrate the pernicious projects of certain seditious and turbu-
lent spirits, who had sworn the ruin of their liberties, and of the 
fundamental laws of the kingdom; who had so far abused the 
confidence of the emperor and of Ferdinand, as to persuade 
these princes to mareh against Bohemian subjects at the head of 
hostile armies ; in order to seize Prague; to ki l l or imprison the 
greater number of the nobles, and deputies of states; to raze 
their churches; and to abolish the free exercise of their religión *. 
This manifestó being read aloud, was approved by the states, and 
a general murmur of applause was heard amongst the people. 
In the midst of these transactions, an order arrives from the 
imperial ministry, commanding the Protestant leaders to disperse, 
and to retire to their respective habitations. Upon this, count 
Thorn, attended by a number of other barons on.horseback and 
in armour, rides up to the castle, and having secured its gates, 
proceeded immediately to the hall, in which the ministers of 
Matthias were assembled in council on the present important 
emergence. Invective and altercation were soon followed by 
blows: and the counts Martinitz, Slavata, and Fabritius, who 
held the principal offices of government, were thrown headlong 
out at the windows. Though they fell from a height of sixty 
feet, and that several shots of musquetry were fired at them as 
they fell, they escaped, not only with their lives, but free from 
any material harm. The Catholics considered this remarkable 
preservation of these three men as a miracle wrought by Heaven 
in support of the Romish faith. Minute descriptions are accord-
ingly given, in the writings of those times, of the wall of the 
castle of Visigrade, and of the tremendous precipice which inter-
venes between the bottom of the wall and the ditch. But Pro-
testant writers disprove the alleged miracle, by observing that 
the spot on which the Catholics fell, was covered deep with dung, 
and mud, and lea ves of trees. 
The Bohemiana, now involved in the guilt of rebellion, deter-
Revoit of mined to persevere, and to seek from their own valour 
Bohemia. an(j g00(j fortune for that indemnity which they had but 
little reason to look for at the hands of Matthias, and still less 
• Everhardi Wassemburgii Embricensis Commentarium de Bello ínter Imperatores Fer-
dinandos TI. et III. ct eomm Hostes. 
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from those of his successor. Their minds opened to greater 
views than those they had entertained on the first alarm of 
danger; and they now resolved to vindícate by the sword, not 
only their religión», bnt their civil privileges. In this resolution 
they were enconraged, whether they surveyed the internal situa-
tion of their own kingdom, or cast their eyes abroad npon 
foreign states. There was nothing in Bohemia to resist their 
united forcé. Matthias, declining in health as in years, was not 
able, and perhaps would not be very willing to maintain, in oppo-
sition to the just pretensions of a generous people, an arbitrary 
jurisdiction that must soon devolve to an ambitious rival and 
hated successor. The country was naturally strong and fertile, 
the people high-spirited and warlike, and ready to encounter 
danger and death in defence of their religión. If passing from 
their own, they contemplated the state of other kingdoms, cir-
cumstances not less animating presented themselves to their 
view, and fanned that generous fire which glowed in their 
breasts. The contagión of example, which more than reason 
governs the world, displayed its full forcé on this important 
occasion. The Venetian republic, and the duke of Savoy, had 
of late maintained their independence in opposition to the pre-
tensions and power of that civil and religious tyranny, with 
which the Bohemians were now called to struggle. The Protest-
ants of France formed of themselves, as it were, a sepárate state 
in the midst of a mighty kingdom. A n d the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands, in spite of the veteran armies of Spain, and 
the gold of the western world, had risen from the lowest and 
most distressing circumstances that could be imagined, to the 
greatest height of liberty and power. These circumstances were 
ever present to the minds of the Bohemian leaders, and formed 
the chief topics in their public harangues, as well as in their 
writings, which were circulated all over the kingdom by means of 
the press, and which were full of eloquence and vigour. A n d as 
divers states animated the Bohemians by their example, so all 
Protestant powers, it was probable, would support them with 
more substantial assistance. The sympathy of religión would 
render theirs the interest of nations: and their companions at 
the altar would be their fellow-soldiers, in the fiold of battle *. 
* Historia de Don Fclippe, &c. por Goléa lo de Cespidcs, lib. i . cap. 6. Batt. Nani, 
lib. iv. 1618. 
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The Bohemians having determined to insist on the restoration 
of their ancient laws and constitution, expelled the old garrison 
out of the castle (which was the royal palace), and replaced it 
by another in which they could confide. They appointed thirty 
persons to govern Bohemia, with the title of Directors. These 
magistrates having, in the first place, taken an oath of fidelity 
and allegiance from the inhabitants of Prague, proceeded to the 
administration of government. The first act of their power was 
to banish the Jesuits, and to confíscate their effects. They 
raised an army of two thousand horse, and twelve regiments of 
foot, and gave the supreme command to count Thorn. They 
addressed a manifestó to the emperor ; to the states of Silesia, 
Moravia, Lusatia, to the whole provinces and states of the 
empire; and to all the world; containing an account of their 
conduct, and invoking the aid of all the friends of religious 
toleration and civil liberty. 
Ernest, count of Mansveldt, was the first who espoused the 
Bohemian cause, and the last of its adherents who abandoned it. 
He was a natural son of that count Mansveldt, whom Philip I I . 
appointed governor of the Netherlands. In his early years, he 
attached himself, like his father, to the house of Austria. The 
court of Vienna was filled with a just admiration of his talents 
Count a n ^ v ^ u e 8 J a n c ^ m a transient fit of favour, promised 
Mansveldt to invcst him with the rights of legitimate birth, and to 
theTcivke him in possession of the estates of his family. But 
of the Boiie- a regard to intcrest violated a promise that had been 
made merely from generosity : and as the most violent 
resentments are those which arise from disappointed confidence, 
count Mansveldt's hatred of Matthias was implacable. His 
aversión to the house of Austria he extended even to their 
religión. He renounced the Catholic faith, and openly professed 
the doctrines of Luther. He abandoned the service of the 
emperor, and entered into that of Charles Emanuel, the most 
active and enterprising of all the enemies of Austria. But the 
present situation of affairs in Germany, oponed so full a career 
to the genius, the ambition, and the vengeance of Mansveldt, 
that he could not forbear expressing to the generous prince 
whom he novv served, an eager desire of offering his svvord to the 
revolted states of Bohemia. The duke of Savoy, who considered 
the disturbances in Germany as the surest pledge of his own 
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security, not only applauded the views of the count, but permit-
ted him to levy two thousand men, and also engaged to keep 
them in pay for him for several raonths*. A t the head of this 
sraall forcé Mansveldt marched into Bohemia, where he was 
received with the utmost joy, and instantly honoured with the 
charge of general of the ordnance. Thus the forces of Bohemia 
were intrusted to commanders who were both of them foreigners, 
both men of desperate fortunes, both breathing vengeance against 
the house of Austria, and both of them possessed in an eminent 
degree of military capacity and political discemment. Y e t 
between the characters of these men there was a remarkable 
Characters difference. Count Thorn, who had the talent of rous-
Thornand18 inS-> uniting, and wielding the minds of men, was the 
Mansveldt. best fitted to govern a nation: Mansveldt, so brave, 
enterprising, inventivo, and refined, the best qualified to conduct 
an army. The military talents of this extraordinary person 
shone forth, indeed, beyond those of his contemporaries. Ñor 
did ever any hero, in any age, exhibit greater boldness in 
encountering, or greater dexterity in escaping, from danger. 
These fierce commanders take the field at the head of sepárate 
armies. The flag of rebellion is displayed throughout all 
Bohemia, and by a powerful contagión incites a general insur-
rection in Silesia, Moravia, Lusatia, Hungary, and the Upper 
Austria f. 
The news of this revolution distracted the emperor with 
Embarrase- opposite passions. The idea which so naturally 
é*nperorthe Presents itself to monarchs in similar circumstances 
Matthias. occurred first to Matthias. But coercive measures 
might be as fatal to his own power as to the liberty of Bohemia. 
He was not able to take the field in person : the command of an 
army would of course be claimed by Ferdinand : and so powerful 
an engine would place in the hands of that prince the whole 
authority of government. Moved by this consideration, he wrote, 
in the style of the Catholics of those times, a paternal letter, 
requiring the evangelical states of Bohemia to lay down their 
arms, and disband their troops, promising them, in case of 
obedience, indemnity and protection. This offer the revolted 
provinces regarded not as a mark of lenity, but as a proof of 
* Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1618. 
t Rushworth's Coll . vol. i. p. 7, 8. 
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weakness*. They despised it so much, that they disdained to 
answer it. Matthias then forbade all levies of troops in the 
empire, without the imperial permission, and published to the 
world an elabórate account of the Bohemian revolt. A paper 
war ensued between that prince and his revolted subjects; and 
it was evident that the quarrel must be decided, as usual in such 
cases, not by the pen, but the sword. Accordingly, with the aid 
of the princes, friends, and allies of his house, he raised in 
Germany an army of ten thousand men. The king elect of 
Bohemia, as had been foreseen, demanded the command of this 
forcé, and obtained i t ; but with such restrictions as betrayed the 
jealousy of the oíd emperor, and left little more to the nominal 
chief than the shadow of power. Ferdinand declined the exercise 
of so limited an authority, and this the rather, that it would tend 
to heighten the disgust of the emperor, and might even induce 
him to take measures for disappointing his expectations of the 
imperial crown. The command of the army was, therefore, with 
Count Buc- the consent of Ferdinand, intrusted in the hands of the 
po^nted to famou8 count Bucquoy. This general took the field 
the com- without delay, and, having reduced the town o^ 
imperial Teutsbrod, fixed his head-quarters in Budovits, the 
army. oniy piace 0f gtrcngth that now remained to the 
emperor in all Bohemia. Count Thorn advanced against 
Bucquoy, reduced K rumiaw, with the suburbs of Budovits, and 
held that city in cióse blockade. Various skirmishes happened 
of course between the opposite armies; and fortune inclined 
sometimes to the one side, sometimos to the other. 
Whi ls t count Thorn was thus employed in watching the 
Various niotions of the imperial general, Mansveldt carried on 
ekirmishes with success the siege of Plisen. This city was import-
ímpTriali'st! ^or ^ situation, as it commanded an extensivo and 
and the fertile tract of country along the course of a branch of 
o emians. M u i d a ; and also contained great stores and 
treasures. For this being the only place in that quarter of the 
kiugdom, where the power of the Catholic predominated over 
that of the Protestant inhabitants, thither the Jesuits and priests, 
and many of the richest citizens of the Bohemian capital, had 
retired with their most valuable effeets. The conditions on 
which the inhabitants of Plisen surrendered, after an obstínate 
* Historia de Don Felippc III. por Gon. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. (í. 
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resistance, were, that they should maintain two companies of 
evangelical soldiers ; redeem the city frora plunder by sixty 
thousand florins ; and take an oath of fidelity and allegiance to 
the Protestant states of Bohemia. Several Catholic soldiers as 
well as citizens preferred exile, with the loss of all their goods, 
to this last condition. Mansveldt having thrown into the city a 
strong garrison of both horse and foot, continued his route in 
Bohemia, and took several places almost without resistance. 
During these transactions, continual overtures were made on 
Tbe empe- the part of the emperor for peace. Matthias appeared 
overtures in the singular character of a suppliant for power. He 
for peace. condescended to address many premisos and flattering 
expressions of regard to individuáis *. The evangelical states liad 
at first, as has been already observed, treated the emperor^ 
advances towards a reconciliation with a contemptuous silence; 
but after he liad drawn his sword, he became a more respectable 
correspondent, and they deigned to honour him with a letter. 
This letter contained very singular matter. The whole was a 
bitter compiaint of the ravages committed by the imperial troops 
in the kingdom of Bohemia. Matthias answered, that he was 
soríy for what liad happened, but that he would be under the 
necessity of sending more troops among them, if they should 
refuse to lay down their arms. The Bohemians at this time 
endeavoured to incline the emperor to peace, by the mediation of 
the archdukes his brothers ; and it is probable, that could they 
have obtained the restoration of their ancient constitution, and 
the establishment of the protestant religión, they would have 
been willing to leave to Matthias, or to Ferdinand, all the power 
of a feudal king. But neither was the emperor inclined to rest con-
tented with so confined an authority; ñor, perhaps, could the dif-
ference have been composed if he liad. A l l confidence between the 
contending partios was lost: and the matter now in dispute, was, 
which should retain the power of the sword ; an arduous question, 
and which an appeal to the sword itself could alone determine. 
Matthias had laboured long under bodily infirmities and 
Death of anxious cares, when the stroke of death laid him at rest, 
Matthias, on the 20fch March, 1619. Ferdinand, his successor, 
and surcos- ' 
sion of Fcr- doubtful of his ability to reduce his subjects to obedience 
by forcé of arms, attempted to gain their confidence and 
* Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII. Roy do Franco, et des priucipaux Evéncmcns arrivcz 
pcndant ce RiNgnc dans tous les País du Monde. 
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voluntary submission by argurnent and persuasión, and acta 
expressive of a tender regard for their happiness. He commanded 
Bucquoy to cease from all hostilities, and gave orders for a 
general suspensión of arras throughout all his dorainions. To all 
his revolted subjects he offered pardon and oblivion, a full 
confirraation of their privileges, and a full toleration in raatters 
of religión. H e added raany expressions of good-will, and 
earnestly exhorted thera to tread in the paths of peace. The 
exhortations of Ferdinand were not more successful than those 
of his predecessor. Count Thorn having taken Iglaw, a frontier 
town of Moravia, with several other places, and being reinforeed 
by troops, not only frora the provinces dependent on Bohemia, 
but also frora Hungary, at the solicitation of several Austrian 
barons drew near to the Danube. Having been furnished with 
boats by those who favoured his cause, he crossed that river with 
all his forces, and carried terror into the city of Vienna, as well as 
all the adjacent country. The whole garrison of Vienna araounted 
only to fifteen hundred foot and two hundred horse. This sraall 
forcé was under the necessity, not only of guarding the city from 
external attacks, but also from intemal sedition : for count Thorn 
had a nuraerous party within the walls of Vienna, who had 
engaged to facilítate its reduction by securing one of the principal 
gates. H a d that coramander advanced on the present occasion 
with his usual celerity, the possession of the Austrian capital 
would, in all probability, have fixed the independency of the 
Bohemian states, and drawn after it other iraportant revolutions. 
But trusting to the terror of his arras, and the influence of his 
partisans, he hoped to reduce Vienna, even without a struggle. 
H e suraraoned that city to surrender. But while he lay two 
days at Fischen expecting an answer, the university arraed five 
hundred students, and a reinforcement of several companies of 
cuirassiers having passed under false colours through the raidst 
of the Bohemian squadrons, arrived from the grand-duke of 
Tuscany. A t this instant some zealots were in theactof shaking 
Ferdinand by the doublet, and deraanding, with raany irapreca-
tions, liberty of conscience. The trarapling of horses and the 
glittering of swords and spears relieved the king from the 
iraportunities of those rude petitioners, and filled thera in their 
turn with constemation and terror*. Count Thorn now drew 
* Gio. Balt. Nani, Historia della Rt-pub. Véneta d'all' an. 1613. Sin' al' 1671. 
lib. iv. 1619. 
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near the city, with a design to besiege i t ; but by this time his 
presence was thought necessary in another quarter. 
Count Dampierre of Lorrain had raised four thousand men in 
Hungary, with which he intended to join the army under the 
command of Bucquoy. Mansveldt, having learned his design, 
immediately resolved to attack him, before a junetion of the 
Hungarians with the main imperial army should render their 
united forcé irresistible. H e was on his march for this purpose, 
when count Bucquoy fell upon him from an ambuscade, and 
defeated him with great slaughter. Mansveldt himself was 
among the wounded, and a great number were taken prisoners. 
The Bohemian army retreated to Breslaw, the capital of Silesia; 
and on occasion of this disaster it was deemed expedient to 
recall count Thorn, to oppose the progress of the victorious 
enemy. Bucquoy, having reduced several places, retired to 
Budovits, where he waited for some troops he expected from 
Flanders*. Count Thorn, having in vain endeavoured to bring 
the Imperialists to an action, but having recovered some fortresses 
they had taken, set out for Prague, where the reformed of Bo-
hemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia, were assembled. 
In this situation of affairs, the archbishop of Mentz, as chan-
cellor of the empire, proclaimed a diet at Frankfort for the 
election of a king of the Romans. The electors at tended either 
in person or by their proxies, and, on the twenty-eighth day of 
August, Ferdinand was adorned with the imperial purple. 
The Bohemian states had now been assembled for two months, 
The Bohe- and in the course of this period they formed a league 
fortify offensive and defensive with the annexed provinces, and 
thenjseives ano^er of the same kind with Bethlehem Gabor, who, 
by new alh- _ , . _ . , , 
anees, and from the rank of a prívate gentleman, had been exalted 
[ wJe*^0 ^ e favour the Porte, to the sovereignty of Tran-
new king. sylvania. This prince the Bohemians engaged to sup-
port in an effort to mount the throne of Hungary; as he, on 
his part, promised to maintain their rlght to elect a king of 
Bohemia. F o r they had solemnly resolved never to recognise 
Ferdinand as their k i n g ; but to choose a Protestant for their 
sovereign, and to shake off for ever the yoke of all the princes 
of the house of Austria. They justified their renunciation of 
Ferdinand by several arguments. " B y preserving the forms of 
* G0119. de Ccspides, Hist. &c. lib. i . cap. 6. , Ilist. Louis XIII. 
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free government, they said, the monarchs of Europe had been 
enabled to conceal their progressiori towards absolute power, and 
insensibly to impose the yoke of slavery on their unguarded sub-
jects. The election of Ferdinand, however formal it might 
appear, was certainly no other than an act of authority. Matthias, 
in the fulness of his power, had nominated his successor on the 
throne, and no individual had dared to oppose his wil l . Thus 
it was that the house of Austria trampled on the liberties of a 
free people, and abused the power which was intrusted in their 
hands for the public good, for the purpose of perpetuating it in 
their own faraily. But, waiving the question conceming the 
validity of his election, they maintained that Ferdinand had 
forfeited all title to the crown, by violatin the privileges of the 
states, particularly by endeavouring to fortify himself on the 
throne by means of foreign aid ; to control Germana by the arms 
of Spaniards.1' These were grave and solid reasons, but they 
added yet another, which appears very extraordinary, and even 
somewhat ludicrous; they said they had a right to choose a new 
king, because Ferdinand had smoothed his way to the crown of 
Bohemia by means of Spanish gold; insinuating, that if they 
-had swom allegiance to that prince, they had been bribed to 
do so*. 
Such were the reasons of the Bohemians for deposing their 
king. Their motives for electing another were equally cogent. 
A s they had not yet experienced the inconveniences of an aris-
tocracy, the election of a king did not seem necessary for the 
purpose of intemal govemment, ñor were they so much attached 
to regal dignity as to choose a king merely for the pomp and 
parado of a court. But the vigour of the prince who claimed 
the throne made it necessary for them to form, by all means, 
powerful alliances and connexions. They made a tender of their 
crown first to the duke of Savoy. That prince had already 
given them proofs of his good-will; and his superior genius 
seemed necessary to defend them against the threatened danger. 
But the duke declined to accept the crown, though he applauded 
the generous spirit of the Bohemians, and exhorted them to 
persevere in the noble course on which they had entered. They 
next cast their eyes on the elector of Saxony ; but the hope of 
the succession to the duchy of Cleves restrained that prince 
* Harte's History of Gustavus Adolphus. 
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frora opposing the house of Austria. They now made an offer 
of the Bohemian throne to the elector Palatine. The spirit and 
zeal of this prince seemed not unworthy of a crown; and by his 
own forcé, and his connexion with prince Maurice*, and the 
king of England, they imagined he would be enabled to preserve 
it. Frederic, after some little hesitation, which was easily 
The elector overeóme by his natural ambition, and the incitements 
Palatine of the priucess his wife, who had great influence over 
wownVf 6 him, accepted the offer, and, having levied an army of 
Bohemia. ^en thousand foot and two thousand horse, marched into 
Bohemia in support of his new subjects. 
Whi le the commotions in Germany drew attention from every 
The nations ^^^ft^T, and from interest, frora affection, or from 
aiarmed at religión, iutercsted all nations, a comet appearing 
ance^fT" towards the North in the heavons, aggravated the 
comet. general gloom ; and the rainds of raen were agitated at 
once by the alarais of war, and a superstitious terror. A belief 
in astrology was, at this period, universal in Europe as well as 
Asia . Paraphlets were daily published, containing interpreta-
tions of the comet. Whi le the vulgar considered it as ominous 
of domestic and particular events, raen of genius and learning, 
deriding such absurd coraraents, supposed that a general syra-
pathy pervaded the universo ; that nature at certain periods was 
in a kind of coraraotion; and that, in such a crisis, the rainds of 
raen were naturally moved also f^*. A n d if the languor of inoccu-
pation be the great curse of human lifej, it raay be affirraed that 
at no time was there ever a greater portion of felicity difíused 
throughout the world. 
The contest between the emperor and the prince Palatine 
seemed at first altogether unequal. A spirit of disaffection 
and resistance had gone forth throughout the whole of Ferdi-
nand's dominions. H i s crowns tottered on his head, and that 
of Bohemia seemed already fallen. The small army under the 
comraand of Bucquoy was all that he had to oppose to the dif-
ferent forces of the Palatine, of count Thorn, and of Mansveldt. 
A new and more terrible enemy advanced upon him frora the 
* Ilis únele . 
f Batt. Nan. Hist. lib. iv. Wilson's l í i s tory of King James, anno 1619. Hume*» 
Hiit, vol. vi. octavo, p. 165. 
X See L 'Ahbé du Bois, and Ferguson's Essay on Civil Society. 
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East. The prince of Transylvania, under the auspices, and with 
the promise of powerful aid from the Ottoman Porte, marched 
rapidly into Hungary; reduced the capital; assumed the crown, 
with the title of k i n g ; made himself master of all that was 
important in the kingdom except Javarrin and Comorrah; formed 
a junction with count Thorn; and threw a bridge over the 
Danube, with a resolution to carry the war into the heart of 
Austria. 
In this extremity the nativo courage of Ferdinand was sup-
The cause of ported by the treasures, the arms, and the authority of _ 
ém^ml ^Paín* 1^1 a cause which involved at once the greatness 
by Spaín. of his family, and the support of the Catholic religión, 
the Spanish monarch advanced large sums of money, and levied 
a powerful military forcé. A body of eight thousand men 
marched from the Low Countries to reinforce the Imperial army 
under count Bucquoy; and Spinola, with an army of thirty 
thousand, composed of Italians, Spaniards, Walloons, and Irish, 
prepared to invade the Palatinate *. The powerful aid of Spain 
encouraged the electors of Saxony and Bavaria to appear on 
that side which seemed now to be the strongest, and by adhering 
to which they might look for the highest advantages. The views 
of Saxony have already been mentioned-f. A n d as to the duke 
of Bavaria, he was invited by a promise of receiving the estates 
as well as the dignity of his kinsman the elector Palatino. The 
example and interest of the Bavarían, the authority of the whole 
house of Austria, and the common interests of the Romish faith, 
united all the princes of the Catholic League in a resolution to 
* Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1619. Historia de Don Felippe, &c. per Gong, de Cespides, lib. i. 
cap. 9, 11. 
f A writer of great reputation supposes that the duke of Saxony may have been actuated 
by a jealousy of Prederic, who, of an equal, was to become his superior ; or, that he may 
have been afraid lest the princes of the house of Weymar, who were the warmest partisans 
of Frederic, should, by the assistance of that prince, if victorious, regain the possession of 
Saxony, the ancient inheritance of their family. [Pauli Piasecii Chronica Gestorum in 
Europa singularium : apud Amelot de la Houssaie, Disc. Hist.] It is of no importance to 
inquire whether these conjectures be well founded or no. It is often a difficult matter, it 
must be owned, to assign the real motives of the actions of princes, their conduct being often 
determined by secret, and sometimes trivial, causes. As to the matter n question, I shall 
only observe, that I do not find any historian who is inclined to give credit to what Saxony 
himself affirmed ; which was, that he would support the just claim of Ferdinand, in oppo. 
sition to the pretensions of Frederic ; because a contrary conduct would bring a staiu on 
the Protestant religión. Batt. Nani, lib. iv, 1619. 
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support Ferdinand with their lives and fortunes. The pope, 
besides his spiritual benedictions, contributed a pecuniary supply; 
and several ecclesiastics as well as princes of Italy followed his 
exaraple, A n . army was quickly raised for the defence of the 
ancient religión. The command was given to the duke of 
Bavaria. The protection afforded by the Ottoman empire to 
Gabor, interested the king of Poland also in the prosperity of 
Ferdinand ; and in an instant ten thousand Cossacks, fierce and 
savage auxiliaries, overrun Moravia, and join the Imperial army 
under Bucquoy*. 
The eyes of all Europe were now turned to the kings of 
d 7E England and Franco; the first interested in the fortune 
land and of Frederic from the connexion of blood as well as sym-
^Tpresent P a ^ y 0^ re^gion i the second bound by the strongest 
contest. ties of policy and ambition to oppose the progress of a 
proud and hated rival. But the indolent disposition of James, 
his reverence for the rights of kings, an eager desire to eífectuate 
a marriage between the second infanta and the prince of Wales, 
and a conceit withal that the whole world entertained a profound 
respect for his love of justice and great learning; these circum-
stances inclined him, as usual, to embrace pacific measures ; and 
he sought to promote the greatness of the Palatino, not by the 
sword, but by embassies and negotiations -f-. Lewis was neither 
ignorant of the interest of Franco, ñor did he want that spirit 
which was necessary for pursuing it with vigour. But that 
prince, who was one of those modest characters that are apt to 
pay a deference to capacities inferior to their own, was at this 
time under the government of the duke of Luines. That 
favourite was induced, by the artífices of the Spanish ambassador, 
to sacrifice at once the interests of the Palatino and of Franco 
to prívate ambition. The rich heiress of Pequigny and Chaunes 
was educated at the court of Brussels. It became the policy of 
Luines, by the favour of the archdukes, to pave the way for a 
marriage between that lady and his brother Honorius. H e 
entered into a confidential correspondence with these princes, 
and easily acquired their good graces by engaging to favour, in 
the present critical juncture, the views of the house of Austria. 
The veil under which he covered his secret designs from the eyes 
* Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1619. 
f See Hume's History of Great Britain, anno 1619, 
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of this prince, was, that i f the elector Palatine should establish 
himself on the throne of Bohemia, he would undoubtedly protect 
the Hugonots, withwhom he maintained a eorrespondencethrough 
J ] 620 uncle5 the duke of Bouillon. A n ambassador was 
despatched from Franco to the city of U l m , where was 
held a diet of the empire. In this assembly the Catholic and 
Protestant partios were present, and also deputies from corre-
sponding states and princes. The ambassador declared the 
resolution of Lewis to observe an exact neutrality in the present 
dispute, " and expatiated on the misery and folly of war and 
bloodshed, between partios who were not impelled to hostilities 
by any cause of mutual animosity or contention. The only 
quarrel, he said, was between the emperor and the elector of the 
Palatinate. Let these princes, therefore, fight out their own 
battles. But if the minds of princes be too strongly agitated 
by the present conjuncture to embrace such modérate and pacific 
counsels, at least let not the ravages and desolation of war be 
spread over all Germany. On the contrary, let them be confined 
within the narrowest possible bounds ; and, as the kingdom of 
Bohemia is the only subject of contention between the parties 
principally concerned, so let it be the only scene of all military 
operations that may be undertaken in support of their respective 
Treaty of claims by their friends and allies.,1 A treaty was 
^™- accordingly framed in which it was settled that neither 
the Evangelical Union, ñor the Catholic League should directly 
or indirectly invade or attack any electorate, principality, pro-
vince, or city of the empire, Bohemia alone excepted. 
The emperor was now in a situation in which he could act 
with the utmost vigour. The mere good offices of England were 
a general subject of derision*. He was secure from the attacks 
of France. The Protestant princes and states of Germany were 
animated indeed with a hegirty aversión to Ferdinand; but 
their assembly at Nuremberg had already preved how much 
they were divided by political jealousiesf and religious disputa-
tionsj, and how little reason there was to imagine they would 
ever unite in any effectual measures for the support of Frederic. 
The treaty of U l m afforded the emperor a farther pledge of 
* Hume's History of Great Biitain, Reign of James L anno 1619, 1620, 1621, 1622. 
f Hi8t. della Repub. Ven. Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1619. 
X Hist. de Don Felippe, &c. per Gon9. de Cespides, lib. i . cap. 9. 
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security from their attacks, and set him at liberty to pour an 
irresistible forcé into the kingdom and dependent provinces of 
Bohemia. Emboldened by these circumstances, he thundered 
forth against his rival the ban of the empire, and committed the 
execution of that decree to the archduke Albert, and to the 
dukes of Bavaria and Saxony. 
Don Lewis de Velasco being left with fifteen thousand men 
The mar- for the defence of the Austrian frontier towards the 
Lkln-P1 CJnited Provinces, the marquis of Spinola, with a 
PaHiuate ^ P a n ^ a r m y i a8 ^as already been observed, of thirty 
August, thousand men, but these under the colours of Albert, 
marches directly into the Palatinate, and halts at Coblentz, at 
the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle. As this invasión 
of Spinola was a manifest infraction of the treaty of U l m , the 
princes of the Evangelical Union reproached the Catholic party 
with their perfidy. The elector of Mentz, adding mockery to 
breach of faith, said, that the house of Austria was not bound by 
that treaty, as it was not comprehended in the Catholic League *. 
The princes of the Union, alarmed at the proceedings of the 
Austrians, and provoked at their insolence, opposed to the mar-
quis of Spinola an army of twenty-four thousand foot, under the 
command of the marquis of Anspach-f*. This forcé was joined 
near Worms, on the first day of October, by two thousand 
horse, and four hundred musketeers, under the command of 
prince Henry of Nassau, and by an English regiment of infantry, 
conducted by sir Horatio Veré, consisting of two thousand four 
hundred veteransj. This single regiment, with some scanty 
supplies of money, was all that the king of England contributed 
to the support of his son-in-law. Ñor is it probable that he 
would have adventured to send out this small forcé against the 
Austrians, i f he had not, from the timidity, or the facility of his 
nature, deemed it expedient to make a show of corresponding 
to the zealous attachment of his people to both the person § 
and the cause of Frederick. The Spanish ambassador at the 
court of London managed so dexterously the hopes and fears of 
James, that for the small assistance he afforded to the Palatino 
• Amelot de la Houssaie, Disc. Hist. 
f Hist. de Don Felippe III. por Gong, de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 11. 
X The History of King James, by Arthur Wilson, Esq. 
§ Hume's History of Great Britaiu, anno 1619. 
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he made ampie compensation. A t the very time the armies of 
Spain were battering the English, and the other friends and 
allies of his son-in-law, in Germany, sir Robert Mansell, vice-
admiral of England, was carrying ordnance and naval stores to 
the Spanish arsenals, and protection to the Spanish trade and 
coasts from the rapiñe of the Turks *. 
When the marquis of Spinola arrived at Coblentz, he learnt 
that Anspach was encamped at Oppenheim-f-, a post, one of the 
most important that could have been chosen either for the defence 
or the command of the Palatinate. In order to draw the enemy 
from this advantageous station, and to pave the way for taking 
possession of it himself, the Spanish general made such move-
ments and such dispositions as seemed at first to indicate an 
intention of making an attack upon Frankfort on the Maine, 
and afterwards, to make it diibious whether his design was 
against that city, or against Worms. In the course of these 
operations he redueed the towns of Creutzenach and Altzeim. 
The stratagem of Spinola had the intended eífect. A t the 
eamest request of the inhabitants of Worms, Anspach hastened 
to their relief with his main army, leaving Oppenheim under the 
protection of a modérate garrison. Upon this, Spinola, who 
had set his face against Worms, wheeled suddenly about, and, 
with an amazing rapidity, advanced to Oppenheim, which he 
took by assault, together with great quantities of military stores 
and provisions. In this important place he formed his magazines : 
and, having strengthened it by a numerous garrison and 
^1*' 2 * new fortifications, threw a bridge over the Rhine, and 
passed over into the Lower Palatinate. In this principality he 
reduced upwards of thirty towns and castles in the course of six 
montha^. 
When we consider that this commander not only reduced, but 
kept firm possession, of the greatest part of the Palatinate in so 
short a time, and in the face of an army equal in number to his 
own, and, perhaps, not inferior in bravery; wecannot but conclude, 
either that his capacity must have been far above, or that of his 
adversary far below, the common standard of human nature. 
" History of King James, by Arthur Wilson, Esq. 
t Batt. Nani, Hist. &c. lib. iv. 1620. 
X Gonf. de Cesp. lib. vi. cap. 12, 13. Batt. Nani, lib. iv. cap. 16, 20. Hist. du 
Regne de Lonis XIII. 
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A11 historians agree, that the conduct of Spinola in this, as in 
his otlier campaigns, discovered the most consummate military 
sk i l l ; yet their accounts of his conduct are, in several instances, 
materially different; and, perhaps, all of them, in many respects, 
wide of the truth. The evolutions of armies, their marches and 
counter-marches, and all the various operations of war, are not 
to be described with sufficient accuracy, either frora the hasty 
and partial compilations of the day, or from a comparison of 
works better entitled to the ñame of histories. The general 
himself, or his confidential friends, can alone give an account of 
his views and designs; and, as to the vicissitudes of an engage-
ment, they are not always known, even to the experienced officer 
present in the field of action. The utmost, therefore, that any 
other person can aspire to is, to illustrate the advantages of 
vigilance and foresight; to display the power of discipline, of 
habit, and of opinión; and, perhaps, to point out a few of those 
causes which surprise the hearts of men, and fill them with the 
passions of courage or of fear. 
But if it is impossible, by tracing the designs, to do justice to 
the genius of Spinola, it is an easy matter to discover that he 
had not a formidable rival in the marquis of Anspach. A s an 
Incapacity example has been given of the capacity of the one 
of Anspach, 1 U 11 • 1W U • 
general of general, so an example shall, m hke manner, be given 
the forccs 0f ¡ncapacity of the other. On the third day after 
raised by r •' J 
the princes the arrival of the Dutch and English troops, the mar-
Uni^n. ^1"8 0f Anspach marched, with an intention of surpris-
ing Altzeim, at the head of four thousand horse, and six thousand 
foot, with a suitable train of artillery. The marquis of Spinola, 
unwilling that his reputation should be tarnished, by suífering 
any of the places he had taken to fall again irtto the hands of the 
enemy *, hastened to its relief. Anspach, informed of the march 
of Spinola, suddenly turned about to give him battle; but 
Spinola had, by this time, learned that the army he had designed 
to attack was greatly superior to his own in numbers ; he there-
fore drew his cannon up to the summit of a neighbouring hil l , 
from whence it played on the enemy's cavalry, that had begun 
to press him, with such success as forced them to retreat. Upon 
this the princes of the Union also drew their artillery up another 
hill, on the right hand of Spinola. There was a wide valley 
* Goiiy. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 13. 
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between the armies, and in the midst of that valley a third hl l l , 
covered with cottages and vineyards. B y this hil l the hostile 
armies were mutually concealed, and it was only from the summit 
of this, that the one general could review the situation and 
movements of the other. A s soon as the princes of the Union 
perceived that the Spaniards were glad to fortify themselves in 
a strong position, they rightly concluded that the enemy were 
inferior to themselves in numbers and strength ; and therefore 
resolved to attack them. It was agreed on, that the English 
should begin the charge. Horatio Vere had, for this purpose, 
selected eighty musketeers out of every división of the regiment. 
The whole army, full of ardour, stood impatient for an engage-
ment; but the evening approached, and the raen still lay on their 
arras. The English general, wearied with this delay, rodeup the 
hill of vineyards, accorapanied by the earls of Oxford and Essex, 
to survey the posture of the eneray. They were retreating in 
good order, and in deep silence. The foot raarched first, the 
waggons with the baggage proceeded next, in two ranks, as a 
species of fortification to the infantry, and the horse brought up 
the rear. In this order they raarched with all possible speed to 
Oppenheira. Anspach was posted nearer to that city than 
Spinola, and it was in his power either to reduce that iraportant 
place, or to forcé the Spaniards, under a raighty disadvantage, 
to come to an engagement. The earl of Essex flew to the 
raarquis of Anspach, and entreated him, with rauch eraotion and 
iraportunity, to iraprove the iraportant and favourable con-
juncture. But the raarquis replied hastily, and in an angry 
tone, " There is a fort between us and Oppenheira, and we 
cannot pass to that place without being at the raercy of the 
eneray's cannon,11 Sir Horatio Vere exclairned, " A n d when 
shall we fight, i f we shun the cannon * ?" The season of winter 
had now arrived. It was uncoramonly rigorous. The frost was 
so intense, that the English officers burnt a great raany of their 
waggons; and as to the coraraon soldiers, they lay in heaps on 
the ground, cióse together, like sheep covered with a fleece of 
snow. One would naturally imagine that the rigour of the 
season must have been severely felt by the Italians and Spaniards. 
I f we raay give credit, however, to the authority of a celebrated 
• This account of the inglorious conduct of Aijspach is chiefly takcn from the History of 
King JaDCS, by Mr. Wilgon, who was an eye-witness of what he reports. 
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Spanish author, those inhabitants of southern climates bore all 
the severities of the campaign better than the Germans and the 
Engl ish*. 
While the affairs of the emperor prospered in this manner in 
Progress of the Palatinate, they were still more fortúnate in 
Bohemia. Bohemia. That vigilant prince had learned that 
Osman, who now filled the Ottoman throne, had promised to 
occasion a diversión of the Austrian forcea, in favour of the 
Palatino and Gabor, in the next spring, by invading Poland ; he, 
therefore, urged the dukes of Bavaria ancLJSaxony to collect 
their forcee, to advance upon the strength of the enemy, and, by 
operations equally rapid and decisive, to determine the issue of 
the war, before time and accidenta should turn the tide of fortune» 
and strengthen the hands of Frederic. Saxony instantly took 
the field with twenty-four thousand men, poured into Lusatia, 
laid Budissen, the capital, in ashes, and quickly reduced the 
whole province under the authority of the emperor. Having 
accomplished this object, he despatched fourteen thousand troops 
into Silesia. This forcé reduced Glogaw, a city on the Oder, 
vvhich, by opening a communication with the Baltic, secured a 
firm footing in a fertile and extensive country. 
In the mean time the duke of Bavaria, at the head of twenty 
thousand foot, and four thousand horse, marched into the 
Austrias. The lovver Austria immediately returned to its 
allcgiance, and was reccived into the protection of the emperor. 
The higher, at first, disdained to follow this example of submis-
sion. A garrhon of two thousand soldiers, thrown into Lintz, 
the capital, by count Mansveldt, had inspired the states with 
a degree of confidence and resolution, which was not to be over-
eóme by an apprehension of danger, while it was yet distant. 
But the near approach of Bavaria struck them so forcibly, that, 
although their forcé was not diminished, ñor that of the duke 
greater than they had all along suspected, they sent a message 
desiring conditions of peace. Bavaria, contemning their late 
applications, took Lintz by assault, on the 4th of August, 
punished the chief authors of the rebellion with death, imposed 
on those he spared the burden of a strong garrison, and chastised 
the whole country with the ravages of war. A s there wss not, 
in the whole province, any castle or fortress that was able to 
• .Hist, de Don Felippc III. &c. por Gony. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 12, 14. 
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withstand the conqueror of the capital, all the chief men either 
submitted to the emperor, or fled into Bohemia. Having thus 
re-established peace, together with obedience, in Austria, Bavaria 
passed on, in order to join count Bucquoy, who opposed with 
various fortune the Bohemian army, whose head-quarters at this 
time was Egleburg *. The count, aceording to orders from his 
prince, marched from Langlovits to Budovits. Here he was 
joined by the duke of Bavaria : and the two generáis having liad 
a short conference, the different armies continued their march, 
by different routes, towards Prague. On the lOth day of 
October, they both of them, whether by concert or by accident, 
drew near to Pilsen. Hitherto their divided forces had reduced 
every place that was situated in the tracts through which they 
bent their courses ; and the footsteps of the Cossacks were every-
where marked with blood. But Pilsen resisted their united 
Count power, being defended by the subtlety and refinement 
Mansvcldt of Mansveldt. The count being summoned to surrender 
imperial ^o the combined armies of his imperial majesty and 
generáis. ^iie (\u\íe 0f Bavaria, demanded a cessation of arms, 
and proposed a treaty of accommodation. He insinuated, in a 
letter which he wrote to the duke and Bucquoy, some general 
complaints of the injustice of fortune, and of his own hard fate, 
which had doomed him to struggle with difficulties, and to be 
rewarded with ingratitude and disappointraent. The cora-
manders to whom these hints were addressed considered them 
as an advance, on the part of Mansveldt, to surrender the town 
and garrison of Pilsen, upon those conditions which politi-
cíans soraetimes take the liberty of holding out to soldiers of 
fortune. A circumstance had taken place, which shall by-and-
by be mentioned, that enabled them to comprehend, as they 
imagined, the coun^s meaning, and which inclined them at the 
same time to give easy credit to his sincerity. They did not 
hesitate, therefore, a moment, to transmit to Mansveldt a very 
friendly letter, in which they endeavoured to restore him to the 
interests of the house of Austria, by the most liberal promises 
of preferment and fortune. But Ferdinand had not treasures 
eufficient to bend the inflexible spirit of that gallant hero ; ñor 
was it in his power to have set before his eyes so glorious an 
object at once of ambition and revenge, as that which he now 
* 00119, de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 10. Batt. Nani, bb. x. IG20. • 
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pursued. Mansveldt, however, counterfeited a satisfaction in 
the assurances that had been given him : but he declined to sur-
render the place, and the troops he commanded, without saving 
his honour, by making a show of resistance, The imperial generáis 
perceived at last that they had been the dupes of artifice *. 
There was no reason to despair of being able to reduce Plisen by 
forcé of arms; but the obstínate valour of Mansveldt, it was 
probable, would render the siege tedious; and, in the present 
crisis, every moment was precious. After being amused for 
thirteen days, they pushed on towards Prague, and at Raconits 
encountered with the Bohemian army, which was now conducted 
by the marquis of Anhalt and count Hollach, his lieutenant-
general. These men were but little acquainted with military 
affairs ; but they possessed the ear of the Palatine, who, passing 
by the distinguished merit of the counts Thorn and Mansveldt, 
bestowed his confidence where he had placed his favour. This 
was the circumstance which gave credit to the pretences of 
Mansveldt, and enabled him to impose on his adversarles at 
Plisen. 
Adjoining to Raconits, on the west, stood a hill , covered from 
the bottom upwards, to the middle, with a thick and intricate 
forest of pine and fir trees, whose cióse and feathered branches 
intwined with one another, and reaching to the very ground, 
formed a shade impervious to the rays of the sun, and a retreat 
to wild beasts. In this natural fortress, Anhalt resolved to 
make a stand, and to wait the approach of the enemy. He 
formed a camp for the infantry on the upper part of the hill , and 
defended the approaches to the whole, by the cavalry, and five 
hundred musketeers. A s it would have been dangerous to have 
advanced to Prague, leaving so great a forcé behind them, the 
imperialists resolved to assault the hill on all hands, and to pro-
voke the enemy, i f possible, to an engagement. But if, in this 
attempt, they should be unsuccessful, they hoped, at least, to 
derive some advantage from that spirit which is infused by an 
attack, and from that depression of courage and loss of reputa-
tion which the Bohemians would suffer by declining an action. 
The most desperate efforts were accordingly made to dislodge 
the Palatine, by setting fire to the vegetable rampart that pro-
tectcd him, and opening avenues for the ascent of the imperial 
• Batt. Naui, lib. iv. 1620. 
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troops, by the hatchet. In this attempt, many officers as well 
as prívate men fell, and Bucquoy himself was grievously wounded. 
On the 5th of November, Anhalt perceived the imperial army in 
motion. Upon this, he despatched count Thorn with a consi-
derable forcé to Prague, to strengthen the city, and to fortify 
the wavering minds of the inhabitants. He himself followed 
soon after with the main army. He leaves his baggage behind, 
and, by forced marches, through unfrequented paths, across the 
mountains, arrives before the imperialists, at the Bohemian 
capital. The vast extent of that city, which was open in many 
places to hostile invasión, determined Anhalt to post his army 
on the Wisemberg *. 
The Wisemberg, or White H i l l , is of no great height or 
Battk- of circumference, but, being cut and broken by crags and 
Praguc. (Jeep ravines, it is of difficult access, except on that sido 
which looks towards Prague, where an inclined plañe, of equal 
fertility and beauty, extends from its summit to the walls of the 
city. The lower part of this declining space was covered with 
a range of houses, or rather a straggling village, which formed 
part of the suburbs of Prague; the middlemost was an extensive 
park, adorned with a wood, and a royal palace, called the Star ; 
the higher overlooked, and in many places commanded, the 
capital. In this strong position the Bohemian general drew up 
his forces, and here he determined to abide the assault of the 
enemy. The various projections and incurvations of the hill , 
improved by art, seemed to defy the boldest assailants. A n d 
that the men might not be tempted to abandon so advantageous 
a station, Anhalt ordered the gates of the city to be shut, and 
signified what he had done to every división of the army. Having 
taken this precaution, he ranged his troops in order of battle, 
and waited the approach of the enemy 
The imperialists, wlio had by this time advanced within half 
a league of Prague, were struck with the advantageous situation 
of the Bohemians, and deliberated, whether or no they should 
give them battle. But the advanced season would not permit 
them much longer to keep the field : and in the spring, thirty 
thousand Turks^: would be added to the number of their enemies. 
* 00119. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 14. Batt. Nani, lib. ¡v. 1620. 
f Hist. de Don Felippe III. por Gon9. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 14. 
X Hifct. du Régnc de Louis III. Roy de F í a m e , ct des principaux Kvencmciu anivez 
priidant ce Rt'gnc dan» ton» Ies País du Monde. 
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A l l the friends of Ferdinand liad álready taken an active part in 
his cause, and his whole forcé was now in exertion. The powers, 
on the other hand, that formed the natural allies of Frederic, 
from causes that could not be permanent, stood many of them 
aloof, as if indifferent to his fortune, but would assuredly join in 
support of his cause, if the sovereign authority should be con-
firmed in the hands of that prince by length of time, as well as 
by actual possession. In many cases it was more pmdent to 
guard against disaster than to run any great risk for the sake of 
victory. But in cases of rebellion there was not room for delay, 
for the loss of time was equal to misfortune in the field of battle *. 
The enemy was, indeed, strongly posted ; but the fate of battles 
depended on accidents not to be foreseen by human prudence; 
and the steady valour of the imperialists was more likely to 
bear up under any unforeseen and adverse circumstance, than 
the tumultuous courage of the tmdisciplined Bohemians. There 
was yet another consideration, which, of all others, had the 
greatest weight in the present question. The sermons of Father 
Dominico, a bare-footed Carmelite, who assured the army that 
the Lord of Hosts would go forth with their standard in his 
own cause, had infused into the soldiers an impatient ardour to 
charge the heretics : so important, in those days, was the office' 
of a military chaplainf ! On the whole. it was resolved to 
storm the h i l l : the troops were formed in order of battle ; th e 
imperialists on the right hand, and the Bavarians on the left. 
They advanced upon the enemy by the way of Stratzis, the only 
way that was practicable. Pursuing this course, they were 
obliged to march in a file over a bridge, and then, before they 
should arrive at the bottom of the Wisemberg, a miry valley. 
The younger Anhalt, son of the general, perceived the advantage 
to be derived from this embarrassing situation, and was all on 
fire to improve it. H e proposed, after allowing such numbers of 
the Imperialists to pass the bridge as should greatly weaken the 
main body of the army on the other side, to attack them before 
they should be formed, and while struggling with the difficulties 
of marshy ground. This plan of young Anhalt, which was not 
less prudent than courageous, appeared to Hollach, the lieu-
* In discordiig civilibus niliil festinatione tutius, ubi facto magis quam consulto opus cst. 
Nec cunctalione opus, ubi pcrniciosior sit qnies, quam temcritas. Tacitus. 
t Batt. Naui, lib. iv. 1620. G0119. ilc Ccsp. lib. i. cap. 14. 
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tenant-general, the effect of youthful impetuosity. The Impe-
rialists were allowed to extricate themselves from their embar-
rassment, without any other inconvenience than what they 
suffered from the Bohemian artillery. In order to avoid this, 
they hastened their march, until the prominences of the hil l 
afforded them protection. Then, having put themselves in the 
best order that the time and nature of the ground would admit, 
they pressed up the Wisemberg with delibérate valour, and made 
a furious attack upon the enemy. The shouting of the soldiers, 
the noise of trumpets and drums, and the roaring of artillery, 
reverberated from the inflexions and cavities of the hill , announeed 
the commencement of the important onset, and shook the coun-
try for many leagues around with terror. Prague, as being 
nearer to the dreadful scene, was more sensibly struck with its 
horrors, and trembled in awful expectation of the eventful issue. 
Frederic, on whose account the contending armies profusely shed 
their blood, beheld from the battlements of his palace*, on the 
one hand the spacious capital of Bohemia, and on the other the 
fieree engagement that was to dispose of the Bohemian crown-f*. 
A t the beginning of the conflict, fortune seemed to smile on the 
Bohemians ; for young Anhalt, supported by count Slich, 
repulsed with great slaughter the first assault. This assault 
was made by count Til ly, lieutenant-general to the duke of 
Bavaria. But the veteran troops, which formed the strength of 
the Imperial army, sustained this disaster with that firmness 
which results from discipline, and a glorious reputation. On 
this occasion the wounded Bucquoy signalized his own spirit, 
and re-animated the hearts of the fearful. H e had been carried 
in a litter to his tent in the camp, there to wait the event of the 
action. But he no sooner saw the Imperialists hardly pressed 
by the Bohemians, than he jumped out of his carriage, and, 
feverish as he was, mounted the first horse he found, put himself 
at the head of his troops, and attacked the Hungarians with 
such fury, that he left near two thousand, as was computed, dead 
on the spot The Walloons, commanded by Wil l iam Verdugo, 
next to Bucquoy, had the honour of restoring the battle. They 
took young Anhalt and count Slich prisoners, and having made 
* In the Star Park, alrcady described. 
f Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1620. Gon^. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 14. 
I Hist, dn Régne de Louis XIII . ct des Evéneinei is , &c. 
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themselves masters of a redoubt, with three pieces of cannon 
turned the artillery with prodigious effect against the thick 
squadrons of the enemy. The panic that was struck among 
undisciplined troops by this sudden reverse of fortune; the 
fright and confusión that had taken place among the Hungarian 
cavalry, from the yelling of the Cossacks ; together with a steady 
and unremitted fire both of cannon and musketry, in spite of the 
exhortations, the threats, and the example of the generáis and 
other officers, threw the whole Bohemian army into irrecoverable 
disorder and terror. A general rout ensued. A U was lost, but 
the honour of having made a brave resistance. Anhalt, having 
first despatched a message to the Palatino, provided for his own 
safety. The regiment of count Thorn was the last that quitted 
the field. The Wisemberg was covered with the arms of the 
fugitivos, and the bodies of the slain. Multitudes, seeking to 
escape from the edge of the sword, perished in the Muida. Five 
thousand Boheraians, that had been posted in the Star Park, 
threw down their arras, and cast themselves upon the clemency 
of the victors. The generáis were willing to give thera quarter; 
but the Cossacks reraaining equally deaf to the orders of the 
commander, and to the cries of the flying victiras, sheathed the 
sword only when the arra was weary with shedding blood *. 
This iraportant victory restored to Ferdinand the crown of 
important Bohemia, and rendered the authority of Austria over 
conse- that kingdom more absoluto than ever, Whatever 
th'e battle priviloges and immunities the Bohemian states had 
of Prague. formerly enjoyed, whether as their ancient rights, orthe 
concessions of their kings, were, by a royal edict, abolished or 
revoked. The electoral dignity, and afterwards the estates of 
Frederic, were, by the mere authority of the emperor, transferred 
to the duke of Bavaria. His principal adherents were proscribed ; 
and all those rigours and severities exercised against the profes-
sors of the reformed religión, which were to be expected from 
a vigorous, unrelenting, and bigoted conqueror. 
The raisfortunes that awaited the elector Palatino were 
singularly affecting: ñor has ever the tragic Muse invented 
scenes more fitted to purgo the minds of raen with syrapathetic 
sorrow. In the silence of the night that followed the fatal 9th 
of November, he fled with his wife and little children into Silesia, 
• Batt, Nani, lib. iv. 1620. 
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where he met with the comraon reception of unfortunate princes. 
His abode among a people, determined to make their peace with 
hís mortal enemy, was as short as it was comfortless. H e 
wandered wíth his family from place to place, still fondly hoping 
to retrieve his fortune by arras, or by negotiation. In the midst 
of his peregrinations, two doraestic events of contrary natures 
equally dissolved his soul into the tenderest anguish. A t Bran-
denburgh, whither he had retired frora Silesia, he was rerainded 
how rauch his faraily had suffered froin his iraprudent arabition, 
by the birth of a son *. The same reflection occurred, in all its 
bitterness, some years after, on a journey to Amsterdara. A s he 
was passing over the Haerlem-raer, in a dark and terapestuous 
night, the light vessel in which he sailed íbundered on another, 
against which it was driven by the fury of the winds and waves. 
Before the ship sank, the Palatine, with some other passengers, 
made their escape to that other vessel; but the prince, his son, 
was unfortunately left in the foundered vessel, which they durst 
not approach, though they heard the cries of the boy, calling out 
for the help of hia father. The next day, when the tempest 
abated, they found him frozen to the raast, which he had 
erabraced as his last refugef. Whi le the unfortunate Frederic 
was thus wrestling with adversity, his friends and allies left hira, 
one after another, and sought to reconcile theraselves to the 
eraperor. Even the brave and active prince of Transylvania, 
who, after the battle of Prague, had the courage to raarch his 
troops to the frontiers of Lower Austria, maintaining his array 
by the plunder of the Catholic subjects of his eneray, even he 
would have abandoned the coraraon cause, and given up the 
interests of his ally, i f he could have exchanged thecrown for the 
viceroyalty of Hungary Count Mansveldt alone, with a sinall 
array, which he subsisted chiefly by pillage and free quarters, 
Courage 8^'^ maintained the cause of Frederic ; and his success-
and con- ful boldness encouragcd duke Christian of Brunswick, 
conmMao» and the raarquis of Badén Dourlach, to appear at the 
V(;1(it- head of arraies on the same side. These princes were 
defeated by the iraperialists under count Ti l ly . But Mansveldt, 
though rauch inferior in forcé to his eneraies, still maintained the 
* Hist. <lii R¿gne «le Loui» XIII. et des Evenemcns piincipaux, &c. 
f History of Kiiig James, by Arthur Wilson, Esq. , 
l Bait. N « l i , lib. iv. It í20. G0115.de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 16. 
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vvar, and discovered, at once, the most wonderful caution in 
securing his own troops, and the greatest valour in annoying 
those of the enemy. For the space of two years, he defied, with 
a small flying army, the whole house of Austria when in the zenith 
of its power, and would probably have prolonged the contest to 
a more distant period, i f the Palatine, at the instigation of the 
king of England, had not, under colour of submission to the 
emperor, dismissed him from his service. The count withdrew 
his army into the Low Countries, and there entered into the 
service of the United Provinces*. 
A t the same time that the treasures and arms of Spain were 
employed, with so much success, in supporting and extending the 
authority of Ferdinand in Germany, the duke of Feria, by the 
subjection of the Valteline, Consolidated the territories of both 
branches of the Austrian race into one extensive and mighty 
empire. 
The Valteline extends from the lake of Como, in Milán, winding 
Revolt of *n an easterly direction between two ridges of lofty 
the Vahe- mountains, to the country of Tyrol , and to the valleys of 
Sol and Munster, from which regions it is separated by 
the hills of Braulio, which may be crossed in the space of six or 
eight hours. On the north, it is bounded by the Alps, and on 
the south, by the territories of the Venetian republic. Its length 
is seventy miles;, its breadth, if we reckon from the summits of 
the enclosing mountains, forty; but, i f from their roots, on a 
médium, not above six. It is watered by the river Adda, and 
being exceedingly fertile in cattle, corn, and wine, it abounded 
in towns and villages full of people. The inhabitants of thís 
valley are said to have been of a mild and dispassionate temper; 
their manners to have been uncultivated and simple; their 
language and customs Italian. The Valteline was in former 
times a part of the principality of Mi lán ; though by this time it 
had fallen, through various revolutions, under the dominión of 
the Grisons. Those republicans governed this dependent 
province with a rod of iron, the antipathy that naturally takes 
place between a conquering and conquered people being exaspe-
rated by that of religión. They interdicted their religious rites 
and usages, banished the Jesuits, annihilated the jurisdiction of 
the secular clcrgy, and converted their churches into places of 
* Hume's Historv of Great Britain. Rcign of James I. anno 1622. 
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worship for the Protestants. Colleges were founded, and 
professors of divinity were brought from Geneva, at the expense 
of the king of England. And , as the Grisons tyrannized over 
the minds of this unfortunate people, so they in reality enslaved 
their bodies. They deprived them, on various pretenees, of the 
fruits of their industry, and even of the patrimony left them by 
their ancestors. A l l those who were in the service of the leagues*, 
might commit the greatest enormities on the Catholics with 
impuiiity. The government of the Valteline resembled that of 
Turkey, by Pashas, and Janissaries; or the dominión which 
is now exercised by European merchants over the princes of 
A s i a f . 
Animated at once by the resolution of despair, a zeal for 
religión, and prívate assurances of the most effectual support from 
the governor of Milán, the Catholics of the Valteline in one day 
flewtoarms, and surprised and massacred the unwary Protestants. 
The magistrates, and men of distinction and property, were, as 
usual in all similar commotions, the chief objects of their rage. 
Upwards of three hundred fathers of prosperous families 
J"ly' were put to the sword ; and their goods, houses, cattle, 
and estates, seized by the insurgents. Immediately the Catholics 
chose new magistrates, and, with the aid of the money from 
Spain, erected several forts, which were also garrisoned by 
Spanish troops. The Grisons, assisted by the wealth of Venice, 
which enabled them to hire some companies of Swiss, made an 
effort to regain the Valtel ine; but were repulsed by the 
Catholics, supported by near five thousand Spanish foot and horse, 
with a train of artillery. Thus the conquest of the Palatinate 
by Spinola, having opened a passage for the Spaniards through 
Flanders into the heart of Germany ; the Spanish territories in 
Italy being linked to those of Ferdinand by the reduction of the 
Immense Valtel ine; and a communication having been already 
the^houseof established between the Milanese and Spain, through 
Austria. the ports of Monaco and Final , on the Mediterranean ; 
• The civil constitution of the Grisons is a democracy. A certain numberof towns and 
villages composed a community or corporation ; several communities, a Icacruc; and three 
leagueg, assembled by their deputies in a general diet, possessed the supreme power of the 
republic. The Grisons are representad by writers of those times, but Catholics, as a fierce 
and intractable people, venal, incoiistant, and delighting in blood ; and in all respects as the 
reverse of the simple natives of the Valteline. 
f Batt, Nani, lib, iv. 1620. Genf de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 16. 
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a chaín seemed to be formed for holding the fairest portion of 
Europe in subjection to the house of Austria. 
Among the fortúnate events of this year, may be ranked the 
preservation of Naples from the attempts of the duke of Ossuna. 
How soon that singular man conceived the bold design of 
converting his delegated into sovereign power, is uncertain. 
RebeiHous His resolution was fixed the moment he learnt that the 
the'dukéfof court of Madrid intended to deprive him of his govern-
üssuna. ment; but it is probable that fluctuating and transient 
ideas of independency on that court had occupied his mind at an 
earlier period ; for when matters were brought to a crisis, it was 
only by pursuing his usual tenor of conduct with unusual alacrity, 
that he endeavoured to accomplish the object of his lofty 
ambition. It appears that he entertained a hearty contempt for 
the feeble capacity and temper of his sovereign*. He character-
ised this prince by an image very natural in the mouth of a 
military man. Talking of Philip, he was wont to cali him, " The 
great drum of the monarchy;" as if he had been merely an 
instrument for communicating the orders of the duke of Lermaf . 
This contempt of the king, and the distance of Naples from Spain, 
were perhaps the circumstances which first suggested to Ossuna 
ideas of raising himself to independent power. These ideas 
appear to have been uppermost in his mind, when he scornfully 
declined to solemnizo the double marriages, and courted popu-
larity, by distributing the money that had been collected for that 
purpose among a number of poor virgins. 
The means by which this duke, who passed with many for no 
other than an ingenious madmanj, endeavoured to bring about 
his ends were so refined and artful, that a brief account of them 
will not appear unentertaining to the reader. 
The order of nobility, accustomed to look back, and to reve-
rence antiquity, he reasoned, would be averse to innovation, and 
disposed to support the crown, which they considered as the 
* Batt. Nani, lib. iii. anno 1617. 
f Anecdotes du Ministére de Conde Duc d'Olivarez. 
í Sir John Digby, in a letter, dated at Madrid (itb June, 1619, writes to the secretary 
Naunton as follows : — " I doubt not but your honour has often heard that the duke of 
Ossuna, in Naples, hath given no stnall cause unto this king to suspect that he had an 
intention to keep himself longer in that govemment than should agree with his majesty's 
pleasure ; and, indecd, he hath so behaved himself, that, were it not the duke of Ossuna, 
(whosc idle brain is so well known in the world,) I should wonder at their patience." 
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source of their own eminence in society. He therefore endea-
voured by all means to humble the nobles, and by studied insulta 
to diminish that respect vvhich was paid to their rank by the 
poople. H e excluded them from all places of power and trust, 
and even plundered them occasionally of their property. His 
chief friends and confidants were strangers. Wherever he found 
a man of courage and genius, whora want or crimes had made 
desperate, he received him into his bosom, and loaded him with 
such favours as infallibly attached him to his person. On 
pretence of quelling coraraotions, whicli he himself liad indus-
triously excited, he introdueed a military force composed of 
foreigners, who were entirely devoted to his will, and who 
acknowledged no other master. He had also ships of war under 
his command, which roved the seas, not under the flag of Spaiu, 
but that of the family of Ossuna. In this manner he proposed 
to train up a naval forcé, that from habit should look up to him 
as the only power entitled to direct their motions. 
The prizes made by his fleet, and the plunder he ravished 
from the nobility, he employed in bribing the council of Spain to 
connive at his enormities, and in increasing his popularity, both 
in the army and among the great body of the people. Through-
out the whole kingdom of Naples he had agents who fomented 
the natural malignity of the people towards their superiors, and 
assured them that the duke of Ossuna was the only person to 
whom they could look up for protection against the tyranny of 
the court, and the insolence of the nobles. He it was who would 
relieve them from oppressive taxes, and ease them of all their 
burthens. One day as he passed by a place where the officers of 
the revenues, in order to adjust the tax, were weighing certain 
articles of provisión, he drew his sword with great appearance of 
indignation, and cut through the ropes of the scales, signifying 
by that expressive action, that the fruits of the earth ought to 
be as free as those celestial influences from whence they spring. 
A t the same time that he was assiduous to gain the favour of the 
Neapolitan people, he also laboured to conciliate the friendship 
and to secure the support of foreign nations. This purpose he 
hoped to effect by doing them all the mischief in his power. For 
this end he left nothing unattempted that might tend to embroil 
the Spaniards with all their neighbours, and to render their very 
ñamo hateful to the world. He endeavoured, as has alreadybeen 
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observed, to bring the Infidels into Italy, harassed the fleets and 
coasts of Venice, and coramitted piracies on the ships of almost 
all nations without distinction. In the mean time he entered 
into a secret correspondence with the Venetian senate, and the 
duke of Savoy, and assm-ed them that all the hostilities he had 
committed were the eífects of the most positivo orders from the 
court of Madrid. He invited them to join with him in a design 
he had formed of restoring the liberty of Italy, by driving the 
Spaniards beyond the mountains. The republic, averse to such 
hazardous exploits, would not so much as hear the duke's pro-
posal. But Charles Emanuel thought it worthy of consideration, 
and instantly communicated it to the court of France. In con-
sequence of this, a person was sent by the mareschal Lesdiguieres 
to learn the real situation of aífairs at Naples *. 
The designs of Ossuna did not escape the court of Madrid j - . 
The council was unanimous that he ought immediately to be 
recalled; but whether he would submit to their orders they very 
much doubted: it was therefore resolved to attempt his removal 
by stratagem. Orders were instantly despatched to the cardinal 
Don Gaspar de Borgia, to basten from Rome to Naples, to take 
upen him the government in the room of Ossuna. The cardinal, 
agreeably to instructions from Madrid, having previously secured 
the countenance of the governor of Castel Nuevo, introduced 
himself into that fortress in the silence of the night: 
Defeated. . 
and the thunder of the cannon which welcomed the 
arrival of Borgia next morning, announced the disgrace of 
Ossuna. 
* Greg. Let. Hist. Osson. Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1619. Anecdotcs du Ministére du 
Conde Duc d'Olivarez. 
f u Hcwsocver," says Sir John Digby, in the letter above quoted, to secretary Naunton, 
*' the Spaniards have seemed all this while to neglect his (Ossuna's) courses, and to despise 
the danger so much spokcn of in the world, yet I perceive they apprehend it more than they 
have made show of; for those ships of war which the duke of Ossuna armed in Naples 
(entitling them his Galleons), having lately fought with a squadron of pirates off the Goleta, 
(to whom they say here he gave a great overthrow, though for my part I believe it not,) and 
entering into the port of Messina, in Sicilia, to succour and repair themselves, were there 
stayed by Don Francesco de Castro, the viceroy of that kingdom, who had express orders 
from henee, and not suffered to return again to Naples. The prince Philbert is with tlie 
galleys, to go directly for Messina, and there to command also those galleons; so as now 
they have taken both the galleons and galleys out of the duke of Ossuna's power, and his 
successor will be instantly named ; after which, I conceive he will be called in question for 
many disorders ; for complaints are daily brought hither against him by all sorts of 
persona." 
B B 
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But the duke, even while he stood on this precipice, did not 
resign his power without a struggle to maintain it. He 
attempted, by means of his emissaries, to rouse an insurrection 
both of the populace and soldiers. But the possession of the 
castle, the constant roaring of artillery, expressive of the will and 
authority of Spain, the acquiescence of the nobility, and those in 
the civil departments of state; these circumstances operated 
with irresistible forcé both on the soldiery and the people, and 
prevailing over their attachment to Ossuna, maintained their 
reverence for that power which they had been accustoraed to 
obey. The degraded viceroy returned by slow joumeys into 
Spain. When he went to court, Phil ip withdrew his eyes from 
him, and turned his back. The high-spirited Ossuna, surveying 
the monarch with contempt, muttered to those who stood nearest 
him, " The king treats me not as a man but as a child." This 
discountenance was all the punishment that was inflicted by the 
meek and gentle king, on a man who had attempted to deprive 
him of a kingdom. But, in the first year of the succeoding 
reign, he was thrown into prison, where he died of a dropsy*. 
The brilliant successes of this year, which diffused through the 
Spanish nation a general joy, made but a faint impression where 
it might naturally be imagined it would have made the greatest. 
So deep a melancholy had overcast the mind of the king that it 
could not be brightened up by the greatest national prosperity. 
In order to revive his spirits by a chango of air and of objects, 
by the advice of his new ministers he set out on a joumey into 
A ril 22 ^ r á u g a l » accompanied with the prince and princess of 
Spain, the infanta Maria , several of the nobility, the 
gentlemen of his bed-chamber, and his confessor. The towns 
through which he passed testified their joy at his presence by 
acclamations and triumphal arches. On the feast of St. Peter 
he made his public entry into Lisbon. The river was covered 
with all kinds of vessels, which were gaudily decorated, and 
exhibited the greatest profusión of riches. Thirty-two triumphal 
arches, adorned with gold and precious stones, displayed in a 
manner still more pompous the wealth of the capital of Portugal. 
Philip, struck with so raagnificent a spectacle, said, " H e never 
knew before that he was so great a king." Having assembled the 
* Hist. de Don Felippe IV . por Don Go alo de Cespides, lib. segundo, capitulo 
t e g a n á o . 
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cortee, or estates of the kingdom, he received the crown, with the 
homage of his subjects. The king, in return, agreeably to ancient 
custom, swore that he would preserve inviolate the rights and 
privileges of his people. The cortes also swore fealty to the 
prince, as the heir-apparent. This they did in conformity to the 
wishes of the king. For that good prince, convinced that his end 
was approaching, was anxious to establish his family in peace 
and comfort. H e remained at Lisbon for some months; but, 
through the infirm state of his health, did not appear much in 
public. On his return to Madrid he was detained for some 
time by a severo fit of his distemper at Casa Rubios. Having 
somewhat recovered, he pursued his joumey, and employed the 
short remainder of his life in the settlement of his family. The 
infant Don Ferdinand, his third son, at the age of ten years 
received a cardinal's hat, and, with the approbátion of the pope, 
was raised by proxy to the see of Toledo, the primacy of Spain, 
and the richest benefice in Europe. 
On the twenty-fifth day of November the marriage Was con-
summated between the prince and princess of Spain. A n d on 
the fourth of December the prince was introduced to the counciís 
of state, in order to learn the importance, and how to discharge 
the duties, of the crown. This measure the king adopted in imi-
tation of his father's conduct with regard to himself. In imita-
tion of the same example he left, for the use of his son, some 
instructions in writing*. 
In the month of February the king^s illness retumed in all its 
Feb. 23. malignity. Soon after his return from the chapel he 
niness of was taken with a fever, which continued with various 
Philip. intermissions about the space of a month. During all 
this time his spirits were depressed with the deepest melancholy, 
and he persevered, notwithstanding some encouragement from 
the physicians, in expressing his full assurance that he should die. 
He desired that the image of the Holy V i rg in of Antiochia 
should be carried about, which was performed on Sunday the 
M h twenty-eighth, in a solemn procession, at which the 
councillors of Spain and many of the other nobles 
assisted. In the evening of that day commandment was given 
* Hist. de Don Felippe, &c. por Gonfalo de Cespides, lib. i . cap. 7,16, 18. Anec-
dotes du Ministére du Conde Duc d'Olivare?.. Amelot de la Houssaie. 
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to all the churches of Madrid to place the blessed sacrament 
29th upon the altars. On Monday, about four o'clock in the 
evening, the king grew worse than ever. He had before 
been seized at different times with a violeni vomiting and a 
diarrhoea. Blisters now appeared on his limbs and other parts of 
his body; and the physicians feeling his pulse, said unanimously, 
" That they undoubtedly assented to the king in the opinión he 
entertained of his infirmlty." H e then, in the presence of his 
confessor, with other divines, the grande es of Spain, the presi-
dents of the diíferent councils, and the first lord of his bed-
chamber, authorised the president of Castile to affix in his ñame, 
for his hand shook greatly, the royal signature to a codicil he 
dictated in addition to his testament, whieh he had already made 
at Casa Rubios. This being done, he gave orders that other 
presents, besides those he had already appointed, should be given 
to his confessor, and to his servants. After this, his physicians 
persuaded him to take some food; they also advised him to 
compose himself for sleep; but he answered, " On so long a 
journey, and in so short a time for performing it, I must not 
rest." H e now desired, as the last action of his life, to see, 
address, and to bless his children. H e told the prince that he 
had sent for him that he might behold the vanity of tiaras and 
crowns, and learn to prepare for eternity. To the child Don 
Carlos he spoke long, and in a low tone of voice. He then said 
aloud to the prince, " I recommend the child to your protection. 
It grieves me that I should leave him unprovided; but I hope 
that I leave him in the hands of a good and affectionate brother.',,, 
Then appeared the infanta Maria , and the infant cardinal. A t 
the approach of the infanta he burst into tears, and said, " Maria, 
I am full sorry that I must die before I have married thee; but 
this thy brother will take care of thee:m and turning about he 
said, " Prince, do not forsake her t i l l you have made her an 
empress." He then spoke to the cardinal infant, whom he had 
appointed, when he should be of .a fit age, to be archbishop of 
Toledo. He should be much grieved, he said, if he thought that 
he would not undertake, and faithfully discharge, the duties of 
that sacred office. He also sent for the princess of Spain ; but 
she fainted away as soon as she entered the king's bed-chamber, 
and was conducted back to her own apartment. It was not 
thought proper that she should make a second effort to see the 
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dying king, as she was now in the fourth month of her pregnancy. 
When what had happened to the princess was reported to the 
king, he was melted inte compassion, and greatly affected at so 
striking an instance of sensibility and filial leve. He professed a 
firm belief that the princess loved him as well as any of his own 
children. She would lose a good father, he added, and that he 
had always loved her tenderly. Afterwards, giving them all his 
blessing, he dismissed them with many prayers for their happi-
ness, both here and hereafter. The blessed sacraraent was 
adrainistered to him about midnight. H e received the extreme 
unction at two o'clock in the morning. During the whole time 
of his illness he made a constant confession of his sins, and 
implored divine merey. He confessed to all around him that he 
had often been guilty of dissimulation in matters of government; 
he regretted his supine indolence, and blamed himself greatly for 
having devolved the cares of the state on his ministers; and 
when he reflected that he had not in all things made the will of 
God the rule of his government, he trembled, crying out at 
different times, '* Oh ! i f it should picase heaven to prolong my 
life, how different should my future be from my past conduct!" 
But in the midst of his troubled thoughts he found consolation in 
the mercics of God ; and embracing a crucifix, he expressed his 
hope, that the Redeemer of the world would not leave his soul 
in hell, but that, after many ages of painful purification, he 
would receive him at last into the mansions of the blessed. A t 
devotion so affecting, the spectators burst into tears ; and at that 
instant father Jerome of Florence came up to the bed on which 
the king lay. The father, unwilling to bruise a broken reed, 
held up to the view of the pious monarch the consolations of 
religión, and expatiated on the exemplary purity of his life, and 
that zea! which had appeared throughout the whole of his reign 
for the Román Catholic religión. The al térnate tumults of hope 
His death an(^ ^68^ ^3 '* ^18^ 80 0^11^  ag^a*'e^ ^16 m^n^ 0^ the king 
at last subsided intp a gentle calm, and he died in all 
the tranquillity of faith, on the last day of March, in the forty-
third year of his life, and the twenty-third of his reign*. 
* A letter from Spain, touching the manner of the death of king Philip 111., directed 
to Gondomar, the Spanish lieger ainhassador here in England, A. D. 1621, found among 
Dr. Birch's Collection of Manuscripts, in the British Museum, No. 4108. Gon9alo do 
Cespides, lib. i . cap. 18. 
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The pliant, mild, and religious disposition of this prince would 
and cha- have well entitled him to the praise of pious and ^ood*, 
racter. natUral benevolence of his temper had not been 
controlled, in many important instances, by the bigotry, and 
his piety deeply tinctured with the follies, of superstition. His 
amiable and inoffensive manners would have adorned a prívate 
station; but he was averse to the trouble, and destitute of the 
talents for governing a great kingdom. 
The dispositíon of the minister upon whom, on his accession 
Review of the throne, he devolved the honours and the cares of 
his reign. government, was, like his own, gentle and pacific; and 
pacific measures were necessary in the exhausted state of the 
empire. But a spirit of domination had taken root in the coun-
cils of Spain; the confidants and veteran commanders of Phil ip 
I I . still breathed war ; war was the general voice of the 
nation; and, though peace was the interest of the monarchy, its 
predominant passion was the love of glory. The nobles had 
recovered, in the present, a considerable share of that importance 
which they had lost during the two preceding reigns. A n d i f 
the king was govemed by the dukes of Lerma and Uzeda, these 
ministers were themselves obliged, in all momentous afíairs, to 
comply with the general bent of the kingdom. The ambitious 
maxims which had been impressed on the ductile mind of Phil ip, 
from his earliest infancy, religious prejudices, and the warlike 
temper of the nation, prevailed for many years over that love of 
tranquillity which distinguished both the king and his minister, 
and also over the interests of the nation. The war was prose-
cuted, but not with succóss. The military discipline, valour, and 
skill of the Spaniards, were yet undiminished; but vigour and 
prudence were wanting in their councils. No attention was paid 
to the trade and manufactures of the Netherlands, Portugal, or 
Spain. The chief object with administration was to bring home 
in safety the treasures of America ; remittances, which distance 
and the naval power of the enemy rendered infinitely slow and 
precarious, and which passed with rapidity, through a thousand 
channels, into the hapds of their industrious enemies. The 
resources of war were dried up ; the public finances were defi-
cient; yet, even in this situation of affairs, plans were formed for 
exciting a rebellion in Franco ; and an armament was equipped 
• Fclippe P ió y Bueno. 
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for the conquest of Ireland. The attention of the Spaniards 
was thus distracted by different views, and diverted from that 
which, while they chose to pursue it, ought to have been its only 
object. 
The attachment to liberty, the enthusiasm of religion,Jaborious 
industry with public and prívate economy, prevailed, but not t i l l 
after a struggle of near half a century, over the wealth, the repu-
tation, and disciplined valour of the numerous armies of Spain ; 
and this haughty nation was obliged at last to hearken to terms 
of accommodation. It was indeed in a great measure owing to 
misconduct and want of vigour on the part of the Spanish minis-
ters, that the war had not been attended with greatet success ; 
but they had judged wisely in resolving to bring it to a conclu-
sión. Ñor was there any reason to doubt that the truce would 
prove as advantageous to the Spaniards as to the Dutch, if those 
who held the reins of the Spanish government should afterwards 
conduct themselves with that prudence, moderation, and wise 
economy, which they might have been taught by past experience. 
But the world was yet ignorant that domestic industry is 
preferable to extended dominión. This doctrine, which is but 
just beginning to influence the cabinets of princes, in the period 
under review was scarcely thought of; ñor has it yet had any 
visible influence in the councils of Spain, after its truth has been 
preved by the experience of near three centuries. That the 
strength of any country chiefly consists in the industry and 
number of its inhabitants, is indeed a truth deducible not only 
from experience, but from reason. A kingdom, compact and 
populous, has a mighty advantage over one thinly inhabited and 
of great extent. The former resembles a garrison within the 
narrow limits of a well constructed fortress, which is able to 
resist assaults of superior numbers without, and often to make-
successful sallies: the latter, a fortification on too large a scale, 
whose extensivo works cannot be defended with effect against 
all the attacks of a vigilant and active enemy. This important 
truth is illustrated, in a very striking manner, by the circum-
stances of the Spanish monarchy during the reign of Ferdinand 
of Arragon, contrasted with its situation in that of Phil ip I I I . 
In the first of these periods the dominión of Spain extended over 
the kingdom of Naples, and all the islands of the Mediterranean, 
from the Straits of Gibraltar, to the southern extremity of 
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Italy, besides Trípoli, Bugia, Oran, Mazalquivir, and other 
towns on the coast of Africa. The sraall kingdom of Portugal, 
though governed hitherto by its native princes, it was easy to 
foresee, would sooner or later be reduced, by policy or by arms, 
under the power that so greatly preponderated in that península 
of which it formed a part. The vicissitudes of fortune had never 
conspired more harmoniously with the operations of nature, to 
form a mighty and durable empire. The branches were not so 
ponderous, or stretched out to so great a length, as to fall off 
and to lacérate the parent stock; but, on the contrary, they 
were such as returned the nourishment they drew, with increase. 
The populousness, the industry, the martial spirit of Spain, ren-
dered it at that period the niost powerful monarchy in Europe, 
and formidable to all its neighbours. But in the reign of Philip 
III . , the imperial power of Spain, which extended over a greater 
part of the globe than that of Rome in the zenith of her power, 
was foiled in a contest with a small territory, peopled with manu-
facturers and merchants. 
The Spanish nation, after this mortifying defeat, sought to 
conceal its want of power by an increase of pomp and splendour* ; 
and to recover, and even extend its authority, by intrigue and 
negociation. The first of these arts, in the present times, appears 
somewhat frivolous. It ought, however, to be considered, that 
in those days the ancient hospitality and magnificence still 
remained, and were considered as very important circumstances 
in governmentf. A s to the second, never certainly were intrigues 
and negociations conducted with more address, or crowned with 
greater success. The Spanish ambassadors generally governed 
the courts at which they resided : and it was in the reign of the 
feeble Philip I I I . that those chains were forged, which for so 
many years alarmed the nations, and which, i f they had not been 
burst asunder by the vigorous arm of Gustavus Adolphus, and 
the generáis trained up to war under his standard, would have 
extended the authority of Austr ia over Europe. 
While few nations, from the Euxine and the Baltic to the 
* See Appendix, C . 
•f Chamberlayne mentions, as a proof of the moderation and economy of the elector 
Palatine, tbat vvhen he carne to England to pay his court to the príncess Elizabeth, he had 
a small train of sober well-fashioned gentlemen, servants and all, not exceeding one hun-
dred and scvcuty. Birch's Collection of Manuscripte in the British Museurn. 
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Pyrenean mountains, escaped the calamities of war, Spain en-
joyed the supreme blessing of profound peace. The success of 
her arma in Germany retrieved that loss of reputation which she 
had suffered in the Netherlands. A n d as it is the prerogative 
of military renown to díctate many circumstanees of custom and 
fashion, the dress and manners of Spain were very generally 
imitated by other nations*. The magnificence of the court was 
supported at an incredible expense; and the Spaniards were 
still esteemed the first nation in the world. This splendid face 
of things had an imposing air abroad; but the nation at home, 
oppressed with taxes, suffered for all its acquisitions and 
triumphs. 
* As it.is comtnoa to say of a man of fashion, on his returu frotn the Continent, that he 
is very much Frenchified, so, in those times, travellers generally hecame very much Spa-
nishified. " Mr. Rossingham," says Mr. Chamberlayne, "is come home so Spanishified, 
that 1 hardly knew hiin when he saluted me." Birch's Collection of Mauuscripts in the 
British Museum. 
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A Journal of ihe Conference hetwixt his Majesty's Commissioners and 
the Commissioners of the K i n g of Spain, and Archdukes of Austria, 
Dukes of Burgundi/y tyc, at the treating and concluding of a Peace 
with the aforesaid Princes, at Somerset House, in London, anno 1604. 
SUNDAY the 2nd of this instant, the earl of Dorset, lord high 
May, treasurer, the earl of Nottingham, lord high admiral, 
1604. ^jjg earig 0f Devonshire and Northampton, and the lord 
Cecil principal secretary, being appointed commissioners by his 
majesty to treat with Don Juan de Taxis Conté de V i l l a Mediana 
the Spanish ambassador, and signior Alexander de Rouida a 
senator of Milán, commissioners, authorised on the behalf of the 
kingof Spain; and the count of Aremberg,the president Richardot, 
and the audiencer Verriken, authorised in the like manner on the 
behalf of the archdukes of Austria, Burgundy, &c. to treat about 
the making and concluding of a firm peace and amity betwixt 
his majesty's kingdom and subjects and the aforesaid princes' 
subjects and dominions, their lordships repaired to Somerset-
house, the lodging of the said Spanish ambassador, and there, 
with the rest of the other commissioners, entered into a common 
conference concerning the said business. 
A fair great chamber, heretofore used for the council-chamber 
in the said house, was expressly prepared by his majesty for the 
said meeting, and it was thought fit to give the said commissioners 
the place of the right hand at the table, in respect of the great 
honour done to his majesty in sending of the said commissioners 
to treat here within this realm. 
The said commissioners being placed together on the right 
hand of the table, and their lordships on the left hand in the same 
manner, the earl of Northampton in a speech in the Lat in 
language, fraught according to the manner of the times, with 
many quotations and allusions to the sacred scriptures, and the 
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Grecian and Román literature, among other things, congratulated 
his audience on the prospect of peace; set forth the pacific dispo-
sitions as well as prosperous fortune of his Britannic majesty; 
expatiated on the duty of sacrificing all passions, whether of 
individuáis, or of the times, to the general good of mankind; 
mentioned several circumstances which ought naturally to 
conciliate peace and good will between the king of Spain and the 
princes of the house of Burgundy on the one part, and the king 
of Great Bri tain and Ireland on the other; and expressed, in 
conclusión, his ardent wishes and hopes that not only would a 
good correspondence be re-established between those princes, of 
which he did not entertain any doubts, but that all grounds of 
animosity, jealousies, and contention would be removed from the 
breasts of their respective subjects. 
After the earl of Northampton had ended his speech, the 
senator of Milán made also a speech in Lat in at greater length, 
and more religious, learned, and elabórate than that of North-
ampton. In this speech, among other particulars, he reminds the 
commissioners of the marked proofs of sincere congratulation 
which his master the king of Spain had given to his Britannic 
majesty on his accession tothe crowns of Scotland, England, and 
Ireland, and of the professions of friendship and amity, which on 
that occasion his most serene highness the king of Great Britain 
had made to his most Catholic majesty. The mutual professions 
of good will which then took place between those princes seemed 
to the senator of Milán to resemble that " rushing of a mighty 
wind" which preceded the descent of the Holy Spirit on the 
Apostles; and therefore he exhorta them to banish from their 
councils all passions and prejudices of every kind, animadverts 
severely and fully on certain denominations and classes or kinds 
of men *, who would endeavOur all that was in their power to 
obstruct the present negociation for peace; calis to mind the 
ancient habits and bands of friendship which had subsisted 
between the kings of Great Bri tain and the princes of the houso 
of Aus t r i a ; bestows the highest praises on king James on account 
of his pacific disposition ; expresses the utmost satisfaction and 
joy at the general appearance of a pacific disposition throughout 
Europe ; exhorts all tho European princes to peace among them-
selves, and animates them to a common resistance of the Turks, 
* Hominum genera. 
A P P E N D I X . 381 
the common enemy of Christendom. H e prays for a return of 
peace and, commerce with all their blessings; he promises his 
utmost endeavours for effectuating so desirable an object, and 
appeals to God for the sincerity of his declarations. 
The president Richardot raade a short declaration in French, 
to the like effect, of the affectionate desire of his princes to 
continué and maintain the good amity which had been ever 
between his majesty and them; and that to that end, and not to 
fail in the performance of any kind and loving office towards his 
majesty, the said princes, his masters, sent to congratúlate his 
majesty's coming to the crown. So because it hath heretofore 
fallen out, either in respect of the unhappiness of the former 
times, or by God's just judgment for our sins, or by other 
occasion, that there have reigned great dissensions between the 
kings of England and the princes of the Low Countries, now 
possessed by the said princes, which heretofore could not be 
determined, their desire was both for the assurance of the public 
quiet of Christendom, which hath received no small interruption 
by those differences, and to renew the ancient amity and friend-
ship which hath been ever carefully cherished between this state 
and the said provinces ; to conclude such a firm peace and solid 
amity between his majesty and the said princes as might be for 
the common utility of both their states, which they hoped would 
accordingly succeed to the effect desired by them, out of the trial 
which they have always made of his majesty's princely and 
Christian inclination to so good a work; and out of the same 
assurance for the like respects of interest, they had solicited the 
king of Spain to join in common treaty with them, which he 
prayed God to bless with a happy and fruitful success. 
The several speeches being made and ended, it was signified by 
the lord Cecil that their next proceeding ought to be, according 
to their use and order, to exhibit their several commissions to 
each other's considerations. Whereupon the same was accord-
ingly done of all parties, and the Spanish ambassador did first 
read the immediate commission which was granted by the king 
of Spain to the constable of Castille, whereby not only absoluto 
power was given to himself to treat and conclude a peace, but 
also a farther authority (as they did enforce) by the words, 
tratar y hazar tratar^ to constitute and sub-delegate other 
commissioners according to the power whereof they declared that 
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the said constable had sub-delegated, by another special com-
mission from hiraself, which was also showed and read, the said 
Spanish ambassador, and signior Alexander Rouida to be in his 
absence commissioners for the king of Spain, to proceed in the 
said treaty. A n d furthermore, the said ambassador produced a 
letter written from the king of Spain unto himself, whereby he did 
nomínate and appoint him to be a commissioner in the said treaty: 
that being done, the lord treasurer proceeded in the reading of 
his majesty's commission; and afterwards the count Aremberg 
did in the like manner read the eommission of the archduke and 
the Infanta, and copies were delivered interchangeably to each 
other, of all their commissions. 
Their lordships, conceiving to have cause to note some defects 
in the Spanish commissions, as well in that it appeared by the 
same that they were to treat with sub-delegates, whose authority 
was derived from the power of the constable's commission, as 
also for that it seemed to them that the words tratar y hazar 
tratar were something weak to authorize the said constable to 
sub-delegate other commissioners under h i m ; their lordships did 
therefore think fit to withdraw themselves to the lower end of 
the chamber, to advise of the objections that were necessary to 
be made to the said commissioners, and after some small time of 
conference among themselves thereupon, they retumed to their 
former seats, and it was signified to them by the lord Cecil, that 
although their lordships could not deny that they had cause to 
receive great contentment in the honourable and forward dispo-
sition which both the king of Spain and archdukes had showed 
to effect the conclusión of a firm peace and amity between his 
majesty and them, wherein his majesty was willing to answer 
them with the like correspondence of his part, yet notwithstand-
ing that, they hoped that it would not be displeasing unto the 
said commissioners, that their lordships, in careful discharge of 
their duty towards his majesty and the trust reposed in them, in 
a matter of so great weight and importance, did acquaint them 
with those things, wherein their lordships, in their judgment, 
held themselves bound to be better satisfied as being, first, 
derogatory to the king's honour; that themselves, representing 
the quality which they did, of principal councillor to the king's 
majesty, should be referred to treat only with commissioners 
sub-delegated by derived power of the constable of Castile, who, 
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although he were to be acknowledged a person of good blood, 
and chief quality, yet that he was not to be considered for other 
than a subject of Spain. 
A n d secondly, for that their lordships were doubtful whether 
the words of l iazar tratar were to receive the construction of 
giving power suffieient thereby to the constable to sub-delegate 
other commissioners; and that, though it were true, that the 
commissioners of France treated at Vervins with others autho-
rized by the archduke, being a prince made a difference therein : 
and moreover, that there was no other meaning at the first 
meeting of the said commissioners at Yervins, save only for the 
present to handle matters by way of conference and proposition, 
so as it was not taken so behoveful to insist upon the^ due for-
malities of an exact commission; and therefore, his lordship 
prayed the commissioners to give their lordships answer to the 
aforesaid objections, where their lordships conceived it to be very 
material and fit to be satisfied. 
Hereupon the Spanish and arcbdakes'' commissioners withdrew 
themselves to the lower end of the chamber, and after some con-
ference among themselves, they returned to their former seats, 
and the senator of Milán, in the ñame of them all, delivered this 
answer, that i t was far from the meaning of the king of Spain, 
by any proceedings of his in this matter, to cast any dishonour 
upon the king's majesty, but rather, that his intent appeared to 
be the contrary, by the choice which he had made of the person 
of the constable to be employed in this business, which he would 
accordingly have performed by his own presence, i f he had not 
been prevented by his indisposition of body, the which necessity 
was cause that he had made the said sub-delegation, being 
unwilling that a business of so great importance should receive 
any delay; and that as the said constable intended to assist at 
the conclusión of the treaty, it would in part answer the other 
objection touching the insufficiency of the words hazar tratar, 
which in the Spanish tongue they held nevertheless to be strong 
enough to give authority to depute and sub-delegate others, and 
that it was to be remembered, that, the like exceptions being 
taken to the same words by the English commissioners at 
Boulogne, they were afterwards allowed for good and val id; 
that in the commission given to the archduke for the treaty of 
Vervins, those words were clean omitted, and yet, notwithstand-
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ing, no exeeption taken, but the honour of the prince therein 
contracting trusted ; but that any such doubts were chiefly 
satisfied, in that the treaties which were made were affcerwards to 
receive their strength and virtue by the confirmation of the 
princes., 
Their lordships said they would acquaint the king with the 
objections made by thera, and the answers made to the same, 
and therein receive his majesty^ resolution, without the which 
they durst not further to proceed for the present in a matter of 
so great weight, and so took leave of them íor that time. 
On Tuesday the 22nd of this instant, their lordships repaired 
again to the said commissioners at the place of their former 
meeting, and it was then declared unto them by the lord Cecil, 
that their lordships had acquainted the king's majesty with the 
doubt moved by them upon the view and consideration of the 
Spanish commission, and with the answers made to the objec-
tions, and that thereupon it had pleased his majesty to give 
them directions to signify unto them, that though his majesty 
was resolved to be ever truly sensible of anything that might 
concern him in honour, yet that out of the reality of his mind 
he chose to prefer substance before circumstances, and therefore 
was not willing to insist upon other formalities with them, than 
only to note unto them, that the manner of their commission did 
give cause to those which desired not the perfecting and counte-
nance of this amity to disgrace the proceeding therein, for that 
it was requisite, that, according to the ordinary use, more 
persons than one should have been joined in the original com-
mission to supply the absence of any one in case of sickness or 
otherwise, and especially that the omitting to join the Spanish 
ambassador in the said commission, showed that the order for 
the foresaid sub-delegation was rather out of purpose disesteem-
ing than by accident; and although it was sought to be coloured 
with the authority of a special letter written by the king of Spain 
to him, by the which he was appointed to be a commissioner in 
the said business, yet that the same doth far differ from the 
necessary form of a due and powerful commission so as his 
majesty might be justly moved to appoint commissioners to 
treat by a like answerable power of sub-delegation : nevertheless 
because his majesty found that there was no want of authority 
to treat in the original commission, or reason to doubt of the 
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constable's speedy coming to supply the defect of the said sub-
delegation, the Spanish commissioners, after having had some 
conference among themselves, made answer by the mouth of the 
senator of Milan, 
That they were glad to find, by this real proceeding of the 
king with them, a confirmation of that noble disposition in con-
fidence whereof their princes had been induced and encouraged 
to enter into this treaty with him, for the which they did acknovv-
ledge both in their masters and in their own name all thankful-
ness unto his majesty, and particularly also unto their lordships 
for being a means to reconcile the difference in question, pro-
testing that there was no meaning to proceed otherwise than 
with like sincerity and integrity also of their part, as they hoped 
to reeeive the like measures from their lordships. 
Hereupon it was agreed to proceed to the handling and deba-
ting of the point of the treaty, and it was moved by the earl of 
Northampton that they would begin to make the first propo-
sitions of their part, whereunto they assented; and it was signi-
fied by the senator of Milán, that the king of Spain did, at the 
coming of the king's majesty to this crown, lay open the affection 
of his heart unto him by sending to congratúlate with him and 
to desire the establishing of a sincere and intrinsical friendship 
with him. 
A n d because of the chance of times between his state and the 
kingdoms of England and Scotland, the said king desired for his 
part that the friendship of the said kingdoms might be now 
so straitly conjoined, as that there might be made a league 
offensive and defentive between the said princes, to be friend to 
each other's friends, and enemy to their enemy. 
The lord Cecil yielded them thanks for the great good-will and 
affection which by their offer they expressed unto his majesty; 
but gave them to understand that it could no ways agree with 
the present state of his majesty^ affairs to make such league with 
them at this time as was proposed by them, as well in respect 
that his majesty should thereby declare and engage himself 
against those of his own profession of religión, as also for that he 
should therein viólate his amity with Franco which already did 
stand between them upon condition of a league offensive and 
defensivo: therefore, that the said proposition would be more 
proper for some other time hereafter, and for the present that it 
c c 
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would be best to advise to establish a firm amity for the assuring 
of the liberty of trade and free intercourse between the kingdoms 
and states. 
It was hereupon answered by the senator of Milán, that the 
king of Spain was moved to tender the aforesaid offer unto the 
king, out of the affection which had been before declared, and to 
witness unto him that he would prefer his amity before all others, 
but i f it should be thought inconvenient, for any difficulty, to 
proceed in those terms of condition, that they would forbear 
further to urge the same in that manner: but because they 
would be glad to make a peace that should extend further than 
to the effect of an intercourse, they desired their lordships to 
open themselves what kind of peace the king would'make to the 
princes their masters. The president Richardot used a speech 
to the like effect on the behalf of the archduke. 
The lord Cecil made answer, that they did all agree in the 
acknowledgment of the mutual and real affection of their 
masters, for the which he did the more hope that God would 
bless their work; that their lordships did conceive that it did 
stand with good order first to conclude and establish a general 
amity between kingdoms and states, whereof the effects are 
afterwards to ensue, and that in the perusing and digesting of 
the small points of the treaty, the matters of privileges and cus-
toms, and other necessary provisions which might be thought fit 
to be spoken of as they should fall out, would be best handled in 
their order and course. 
The senator of Milán answered, that it was far from their 
meaning to except against anything which had been formerly 
spoken of, and that it was not otherwise meant to press the order 
for making of a league offensive and defensive, than as should 
stand with the king's own good liking, and not to be prejudicial 
to other princes and states; but he prayed their lordships again 
to explain themselves what kind of peace the king should make 
with their princes, their several natures being reduced under 
those three divisions, either to make a general league offensive 
and defensive, or else a particular league defensive sine offensione, 
which should bind to assist each other in case of being invaded 
by a third person, or lastly to make a peace of firm amity and 
friendship, with condition not to attempt anything to the other's 
prejudice and wrong. 
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The lord Cecil answered again, that their progressions had 
been hitherto to good purpose in that they had declared them-
selves thus freely to each other, and cleared the doubt of their 
commission, and that their lordships would be as willing also to 
give them resolution in this matter of their propositions ; because 
they desired, for the avoiding of misunderstanding, to be clearly 
instructed of the king's purpose therein, whora it was fit, his 
majesty being so near at hand, to acquaint with a matter of so 
great importance and weight, their lordships prayed them to 
give them time to receive his majesty"s resolutions upon that 
point; and that their lordships would return to them again to 
proceed in the business as soon as the affairs of the parliament, 
which they were also necessarily to attend, would give them 
leave: with the which-answer they rested satisfied, and so they 
took leave of each other for that time. 
Friday the 25th, their lordships repaired again to the said 
commissioners in the aftemoon, and the lord Cecil then first 
declared unto them that their lordships had acquainted his 
majesty with the point, whereupon they paused at their last 
meeting, and whereupon they thought fit to receive resolution 
from his majesty's own judgment, and that now they were come 
to make known his majesty's pleasure therein signified to them; 
wherein first their lordships held themselves bound to declare 
truly that which they found of his majesty's gracious and willing 
inclination to entertain good amity and sincere friendship with 
the king of Spain and the archduke; and touching the point of 
making a league offensive and defensivo, that his majesty having 
understood from them the arguments which were made by their 
lordships, not only against the same, but also against the second 
proposition for a definitivo league, his answer to both the said 
points shortly was, that there ought not to be used much argu-
ment to debate those things which were directly to be refused, 
for not being of condition which might receive satisfaction; that 
strict forms were necessary where doubt ought to be made of the 
partios, disposition to observe the conventions; but as his majesty 
did not refuse the former-proposed leagues for want of good 
affeotion, so the said former commissioners were to consider the 
integrity of his majesty's disposition, that was not willing to enter 
into a thing that could not yet be accomplished, as his majesty 
desired, in respect of being otherwise engaged of honour; and 
c c 2 
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therefore, considering the present state of things, that it was fit 
to resort to the third point for making of a firm peace and amity; 
but because it would be a fruitless ñame if the particular con-
ditions were not agreed upon, that it would be necessary first to 
enter into the consideration of the conveniency of the conditions 
to be resolved on, and afterwards to frame the form thereof 
according to the use in cases of marriage, wherein first the 
articles of covenant are handled between the parents, by way of 
admission, upon presumption of a future liking to follow between 
parties whom it is sought to join in marriage. This he declared 
to be the effect of his majesty's answer to their propositions, with 
assurance of all kind and loving affection unto the princes their 
masters. 
After the said commissioners had conferred some time among 
themselves, the senator of Milán made answer in the name of 
them all, that the princes their masters did hold themselves 
confident in the assurance of his majesty's good will and love 
towards them, out of the proof which they had formerly made of 
the same, and being therefore desirous for the better confirming 
and strengthening of that amity, that the unkindness and differ-
ence which had formerly reigned between this state of England 
and the said princes might be now abolished; the said princes 
were moved to make the aforesaid proposition, either by the 
making of a league offensive and defensivo, or only defensive; 
the first whereof was propounded of good will, and the second to 
show that there could hardly be entire friendship between any 
but that they ought to be sensible of each other's harm and 
wrong: but seeing neither of the said propositions could now be 
accepted, for the reasons which had been before alleged, they 
desired to reserve them to other times, and better occasion, and 
in the mean time to proceed to the making of a firm peace and 
amity in the third, whereof it had been before spoken; and 
because of the mention made of former treaties to be an impedi-
ment of the leagues before recited, he desired their lordships to 
declare themselves better, whether there were any incompatibility 
touching the peace to be made with the princes their masters, 
and any other treaties already made with the king, and to show 
what those treaties were, and what peace the king would require; 
for that they knew not that the princes their masters were in 
diíference with any other prince or state of Christendom, but 
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only sought the confirraing of theix* own, without any other ambi-
tious desiring. To the said propositions touching matters pf 
treaties, the lord Cecil made answer, that though the king him-
self might, before the entrance into this kingdom that had in 
former times difference with others, and treaties thereupon made, 
he could not now conveniently do anything that might be in pre-
judice thereof, whereby they might judge to what interest we 
stood still engaged of the time past. 
The senator of Milan desired their lordships to satisfy them 
more certainly, what kind of friendship the king would make with 
their princes for not offending each other, and not ministering 
help to their enemies, to the end there might be no scruple to 
hinder the peace, because in g e n e r a l í b u s non est scientia. 
The lord Cecil made answer, that as he did well perceive the 
forcé of this argument, so he was willing to give him satisfaction 
in things which should be reasonably urged; as namely, that 
there ought to be observances of kind friendship between the 
said princes, and not to be offensive to each other; but for the 
expresfeing of further obligations, and courtesies, in case of the 
falling out of any differences between either of them and a third 
prince, that it was not to be looked, that princes would other-
wise intermeddle themselves in any such sort than as they should 
be moved upon occasion of very good desert, but rather that they 
would be careful for the good of the state still to maintain their 
necessary interest of intercourse with any such other prince. 
The president Richardot said, that it was necessary that they 
should open themselves more clearly to each other, in order to 
come to an end of the business : that the example of other 
princes which had been before mentioned was nothing pertinent 
to their case, because the princes their masters had amity with 
all the world, but only the rebellious subjects of Holland, whose 
protection it was desired that his majesty would quit, and the 
same was the point whereupon their princes desired to contract 
a peace with his majesty. That the archduke did only seek 
justly to reduce their lawful subjects to their due obedience, and 
howsoever those of Holland had hitherto forgotten themselves in 
their duty, that the archduke would be content to receive them 
upon any reasonable conditions, to the end to avoid the further 
prosecution of an unhappy war ; and the said archduke would be 
very glad, that it would picase his majesty to be judge and arbi-
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trator in the cause between them; or in case those of Holland 
should refuse to submit themselves to any conditions of reason, 
that he hoped his majesty would not think them worthy to be 
supported by this state; and he desired that it might be remem-
bered, that the performance thereof was agreeable to the pro-
testation made by the late queen to the world, not to undertake 
the protection of them longer than they might obtain conditions 
of reason. 
The senator of Milán made a speech to the like eífect, of the 
diíference that was to be made of the case of another lawful 
prince in war, and the conditions of rebels, who ought rather to 
be by all means disfavoured, than that an intercourse of trade 
should be entertained with them. 
The lord Cecil made them answer, that he was drawn by their 
last speech to speak of the Hollanders, wherein they plainly dis-
covered their object and intent. That it was true, were it not 
for the distraction growing by their late occasion, there was no 
colour for any diíference to be between the king and the princes 
their masters : he desired that he might not be pressed to dispute 
whether they were rebels or not; but that he would boldly affirm, 
that the contracts which were made by the deceased virtuous 
and pious princess, whose memory he was bound to honour, with 
them which called themselves by the ñame of the United Pro-
vinces, were done upon very just and good cause. H e desired 
that they would proceed to agree to the peace that was to be 
made, and if they thought it not fit to take any other conclusions 
until they were first satisfied whether they would continué to 
trade with Holland or not; his lordship prayed to understand 
from the said commissioners, whether they held that point to be 
so essential as that the peace could not be proceeded on without 
receiving, first, a resolution therein, or otherwise to be acci-
dental, that necessarily requireth to have a proposition made 
for it. 
The senator of Milán answered, that he must still insist upon 
the diíference that was to be made of rebels, in regard of whom 
the said trade might be considered to be essential, or accidental, 
according to the greatness or smallness thereof. 
The lord Cecil answered that during the time the king's 
majesty was only king of Scotland, he being in firm league and 
amity with the princes their masters, did, nevertheless, use a 
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continual course of trade with those of Holland, as in the like 
manner France and Denmark and all other states had ever 
used, and that there was no reason he should do himself the 
wrong to undergo now a worse condition therein, than heretofore 
he had done and others now did. 
The senator of Milán now answered that we were to live by 
laws, and not by examples. 
That it was true they were at peace with Scotland, when 
nevertheless Scotland used to trade with the Hollanders, and 
though they had reason to except against the same, yet because 
they held not the same trade to be great, they thought not fit 
to break their peape thereupon, which would have been of great 
inconvenience to them ; that now it was not only a far greater 
trade by the unión of the kingdoms of England and Scotland, 
but also the making of a new peace, wherein it was requisito to 
provide a remedy against inconvemences of the times past. 
The earl of Northampton answered to the several parts of the 
senator's speech ; that though we were to be governed by laws 
and not by examples, yet that examples were the means of 
interpreting the laws ; that the king of Scotland did bring with 
his own person the privileges which he formerly enjoyed; and 
that good or evil was not to be measured by proportions, but to 
be esteemed by the justice or injustice thereof. 
The senator of Milán alleged that it could not be denied but 
that trade was an assistance, and thereby repugnan! to the 
treaties of amity, and in that respect the use thereof unlawful. 
The earl of Northampton answered him, that i f it were not 
heretofore unjust for the king to use that liberty being king of 
Scotland, then that there was no reason to except more against 
it now, that the king's majesty takes no other course therein 
than was used by the king of Spain himself, who was content to 
admit and entertain a trade with those which he called his 
rebellious subjects, which, as it might be alleged to be done 
chiefly for his own utility, and not for any respect done to them, 
so his majesty did profess only to regard therein only his own 
necessary interest. 
The lord Cecil added further that it was good to let them 
plainly know that the trade with those provinces was of so great 
importance to us, that we could by no means spare the same; 
and moreover, that the king was no less tied by the weight of 
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other considerations, not to renoimce the holding of further cor-
respondence with them, in due care not to lose the great debt 
which they owed him, and the possession of the towns which he 
held among them, and therewith also not to make themselves 
desperate, to betake themselves unto other protection, which 
might be more dangerous both for Spain and England, and 
therefore, he told the said commissioners, that they were not to 
expect to receive satisfaction upon that point. 
The said commissioners answered, that they had respective 
meaning not to seek to restrain our trade to our prejudice ; but 
only to bar their rebels from partaking also by our means, of 
the fruit of our trade with their princes, for the prevention 
whereof that it was fit to . advise how to limit our trade in due 
sort; and they prayed their lordships to propound some reason-
able means for the same. 
The lord Cecil desired the said commissioners, that they 
would rather explain unto their lordships their desire therein; 
but because the time grew late, it was agreed to respite the 
further handling of that point unto their next meeting, and so 
they took leave of each other for that time. 
Thursday the 31st, their lordships repaired again unto the 
*aid commissioners, and first excused unto them their long 
absence, by the occasion of other important business, and then 
desired to proceed in the determining of the business last in 
communication between them, and to receive the said commis-
8 1 0 ^ ^ answers therein. 
The senator of Milán answered, that the last speech was 
concerning matter of trade, wherein they were willing to con-
serve our former liberties unto us, so as their rebels might not 
be benefited by the use thereof, and therefore they desired 
their lordships to propose the means of a middle remedy unto 
them. 
The lord Cecil said, that their lordships being persons of 
honour did not desire to marchand the point with them; but 
thought fit to let them know that there was no possibility of 
yielding to restrain the trade of his majesty's subjects into 
Holland, and likewise of the Hollanders* trade unto his majes-
ty's dominions, which he did not entertain for their sakes, but 
only for our own good ; and, considering that all other princes 
take their liberty, that there was no reason to restrain tho 
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subject of his majesty, who, for the considerations which had 
been before expressed, was much more interested to maintain 
the same: and therefore he wished that there might be no 
further argument upon that article, but to pass over upon some 
other. 
The president Richardot alleged, that their last treaty made 
with France, was strong in general terms, to restrain the 
French from ministering such help and assistance to their rebela 
as the use of trade did' import, and like assurance had been 
since given for the revoking of their ambassador out of those 
ports; but howsoever that the same had not been observed, 
it ought to justify the wrong that they had received therein. 
That their intent was to be careful of our lawful interest, and 
they desired us to have the like consideration of theirs, and 
therefore prayed that their lordships would propose some reason-
able way of remedy therein. 
The lord Cecil answered him, that it was yet unknown unto 
us, what benefit we should receive by the trade of Spain, but 
that we were assured that the trade of the Low Countries, was 
of greatest importance unto us : notwithstanding, to show that 
their lordships were most willing to accommodate themselves to 
reason, that their lordships would assent to prohibit the carriage 
of all materials of war to those of the United Provinces, upon 
pain of confiscation of the same commodities. 
The senator of Milán desired their lordships to explain 
themselves, whether their lordships understood thereby, that it 
should be also lawful for the subjects of England to carry the 
commodities of Spain into the Low Countries, and so likewise of 
the Low Countries into Spain, because their meaning was not to 
allow that favour unto the Hollanders, howsoever they might 
otherwise agree to approve our trade with them; neither also 
that it should be lawful for us to trade in their ships, and in any 
sort to colour the said Hollanders' goods. 
The lord Cecil said, that he found their reasons to be very 
allowable, in that they sought to impeach their enemy's good, 
and he hoped likewise, that they would acknowledge it to be as 
reasonable that we ought to seek to receive benefit by the peace, 
or otherwise that it would be better for us to remain still in 
war, in respect of the fortúnate purchases which we had made 
at the sea. But because it was fit that their lordships should 
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receive informations from the merchants concerning this point, 
before they did further determine thereof, he desired that they 
would proceed to some other matter and leave that question to 
some other time, which was assented unto; the point of inter-
course with Holland and Zealand being admitted in general, 
and the question referred to further considerations, whether we 
ought to be restrained to vent the commodities of Holland and 
Zealand into Spain, and so likewise of Spain into the said Pro-
vinces: and it was desired by the said commissioners, because 
they had already made two propositions of their part, that their 
lordships would now expresa themselves eoncerning their de-
manda. 
The lord Cecil said, that their lordahips would be willing to 
give them aatiafaction therein ; and therefore, firat, that he would 
begin with the complaint of the great wrong and grievous 
vexationa, which were committed upon our merchants trading 
into Spain, by the authority of the inquisition there, whereof he 
desired that they might from henceforth be diacharged and 
cleared, and a free liberty of trade to be granted to his 
majesty'a aubjecta in all the dominions of the king of Spain and 
the archduke. 
The aenator of Milán anawered, that they were to yield to 
any thing which waa in the power of their commiaaion in the 
favour of the trade of his majeaty'a aubjecta, but under that 
generality, that they could not promiae other mattera for the 
which they had no authority, namely, that they would promise 
and undertake for a liberty of trade to be granted in the king 
of Spain's dominions of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and so like-
wise in the territories of the archduke; and concerning the 
inquisition, he alleged that i t was to be held for a general 
ground, that the inquisition took no notice of any fault, but where 
there waa a public acaudal given, the which order the king would 
be careful to recommend to have duly observed according to that 
rule, ánd i f they might receive informations from our merchants 
of the particulars of the grievancea whereof they complained, 
that they would endeavour to procure them redreaa thereof. 
The lord Cecil made answer, that their lordshipa would be 
glad to receive better satisfaction from them to the two pointa 
propoaed by their lordshipa, because their lordships did conceive 
that there should have been a general admittance and permiasion 
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of trade into all the dominions of the king of Spain; by 
nominating of some countries and omitting of others, it seemed 
that there was a meaning to use a restriction therein, which did 
not answer to the condition of a general and reciprocal free trade, 
which ought to be granted between the princes: for the other 
point concerning the inquisition, that his majesty was not willing 
to exempt his subjects frora punishment for any offences which 
they should commit by public scandal given by them, but there 
was no reason that they should be otherwise subject to the 
passionate censure of the inquisition, to be so strongly dealt with 
by them as ordinarily they had been, where the like severity was 
not practised in any part of Italy ñor in the proper dominions 
there of the king of Spain, where it was conceived that he had 
as great a power to exercise the authority of the inquisition ; and 
therefore, i f order were not taken therein, that his majesty should 
be forced to make the subjects of the king of Spain to undergo 
the like severity here. 
The senator of Milán answered, that for the matter of trade, 
they did not design for the better demonstration of the freedom 
of the intercourse in the king and archduke's dominions; but 
that now he would more particularly explain himself, that our 
subjects should have trade in any place of the king^s dominions 
where he admitted any other prince to have intercourse with him ; 
and for the matter of the inquisition, that the king of Spain had 
as great authority to exercise the form of that law in his domin-
ions in Italy, as in Spain, but that it could not be dropped ; that 
some judges might want discretion in their proceedings, for that 
princes might make judges, but could not give them discretion. 
The lord Cecil said, that concerning the answer made for the 
granting of such a liberty of trade unto his majesty's subjects as 
was allowed unto other princes, they were not acquainted with 
the interest of other princes, of whom some had more prívate 
considerations than others; but for us, which were of another 
constitution, that it was no way fit for us to be restrained in our 
trade, and that we expected liberty granted us, to trade to the 
Indies, and desired to know whether any just reason could be 
alleged for excluding us from them. 
The senator of Milán confessed, that their meaning was to 
restrain us from the trade of the Indies, which could not be 
imputed to be a wrong unto us, because it was never before 
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granted us in any former treaties, never hitherto permitted by 
the king of Spain to any of his own subjects, or nearest kindred, 
or so much as to any of his children, therefore he prayed to be 
excused, for that it was not in their power to give their lordships 
satisfaction in that matter. 
The lord Cecil answered, that the king was resolved to 
maintain all things which were necessarily belonging to a lawful 
trade, and he hoped they would not urge unreasonable restrictions 
upon him which had no example ; that he desired trade with all 
the world, but so as it might be also accompanied with liberty 
to distribute the said raerchandize affcerwards into any ports to 
the best behoof of the merchants ; that they were content that 
any goods which should be taken belonging to the Hollanders, 
should be subject to confiscation, whereof it should not appear 
by good proof, that they properly had been before changed, and 
the right of the same to be since in any of his majestys subjects 
to transport goods in any of the Hollanders1 vessels upon the 
same penalties, but that other harder restrictions ought not to be 
imposed upon them. The earl of Northampton told the said 
commissioners further, that he did conceive them to be so 
reasonable, as they would not impose other laws upon us than 
themselves would willingly admit in a case of their own like 
interest, there being no reason to hinder to vend that to his best 
commodity in any other place, which he had adventured to fetch 
home to his great hazard; besides, that his majesty should 
receive a notable prejudice therein in the state of his customs, 
for that there arisca a far greater benefit to him by the 
transportation of commodities out of the realm. 
The senator answered, that they did not séek to impose laws 
upon us, but only to próvido for their own security ; that by our 
means the Hollanders might not enjoy those things which they 
did restrain from them; and considering that there might be 
found vent for the said commodities in other parts, as Poland, 
Denmark, Dantzick, &c., that ought not to be held unreasonable 
to be yielded unto. 
The earl of Northampton answered, first, that the generality 
of the words expressed not in this treaty only, but in those of 
former times, gave a more free scope and freedom of access to the 
ports and dominions of the king of England and Spain, than a 
construction against the plaincst purpose and sense of their words 
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themselves ought to qualify, for it was true that omnia intelli-
guntur permissa qua non sunt expres sé prohibita, &c. (every thing 
is understood to be permitted, that is not expressly raentioned in 
the list of exceptions and prohibitions, &c.) That the treaties 
between Lewis the V I L and Maximilian, and between Henry 
the V I I I . and the emperor Charles, at Cambray, Bruxells, &c. 
did afford freedom of trade to Englishmen, with these words, 
sicut propri j suhditi, sicut in sua patr ia , (as his own subjects, and 
as if in their own country,) &c. A n d secondly, that though the 
king of Spain might modérate the desires of his own subjects, or 
of those princes in whom ho had a greater interest for many 
special respects, yet might the king of Britain stand upon the 
same terms that the queen of England did with Don Aires 
the Portugal ambassador, pressing earnestly a prohibition of 
English merchants upon the same grounds and motives that their 
lordships do now, which were that in this case she could not 
condescend with honour, to the king of Portugal's request, lest his 
scope of trading universally in her dominions should be more abso-
luto than her's in the dominions of Portugal thus limited ; that i f 
ports, which by the law of nations ought to be free to all men in 
respect of trade and use, though not of jurisdiction and property, 
might be shut up to any, it was to be either for hostility as the 
Civilians demónstrate, or in respect of infidelity ; but that in the 
first degree, the king of Br i ta in^ subjects could not be ranked in 
respect of league; ñor in the second, because the differences there 
are in religión between the princes reached not so far; but by 
the judgment of Hostiensis, a leamed canonist, it was required 
that there should be either falsorum et plurium deorum, aut 
utriusque testamenti rejectio ; (a belie for worship of falso, or a 
plurality of Gods ; or an abjuration of both Oíd and New 
Testament;) therefore, against us the Spaniard ought neither to 
shut up their ports ñor their harbours; that the last will of a 
Christian made in the ports of a Pagan prince was sufficient in 
law; because these were holden j u r i s publici et jure gentium a d 
usum communem tendere, (to belong to the great republic of the 
world, and by the law of nations to be subservient to the common 
good of all). Whereas, all testaments that are made within the 
dominions of a Pagan prince were by law reversible: that, therefore, 
it was holden by the Civilians, that in case a man would lay the 
charge out of his own purse of making or unbarring a haven, 
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which is the greatest merit that industry can perform, etiamsi 
edificio, sunt edificantwn tamen ipse portus dehet esse communis, 
(although all structures are the property of those who raise them, 
ports themselves ought to be common). A n d that so far were 
the Civilians from barring princes out of ports, as that they seem 
rather to be portuum vindices, (the assertors of the freedom of 
ports,) in purging the seas from piracy, and that their ports were 
a protection in ó m n i b u s maribus, (in all seas) ; besídes, that if any 
body may bar us from trading into those parts, the right of that 
exclusión belonged properly to those Indian princes themselves, 
to whom the seas did belong, as the Civilians averred, in property 
and jurisdiction, that confine upon their state, and which did 
possess those places wherewith he desired to trade, for that the 
Portuguese did not possess the 20th part of that which is open; 
1000 leagues, lying sometimes between one part possessed by 
them and another, and they paying to those Indians pier custom 
and tribute for their freight, &c. That those princes were so 
far from barring and excluding, as they did rather allow all the 
world to trade, and if they did not, that the worst part must be 
ours in adventuring so far without sound warranty: and these 
arguments were further added by h im; first, thá t in universal 
societies there ought to be an equality, and therefore a reciprocal, 
free intercourse was to be admitted by the law of society. 
Secondly, that a contract, to be gainful to the one part with-
out commodity to the other, was leonina societas, (a society of 
lions). Thirdly, that our kingdom consisted more of navigation 
than others did, and therefore, that their answer for having 
denied it to other countries was nothing pertinent to us. 
Fourthly, that our people was a warlike nation, and having 
been accustomed to make purchases on the seas, could not better 
be reduced than allowing them a free liberty of trade. 
The which he enlarged with this further amplification, that 
the other princes forbearing this trade was no lawful bar to the 
king of Britain ; because it was rather for want of means than 
liberty in them; but the providence of God having fitted this 
state more for trade than any other, in the making of ships, the 
situation of the monarchy, the capacity of ports, the disposition 
of raen, the strength of their constitution, and the convenience of 
all ordinary means, would tax us in a manner both with sloth 
and idleness, in case we should forbear to make our advantage 
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by that means which nature offered; wherefore since we could 
not, without error and absurdity, suffer those wooden walls, as 
Apollo gracefully tenned them, which are the ramparts of Br i t -
tany, to rot for want of use, there was great reason that the king 
of Spain, drawing them from employments of hostility, should 
leave them to the general and ordinary course of trade, whereby 
they might be raaintained, the subjects enriched, and the state 
fortified. 
The senator of Milán answered, that though ordinary societies 
by leave should be equal, yet that they might be limited by con-
versions, and that the same ought not to be found strange in 
this case, because the said Indies were a new world ; and touch-
ing argument of inequality of condition, that it could not be so 
reputed, because the subjects of England should have the liberty 
of commerce of thirteen kingdoms belonging to him, for the 
three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and, Ireland; and there-
fore, that it could not be said to be leonina societas ; that the 
king of Spain had ever denied the liberty of that trade to all his 
own subjects of what country soever, though depending as much 
upon navigation as we did : lastly, whereas it was argued that 
the liberty of the said trade would contain our people in better 
ternas, that there was no reason that our men, which had before 
benefited themselves by the spoils unjustly, should now have for 
recompense a trade which had been denied to all others, even to 
the king of Spaín's own kindred and brethren. 
The lord Cecil said, that he found, by the former speech of 
the said commissioners, that they were not authorized to give 
any further satisfaction touching this point, and therefore, that 
he thought it fit to refer the resolution thereof to the coming of 
the constable of Castillo, to whom he hoped it would appear that 
he had not so much reason to deny the liberty of that trade as 
his majesty had to insist upon it . 
The commissioners answered, that the constable was no more 
authorized to give satisfaction therein than they were, being a 
matter which they did not expect would ever have come in ques-
tion, and so their lordships1 conference ended with them at that 
time. 
Friday the Ist of June, their lordships repaired again to the 
said commissioners, and the lord Cecil declared unto them, that 
their lordships held it to be the best course, to the end, to bring 
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the treaty to a more speedy and orderly conclusión, to take the 
view and form of other precedent treaties, and to select out of 
the same such rules as were necessary for the present t ime; that 
it was agreed of the form of the amity, and that the princes 
should not minister occasion of offence to each other, and that 
since there had been question of moderating our trade, which 
they termed to be an assistance to those of Holland, that their 
lordships since last being with them, had due consideration of 
the matter, and did protest not to be willing to insist upon any 
liberty to pleasure the Hollanders for the bettering of their con-
dition, but because i f they should admit the restrictions which 
had been proposed by the said commissioners or merchants, they 
should be bound to undergo infinite inconveniences and vexations 
by the perils which the same would draw upon them, for that it 
was impossible so clearly to distinguish of the sort of merchan-
dize according to the several places of their making, but that it 
would breed a confusión of questions, and difference and endless 
troubles and molestation to the merchants; and therefore, that 
there was no reason to make any goods of Holland subject to 
confiscation, after such time as the pi*operty of them should be 
changed. 
The president Richardot answered, that it was not so hard 
a matter as it was conceived, to discem and distinguish of the 
places where any commodities were made, as well by the fashion 
itself of making, as also by the applying of some seal and mark, 
the which considered, that there was no reason but that they 
should confíscate the merchandise of Holland from what place 
soever the same should be brought. 
The lord Cecil told him, that contrariwise, it would be insup-
portable to our merchants, which would grow thereby, and we 
were moreover to have respect to the prejudice which we should 
otherwise receive by that means in our trade with Franco, who, 
finding that we had covenanted not to vent the commodities 
which they might tender unto us, though being of foreign growth, 
would also hereupon interdict the receiving of our commodities 
into that country; therefore he wished it might be forborne to 
dispute further of that matter for the present, and to pursue 
his first motion to make a selection of articles out of former 
troaties. 
The senator of Milán answered, that they had some other 
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special demands first to make, whereunto they desired to receive 
answer; namely, that they desired to be restored to the towns 
which were held belonging to them in the Low Countries. 
The lord Cecil told thera, that the k ing^ majesty did not pre-
terid any interest of right to the said towns, and wished it were 
lawful for him to restore them to the true proprietary, but that 
he held them as pawns for good suras of money owing to this 
crown, and that there were no reason he should dispossess himself 
of them t i l l he were satisfied of the said debt. 
The senator of Milán answered, that we received the said towns 
frora those that had no right to pledge them. 
The lord Cecil said, that the king should be much wronged to 
deliver them to others than from whom he received them ; and 
i f they would consider it well, that it would be safer for them that 
the said towns should be continued in his majesty's hands, than 
be restored to the States. 
The senator of Milán proposed it as a doubt how, if he would 
not restore the said towns presently, it might stand with the con-
tinuance of the peace ? Fo r their desiring to reduce the islands 
to their obedience, might lead them first, for their better entrance, 
to begin with the towns. 
The earl of Northampton told him, that the deceased queen 
possessed herself of the said towns by the like justice as the king 
of Spain took towns in Franco, and did ally herself with Holland 
and Zealand by the same right as he did with the house of 
Guise, so as it ought no more to be disputed with us than it was 
in their case, whether they took the towns and possessed them 
from vero domino (the right owner), or not, whereof mention had 
been made by them. 
But their lordships observed, that the great difference was to 
be made between the right of restoring of towns conquered, and 
euch as were delivered for the satifying of conditions of pledge 
and assurance. 
The lord treasurer added further, that great difference was to 
be made between the bounds and contracts of private men, and 
those of princes; that in the one the strict rules of private law, 
as was expressed, might have place; but in the second, there was 
not only respect to be had of the laws, but also of public utility 
and princely honour, and of the equity that ought to be between 
great states : wherefore, inasmuch as the deceased queen of 
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England did, as a public princess, enter into contract for the 
said towns, that the king's majesty was now still to hold them, 
and might not in honour deliver them ; besides, that it was for 
the good of the archduke that they should rather fall into our 
hands than into worse. 
The senator answered, that the ignorance of the law to whom 
the said towns belonged, ought not to be available to him that 
should have informed himself by better knowledge, as well con-
cerning the right of prívate interests as of public ; but i f it should 
be admitted to yield profit to him for the time, it ought to be 
only for the benefit of the mere fruits, and not for the detaining 
of the thing itself; and whereas it was alleged, that it was 
happy for the archduke that the said towns fell into so good 
hands, that it would now appear by the restoring of the said 
towns ; or otherwise, that we only respected our own interest, and 
nothing the good of the archdukes. 
The president Richardot answered, and pursued the same 
argument; only adding, that the king's right for his money might 
be sufficiently preserved against the partios that engaged the 
towns, and that they would assist us therein : that it would be 
dishonourable for their princes to make a peace, and to leave the 
said towns in our hands, and that they desired to know whether, 
i f they should attempt the recovery of those towns, it should be 
taken as a breach of the peace. 
The lord Cecil told them they had reason to seek to fortify 
their demands, but that their lordships had more reason to 
maintain their denial if their lordships should be forced to pro-
secute the further reasons which had been delivered unto them of 
state and honour, and plainly they were to understand, that it 
was a thing that the king would not do; that they ought to con-
tent themselves with the making of a firm peace with us, without 
casting us thereby into greater inconveniencies than we were 
before subject unto by the war with them; that i f they had pur-
pose to attempt anything against those islands, they should not 
be therein impeached by us, but only we would look to the guard 
of our towns. 
The earl of Northampton pursued a speech to the same effect. 
The senator of Milán answered, that they knew no difference 
between the right of a prívate man and of a prince, but that a 
prince could not be compelled to make restitution ; and whereas 
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i t was said that these things could not be determined by the 
streams of law, that they required the said towns by the law of 
nations, vvhich did yield to every man his right i but because it 
was alleged that tlie king should viólate his oath and honour, 
in case he should assent to the present restoring of those towns, 
they confessed it was regia potestatis (a matter of sovereign 
power), and, therefore, that they would not further insist upen 
that demand: but they desired to be answered to their former 
proposition; whether, in case they should be forced to the reduc-
tion of the towns, it would be held a breach of the peace, which 
they desired to have continué inviolable, and desired some pro-
visión to be made for it. 
The lord Cecil said, that their lordships were willing to concur 
with them to assent to anything that might be reasonable for 
the reconciling of this difficulty, but that it was fit to proceed in 
the matter with great moderation, lest it might otherwise give 
interruption to the peace, and i f they already advised of any 
unreasonable proposition to be made to their lordships, they 
would be glad to understand the same, or otherwise, that i t 
might be considered of against the time of their next meeting, 
which was approved by the said commissioners. 
The earl of Northampton told them, that he would briefly 
remember unto them before their departure two considerable 
things; first, that their lordships had yielded unto them in all 
considerable matters, and given them no interruption; and 
secondly, how unwilling their lordships were, by way of argu-
ment, to revive the remembrance of the oíd differences, whereby 
they could sufficiently answer the point of the present proposi-
tions. 
Tuesday the 5th of June, their lordships repaired again to 
the commissioners, and the lord Cecil declared unto them, that 
their important business which hindered them from coming 
sooner to them, forced them still to begin with excuses for their 
long absence ; that they had acquainted his majesty with the 
point that remained last in difference between them; and that 
they were commanded by his majesty to make them that answer 
to the same, whereof he desired they would make good interpre-
tation ; that he was willing to give their princes all good assur-
ance and satisfaction of his design to entertain firm amity with 
them, but that he had reason chiefly to look to proceed in the 
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making of the peace with the safe-guard of his honour, which he 
held in no less recommendation than his life, namely, concerning 
the cautionary towns, which he was resolved not to deliver over 
unto them for the reasons which had been before declared unto 
them, and that his majesty did find exceeding strange, that they 
should seek to exact more of him in that behalf, than they had 
done of their base and barbarous mutinied soldiers, with whora 
they had lately compounded, and had been contented that they 
should deliver back unto the States' hands the town of Grave, 
which they had received from them; but if they thought that 
there could be no peace made with his majesty, if he continued 
to hold the said towns, he would be willing, so as they would 
find the means, how he might be reimbursed his money, to 
deliver them back into the States' hands according as by contract 
he was bound ; that thereupon their princes might afterwards 
take such course as they should think fit for the recovery of 
them. 
The senator of Milán answered, that the propositions made 
for not restoring the towns were the reasons of honour and 
ut i l i ty : honour, for being otherwise engaged by contract to 
them from whom we received them ; and of utility, in respect of 
your debt; that they did not desire to wrong the king in his 
honour, but because the holding of the said towns by the king, 
would be an impedíment to the observing of the peace ; there-
fore, that they would be glad that some reasonable means might 
be proposed how the one might be preserved with the other, 
which they thought might well be by suffering the king to keep 
the said towns in his hands some three or four years: in the 
which time it were to be hoped that the Hollanders might be 
reduced to obedience either by his majesty's mediation, whereof 
they had good hope, or otherwise by the good work of God ; 
and if they were so, all difficulties would be removed, and order 
might be taken for satisfying of the king's debt; but i f they 
should still remain in disobedience, then there would be no 
cause why the king should longer respect his promise to the 
Hollanders, finding them to continué so obstinate, and he was 
desirous that by thís contract now to be made, the king would 
promise them to restore the said towns unto their princes. 
The lord Cecil said, that knowing the king's heart to be so 
full of integrity as they did, their lordships should much fail of 
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their duty, i f they should not return an answer worthy of their 
proposition; i f there was not a third person interested in this case, 
the difficulty for the restitution of the towns might much more 
easily be cleared; but it was apparent to every man's reason, 
that a thing deposited could not be delivered over in the preju-
dice of a third person, and a thing simply deposited could not 
afterwards be restored upon conditions ; that the covenant now 
to restore the towns at a limited time hereafter, imported as much 
as the present restoring of them ; that it were better therefore 
to advise of some other means ; and that the king's majesty, to 
witness that he would be willing to give the said princes all the 
satisfaction that he might, would use all good endeavours to 
draw the Hollanders to a peace; and because, as their necessity 
should increase after having lost the favour of his majesty's pro-
tection, they would then be most conformable to reimburse the 
king's debt: that whensoever they might be drawn to submit 
themselves, the king would make it appear that he likewise, for 
his part, would not stand upon any reasonable matter of money 
for the restoring also of the said towns, to bring the war to an 
end.. 
The president Richardot asked, whether it was not intended 
to yield to any limitation of time for the restoring of the said 
towns, but to refer it to the uncertain reducing of the States, 
and so to continué to a time infinite. 
The lord Cecil answered him, that there was no reason to 
expose the k ing^ majesty to the discredit of a dishonourable 
treaty for yielding to a limited time, seeing they were assured 
to reduce the said Hollanders within a short time after they 
should want the benefit of his majesty's assistance. The earl of 
Northamptoo added further, that if the like reason of equity, 
after five years,' should remain as now, for the not-delivery of 
the said towns, why should they more urge the delivery to be 
then made than now? That it could not be denied that the 
Hollanders should be less able to withstand and to resist the 
archduke, being separated from us, than now; and therefore it 
was to be judged they would be reduced: but i f contrariwise, 
by despair, that people should be forced to seek other protection, 
it were to be considered whether it were not better for the princes, 
that the king's majesty should join with them for the defence of 
his plodges, than to leave them to desperate men without having 
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his interest in them. Hereunto the senator of Milan replied, 
that though the said arguments had been in part before, and 
might be again Bufficiently answered; yet that they would not 
insist upon further disputation, but rather desired to bring the 
point to a conclusión; and therefore, because it was alleged 
that it would touch the king no less in honour presently to cove-
nant for the restoring of the towns at a certain time hereafter, 
than it would be to do it presently; and seeing, on the other 
side, it would be dishonourable for their princes that there 
should a peace be made vvithout providing for this point in some 
sort, they offered to their lordships' consideration the framing of 
the said promise in this or like manner : that i f within some 
certain time to b^ limited, those of Holland, &c., should not 
conform themselves at the king^ solicitation, that then the king 
would be left to his liberty to dispose of the towns, according as 
should be agreeable to justice and good amity. 
The lord Cecil told them, that it was fit their lordships should 
acquaint the king with the said overture, before they gave them 
a conclusivo answer thereunto, in respect that the king had been 
something distasted with the motion that was formerly made, 
and so their conference ended for that time. 
Thursday the 7th of June, their lordships repaired again to 
the said commissioners; and the lord Cecil declared unto them, 
that their lordships had at large acquainted the king with the 
arguments which were particularly handled by them of both 
sides, touching the point of the rendering of the towns; and the 
king's majesty took in so good part the moderation which they 
had used in being careful to temper the matter, that his honour 
might not be wronged, as he protested to be in trouble between 
the care how to show himself thankful to their masters for the 
due respect therein had of him, and of the other side not to do a 
thing which might be dishonourable |[to him upon consideration 
of precedent contract made between the deceased queen and the 
United Provinces, which he was bound to observe : he did find 
that he stood so strictly engaged in honour towards the States, 
that he could not yet (aa they do now stand) enter into a cove-
nant for the delivery of the said towns to their masters; but 
that he conceived the best expedient would be, that he should 
enter into a new coramunication with the States, and to profess 
unto them, that if they should not either take order for the pay-
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ment of theír debt by a certain time, or else conform themselves 
to the obedience of their princes, that then the king's majesty 
would be at liberty to take such course with the said towns as 
should be agreeable with honour and justice; which assurance 
of the king's good inclination toward them in this course might 
well content them without urging the king to a more expressed 
promise. 
The senator of Milan answered, that they never doubted of 
the king's affection for the good amity towards their princes; 
and therefore, that they held themselves bound to be the more 
careful to use their best endeavours for the tempering and accom-
modating of the point in question, so as the honour of both 
princes might be preserved; which they, by way of discourse, 
and not otherwise, conceived might be, by the assigning of a 
time convenient unto the Hollanders, wherein they should con-
form themselves, or else the towns to be restored to their princes ; 
but that now it was added further, that i f the States would pay 
the money in the mean season, that then they should receive the 
towns again, which could not be contracted by them, without 
prejudice to their princes1 thonour; and therefore, he referred 
himself to the president Richardot, to declare the interest of the 
archdukes upon that point; who signified, that it could not 
stand with the honour of their master to make any such contract. 
The lord Cecil told them, that all that hitherto had been 
spoken was by way of discourse,' to the end to seek to reconcile 
this question; that as they were not to admit any mention to 
be made of restoring the towns to the States, because they con-
ceived they should thereby approve either the States possessing 
of the said towns, or their fact to be lawful, so the king his 
master would be as loath to covenant anything which might pre-
judice or discredit his own contracts with the States, in that he 
had accepted the said towns; therefore, as before had been 
declared, that the king did hold it to be the best course to sum-
mon the States to enter into a new conference and contract with 
him, whereby he might próvido, that i f they should not conform 
themselves within a convenient time, that he would be at liberty 
to take such course with the said towns as should be agreeable 
with honour and justice : and other promise than this, that he 
could not for the present make, t i l l he had freed himself of the 
contracts with the States which did now stand in forcé. 
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The president Richardot desired, in the name of all the said 
commissioners, that they might have some time given them to 
consider of the said proposition ; and withal, that some form of 
an article might be conceived for that purpose, to be delivered 
unto them, which was allowed of, and agreed to pass over to 
olear the point of the trade, which had been formerly handled. 
Concerning the said matter of trade, the lord Cecil told them, 
that their lordships having had conference with the merchants 
thereof, they did all protest, that the restriction that was sought 
to be imposed upon them for not transporting the commodities 
of Holland and Zealand into Spain, would be of so great vexation 
and trouble unto them in their trade, as would be to their ruin, 
if they should be forced to undergo the inconvenience thereof; 
and therefore his lordship desired the said commissioners not 
further to urge the said condition, and the rather, considering 
that the benefit thereof would nothing be so great unto them as 
the prejudice would be great unto us : that we were content to 
give them satisfaction to yield, that our men should not make 
use of the Hollanders"' ships or mariners, whereby they would be 
exceedingly distressed, 
The president Richardot answered, that the trouble would 
not be so great as was pretended ; and that our merchants might 
be furnished of the same commodities out the arcbdulses"* 
provinces, which they fetched out of Holland and Zealand, which 
might well be distinguished by a seal from those of Holland. 
The lord Cecil told them, that our trade could not be so soon 
settled in their provinces; and that the States would moreover 
give impeachment to our trading with them, as they did to all 
other princes and states of the world, pretending that they could 
not admit of any trading with the archdukes without their 
manifestruin; and that we did expect to receive their protestation 
upon that point. 
It was said by the commissioners, that the States would not 
daré to impeach our trade, i f wewould take the courses which 
we might do, to be sensible thereof; but it was told them, that 
it could not be done without plunging ourselves into a new war ; 
and it was desired by their lordships to leave this question of 
trading with them, to be handled in its proper place and course, 
and to clear the other point first spoken, touching the transporting 
of Spanish wares of those princes into Spain, concerning the which 
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the lord Cecil signified unto them that, if it would please thera 
to be satisfied in the effect of that which they desired, he would 
propose an offer unto them how it might be done, and our 
merchants freed frora molestation, which should be, that the 
king's majesty should prohibit the transporting of the commodities 
of Holland and Zealand into Spain ; and solikewise of Spain into 
those provinces, by any of his majesty's subjects, upon pain of 
confiscation of the same commodities, and of incurring further 
punishment; and, for the better observation thereof, that some 
seal should be appointed to design the commodities carried out 
of England. The said commissioners desired to take time to 
consider of the said proposition, and so brake off their conference 
for that time. 
Friday the 8th of June, their lordships repaired again to the 
said commissioners ; and it was moved by the lord Cecil, to know 
their resolution touching the point which had been last handled. 
It was answered by the said commissioners, that they were 
content to agree to the passing of our commodities into Spain, 
upon straight order and prohibition to be made by the king's 
majesty, according as was offered, that none of the commodities 
of Holland and Zealand, should likewise be under that colour 
transported by his majesty's subjects into Spain, upon confiscation 
thereof; and for the better avoiding of fraud in that behalf, that 
the merchandises of England which might be subject to question 
being of the same kind and making as those of Holland, should 
be distinguished by the marks and seáis of the towns where they 
were made, and having that testimony, that they should not be 
subject to visitation, for the merchandise which should be marked, 
but there have their allowance. 
It was then moved by the lord Cecil, to know what provisión 
they would require for the merchandises which should be brought 
out of Spain, for not transporting the same into Holland and 
Zealand. 
The senator of Milán said, that we might be discharged of 
giving any caution in paying the impost of thirty upon the 
hundred; but it was answered by the lord Cecil, that we did not 
now only expect to have the impost abolished against us, but also 
to be restored to our former privileges and liberty of trade with 
them. 
The senator of Milán declared, that their care was to give 
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their lordships satisfaction, by all raeans to make it appear what 
affection they did bear unto the peace : and therefore, although 
there were an order established for payment of thirty upon the 
hundred, for all goods issuing out of Spain, unless the same should 
be carried unto the archdukes, provinces, that the said imposts 
• should be remitted for such raerchandises as should be brought 
into England only. 
The lord Cecil answered, that though we must interpret every 
thing for a courtesy from them, wherein they would show to make 
a difference between us and others, yet that we found it would be 
a hard condition unto us, to be restrained not only from carrying 
the commodities of Spain into Holland, but also into France; 
which haply might be an occasion also to impeach the liberty of 
our trade with France in respect of our admitting a condition of 
such prejudice unto them. But notwithstanding that their lord-
ships were contented not to dispute the reasons of their interest, 
and would admit the said condition, upon protestation that the 
restraint for the transporting of Spanish commodities into France 
should not stand longer than t i l l the present differences which 
were between France and their princes for matter of trade might 
be compounded, wherein that the king's majesty would be glad 
to do some good office between them, to take away those inter-
ruptions which might grow thereby to the state of the common 
trade of their subjects; that it foliowed to be the next question, 
what caution should be given for the observance of the foresaid 
restraint for such commodities as should be brought out of 
Spain. 
It was answered by the senator of Milán, that they required 
the caution which was provided by their placard for the giving of 
assurance in Spain for the payment of the impost of thirty upon 
the hundred, i f a certifícate should not be afterwards brought of 
the landing of the said goods in England, and not for carrying 
the same to the prohibited places. 
Tho lord Cecil told them, that there was no meaning to yield 
to give such assurance, in respect of the inconveniences and 
vexations which the same would draw upon our merchants; 
besides, that it was dishonourable for the king to yield unto it, 
that he was content to make strict prohibitions to the contrary, 
upon pain of incurring severo penalties, and if any further caution 
were to be given, that it were rather necessarily to be taken here 
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in England ; that in such cases, where a provisión could not be 
conveniently made without occasion of greater inconveniences 
otherwise, there ought to be reposed a trust in the honour and 
word of the prince, and upon complaint that should be made by 
the ambassador of Spain residing here of any contrary actions in 
that point, that there should be redress thereof. 
It was earnestly pressed by them to have some better pro-
visión ; but in the end, after much debating, it was agreed to 
put off this question t i l l some other time, without resolution of 
either part. 
It was afterwards propounded by the senator of Milan, to 
olear the point also touehing the imposts which our merchandise 
should pay, which were to be carried out of England into Spain, 
because the impost of thirty upon the hundred did stand still in 
force against us. 
The lord Cecil told him, that we undertook to bring the trade 
to the same state of payment of both sides, as it was before the 
breaking out of the last troubles. 
The commissioners answered, that their prinees were content 
to remit unto us the impost of thirty upon the hundred, and that 
our merchants should not be subject to pay any other dues than 
were established by the time of the publishing of the last placard 
of thirty upon the hundred ; and that they did not hold them-
selves to be authorised to look further backward for the taking 
away of any impost, than t i l l the said t ime; so that there was 
no reason that we should seek to exempt ourselves from those 
impositions which were before established, and which are gene-
rally paid by the subjects of all other princes and other states 
whatsoever, and even by their own subjects; but i f there hath 
been anything particularly imposed more upon our nation than 
upon others, then, that we had to seek the abolishing thereof, 
and not otherwise. 
It was answered by their lordships, that if the said commis-
sioners were not authorised, as was alleged by them, to yield 
to any moderation of the imposts for longer time than t i l l the 
setting out of the last placard, there was no reason for the 
present, to speak further thereof; and touching the other point, 
that we ought, in reason, to submit ourselves to the same general 
payments as all others did. 
That the same was no good argument to be uscd to us» 
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to whom there ought to be a more particular respect, in regard 
that we ever had in ancient times a more strict alliance and 
amity with them than other nations had, which was an occasion 
to move princes in favour of such an extraordinary friendship, to 
grant more special privileges and immunities to some nations 
than might be challenged by others, that could not pretend the 
like consideration, as it might be exemplified by the aneient con-
vention made between Franco and Scotland, wherein the Scottish 
then had more beneficial privileges granted unto them than any 
other nation; that in our treaties with Burgundy, it had been 
provided to set down our particular privileges, and care had been 
taken to use us always with the same respect of favour in Spain, 
where our friendship had been the same; and therefore, that 
their lordships found it strange that they would not make the 
treaty to have reference to the former time of amity, rather than 
to the latter more confused and troubled time wherein the inter-
ruption grew. 
The said commissioners protested, that they knew not, for 
their parts, what other impositions had been established since 
the time of the last troubles, besides the impost of thirty upon 
the hundred; and therefore, that it was to no purpose to argüe 
longer upon an uncertainty, which could not be determined 
without better information of that point: whereupon it was 
thought fit to break off their conference for that time. 
On Wednesday, the l l t h of June, their lordships repaired 
again to the said commissioners, and it was signified unto them 
by the lord Cecil, that their lordships expected to hear from 
them what other propositions they would make, of their part, to 
proceed to the conclusión of the treaty. 
Whereupon it was answered by the senator of Milán, that it 
was best, before they entered into any new matter, first, to 
recapitúlate and clear the points which had been before dis-
cussed and agreed on for matters of trade, namely, touching the 
goods of Holland and Zealand into Spain, and so likewise of the 
merchandises, &c., we should carry out of England, or the arch-
dukes1 provinces into Spain, and so likewise out of Spain into 
England or the archdukes1 provinces only; that they should be 
exempted from payment of the impost of thirty upon the hun-
dred, and the provisión to be accepted which was offered; and 
the king's majesty should restrain the transportation of the com-
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modities of Holland and Zealand into Spain, on pain of confisca-
t ion; and further, in testimony that the said merchandise should 
be known to the English, that the same should be marked and 
distinguished by the seáis of the places where they were made; 
but for such merchandise as should be transported out of Spain, 
he enforced it to be necessary that our merchants should enter 
in bond to the valué of thirty in the hundred, not to carry the 
same to other places than only to England or the archdukes' 
provinces ; and upon any confiscations grown for anything done 
contrary to the foresaid order, the king of Spain to be satisfied 
out of the same ; the valué of the said imposts of thirty in the 
hundred, and the rest due, to be answered into his majesty's 
exchequer, with the allowance of the half part thereof to the 
informer, 
It was answered by their lordships, that in Spain there had 
been lately raised another impost of twelve in the hundred, upon 
wines and oils which were shipped from thence, wherein his 
majesty's subjects did sustain the greatest grievance, for that 
they did most deal with the said commodities; and therefore, 
that his majesty^ subjects should not receive any benefit by the 
trade of Spain, unless the said impost might also be taken away. 
It was alleged by the commissioners, that the said impost of 
twelve in the hundred did extend to all other nations, and even 
to their own subjects, and therefore could not now be removed. 
But it was answered by their lordships, that there was no rea-
son to comprise us under that generality, to whom there belonged 
a more particular regard for restoring us to the privileges and 
customs which had been anciently accorded between us and 
them. 
The others insisted earnestly upon the maintaining the lawful-
ness of the said impost; so as, for that time, nothing was con-
cluded upon that point. 
Afterwards there was speech of the caution which our mer-
chants should give, which the said commissioners required, with 
sureties conceming the merchandise which they should bring out 
of Spain, for the not venting of the same contrary to the placard, 
but it was utterly refused by their lordships to subject our mer-
chants to so troublesome a caution; and their lordships only 
assented to the giving of simple caution to the valué of the said 
impost. 
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On Wednesday, the ISth of June, their lordships repaired 
again to the commissioners, and it was moved unto them by the 
lord Cecil, that it might be granted, to the end our merchants 
might receive comfort in the trade, to take away also the 
impost of twelve in the hundred, whereof speech had been 
before, as well as of the other of thirty. But it was answered 
by the commissioners, that the present state of their masters1 
affairs could not permit the same to be done. 
It was then demanded by the lord Cecil, that i f they would 
not yield to the reléase thereof, how they would othervvise re-
compense it in some other thing, seeing in justice we ought to 
be exempted from the payment thereof, though their necessity 
would not permit it. 
They said, that they had already gratified by the remittal of 
thirty in the hundred, and that they would -in like manner 
submit themselves to the ordinary impositions of the state, 
and so it was forborn further to prosecute that point at the 
time. 
Afterwards the lord Cecil prayed the said commissioners, to 
resolve their lordships, for the better clearing of the point of trade, 
whether their meaning was to limit us to carry the commodities 
of Spain only into England, and other the k ing^ dominions, 
and the provinces under the obedience of the archdukes, and 
not to any other parts of Christendom, as Franco, Denmark, &c. 
The said commissioners answered, that free liberty should be 
allowed unto us to bring any commodity of Spain, either for 
their own use, or to carry it into the archdukes' provinces, with-
out paying the imposition of thirty in the hundred, and to all 
other places, paying the said impost, &c. 
Thereunto the lord Cecil answered him, that the king's 
majesty found, that i f the placard should continué still in forcé, 
it would deprive his subjects of the benefit of a free trade, and 
generally interrupt the liberty of the commerce of all Christen-
dom : therefore, that the king would be willing, to do a good 
office, to mediato an agreement between them and France, 
conceming the differences now depending between them for 
matter of trade, and the placards thereupon set forth, the one 
against the other, to the end there might be a convention of the 
said placards, whereof the trade might be restored to its former 
state. 
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The senator of Milán answered, that for the point of their 
placards which did directly concern his majesty's subjects, it 
was resolved to exempt them from the payment of the said 
impost; but for the other point which touched other princes, 
although it was a thing unexpected by them, that the interests 
of other princes should come in question, and be handled in this 
treaty, yet that they could not but thankfully accept the king^ 
most gracious offer to be a means for the compounding of the 
differences between their masters and others, and removing of 
the impediments grown about the said placard, wherein as they 
knew their princes would more repose themselves upon con-
fidence of the king's majesty's kindness and sincerity, than of 
any other prince's, so they would be willing to grow to any 
resolution upon the point of the placards, when the king 
should, with due regard of the honour of their princes, work the 
effecting of his intention for the compounding the said diífer-
ences. 
The lord Cecil told them, that they might assure themselves 
the king's majesty would not deceive the trust of their princes 
in that behalf, and would be careful so to handle the matter as 
to propose it to the French ambassador, without any prejudice 
to the honour of Spain, and as it had been casually moved unto 
them, so that the ambassador should be dealt with in the like 
sort, and moved to procure commission to treat thereof, as it 
was desired, that he would do the like from the constable of 
Castillo, to the end the matter might be presently proceeded i n ; 
in the mean season, that it would be best also to suspend the 
motions which had been made upon the point between their 
lordships, and the said commissioners. 
The senator of Milán desired, that the other intended course 
might be no impediment to the determining (for the mean time) 
of the present question between them ; but their lordships 
refused to give them any further answer t i l l they were better 
instructed of his majesty's pleasure therein. 
It was then demanded of them by the lord Cecil, whether 
they had any other proposition to make ? 
Whereunto was answered by the president Richardot, that 
they had a particular motion to make, in the ñame of the arch-
duke, for restoring unto him of the ancient jewels of the dukes of 
Burgundy, which were engaged to the late queen by those 
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which had no right to dispose of them ; and in respect that the 
said jewels had ever been preserved and left in succession to the 
dukes of Burgundy, that they desired the recovery of them more 
in that respect than the valué of them. 
It was answered them by the lord Cecil, that the said jewels 
were engaged by most of the principal provinces of the Low 
Countries for good sums of money; therefore, that the king's 
majesty could not deliver the said jewels without their liking 
and agreement, and order to be taken for the reimbursement of 
his sum of money, for the which hereafter some better expedient 
mightbe found than could be now: and the archdukes might assure 
themselves, they should find the king's majesty very willing to 
use them with kindness therein; and his lordship signified unto 
them, that their lordships were also to make demand in behalf 
of the king's majesty for the reimbursement of other moneys, 
which were lent by the deceased queen to those princes, for the 
appeasing of the troubles, at the time of the pacification of 
Gaunt; which money the deceased king of Spain promised 
afterwards, by his letters, to pay interest of, it being for the use 
and benefit of his service. 
The commissioners alleged, that the satisfying of that debt 
did not properly belong unto their princesa and the rather, 
for that there followed no observation of the pacification made 
at Gaunt, and so for that time their conference ended. 
On Monday the 18th of June, their lordships repaired to the 
commissioners, and it was signified to them by the lord Cecil, 
that their lordships, out of their desire to bring the treaty to an 
end, thought it fit to conceive and frame certain articles agree-
able to the points which had been hitherto treated o n ; and 
because there had been something insisted on which had re-
ference only to some considerations of the present time, with 
the which matters it were not fit to clog the other general and 
perpetual conventions of the treaty ; therefore, that their lord-
ships thought it best to make some provisión for those tempo-
rary restrictions, by private articles to be passed between the 
princes. 
Hereunto it was agreed to read the articles which were con-
ceived on both sides, which was pursued t i l l it came to the 
article in the which they designed in what countries of the 
king of Spain's dominions intercourse and traffic should be 
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permitted to the king's majesty's subjects, and for that the 
naming of some parts of the dominions of Spain and excluding 
others showed that they had a meaning to exelude us from the 
trade of the Indies, it was desired by their lordships to agree 
that point concerning the Indies before they proceeded any 
further; and therewith it was declared unto them, that i f they 
could show any ancient treaty wherein the like restrictions had 
been used, then that their lordships would yield to reason 
therein ; otherwise, that there was no cause but that the trade 
ought to be accorded unto us in the article in the said general 
terms as had been unto all others in former time. 
It was answered by the senator of Milán, that they conceived 
the said article to be made according to their former conference 
with their lordships, seeing no mention was therein made of the 
Indies one way or other; nevertheless, i f their lordships did 
mislike anything in the form of the words thereof, that they 
would be content the same should receive alteration, so as there 
might be a provisión that the trade of the Indies might not 
thereby be permitted. 
The lord Cecil said, that to speak clearly unto them, as their 
lordships did conceive they would be unwilling to grant us the 
freedom of that trade, so they prayed them to understand that 
their lordships were not less resolved not to assent to be more 
restrained now from the liberty of using that trade, than we had 
been by former treaties. 
The senator of Milán answered, that howsoever ancient treaties 
had been penned by neglect, yet that observation showed that 
the use of that trade had never been granted to us ; and seeing 
the taking of that liberty by colour of those words, might breed 
occasion of war again, it was convenient so plainly to express 
them at this time, as that all peril might be avoided, and nothing 
left that might give interruption to the peace. 
Their lordships answered, that it was not their meaning now 
to dispute the king of Spain's right to the Indies, or whether he 
might lawfully restrain our trade thither or not ; but that the 
king's majesty would not so wrong his honour as to yield to be 
more restrained in that freedom than Franco and other provinces 
were, by the conventions made with them. 
The senator of Milán answered, that Franco never made that 
question for the liberty of the trade for the Indios as we had 
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done; but seeing that the king's majesty would not admit a 
public article of restriction in such sort as they desired, because the 
same might be prejudicial to him in honour ; that they would be 
content to pasa the article in the same general terms with us as 
they did with France, so as the king would promise, by eome 
prívate article, that he would not approve his subjects trading 
thither; but if any should offend in the contrary, that he would 
both punish them himself for the same, and allow the king of 
Spain to do the like. 
It was told by their lordships, that the king would be satisfied 
with the general article which was passed with France, and that 
he could not otherwise assent to any prívate article whereby to 
yield to exelude himself from the said trade, only he would be 
content not to mislike that the adventurers into those parts 
should be left with the peril which they should incur thereby; or 
otherwise, that they would accord to forbid his subjects to trade 
unto any of the places which were now possessed by the king of 
Spain in the Indies, so as the said king would not give interrup-
tion to our trading to any other places which were not precisely 
under his obedience. 
Then it was urged by them to declare, by a private writing, 
that he would leave the adventurers to their own perils, in such 
sort as had been before spoken of; but it was refused to engage 
the king to make any such promise by writing. 
Hereupon it was alleged by the said commissioners, that they 
having seriously advised how to reconcile the point of difference, 
they knew of no other means to do the same than to pass the 
article in general words, for the licensing our merchants to trade 
to all such places where formerly they had used to do. 
Their lordships insisted still to have the article to pass in 
absoluto general terms, without any manner of restrictions, and 
told them, that if they thought it fit, there might be protesta-
tions made thereupon of both sides: of their part, for not intend-
ing to allow us the trade of the Indies; and, for our part, for our 
not assenting to be excluded from thence. 
But the said commissioners refused to yield thereunto, 
alleging that they could not further enlarge themselves than as 
they had formerly declared, and protesting vehemently, that i f 
the said matter should be stood upon, they should be forced, to 
their great grief, to break off the treaty, which they referred 
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to the consideration of his majesty ; whereupon their conference 
ended for that time. 
Thursday the 21st of June, their lordships repaired to the said 
commissioners, and it was declared unto them by the lord Cecil, 
that their lordships did acknowledge, that the form of the 
proceeding of the said commissioners with them had been so 
good, and agreeable to honourable dealing, as their lordships 
wished that it were also in their power to make them some 
requital to their l ik ing ; therefore, that their lordships would 
not seek, aceording to the custom of ministers in like cases, to 
valué themselves by many diligences of reservedness, but would 
plainly let them know that day, what they would grant them 
next; for the which cause, although there was a breaking óíf 
the last time upon the point then in question concerning the 
Indies, so as thereupon occasion of scruple might arise which 
partly should ruin the conference; yet that their lordships were 
not willing to stand thereupon, but to return to debate that 
argument with them to a further reconciliation, if it might be, 
for the concluding of the peace. A n d first, to make them 
answer, by the k ing^ commandment, to those things which had 
been the day before proposed to his majesty by the archduke's 
commissioners, in their audience with his majesty, concerning the 
licensing of men to pass from henee to the service of the States, 
the which numbers he said had not been raised by any assistance 
of the king's authority, but only by the prívate gathering of a 
few voluntarios together; nevertheless, because the public passing 
of them at that time from the city gave scandal unto the said 
commissioners, that order was taken by the king to restrain 
the transportation of any further numbers, at that time, from 
this place : but that the king must plainly let them know, that 
he could not deny his subjeets the liberty to employ themselves 
in service abroad, in all places which were in amity with his 
majesty, to the end to preserve the peace and quietness of his 
state, which abounding of people, he could not restrain them 
from seeking to make their fortune by service abroad, and that 
the king would therein show no partial affection to the States, 
but would give the like free liberty to the archdukes to draw any 
numbers from henee, which they should require for their service ; 
and withal, it wae remembered unto them, that there was no 
reason to limit, in that point, more his majesty's subjeets than 
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those of France and other countries, which did ordinarily go to 
the service of the States. 
The senator of Milan protested, how great satisfaction they 
received by their lordships, honourable proceeding with them, 
and prayed their lordships to conceive that they had no other 
meaning but only to refer the matter which was in difference to 
his majesty's consideration, and to be reconciled by his majesty's 
better wisdom and judgment; and he reinforced to the presi-
dent Richardot, to make answer to the other parta of lord 
CeciFs speech^ because he had dealt in the said matters with the 
king. 
The said president acknowledged that they had received good 
satisfaction from his majesty, by the answer which he had mado 
them of not having been acquainted with their levies of men 
which had been complained of by them, and by the promise 
which it pleased him to make, to take order therein; and touch-
ing the offer made to furnish their princes in the like sort, in 
any number which they should require for their service, they 
gave their lordships thanks, saying that they would advertise 
their princes thereof; but desired that, under that colour, there 
might not be liberty given to their enemies to draw men from 
henee, which would be directly against the peace; and for the 
proceedings of France, that we were not to take example by 
them, for that, howsoever they brake with them in that point, 
yet they being charged therewith, did not stand to the justifica* 
tion thereof, but alleged for their excuse that they were but 
banished men that put themselves into that service; and more-
over, that at the making of the peace, the French king did pub-
licly prohibit that any of his subjeets should afterwards serve there. 
The lord Cecil said, that he found that the said answer which 
was made by them, consisted of two points; first, of the 
inconvenience that might grow thereby to them, then of the 
answer made for France. F o r the first, although i t could not 
but be in some sort inconvenient for them, that ourselves should 
retain within the realm a superfluous nuraber of id le and loóse 
persons, which by that means were routed abroad, we were rather 
to respect the avoiding of a greater mischief thereby unto our-
selves, than a less prejudice that might grow to others: and 
touching that which had been said of France, that howsoever 
others would largely promise without respect of performance, 
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yet, that the king's majesty had that just regard unto hishonour 
and word, as he would promíse nothing but that he would duly 
perform ; and thetefore, that he would freely profess beforehand 
what liberty was fit for him to take for the good of his state: 
besides, that there was grcat difference to be made between us 
and Franco, in respect of a nearer interest we had with the States 
for the towns which the king held in caution and otherwise, 
which necessarily as yet required the holding on of a correspon-
dence with them. 
The earl of Northampton pursued a speech to the same effect, 
comparing the politic body of a commonwealth to the natural 
body of a man, wherein it was often necessary to purge super-
fluous and i l l humours, which otherwise might endanger the 
health of the body ; so also that if it were meant to spend abroad 
loóse persons, as they grow to abound in a commonwealth, the 
retaining them could not be without danger of the safety of the 
same. 
The commissioners answered, that there might be means for 
them to serve abroad in other places, though not in Holland and 
Zealand, to their prejudice, and that they had ever grounded 
themselves upon the king^s promise, that there should be a 
restraint for going thither. 
Whereunto their lordships shortly replied, that men were most 
willing to repair thither, where there did occur most action and 
matter of employment, as at this time there was in the Low 
Countries ; neither would they, as counsellors, advise his majesty 
otherwise to restrain his subjects ; and so they brake off for that 
time, t i l l his majesty's pleasure might be better known therein. 
Wednesday the 27th, their lordships repaired again to the 
commissioners, and the lord Cecil signified unto them, that their 
lordships had made the king acquainted with the matter which 
remained in difference between them, at the time of their last 
conference, touching the restraining of voluntarles to repair to the 
eervice of the States, and how they urged a promise made in that 
behalf to some of them by the k ing ; and also, for revocation of 
the number which were now there : whereunto the king's majesty 
did answer, that he was sorry to have been so misunderstood, 
but would be loath to enter into any question thercupon with an 
ambassador, for that he would not acknowledge that he had 
promised any such thing without doing himsclf great wrong ; but 
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if, out of the liberfcy of a free mind, and a good affection towards 
them, he had 8aid in discourse, that i f he should hereafter find 
the States to persist st i l l in their obstinacy, that then he might 
be moved to prese more straightly against them in such course 
as had been spoken of, there were no reason that any such 
discourse which was ever used by him with reference to the 
respective conditions of a peace, should be urged as a promise 
which would bind himself presently to satisfy. 
The count of Aremberg desired that he might explain himself, 
that he did not charge the king to have made any such direct 
promise, but only to have used speech to him, whereby he thouglit 
to have reason to conceive hope of such an affection in the 
king towards the archdukes. A n d the president Richardot 
prayed their lordships to consider, that i f that article were not 
accorded, it would be directly to cross the purpose of a peace, 
and contrary to all former treaties; and thereupon he produced 
precedents of former treaties which were all made with strict 
cautions respecting that point. 
The lord Cecil answered, that the king had not so i l l a purpose 
to prejudice them by that liberty of that article as they seemed 
to conceive jealousy, but only to avoid inconveniency to himself; 
and that there was not so precious regard to be had to that 
which the formalities of the law did require, as what did more 
noarly concern the king in his pr ívate and particular interests, 
the use being always to make the conditions of peaco agreeable 
to the considerations and respects of the time present; and 
therefore, that the king's majosty prayed them to be satisfied 
that the present state of his affairs would not permit him to allow 
of that article of restriction. 
The senator of Milán answered, that they perceived that the 
king's majesty had an honourable meaning not to do anything 
that might tend to a violation of the peace ; but only to avoid 
being bound to restrictions which might touch him in honour: 
therefore, he wished that the articles might be preserved which 
had been conceived, and that they might be so framed as that 
the honour of both parties might be preserved. Whereupon it 
was agreed to read the articles which had been offered by the 
said commissioners. A n d their lordships fínding cause to except 
against his strictness of them in «undry points, 
It was declaml unto them by the lord Cecil, that the king's 
A P P E N D 1 X . 423 
majesty was not of the disposition of other princes that seek to 
make evasions by the subtilty of words; but contrariwise, was 
sincerely rainded, as he desired, that the treaty might be made 
in so clear words as might breed no ambiguity, or doubt of 
interpretation; and therefore, as the king would be willing to 
yield to reasonable things, so he desired that the treaty might 
not be compounded of unnecessary and superfluous articles, as 
their lordships conceived sorae of those to be which were deli-
vered by the said commissioners. 
The said commissioners answered, that they would agree to 
#any reasonable amendment, but first, they desired to be satisfied 
from their lordships, what order should be taken for the revoking 
of the regiments of his majesty^ subjects, and commanders, which 
were in the service of the States; for that it would not stand 
with the conditions of a peace, to suffer them to continué longer 
there; and therefore desired, that it ought to be agreed to 
revoke the said troops by a public edict. 
Their lordships prayed them seriously to consider, whether i t 
would not be much more inconvenient to the king to yield to 
their demands therein, than the forbearing thereof would be 
advantageous to them, both in respect of the great pester and 
burthen which he should draw upon the realm by the revoking of 
the said troops ; and the rather, for that most of them had great 
sums of money owing to them by the States, for the discharge 
of their accounts and reckoning; and inasmuch, likewise, as by 
that means he should so much discontent the Hollanders, as 
might move them, out of despair, to practise to recover from his 
majesty the towns which he held there, whereby there would not 
remain unto them either credit or power to mediato with them 
to reduce them to obedience ; that the number of his majesty's 
subjects now serving there was not great, and of them, few which 
were persons of account. But, for their satisfaction, that the 
king's majesty would be content to disavow hereafter the repair-
ing of any persons of quality to the service of the States, and to 
endeavour to divert them from going thither. 
The said commissioners answered, that to make it appear that 
they would not press the king in anything to his prejudice, they 
would satisfy themselves with the forbearance of the said public 
revocation, so as the king would promise that there should be 
some prívate means used to persuade them to return, which was 
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thought reasonable to be proraised by their lordships to be done 
so far forth as the partios serving there could be induced there-
unto; and thereupon the articles were so reformed as should 
neither import any snch public revocation, nor to restrain the 
going of voluntarios thither; and upon that conclusión taken, 
their lordships ended their conference for that time. 
Friday the 29th of June, their lordships repaired again to the 
said commissioners, and it was moved by the lord Cecil, that 
there might be a review of the articles which were formerly 
agreed on, to be thoroughly perfected, that afterwards they 
might proceed to the determining of the other points of the 
treaty, which was accordingly performed ; and after some 
amendments of the articles given on either part, they resolved 
upon the draft of the general articles for peace, and in what 
form the commission for the cautionary towns should pass, and 
that the garrisons of those places should give no aid or assistance 
to the Hollanders. 
This being finished, they proceeded next to speak of some 
provisión, to be agreed on between them, for security of our 
merchants against the dangers of the inquisition of Spain. 
To the which it was answered- by the commissioners, that it 
was out of the king of Spain's power to make any particular 
conventions against the inquisition ; but that they would pass a 
general article, whereby his majesty's subjects should be provided 
for, not to be subject to danger for matters of religión, so as 
they gave no cause of public scandal. 
But it was told them by their lordships, that an article in 
that generality would not be sufficient safety unto the merchants, 
because it would be even in their power to interpret what was 
to be accounted a scandal, and what not; and their lordships 
showed unto them examples of divers notorious wrongs which 
our merchants had received in that case ; besides that, there was 
no cause why difficulties should now be made to yield to parti-
cular provisions; for that in time past, the like had been done, 
as their lordships made appear unto them by that which had 
been agreed on in that behalf with the duke of Alva . 
Whereupon, at length, it was resolved by the said commission-
ers to insert a general article of assurance for that purpose ; 
and to refer the further explanation thereof to some particular 
articles to be agreed oh. Upon these resolutions, their lordships 
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being ready to depart; for that the Spanish ambassador ac-
quainted their lordships with a letter which he had newly 
received from the constable of Castille, wliereby he signified, that 
touching the raotion which had been lately made by the king's 
majesty, for compounding the differences between the kings of 
Spain and France, upon the placard of thirty upon the hundred, 
wherein his majesty offered that himself would be a mediator, 
that although the king of Spain had given the constable no com-
mission to treat thereupon, yet, if the k ing^ majesty would be 
pleased to deal in that matter, that he would nndertake that 
the king his master should ratify whatever should be concluded 
therein. 
Monday the 2nd of July, their lordships repaired again to the 
said commissioners, and signified unto them their allowance of 
the draft of the general article for peace, and touching the 
cautionary towns which had been considered by them of their 
last meeting, save only that they desired the amendment of 
some few words therein; and that, as there was a provisión, 
that the forces serving in his majesty's cautionary towns should 
not minister any aid unto the States; so also, that there might 
be a reciprocal article, that the archduke^ or king of Spain's 
forces should not attempt anything to the oífence of the said 
garrisons, which was assented unto by the said commissioners. 
Then the senator of Milán exhibited to their lordships the 
general article which was conceived by him for freeing of our 
merchants from the dangers of the inquisition in Spain, which 
imported only, that for the better security of the trade there, 
they should not be subject undeservedly to any molestations in 
their negotiations, unless they gave occasion of scandal. 
Their lordships took great exceptions both to the weakness 
of the word " undeservedly," as also, for that there was not a 
direct mention of the words, " for not receiving molestation for 
cause of religión,11 which their lordships desired to have clearly 
expressed, to give satisfaction to the king^ subjects, that care 
had been taken for their security in that behalf. 
The said commissioners assented to amend the word " unde-
servedly,11 but they utterly refused, a long time, to have any 
mention made in the article of matters of religión, and earnestly 
insisted to have the same to run only in othcr general terms; 
for that they could not undertako to prescribe in causes of 
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religión, but that there might be a sufficient provisión for the 
raerchants'' safety by other prívate articles. 
Their lordships answered, that it behoved the kingfs majesty 
to be no less careful to provide, that his subjects might not bo 
wronged for matters of conscience, than they showed themselves 
to be careful to preserve their religión ; and that there could not 
be aptly made a reference frorn the general article to the private, 
unless there were mention made in the general article of the 
matter referred; and, moreover, that it would minister suspicion, 
that there would follow no due execution of the said private 
orders, i f it should be refused so much as to ñame the thing that 
was to be provided for. 
Their lordships further had speech with them, touching the 
explanation of their meaning in the word "scandal for that, 
if it were left ambiguous, it might draw his majesty's subjects 
into danger, as well for omissions as commissions, as they did 
exemplify in some particulars. 
The said commissioners answered, that i f they should express 
all particulars, what should be interpreted to be scandalous, and 
what not, the same would grow to be infinite; and therefore, 
that they held it best rather to rest in the general than to descend 
to over great particularities; notwithstanding that they accorded 
that, for the better distinction, the word "public,1 should be 
added unto i t ; and that they accounted not the use of private 
prayer by our merchants, either in their ships, or in their cham-
bers, to be within the compass of public scandal, but to be a 
matter of adherence to trade; and in the end, after much debate, 
the said commissioners further yielded to pass the general article, 
with mention, that his majesty's subjects should not be molested, 
either by land or sea, for matters of conscience, within the king 
of Spain's or archduke's dominions, i f they gave not occasion of 
public scandal; and that the particular agreements made in that 
behalf with the duke of Alva , should now also privately be 
confirmed. 
Wednesday the 4th of July, their lordships repaired again to 
the said commissioners, and the lord Cecil put them in mind of 
the general article which was agreed on, conccrning the inquisi-
tion, which was again read and approved by them ; and also of 
confirming of the private articles, which were assented unto by 
the duke of Alva ; but their lordships desired further, that order 
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also might be taken, that his majesty's subjects might not be 
entangled by any questions or provocations proceeding from 
their parts, that might minister cause of scandal, by declaring 
of themselves, being urged by such means; and also, that the 
consuls of the English might not, in respect of their residence 
there for the government of the merchants, be accounted as 
inhabitants, and thereby made subject to the censures, which 
were not reputed inhabitants ; both which propositions were 
thought reasonable and agreed unto. 
Afterwards their lordships, entering further into treaty of the 
raatter of intercourse, the lord Cecil took occasion upon the 
articles, which had been before delivered unto them by the com-
missioners, to signify that their lordships found they had therein 
made question of things which they thought should never have 
come in speech, but have passed under silence, namely, touching 
the restrictions added by them concerning the trade of the Indies, 
which had never been heretofore offered to any other prince, in 
any other treaty; and it could not stand with his majesty's 
honour now to admit. 
Whereunto the senator of Milán answered, that although 
they did not hold anything which had passed in discourse to 
stand resolved, t i l l the same were absolutely concluded; yet 
they prayed their lordships to remember, that in the argument 
of that matter, they had so far forth declared themselves, that 
they were to stand upon it, being a liberty which the king had 
not hitherto granted to his own brethren, or any other friends. 
The earl of Northampton, in answer unto him said, that he 
declared his mind so ambiguously, that their lordships under-
stood not thoroughly whether their raeaning was, that they could 
not permit the said trade, or whether they could not but by 
express \tords forbid i t : that, touching the first, their lordships 
had no desire to move them to grant the same; but touching 
the latter, that there was no reason that his majesty should be 
hardlier dealt withal, in the point, than other princes had been, 
especially the cause being of that nature as that therein there 
ought to be no restraint. B y the law of nature and nations, the 
sea ought to be common to all men; and likewise among friends, 
mutual commerce ought not to be forbidden in any part of their 
dominions. 
I The senator of Milán rcplied, that although by nature, in 
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ordinary course, the sea was free to a l l ; yet notwithstanding, 
the jurisdiction thereof might be prescribed, when a positive act 
gave first occasion thereof; and thereupon entered into a large 
declaration, how the king of Spain and Portugal had by pre-
scription attaíned a right, as he said, in those seas ; and touch-
ing the other allegation, that liberty of intercourse ought to be 
yielded unto in each others kingdoms and dominions, among 
friends, he said, that the king's majesty was willing to grant the 
same in his other dominions, which were great; but, for |the 
Indies, which he had discovered with. great charge and loss of 
men, i t was reasonable that he should restrain the same to his 
own benefit, to answer so great a charge. 
Whereunto the earl of Northampton answered, that neither 
of these two points which he pleaded—of privilege by first dis-
covery, ñor of prescription by time, which were all the grounds 
that the king of Spain could take for that arrogation of the 
propriety of the Indies to himself, could in any reason stand ; 
because that, for the first point of privilege, we did produce 
patenta granted by Henry V I I . : yet in record, to Columbus, 
&c., for discovering of the Indies quinto M a r t i i anno s é p t i m o ; and, 
t hat further testimony which Ferdinandus Columbus set down 
m the life of his father, whereunto he might add the answer of 
Charles I. to the Portuguese ambassador, claiming against him, 
as the Spaniards did at this day against us and all nations, a 
solé interest in this trade,—that it was not found out by thcir 
skill, but by mere chance, they being cast upon those places by 
shipwreck, not guided by foresight or knowledge; besides, that 
if first discovering might give occasion of any such prohibition, 
that then the queen's majesty might have restrained their fishing 
in the Northern Seas, which, notwithstanding, the Spaniards 
took liberty to use ; and lastly, that the froedom of intercourse 
to the Indies could not be prejudicial unto them, but good for 
both states, our merchants demcaning themselves well in their 
trade: and touching the point that the king of Spain could not 
challenge the said right by prescription, the said earl alleged 
that he could avouch all the greatcst doctors of the civil laws 
and common law to prove, that to prescribe the seas was 
against the law of nature and nations ; because, by that, not only 
maria et eqnora, sed et omnes res immohiles ctiam communes erant, 
(not only seas, and navigablc rivers, and lakcs, but whatcvT 
A P P E N D 1 X . 429 
things were fixed and immovable, were common). Fo r though 
we have a little digressed from their community, so far as con-
cerned the propriety of lands, whose dominión being common by 
nature, was notmthstanding, by tract of time, divided and 
severed from that community; yet that in the dominión and 
propriety of the sea it was otherwise, the law of nature and com-
munity remaining still, as at first, unchangeable; both because 
the mobility and fluxibility of that element admitted not such 
anchor-hold of possession; as also, because the main ocean was 
too vast a share to be possessed or commanded by any other 
sovereign than by him that created i t ; but to omit that heap 
of testimonies, which the grave senate of the leamed writers 
offered in this case, his lordship said, he would only avouch one, 
which for his understanding was to be reverenced, and for his 
integrity to be preferred in this cause before any, in respect 
that he was of council to the king of Spain, whose interest was 
chiefly pinched in his conclusión : the author he alluded to was 
Ferdinando Vasquieres, who, glancing at the Venetians and 
Genoese for assuming to themselves the exclusive interest and 
right in their several gulfs, reprobates their tenets in the 
plainest terms; and also, the opinions of that crowd of Portu-
guese and Spaniards who espouse their doctrines. Vasquieres 
freely declares his opinión, that the kings of Spain have not any 
prescriptive jurisdiction over the great Indian Ocean, and main-
tains, in general, the liberty of the seas against the idle dreams 
of the Venetians and Genoese, and all who abet their narrow 
and unjust maxims on this subject. 
The earl of Northampton having quoted at length the words 
of Vasquieres in the original Latin, of which the substance has 
just been given briefly in English, proceeds to observe, that the 
ground of this writer's opinión was that reason which was for-
merly set down, that no prince was tied to any civil laws from 
which prescriptions did spring, but resorted to the common law 
of nature and nations, which absolutely prohibited all prescrip-
tions of those things which God and nature had left in commu-
nity and liberty. A n d whereas lawful prescription did require 
a space of time, ciyus non extat memoria (immemorial); that it 
was evident by the report of records and histories, that the first 
possession of any place in those parts happened within the 
memory of man ; raoreover, that this prescription had been 
430 A P P E N D I X . 
intemipted, which it ought not to be, when right was claimed, 
might be proved not only by the resort of the countrymen to 
those parts in time of war, and of the French and other nations 
in like manner; but most evidently by that answer of the 
emperor Charles to the king of Portugal, excepting against his 
traffic to the East,—That trade was open to all nations by sea, 
that he would be barred of no place where there was hope of 
gain; and most plainly by this conclusión, when the Portuguese 
began to speak so big, that it was a phrase fit to affright and 
terrify faint spirits ; for that it lay in him to requite all affronts 
with double measure: and therefore, that it was best for them 
to depart peaceably for the present time, and return again cum 
f a c t i essent jrrudentiores (when they had learned greater pru-
dence). The said earl adding therewithal, that he would be 
oath to be conceived, as i f in this they went directly to contest 
or oppose against the scope of greatness of the king of Spain ; 
but only to demónstrate to the said commissioners upon this 
occasion, how great equity there was in the demand of our mer-
chants, that free trade might be allowed to them by the common 
passage of the seas, so they wronged no princes in Europe, 
came not where the king of Spain had regiment or property, ñor 
sought traffic by forcé; but with freedom, and to the liking of 
those Indian princes, which experience had taught did invite 
them, and would be glad of them. 
The senator of Milán answered thereunto, that although 
Vasquieres were of that opinión, yet there were many others that 
upon good advice had determined otherwise, and for the Emperor 
Charles, i f he should so answer to the Portuguese touching the 
East Indies, that it might have been retorted against himself, in 
respect of his right to the West Indies ; that, for the example of 
the discovery of the northern seas, they had interest in the said 
discovery as well as we; and, for the controversy between the 
emperor and the king of Portugal, that the pope had determined 
it, distinguishing each part to other by separation of the line. 
To this it was answered by the earl of Northampton, first, that 
it did not rest in the liberty of any prince or potentate under 
heaven to limit or stint the scope of traffic or intercourse, which 
nature had left at liberty ; for since society was comfort of men's 
life, amity the bond of unión, and charity the badge of Christ, to 
take away the ordinary means of settling and establishing those 
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infallible assurances were the ruin and utter overthrow of that 
happy work which Christ would have intended. Above anything, 
therefore, it was sin to cut off the most apt occasion of reconciling 
minds and affections that were so far severed, both in piety and 
policy. Again it was alleged that the Pope, of all other 
potentates, was least fit, and worst qualified, to decide those 
debates, drawing both his priesthood and the warrant of his 
pre-eminency from Christ our Saviour, who, in respect that his 
kingdom was not of this world, ñor to be maintained by the 
sword, as that of other princes, but was dependent upon another 
string, refused flatly to decide some question wherein he was 
elected arbitrator, about the partition of a state of inheritance. 
But supposing that a Pope, as pastor, had to deal and modérate 
in their disputes between the sheep of his own fold, yet as 
St. Paul refused plainly to judge of those that are without the 
Church ( D e i iis qui sunt foros j u d i c a r é ) , so likewise, it might be 
thought hard by some princes which were not within the fold, to 
hearken to the voice of a strange shepherd (audire vocem pastoris 
cujus nonfui t ) . Last of all, the uttermost that either in law or 
equity could be required, was, that the sentence should stand in 
full strength only against those that had submitted their 
cause to the compromiso, that is, Spain and Portugal, without 
comprising other princes of Christendom that were left at liberty : 
that the work of winning souls was laudable and excellent; but 
yet, since the task was over-great for one state, or two, so many 
provinces having nothing to do with Spain or Portugal, which 
were to be drawn by ordinary means into the ordinary way, the 
safest and soundest course for the despatch of that labour, as our 
Saviour himself had taught, was to send in many labourers where 
the harvest was plenteous (multos operantes ubi messis multa), and 
not to lay the labour upon one hand or two, which, in reason, 
must be weary before the church be replenished. That many 
were both resoluto and able to preach Christ crucified, which by 
obstructions of ready passage were excluded from the scope of 
their religious industry. 
That the bounty of Christ, in giving and granting, as the royal 
prophet had set down, lerram J i l i i s hominum (the earth to the 
sons of men), was only limited by conscience and equity, with this 
respect, that it did not take away the right of any other, either 
by pre-occupation, purchase, gift, or any other means possessed 
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of his part; because, not everything, but quod nullius in bonis 
est (what is in no man1» possession), being either derelicted, or 
nunquam acqidsitum (never acquired), occupanti conceditur (be-
comes the property of the first occupier). But in this case we 
did not seek territorial property, but coramerce, and the propa-
gation of faith and charity ; therefore, not to be refused. 
The lord Cecil said, that to bring the matter to a conclusión, 
he desired to be satisfied from the commissioners, whether by 
their commission they were so restrained as that they could not 
pass that artiele for common liberty of intercourse, without an 
express prohibition of the Indies ; which, if it were so, then that 
their lordships must plainly let them know, that the king's 
majesty could not admit a condition so much prejudicial to his 
honour. 
The senator of Milán answered, that by their commission, they 
could not admit any artiele in another form than to exelude from 
the liberty of the trade with the Indies: notwithstanding, i f 
their lordships could advise of any means how, the substance 
being preserved, the king's honour may duly be respected, by 
the alteration of any other form of words than was proposed, 
they would willingly assent thereunto ; or otherwise, that they 
were sorry that so much labour had been taken in vain, seeing 
they could not effect what was desired of all parties. 
Hereupon, after further consideration and debating, it was 
resolved at length by all parties, that in the artiele conceived 
for general intercourse, those words should be inserted, in quibus 
ante hellumfuit commercium, juxta etsecundum usum et observantiam, 
(in matters wherein there was commerce before the war, agre-
ably and according to the usage and observance of ancient com-
paets,) and so the artiele to pass for the kingdoms appertaining 
to the Spanish king; whereby their lordships thought it fit, 
rather to leave the matter to the liberty of the other interpreta-
tion of former treaties, and the observance and use thereof, than 
that the instancing of express permission or prohibition might 
give interruption to the treaty. 
Their conference being ended, the lord Cecil signified to the 
said commissioners, that the French ambassador had acquainted 
the king's majesty, that he had received authority from the 
French king his master to treat with the said commissioners 
for the compounding of the diíference concerning the impost of 
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thirty in the hundred, and the Spanish ambassador also agreed 
to have agreed with him thereupon. 
Thursday the 5th of July, their lordships repaired again to 
the said commissioners, and it was moved by their lordships, that 
they might proceed to consider of the rest of the articles which 
were delivered by the commissioners of Spain, concerning inter-
course of trade, upon the perusal whereof, it was moved by the 
lord Cecil, that there might be a permission that it should not 
be lawful for the ships of war of the said princes, to enter into 
our ports above a certain number; and that advertisement 
should be before-hand given to his majesty by the said princes, 
when they should have occasion to send extraordinary numbers 
of ships of war into those parts, which was thought reasonable, 
and the same inserted accordingly, into the said articles; and 
so, with other amendments in some other points, the articles for 
the trade with Spain were resolved, and agreed on. 
Afterwards, their lordships proceeded to consider of the 
articles which were delivered by the archdukes' commissioners, 
wherein their lordships finding that, among other things, they 
had specially inserted the former trade of our merchants into 
the archdukes' ports, and undertaken to assure the liberty of the 
same trade. 
I t was demanded by their lordships, whether they intended 
to enjoin our merchants to trade into their ports, notwithstand-
ing that the States should oppose themselves thereunto. 
The said commissioners answered, that seeing they had allowed 
of merchants to trade into Holland, it was as great reason, that 
the king should take order, that his subjects might be permitted 
to trade freely into their ports, the archdukes being no less 
worthy to be therein regarded than the Hollanders. And, as it 
was one of the most essential points whereof they expected benefit 
by the treaty, that it did likewise import the king's majesty in 
his honour not to have his subjects' trade restrained by the said 
Hollanders. 
Their lordships answered, that it was not the king's meaning 
to make a diíference of respect between the archdukes and the 
Hollanders; but that it was fit to proceed by such degrecs, as 
not presently to give them discontent by any public stipulations 
against them, whereby to enter into terms of unkindness with 
them ; and for the peace which he made with the archdukes, 
F F 
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to hazard to plunge hímself into a more desperate war with the 
others, in respect of their obstinacy, to restrain all trade from 
their ports, pretending that otherwise their ruin did depend 
thereupon; besides, that as raerchants could not be compelled 
to trade to any places where they should not find it convenient 
and safe for them, so that there was no reason to tie the king's 
majesty to straiter conjunctions upen that point than the Freneh 
king was by his treaty ; but that they might assure themselves, 
that the king's majesty did effectually desire that his merchants 
should trade into their ports, and that all good opportunities 
should be taken for the same. 
The said commissioners alleged, that it did not less import the 
archdukes, that their princes should be relieved by trade; and 
therefore, earnestly insisted, in respect that the benefit thereof 
was one of the principal fruits of a peace, as had been before 
declared, that there might be direct provisión for the same by 
articles, as had been proposed. 
Their lordships said, that they would be willing to satisfy 
them, in the effect of that which they desired, to endeavour that 
our merchants might trade into their ports, though it could not 
be as yet with that fullness as heretofore it liad been used; and 
i f the States should impeach our merchants therein, that the 
king's majesty would show as conveniently he might, to be 
sensible thereof; but because i t was not fit for him to promise 
by open act, to take any unkind courses against them, their 
lordships yielded otherwise to pass the said articles in general 
and reciprocal terms, that care should be taken by the king's 
majesty, and the archdukes, for a free intercourse of trade 
between their subjects in each of their countries, and delivered 
them a minute of an article for that purpose, whereof the said 
commissioners desired to have leisure to consider t i l l the day 
following, and so their conference ended for that t imé. 
Friday the 6th of July, their lordships repaired again to the 
said commissioners, and their lordships requiring to understand 
by them how they were satisfied with the article which was 
delivered to them at their last meeting for a reciprocal inter-
course of trade with the provinces of the archdukes. 
The president Rickardot answered, that they were forced 
again to represent to their lordships, that it did so much import 
them to receive benefit by the trade of his majesty's subjects 
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with them, as that they must desire that there might be a direct 
provisión for the same; that it was not their purpose to seek to 
engage his majesty into a war, but only desired that we would 
take order, which we might, for relief in that behalf, otherwise 
that they should receive little fruit by the peace; that they con-
fessed their strength to be too weak by that they were 
not able to prevail for the freeing of their ports from the i in-
peachments which the Hollanders did give them; and therefore, 
that they desired his majesty's assistance therein, which they 
conceived was not to be refused, seeing it would be good for the 
subjects of both countries to procure such an intercourse of trade. 
The Lord Cecil told them, that as the king's majesty would be 
willing to favour the archdukes in anything he might, so he was 
to have care not to do it with prejudice of his honour; as in this 
case they sought to impose such a condition of inequality upon 
him as could not be very disadvantageous unto him if he. should 
assent to the same; and therefore, that the article concerning 
the said matter ought to pass between the king and the arch-
dukes in reciprocal terms. 
The earl of Northampton added, that the joining of the king's 
majesty with the archdukes could not but be both honourable 
for the said princes, and also effectual to the purpose by the 
commissioners intended: honourable, in that considerations made 
between greater and lesser princes ever strengthened the weaker 
and redounded to their reputation; effectual, for that when it 
should appear that his majesty liad a joint desire together with 
the archdukes, that the commerce for their subjects should be 
free, and to that purpose had recíprocally accorded that each of 
their ports, and the passage thereunto, should be open to the 
other's subjects, it could not but be of great forcé to work][the 
effect which was designed for the common benefit of trade ; and 
further, his lordship referred unto their considerations, i f his 
majesty should undertake the care solely, as by their speeches 
they urged, whether, besides the note which ought to be taken of 
so unequal conditions clean contrary to the common ground, nbi 
commodum ib i onus (the party that is to reap the profit ought 
to bear the burthen), the same might not be interpreted also, 
to imply in this point, a league offensive and defensivo, and a 
professing of hostility to all the archdukes' enemies, or at least 
administer cause of jealousy unto the United Provinces; that 
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his raajesty would take occasions to damnify them for the 
archdukes1 benefit, which, how inconvenient it were to be done 
at this time, both in respect of his majesty's honour, and the dis-
commodity also that might grow thereby to the archdukes 
themselves : the case standing with them to consider duly of it, 
and then he doubted not, but tliey would no longer insist on 
those terms, nor seek to press their lordships further than might 
be accorded unto conveniently. 
Their lordships finding the commissioners not fully satisfied 
with the aforesaid reasons, it was at length agreed to insert into 
the said article the words conjunctim et divisim (conjointly and 
severally) ; which gave satisfaction unto the said commissioners, 
and the president Richardot, in the ñame of them, yielded great 
thanks unto their lordships for their honourable proceedings with 
them in all the course of the treaty, wherein they acknowledged 
to have received very good contentment, and prayed to be ex-
cused from having so much insisted upon the last matter, in 
respect that the same was also of great importance unto them. 
That article being so agreed, their lordships signified unto the 
said commissioners, that they conceived to have now resolved of 
all the principal articles of the treaty, and that the king's majesty 
was not willing to tie himself to longer residence within the city 
at that time of the year, but to go his intended progress ; there-
fore, they wished that the coming of the constable of Castile 
might be hastened, with all the speed that might be, which the 
said commissioners undertook to do, and that he should arrive 
within twenty days ; and because there remained nothing else to 
be further done for the final concluding of the treaty, than only 
to consider of certain demands which had been made by our 
English merchants for their better assurance, and to reduce the 
treaty into form; it was moved by their lordships, that for the 
speedier accelerating of that business, Sir Daniel Dun and Sir 
Thomas Edmonds might resort unto them for the despatch 
thereof, with them in respect of their lordships other employ-
ments, at that time, which was assented unto. 
It was, moreover, moved by the Lord Cecil, that it might be 
proceeded by the treaty, that i f hereafter, upon the king's 
intercession, those of the United Provinces might be drawn to a 
reconciliation with the archdukes, there might be a reservation 
of liberty for the receiving of them upon the king's motion and 
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solicitation in that behalf, which was likewise yielded unto, and 
so their lordahips' conference ended for that time. 
Friday the lOth of August, the constable of Cas tile arrived at 
London, being conducted ftom Gravesend to Dover by the Lord 
Wotton, and the chief gentlemen of Kent , whither the earl of 
Northampton, attended by divers of the king^ servante, and 
others, was sent to receive him, who brought him thence to 
Somerset-house, which was richly furnished for him by the king, 
and order taken for the defraying of him and his train at the 
king's charges, and so likewise for all the other commissioners. 
Those of Spain being lodged together at Somerset-house, and 
the archdukes1 commissioners at Durham-house. 
Sunday the 12th, their lordships and the commissioners went 
to visit and welcome the constable in the king's name. 
Tuesday the 14th, the king's majesty returned from Royston. 
Wednesday the 16th, their lordships went to confer with the 
constable, to make a recapitulation of all the points of the treaty 
which had been formerly agreed on with the other commissioners; 
and, for that it was propounded by the merchants to know 
whether the treaty did import to give them leave to carry like-
wise the comn^odities of Germany into Spain, as well as those of 
this realm, without paying the impost of thirty per hundred; 
which, although their lordships conceived in their meaning, and 
according to the words of the treaty, to be clear in that point; 
nevertheless, it was thought fit by their lordships, to speak by 
accident of that matter, first, with the commissioners, and after-
wards as there should be occasion with the constable himself, 
which was accordingly done: and the said commissioners insisted 
eamestly upon the contrary interpretation of the said point, for 
not comprising the merchandises of Germany to be free from the 
p.ayment of the said impost of thirty in the hundred : and also, 
the constable maintained, that he would not yield to the further 
enlarging of the said article, seeing he had sent the treaty 
subscribed by their lordships into Spain. 
Whereunto their lordships replied, that they only desired the 
explanation, and not the enlargement of the said article, for that 
they did not assent to the passing of the same, but with the 
meaning for concluding the aforesaid liberty for the merchandises 
of Germany ; whereupon that .they must still stand as a thing 
which deeply concemed the intérest of his majesty's subjects, and 
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upon these terms their lordships departed from the constable at 
that time. 
Thursday the 16th, the constable received audience of the 
king.^ 
Friday the 17th, their lordships repaired again to the constable, 
to agree of the form of the preamble of the treaty, and had again 
speech with him concerning the former question of the merchan-
dises of Germany, insisting, as before^they had done, that they 
could not yield otherwise to interpret the said article with the 
liberty which had beeri mentioned ; whereupon, after some further 
debating of the matter, the constable in the end agreed to the 
admittance of that liberty, for free transportation of the mer-
chandises of Germany into Spain, which were subject by the 
placard to the payment of the impost of thirty per hundred; 
but he desired that their lordships would content themselves 
with the promise thereof, under his own hand, without altering 
any thing in the words of the treaty ; for that having sent the 
treaty into Spain signed by their lordships, it might be reckoned 
a great lightness in him to yield afterward tO the enlargement of 
the same in any thing; and he undertook that the king of Spain 
should ratify his said promise, which was accepted by their lord-
ships, and a prívate article accordingly drawn aníl signed by him 
for the said matter, and their lordships also procured him at the 
same time to sign the prívate articles for the moderation of the 
proceedings of the inquisition against his majesty^ subjects 
trading into Spain. 
Sunday the 19th, the king's majesty took his oathin the chapel 
beforc the constable, and the archdukes1 commissioners, for the 
observation of the peace ; and that day all the said ambassadors 
were sumptuously fea&ted by the king, at his own table at dinner, 
in the great banqueting-house, and during the time of dinner, 
order was given for the proclaiming peace at the court-gate and 
through the city. 
Monday the 20th, the constable had a prívate audience by 
the king. 
Tuesday the 21st, it was appointed that the constable should 
take his leave of the king, because of his majesty's desire to 
leave the city, to proceed in his pretended progress; but in 
respect that the constable fell sick, and was too unable to stir off 
his bed, the king's majesty was pleased to visit him at his own 
A P P E N D I X . 439 
lodging, and there to bid him farevvell; and to do the like to the 
count of Aremberg who was also indisposed of his gout, after 
performance whereof his majesty immediately departed from 
London. 
Saturday the 25th, the constable and the rest of the 
commissioners departed from London, the constable being 
accompanied to Gravesend by the earlof Northarapton, and frora 
thence to Dover by the Lord Wotton. The earl of Aremberg 
and the rest of the arcbdakes' commissioners embarked them-
selves about the same time in the river. 
B . 
(PAGE 237.) 
SIR Francis Cottington, in a letter to the Lord Treasurer Salis-
bury, dated Madrid, 5th February, 1609, says: " The carrying 
avvay the Moors of Valentía, who were suífered to transport all 
their wealth with them, hath cost the king, besides what he still 
owes, much abo ve 800,000 ducats, as myself have seen by the 
brief of the account in a comptador's house. Prada (one of the 
Spanish secretarles of state) tells me of much more, which I can 
also easily believe. 
" Hereupon, it seems, the king hath taken a resolution not to 
suffer any one that goes now from Andalusia, Estremadura, and 
the two Castiles, to carry away any kind of gold or silver, or pro-
hibited commodities; neither may they, by exchange or other-
wise, convey their moneys out of these kingdoms; which to 
prevent, by proclamation all men are prohibited to deal with 
them in that nature, upon pain of extraordinary punishment. 
" The French ambassador, notwithstanding, as it seems, 
received of them great sums of money upon good conditions; 
and, for the more safe conveyance of such papers as he gave 
them, he despatched his steward in post for Franco. This was 
not so secretly carried, but his steward was apprehended in Buy-
trago, thirteen leagues henee, and brought back prisoner to this 
court: his mail was taken from him, and sent unto the secretary 
Prada. The ambassador, hereupon, wrote a very angry letter 
unto the council, in which, as himself tells rae, he threatened, i f 
they oponed the mail, no raessenger or correo should pass froin 
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henee through Franee without having his letters seized. H e 
went in person to every ene of the couneillors of etate, and 
utteredmuch choler. In the end, as I am informed, they gave him 
his raail unopened, and the steward is again on his way with it. 
*' B y order of the couneil, Sylva de Torres, the president of 
Alcaldies, wrote a letter unto the ambassador, and sent it him 
with the m a i l ; the ambassador took the letter, and without 
opening it, threw it into the fire, saying unto the messenger, 
4 Tell Sylva de Torres that this answer I give him.'' The 
ambassador doth much glory herein, but is by many censured 
for his passionate proceeding. They are here very angry with 
h i m ; and though they say little, will , I dare assure your lord-
ship, find a trick to tame him, if he remain long among them. 
The sums of money he hath received, are reported to be so 
extraordinarily great, as I dare not report it unto your lordship; 
but Prada himself tells me of many hundred thousands." 
In a letter to the lord treasurer, dated Madrid, the 4th of 
March, 1609) Sir Francis writes thus: " B y my former adver-
tisements, your lordship has understood that the Morescoes of 
these parts were prohibited to carry away any kind of gold or 
silver. This was so strictly executed, as some thirty-two or 
thirty-three were hanged at Burgos for being found with money 
and jewels. Amongst the rest, one that had in his albarda, 
which is like a pad to carry sacks on, four hundred ducats in 
doubloons. Notwithstanding all this wariness and rigour, they 
found that some, by bilis of exchange, others in specie (artificially 
hidden), carried away great treasure ; whereupon they ha ve now 
published, that all shall carry what money they will , condition-
ally, that by the wa3r, where they shall be searched, they leave 
the one-half to the king. 
M Coramissioners are now sent from henee into every province, 
and to make sale of such houses and possessions as they have 
left, and were belonging to them; by which it is thought the 
king shall gather a very great treasure ; and doubtless, it cannot 
be otherwise.1'' 
It appears that his Catholic majesty never dreamt of applying 
the confiscations of the Morescoes to the exigencies of state, but 
dissipated them with a thoughtless profusión among favourites. 
From a letk-r of Cottingtons, dated Madrid, 16th of May, 1610, 
we learn that " the king had given unto the duke of Lerma, out 
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of the goods of the Moresooes, 250,000 ducats; unto the duke 
of Uzeda, Lerma's son, 100,000; unto the conde of Lemos, 
100,000; and unto the Condessa Lemos, Lerma^ daughter, 
50,000 ; which is in all 500,000 ducats, all paid already out of 
the sale of the lands and goods of the Morescoes." 
The foliowing extract of a letter from Cottington, dated 
Madrid, June lOth, 1610, serves at once to illustrate the state 
of society in Spain, and the condition of the wretched Mores-
coes who remained, after the expulsión of their kindred, in that 
country:— 
" Of late there have very few nights passed, in which many 
people, of all ranks, have not been slain in the streets; where-
upon it is here proclaimed, that no man may keep a slave within 
five leagues of this court; as imagining that those kind of people 
have committed these murders; and not unlikely, for that few 
did here serve themselves with other than captivo Turks and 
Moors; and so the multitude of thera were very great.'1 
In what follows, we have an example of the vicissitudes of 
nations; for as we have just seen the hard fate of the Moors 
oppressed by the Spaniards, we shall there behold a picture not 
lesa affecting than curious, of the Spaniards, at a former period, 
oppressed by the Moors. 
Sir John Digby, afterwards earl of Bristol, the Brit ish ambas-
sador at the court of Spain, in a letter, dated Madrid, 22nd 
December, 1617, says, " Certain inhabitants are here, now some 
few months since, discovered amongst the mountains, not many 
leagues from Salamanca, who dwell in a valley compassed by 
impassable hills. They are, to the number of five hundred 
persons, and doubtless have dwelt there (they I mean and their 
predecessors) ever since the conquest of Spain by the Moors, 
from whom it seems they fled (some few families of them) ; and 
hard it is to understand how they got down into that valley. 
They have no other grain but rye, ñor other flesh than goats'. 
Fish they have in brooks and lakes; and the valley is of a good 
compass, which was hitherto imagined to be only mountain 
inaccessiblc. . 
" Some sixty years past, were likewise discovered, in the 
Pyrenean hills, divers villages, not far from L a Pena de Francia, 
and in the same nature as these are, who are extreme poor 
miserable souls, and know neither God ñor any religión.11 
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W E learn from a letter of Sir Francis Cottington's, dated 
Madrid, January 5th, 1610, that the Spanish parliament had 
been just dissolved, after having been continued for the space of 
four years. " Many new laws, Sir Francis adds, are published, 
though not yet printed ; amongst which it is provided, that no 
man, on great penalty, may lend his coach, nor any go in coaches 
of their own without four horses in it, two coachmen, and a 
gentleman of the horse following on horseback." 
The duke of Lerma appears to have carried his love of pomp 
or parade to lengths, that to the present age must appear to 
be ridiculous, which, to his cotemporaries, appeared to be exces-
sive, and which, ín his particular circumstances, were certainly 
imprudent. 
" In a late letter," says Sir John Digby (writing to the Bri t ish 
secretary of state from Madrid, 9th of June, 1617), " I advertised 
you of 70 long carts sent from henee with stuff, by the duke 
of Lerma, unto L e r m a ; touching which, I must now thus far 
advertise your honour, that those carts going all together out of 
town, with a multitude of officers and servants, in great bravery, 
with trumpets sounding before them, passed by the palace gate, 
that not being the direct way, where the king, hearing the 
trumpets, inquired the cause of their sounding; and being 
thereof informed, called for the duke, and gave him a very sharp 
reprehensión, who laid the fault upen his officers, and forthwith 
turned many out of his service who had great and gainful places. 
But this, I understood, gives the king so little satisfaction, as 
he now absolutely refuseth to go to Lerma, where the duke had 
made extraordinary preparation for his entertainment. This is 
so much noted and spoke of in this cóurt, as I have thought it 
worthy the advertising unto your honour ; and peradventure, it 
may be the beginning of a greater inconvenience to the duke. 
His píate alone, sent in these carts, besides money, jewels, and 
stuff, weighed above eight hundred thousand ducats, as I am 
credibly informed by those who had the charge of it, and have 
seen it in their books by good account." 
It appears from a letter of Sir John Digby's, dated Madrid, 
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28th January, 1619, that the dulce of Lerma's annual income 
amounted to at least six hundred thousand ducats. 
W e may form some idea of the power and consequence of this 
minister, and of the pomp and state in which he lived, from the 
following extract from a letter of Sir Francis Cottington^ to the 
Lord Treasurer Salisbury, dated Madrid, 19th August, 1610 :— 
" I daré assure your lordship, that he (the secretary Arostequi) 
and I, before winter pass, may peradventure wait many an hour 
together, at the duke of Lerma's door, and go back again without 
getting in. Many times have I seen the constable do this, as 
Sir Charles Cornwallis can well witness. I once saw the Floren-
tino ambassador, being a bishop, thrust out of an outer chamber 
of the dukeV Sir Charles liad more free entrance than any 
man in his time, of what degree soever ; and yet sometimos was 
fain to stay. Your lordship knows well, that, but by the way 
of this duke, here is nothing to be done ; and therefore, I have 
written thus largely of his unsufferable greatness.11 
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Senate on the conc lus ión of peace between the Venetians and Austrians, 305. 
Forms á conspiracy against the Republic of Venice, 308. His character, ib. 
The circumstances which encouraged him in his attempt against Venice, 309. 
Appointed first minister in the Austrian Netherlands, 315. 
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Bommel, siege of, 17, 21, 24. Fort of St. Andrew erected there, ib. 
Boucquoi, count de, wounded in the battle of Nieuport, 41. Commands a body of 
troops, at the siege of Ostend, in the service of the archdukes, 54. Secures 
a passage for the Spaniards over the Rhine, 103. A t the head of an army 
. destined to p e n é t r a t e into Holland, 114. Appointed to the command of the 
imperial army, 344. Surprises and defeats count Mansveldt, 347. Restores 
the battle of Prague, 362. 
Buccleugh, lord of, raises a body of two thousand men in Scotland for the service 
of the Dutch, 82. 
Calderona, Don Roderigo de, history of, 317. His trág ica! end, 327. 
Catholic R e l i g i ó n , an object of great dispute in the negotiation for a peace or truce 
between Spain and the United Provinces, 178. 
Charles Emanuel, duke of Savoy, his character, 247. Attempts to revive the 
league against the house of Austria, that had been formed by Henry I V . of 
France, 249. Obliged to make submissions to the king of Spain, 253. Thwarts 
the ambitious schemes of the court of Spain, 257. Revives his pretensions to 
the sovereignty of Montferrat, 258. Invades Montferrat, 261. Endeavours to 
secure h í s conquests, té . His conduct a subject of mortification to Spain, 263. 
His art í f ices , 264. Courageous resolution of, 268. Favoured by the Venetian 
Senate, 270. Takes the field against the governor of M i l á n , 277. Engages 
with the Spaniards, 279. His illness, 287. Maintains his independency on 
Spain, 315. Declines to accept the crown of Bohemia, 348. But favours the 
Bohemian cause, ib. Listens to a project of the duke of Ossvma's for driving 
the Spaniards out of Italy, 369. 
Clergy, Spanish, oppose an edict of the crown requiring the churches to deliver, 
upon oath, an exact inventory of all their gold and silver p ía te , 45, Persecute 
the Morescoes, 212. 
Cleves, duke of, his subjeets harassed by the depredations of the Spaniards, 15. 
A t times disordered in his judgment, 16. Succession to Cleves and Juliers 
disputed, 241. W a r conceming, 274. 
Colonies, Spanish, disadvantages of, 4. A Spanish colony attempted to be estab-
lished in Ireland, 58. 
Colonna, the historian, invention of, 22. 
Comet, appearance of one affrights the nations, 349. 
Commerce, Dutch, history of, 127. Prohibited by a Spanish edict with the subjeets 
of Spain, 134. 
Confederacies, their usual fate, 27. 
Conspiracies, plots, and assassinations, their history, 307. Frequency in the reign 
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of Philip III., 308. Conspiracy against Venice, ib. This compared with other 
conspiracies, 312. Ret í ec t ions tliereon, ib. 
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D'Aguilar, Don John, c o n d u c í s an expedition from Spain against Ireland, 58. 
Arrives at Kinsale, ib. Assumes the title of general in the Holy W a r , under-
taken for the preservation of the Catholic faith in Ireland, 59. Surrenders 
Kinsale, on terms safe and honourable to his troops, to the English, 62. 
D'Avi la , Don John Alvarez, commands the Spanish fleet in the action with the 
Dutch admiral Heemskirk, 153. 
D'Ampierre, count of Lorrain, raises forces in support of the cause of Austria, 347. 
D'Ancre , the mareschal and lady mareschal, their history, and tragical fate, 294 
Denia, Marquis of, favourite of Philip III. king of Spain, 2. • See Lerma. 
Doria, the celebrated admiral, conducts an expedition against Algiers, 56. 
Dutch, suspicion of Spain their predominant passion, 170. Their obstinacy, 177. 
E . 
East-India company, Dutch, origin of, 130= 
East Indies, operations of the Spaniards and Dutch in, 125. Portuguese settle-
ments there, 132, 137. Trade of, a subject of great dispute in the negotiation 
for a peace or truce between Spain and the United Provinces, 197 
Elizabeth, queen of England, her death and character, 76, 77. 
Emmerick, town of, taken possession of by the Spaniards, 10. 
Expedition of ten thousand troops, partly Genoese and partly Spanish, under the 
command of the celebrated admiral Doria, against Algiers, 56. 
, Spanish, against Ireland, 58. 
F . 
Family compact, between the different branches of the house of Austria, 330. A 
general object of jealousy, 331. 
Ferdinand, of Austria, archduke of Gratz, at war with Venice, 304. Makes peace 
with that republic, 305. Raised to the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary, 330. 
Succeeds to Matthias, 345. Endeavours to reclaim his revolted subjects by mild 
measures,346. Chosen emperor of Germany, 347. His multiplied embarrass-
ments, 349. Is supported by Spain, 350. A n d by the princes of the Catholic 
league, ib. The vigour and v i g ü a n c e of his character, 350, 357. Secares the 
crown of Bohemia, 363. Persecutes his Protestant subjects, ib. 
Feria , duke of, Spanish governor of M i l á n , subdues the Valteline, 365 
Frederic, elector palatino, excites a confederacy against the ambition of the Aus-
trians, 331. Accepts the crown of Bohemia, 349. His overthrow at Prague, 
and subsequent misfortunes, 362, 363. 
Fisheries, Dutch, history of, 126. 
G . 
Gabor, Bethlehem, prince of Transylvania, enters into a league offensive and 
defensivo with the Bohemians, 347. The progress of his arms, 350, 364. 
Germany, state of, 15. Princes of, enter into a confederacy against the Span-
iards, 16. Remonstrate to the archduke Albert against the iniquity of his. 
conduct, ib. Agree to raise a numerous army, ib. Their transactions, 25 
Their army disbanded, 27. W a r in Germany, respecting the succession of 
Cleves and Juliers, 273. W a r in, of thirty years, 330. Its origin, ib. 
Grandees of Spain, disgusted at the preferment of the duke of Lerma, 3; and 
dissatisfied with his profus ión , 6. Their importance and i n ñ u e n c e at the court 
of Philip III. , 319. 
Grave, siege of, 67. Assigned by prince Maurice as a residence for the Spanish 
mutineers, 76. 
Groll , siege of, 116. Surrenders to the Spaniards, 117. Besieged by prince 
Maurice, 122. Relie ved by Spinola, 123. 
H . 
Heemskirk, operations of the Dutch at sea, under the command of that admiral, 
152. His heroic character, 154. Attacks a Spanish fleet riding at anchor in 
the hay of Gibraltar, 155. His death, »6. Vindictive fury of the Dutch on that 
occasion, 156. They obtain a signal victory, ib. Effects of this victory on the 
spirit of the contending partios, 157. 
Henry IV . king of France, a saying of his concerning James I. king of England, 81. 
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His conduct respecting the United States after the peace of Vervins, 149. His 
great plan, 239. His death, 245. Effects of that event, ib. 
Herrings, art of salting them invented, 126. 
Houtman, commands the first Dutch squadron that was sent to India, 130. 
I. 
James I. king of Great Britain, his character, 79. Desirous of peace with Spain, 
83. Concurs with the French monarch in promoting peace between the 
Spaniards and the Dutch, 152. His mean vanity, 252. His conduct with 
regard to the affairs of his son-in-Iaw, the elector palatino, 351. 
Idiaquez, Don John, appointed one of the principal counsellors to Philip III . king 
of Spain, 2. 
Intermarriages between the royal families of Franco and Spain, 251. 
Ireland invaded by the Spaniards, 57. 
Isabella, the infanta, invested, in conjunction with the archduke Albert, with the 
sovereignty of the Netherlands, 6. Arrives with her consort, Albert, in the 
Netherlands, 28. Animates and exhorts the Spanish troops, 33. H e r mag-
nanimity, 42. 
Italy, Spanish levies in, excite jealousies, 56. Engineers brought from Italy to 
the siege of Ostend, 64. W a r in, between the Spaniards and the duke of Savoy, 
270. 277. 284. Liberties of, in danger, 280. 367. 
Jeannin, the president, sent ambassador from Franco to the Hague, 150. Admitted 
to an audience of the States, 180. Presents a memorial to the States, 186. 
L . 
Lerma, duke of, appointed prime minister of Spain, 3. His elevation matter of 
disgust to the Spanish nobles, ib. Unpractised in the arts of government, 4. 
Gives early proofs of profus ión in his administration, 6. Fits out a fleet against 
the English, 27. His lenity and moderation, 28. His maxims of government, 
316. His fa l l , 319. Is made a cardinal, 320. His character, 326. 
Lesdiguieres, the mareschal, sent into Italy by the king of Franco, for the purpose 
of maintaining peace there, 283. Character of> 289. Magnanimous resolution 
of his, 290. Joins the duke of Savoy, ib. The progress of their united forcé in 
Italy, 291. Lesdiguieres recalled, ib. Marches again to the assistance of the 
duke of Savoy, 296. Recalled in the career of victory, 298. But before his 
retum, he obliges the Spanish govemor of M i l á n to come to reasonable terms 
of agreement with the duke of Savoy, ib. 
Lessingen, Dutch troops defeated near, 35. 
Lewis X I I I . king of France, his marriage with Anne, infanta of Spain, 251. 
Resolves to maintain the treaty entered into at Asti, by the duke of Savoy and 
the Spaniards, 283. His conduct with respect to the dispute conceming the 
crown of Bohemia, 351. 
Lingen, siege of, 105^ 
Lippe, count de la, appointed commander-in-chief of the army raised against the 
House of Austria, by the confederated princes of Germany, 16. 
Louisa, preceptor to Philip III. , king of Spain, 2. 
Luynes, Charles Albert de, favourite of Lewis X I I I . of France, his history, 295. 
í n s t i g a t e s an assassination against the mareschal d'Ancre, ib. Sacrifices the 
interests of France, and the general cause of liberty, to pr ívate ambition, 351. 
M . 
Mansveldt, Ernest, count of, entera into the service of the Bohemians, 342. His 
history, ib. His character, 343. A n d exploits, 342. 344. 358. 364. 
Manufactures, decline of, in Spain, 4. 45. Expedients for renledying that evil, ib. 
Mary de M e d i é i s , queeu-regent of France, 249. H e r character, ib. H e r political 
maxims and views, 250. Her author í ty annihilated by the death of mareschal 
d'Ancre, 296. 
Matthias, emperor of Germany, his ambition, 244, 337. A t first courts the Pro-
testants, ib. But afterwards checks their pretensions, 337, 338. His embar-
rassment on occasion of the revolt in Bohemia, 343. Makes overtures to his 
revolted subjects for peace, 345. His death, ib. 
M a u r í c e , prince of Grauge, defeats the Spanish general, Mendoza, 13. His mag-
nanimous policy, 14. Labours under great difficulties, 17. Crosses the Betuwe, 
and reinforces the garrison of Schenk, 18. Receives fresh supplies of troops 
from France, England, and other places, 19. Invente a new species of fortifi-
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catiou, 20. Suspicions entertained of his designs by his countrynien, ib. Lays 
siege to Fort St. Andrew in the isle of Bommel, 30. Prosecutes the wai* 
against the Spaniards with extraordinary vigour, ib. Animates his troops, and 
makes the proper dispositions for the battle of Nieuport, 38. His masterly skill 
in sieges, 68. His singular penetration, 103. Adopta defensivo operations, 113. 
Opposes an overture for peace, 143. The head of a party in opposition thereto, 
184. His reasoning against it, 185. His services rewarded by the United 
States, 199. Extends the boundaries of the States in Cleves and Juliers, 274. 
Opposed by the marquis of Spinola, 275. 
Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, appointed commander of the Spauish forces in the 
't Netherlands, 8. Crosses the Maese, and, by fortifying the towns of Orsay and 
Wassum, secures a communication with the country beyond the Rhine, 9. 
Over-awed by the superior genius of Maurice, prince of Oran ge, 13. Bad con-
duct of, ib. Employed by the archduke Albert, to watch the motions of prince 
Maurice, 67. Fortifies himself in Brabant, ib. Governed by the duke of Savoy, 
259. Is constrained, however, in the character of the Spanish governor of 
M i l á n , to check the duke's ambition, 265 ; and to take the field against that 
prince, 270. His incapacity, 289. Is superseded in the government of M i l á n 
by the marquis of Vil la Franca, 281 
Mescia, Augustm, governor of the citadel of Antwerp, commands a body of Spanish 
troops in the siege of Ostend, 54. 
Metals, precious, scarcity of, in Spain, 98. 
Monteleon, duke of, Spanish ambassador at the court of France, his intrigues and 
art í f ices , 290. 
Montferrat, succession of, a subject of dispute, 258. Invaded by the duke of Savoy, 
261. Award of Spain respecting it, 266. W a r in, between the Spaniards and 
the duke of Savoy, 270. 277. 284. 288. 
Montiglio, reduction of, and memorable incident on that occasion, 291. 
Morescoes, account of, 201. Their character, 202. Persecuted by the Spaniards, 
205. Tyranny of king Ferdinand towards them, restrained by the Cortes, 207. 
Their attachment to the Mahometan re l ig ión accounted for, 210. Memorial 
against them to the king of Spain, 214. Their e x p u l s i ó n from Spain resolved 
on, 225. They attempt to defend themselves, 230. Their hard fate, 234. 
Mountjoy, the English viceroy in Ireland, prosecutes the war with success, against 
the Spaniards and Tyrone, 60. 
Moura, Don Christopher de, marquis of Castel Roderigo, appointed one of the 
principal counsellors to Philip III. , king of Spain, 2. 
Mulleim, battle of, 108. 
Mutineers, Spanish, establish order among themselves, and lay the inhabitants of 
Brabant under contribution, 72. Their contemptuous reply to the edict of the 
archduke's, 74. Protected by prince Maurice, ib. Enter into the service of 
the United States, ib. Put in possession of the town of Grave, 76. 
N . 
Nassau, Emest of, with a small forcé engages the Spaniards near Lessingen, 35. 
Will iam of, sent to restore discipline among the troops, and good under-
standing among the princes of Germany, 27. His consuramate prudence, 42. 
Naval affairs, both on the side of Spain and that of the United States, conducted 
with great vigour, 69. Operations of the Spaniards, Dutch, and Portuguese, in 
the East Indios and America, 125. Operations of the Dutch under Admiral 
Heemskirk, 152. 
Nemours, duke of, joins the Spaniards against the duke of Savoy, 284. 
Netherlands, sovereignty of, transferred by Philip II. to his daughter Isabella, yet 
still to be considered as a fief of Spain, 7. Still governed by Spanish counsels, 
and protected by Spanish troops, 8. 
Nevers, Gonzaga, duke of, defends Casal the capital of Montferrat against the 
attacks of the duke of Savoy, 261. 
Nieuport, siege of, 33. Battle of, 39. Siege of, resumed, 44. 
O. 
Oneglia, taken by the Spaniards, 272. 
Orange, family of, their public services rewarded by the United States, 199. 
Osman, emperor of the Turks, favours the Bohemians in opposition to the Austrlans, 
357. 
Ossuna, duke of, his singular eonduct on occasion of the intermarriage between the 
o o * 
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royal families of France and Spain, 257. His eharacter, 302. Protects the 
Uscocchi, and distresses the Venetians, 304. A n d perseveres in this conduct 
in defiance of orders from the court of Spain, 306. His rebellious designs, 367. 
Defeated, 369. Is deprived of the government of Naples, 370. His death, ib. 
P . 
Pavio, treaty there, between the Spaniards and the duke of Savoy, 298. 
Peace, negotiation for, between Spain and England, 32. A n d between Spain and 
the United Provinces, 125, Recommended by Spinola, 142. Offered to the 
confederates by the archdukes, 143. Overtures for, opposed by Prince M a u -
rice, ib. Strenuously recommended by Barnevelt, 144. Prospect of, matter 
of joy to the people of the United Provinces, 147. The archdukes' proposals 
for, represented by a party in the United States as insidious, ib. The negoti-
ation for, an object of surprise to neighbouring states and princes, 148. A n d 
also of jealousy, ib. The danger of being broken off, 160. Parties and 
disputes relativo thereto in the United Provinces, 163. Commissioners for, on 
the part of Spain, 170. A n d on that of the United States, ib. Treaty for, 
concluded, 198. Articles thereof, ib. Reflections thereon, 200. Treaty of, 
between the Spaniards and the duke of Savoy, 273. 
Philip III . king of Spain, his birth and education, 1. His eharacter, ib. Singular 
instance in this prince of resignation to his father's will, with regard to the 
choice of a wife, 2. His marriage with Margaret of Austria, 6. Gentleness of his 
temper, and his bigotry to the Popish faith, 7. Seuds an expedition, in support 
of the Catholic faith, against Ireland, 58. Abandons the Irish rebels to their 
fate, 62. Ratifies the preliminaries of peace with the Dutch, 158. H i s reluc-
tance to acknowledge the independence of the United States. 192. His religious 
scruples, 193. How removed, 194. His íncapac i ty for government, 201. 
Yields up his pretensions to the hereditary dominions of Austria, in favour 
of Ferdinand, archduke of Gratz, 330. . Takes a journey into Portugal, 370. 
His ¡ l lness , 371. His death, 373 ; and eharacter, 374. Review of his reign, ib. • 
Pompeo T a r g o n é , an eminent Italian engineer, 86. 
Portuguese, their settlements in India, history of, 132. 
Prague, city of, described, 333. B a t t í e of, 360. 
R . 
Rees, town of, reduced by Mendoza, under the d o m i n i ó n of Spain, 10. Besieged 
without success, by the Count de la Lippe, general of the forcee raised in oppo-
sition to the Spaniards, by the confederated princes of Germany, 26. 
Reformation, religious origin and progress of the,l333. The light of ancient times not 
wholly lost, during the darkness of the middle ages, ib. Persecution scattered 
the reformed, and extended the Reformation, 334. Takes deep root, and spreads 
wide in Germany at a very early period, ib. Is propagated particularly in 
Bohemia, by John Huss and Jerome of Prague, ib. Causes that prepared the 
minds of men to adopt the principies of the Reformation, 335. 
Rhinberg, siege of, 9. Reduced by the Spaniards, 10. A n d afterwards by Prince 
Maurice, 48. 
Ribera, Don John de, patriarch of Antloch, and archbishop of Valentia, a relent-
less persecutor of the Morescoes, 213. Presents two memorials against them 
to the king, 214. The effeets of these, 217. 
Rodolph, emperor of Germany, his eharacter, 15.244. 
Roban, duke of, his passionate grief and elegy on the death of Henry I V . of France, 
246. Marches as a volunteer, at the head of some troops of cavalry, to the relief 
of the duke of Savoy, 296. 
Rosny, marquis of, sent ambassador by Henry I V . of France to England, 80. 
S. 
Sandoval, a fortress of that ñ a m e built in Lombardy by Mendoza, the Spanish 
governor of M i l á n , 271. 
Savoy, house of, their eharacter, 247. 
Saxony, duke of, declines to accept the crown of Bohemia, 348. Supports the 
cause of the Anstrians, 349. Raises and commands an army in their s e r v í c e , 
357. His progress, t é . 
Scots, in the Dutch service, their gallantry, 35. 91. Two thousand raised for that 
service by the I¿ord Buccleugh, 82. 
Sluys, « iege of, 92. Surrenders to the Dutch, 94. 
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Spain, exhausted State of, 4. Causes of this, 5. Ambition of, aceounted for, 238. 
Its jealousy of France, 239. Its ambition inflamed by the success of its arms 
in Germany, 277. Internal policy of, 31fi. Singularity in the councils of, 330. 
Immense power of, 366. 
army of, their licentiousness, 14. Their barbarity, ib, Mutiny in, 29. 
Suffer great distressea in the siege of Ostend, 55. Mutiny on that occasion, ib. 
Fifty of the ringleaders being executed, is quelled, 56. Levies for, in Italy, 
excite jealousies, ib. Mutiny and desertion from, 72. Levies for, intercepted by 
the Dutch, 91. Mutiny and desertion from, 141. 
court of, courtesy and gallantry of, 256. Political views of, 257. Award of 
respecting Montferrat, 266. Its magnificence, 376. 
grandees of, humbled in the reigns of Charles V . and Philip II., 319. 
Called to the court of Philip, III . ib. Conspire against the Duke of Lerma, ib. 
ministers of, their misconduct, 73. Resolve to carry on the war against the 
Dutch, 99. Their sanguino hopes of reducing the revolted provinces, 111. 
But suddenly involved in the greatest difficulties, 112. A n expedient of theirs 
for raising supplies, ib. Causes which induced them to wish for peace, 140. 
Prudently conceal their anxiety for peace, 158. Their incapacity for govern-
ment, 201. Astonished at the boldness of the duke of Savoy, 271. The 
reasons that determined them to take part in the contest concerning Cleves and 
Juliers, 275. Their intrigues at the court of France, 283. Support the cause 
of the Austrians, 350. 
prince of, contract of marriage between him and Elizabeth of France, 254. 
His marriage consummated, 371. The prince introduced to the councils of 
state, in order to learn the importance, and how to discharge the duties, of the 
crown, ib. Instructions left to him in writing by the king his father, ib. 
Spaniards, their gallantry, honour, and delicacy of sentiment, 256. Aceounted for, 
ib. Addicted to conspiracies, plots, and stratagems, 292. 308. Their uncommon 
abilities in the reign of Philip III. , both in politics and war, 313. Historical 
sketch of their national character, 314. 
Spinola, Frederic, a Genoese nobleman, commands a squadron of Spanish galleys, 
sent to cruize on the coast of Flanders with great success, 69, 70. Retuming 
from Spain with a reinforcement of eight galleys, loses five, and is deeply affected 
by this disaster, 71. Impatient of inactivity, attacks a Dutch squadron of ships 
of war, t i . A n d is mortally wounded, ib. 
marquis of, arrives in the Low Countries from Italy, 67. His ambition 
roused by his brother's success, 70. Raises at his own expense an army of 
8000 men for the service of Spain, ib. Raised to the command of the Spanish 
army in the Netherlands, 87. His great capacity, ib. His judicious economy, 
88. Changes the mode of attack on Ostend, 89. His personal hravery, ib. 
Conducts the siege of Ostend to a successful conc lus ión , 96. After the reduc-
tion of Ostend, sets out to consult with the court of Spain about carrying on 
the war, 98. Returns to Brussels and makes new levies, 100. His judicious 
plan for conducting the war, 102. Crosses the Rhine, 103. A n d explains his 
designs, ib. Maintains the strictest discipline in his army, 104. Lays siege to 
Lingen, 105. Goes a second time to Madrid, 112. Falls sick, ib. Returns to 
Brussels, ib. Determines to p e n é t r a t e into Utrechtand Holland, 114. Advanees 
through the province of Overyssel, 115. Forced to abandon his project of 
reducing the interior provinces, 124. Recommends peace, 142. A t the head 
of 30,000 men, opposes the progress of prince Maurice in Cleves and Juliers, 
275. His conquesta in those states, 276. Invades the Palatinate, 350. His 
progress and conquests there, 355. 
Sybilla, of Cleves, her raasculine spirit and conduct, 16. 
T . 
Taxis, Don John de, count of Vil la Mediana, ambassador from Spain, at the court 
of England, 82. 
Thorne, Henry, count of, his history, 338. Appointed to the command of the 
Bohemian army, 342. His character, 343. A n d exploits, 344. 346, 347. 360. 
Treaty of alliance between France and England in favour of the Dutch, 81. Of 
peace between Spain and the United Provinces, 198. A n d between Spain and 
Savoy, 273. 280. 
Tyrone, earl of, encouraged by Spain, raises a rebellion in Ireland, 57. Struck 
with a panic fear ; but seeing the necessity of fighting, resumes his courage ; is 
defeated, and his troops dispersed, 60. 
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U l m , treaty of, 352. 
United States, resolve to invade Flanders, 32. Imprudently interfere with prince 
Maurice in the conduct of the war, 43. Their resolution and vigour in the 
defence of Ostend draw the attention of all Europe, 45). Assisted by Henry I V . 
of France, and the queen of England, 65. Rejoice at the obstinacy of their 
enemies, ib. Their views and hopes in the southern provinces, ib. Regarded 
as too sanguine by prince Maurice, 66. Military deliberations of, 90. A n d 
preparations, 100. Strange fremissness in their conduct, 113. Insist on a 
recognition of their freedom by the court of Spain, 145. Dissatisfied with Philip's 
ratification of the preliminaries of peace, 158. Agree to recall their fleet from 
the coast of Spain, 160. Parties and disputes in, relativo to the overtures for 
peace with Spain, 163. Refuse to give up their trade to India, 173. Their 
ambition, 274. 
Ü s c o c c h i , their history and character, 303. Protected in their piracies by the . 
Austrians and Spaniards, 304. 
Uzeda, duke of, his character, 319. Becomes the favourite of Philip III . of 
Spain, 320. 
V . 
V a l e n t í a , barons of, remonstrate against the e x p u l s i ó n of the Morescoes, 222. The 
effect of their remonstrance, 223. They remonstrate a second time against the 
e x p u l s i ó n of the Morescoes, 227. Their humanity towards that unfortunate 
people, 233. 
Valtelline, described ; subdued by the Spaniards, 365. 
Venice, senate of, favours the duke of Savoy in a contest with Spain, 270. W a r 
between, and the Austrians, 304. Conspiracy against, by the Spaniards, 308. 
Defeated, 311. Compared with other conspiracies, 312. 
Vercelli besieged by the Spaniards, 292 ; and reduced, 294. 
Velasco, appointed to the government of Fort St. Andrew, which he had erected, 30. 
V e r é , Sir Francis, signalises his valour, at the head of a body of English troops, in 
the defence of Bommel, 22. Appointed by the United States to the chief 
command of Ostend, 49. Next to Prince Maurice, the most renowned of all 
their g e n e r á i s for military prudence and capacity, ib. Amuses the archduke 
Albert with an ofFer of treating with him for the surrender of Osteud, 53. 
V e r é , Horatio, commands a body of English troops in the service of the Palatino in 
Germany, 353. His bravery, 356, Repartee of, ib. 
Victor Amadeus, prince of Piedmont, sent to conduct his sister from Mantua to. 
Tur in , 258. Sent to the court of Madrid, 265. His reception there, 268 
Military operations of, 288. 
Vi l la Franca, Don Pedro de Toledo, marquis of, appointed govemor of M i l á n , 281. 
His military operations, 285. Constrained to suspend them, 292. Reduces 
Vercelli , 294. Agrees to restore it, 298. But being averse to peace, declines 
to fulfil his engagement, 299. Assists the Austrians in their contests with 
Venice, 304. Acts a part in the Spanish conspiracy against Venice, 310. 
W . 
Wesel, ene of the most flourishing places in the circle of Westphalia, reduced by 
the Spaniards, 10. Catholic re l i g ión restored in that city, ib. Reduced by the 
marquis of Spinola, 276. 
Wisemberg, or White-hill , near Prague, described, 360. 
Z . 
Zisca, the bold leader of the reformed in Bohemia, 334. Defeats the Emperor 
Sigisraond in several battles, ib. A drum made of his skin, long the symbol of 
victory among the Bohemians, 335. 
Zuniga, Don Balthazar de, appointed govemor to the prince of Spain, 327. 
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